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PREFATORY NOTE
The Outlines of Bailments and Carriers form part of a com-
plete work on that subject intended for the use of classes in
law schools. The other part, which is nearly ready for pub-
lication, consists of select cases illustrating and amplifying
principles stated in the Outlines. It is the purpose of the Out-
lines not only to state the foundation principles of the sub-
ject, but to put these in orderly and consecutive form in
order that the student may have an opportunity to see the
subject as a whole. It is believed that any study of the cases
without some such connected view of the subject will involve
considerable loss of time and result in a good deal of indefi-
niteness in conception. The present edition is hurried from





















































































































































The Outlines of Bailments and Carriers form part of a com­
plete work on that subject intended for the use of classes in 
law schools. The other part, which is nearly ready for pub­
lication, consists of select cases illustrating and amplifying 
principles stated in the Outlines. It is the purpose of the Out­
lines not only to state the foundation principles of the sub­
ject, but to put these in orderly and consecutive form in 
order that the student may have an opportunity to see the 
subject as a whole. It is believed that any study of the cases 
without some such connected view of the subject will involve 
considerable loss of time and result in a good deal of indefi­
niteness in conception. 'l'he present edition is hurried from 
the press for use in the author 's classes during the present 
year. 
Ann Arbor, 
January 1, 1904. 
EDWIN C. GODDARD. 
PART L
OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF
BAILMENTS.
§1. Bailment defined. § 7. Transfer of possession, but
2. A contractual relation. not of title.
3. Delivery. 8. ——Bailment and sale.
4. ‘Illustrations. 9. ‘Special rules.
5. ——Acceptance. 10. Bailment purpose.
6. The subject-matter. ll. Redelivery, or delivery over.
12. Classification of bailments.
§1. Definition.—Many attempts have been made to define
a bailment but none is free from criticism. For our purpose it
is enough to say that-
A bailment is a contract relation resulting from the delivery
of personal chattels by the owner, called the bailor, to a second
person, called the bailee, for a specific purpose, upon the ac-
complishment of which the chattels are to be dealt with ac-
cording to the 0wner’s direction.
An analysis of this statement will make clear the primary
principles applicable to the subject.
§2. Contractual relation.-The bailment relation is one of
contract and the principles of contract law are applicable
thereto. No one can be made a party to a bailment except
§1. [—] Krause v. Common- §2. Costello v. Ten Eyck, 86
wealth, 93 Pa. st. 418, 39 Am. R. Mich. 348, 49 N. W. R. 152, 24 Am.
762; [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. St. R. 128.



















































































































































OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
CHAPTER I. 
OF THE DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF 
BAILMENTS. 
§ 1. Bailment defined. § 7. Transfer of possession, but 
2. A contractual relation. not of title. 
3. Delivery. 8. -Bailment and sale. 
4. -Illustrations. 9. -Special rules. 
5. -Acceptance. 10. Bailment purpose. 
6. The subject-matter. 11.  Redelivery, or delivery over. 
12. Claesitlcation of bailments. 
§ 1. Deflnition.-Many attempts have been made to define 
a bailment but none is free from criticism. For our purpose it 
is enough to say that-
A bailment is a contract relation resulting from the delivery 
of personal chattels by the owner, called the bailor, to a second 
person, called the bailee, for a specific purpose, upon the ac­
complishment of which the chattels are to be dealt with ac­
cording to the owner 's direction. 
An analysis of this statement will make clear the primary 
principles applicable to the subject. 
§ 2. Contractual relation. - The bailment relation is one of 
contract and the principles of contract law are applicable 
thereto. No one can be made a party to a bailment except 
§ 1. [-] Krause v. Common­
wealth, 93 Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. 
762 ; [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. 
Raymond, 909, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 
199. 
1 1 
§ 2. Costello v. Ten Eyck, 86 
Mich. 348, 49 N. W. R. 152, 24 Am. 





OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
by his contract freely made, or by some condition which by
operation of law is regarded as equivalent to a contract.
§3. Delivery.-The word bailment comes into the English
Common Law through the Norman-French. It is derived from
bailler, to deliver, and delivery has been said to be the key
word of bailment law.
A prime requisite to the establishment of the relation is a
delivery by the bailor to the bailee, or something which by
operation of law takes the place of such delivery. The bail-
ment relation, then, may be formed by delivery, actual or
constructive, or by operation of law.
§4. iIllustrati0ns.—(a) Actual delivery is a manual
handing over of the chattel by the bailor, or his authorized
representative, to the bailee or to his agent. The delivery of
a watch to a jeweler for repair, of a horse to a smith to be
shod, and of a package to an expressman to be carried, are
familiar illustrations.
(b) Constructive delivery takes place when because of the
circumstances, or of the nature of the chattel, actual delivery
is impossible or useless. The delivery of a key to a warehouse
may be a constructive delivery of the goods therein, and the
retention by the vendor of the goods sold constitutes him, so
long as he retains possession, the bailee of such goods by con-
structive delivery, without any actual handling of the goods
by either party.
(c) Delivery by operation of law results from the finding
of lost goods, or the seizure of goods under legal process. The
finder, or the oflicer is, by operation of law, not by consent of
the owner, bailee of the goods while they remain in his pos-
session.
§5. i-Acceptance.—No delivery is complete till accept-
ance by the bailee. One cannot be compelled to become a
bailee without his consent. Even the finder of lost goods does
not become the bailee unless he voluntarily takes possession of
the goods.
§4. King v. Jarman, 35 Ark. 190, [—] Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass.
37 Am. R. 11, 16, and note. 479, 9 Am. D. 168; First National
§5. Michigan Central R. R. v. Bank v. Ocean National Bank, 60

















































































































































§§ 3-5 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
by his contract freely made, or by some condition which by 
operation of ]aw is regarded as equivalent to a contract. 
§ 3. Delivery.-The word bailment comes into the English 
Common Law through the Norman-French. It is derived from 
bailler, to deliver, and del·ivery has been said to be. the key 
word of bailment law. 
A prime requisite to the establishment of the relation is a 
delivery by the bailor to the bailee, or something which by 
operation of law takes the place of such delivery. The bail­
ment relation, then, may be formed by delivery, actual or 
congtructive, or by operation of law. 
§ 4. --mustrations.-( a) Actual delivery is a manual 
handing over of the chattel by the bailor, or his authorized 
representative, to the bailee or to his agent. The delivery of 
a watch to a jeweler for repair, of a horse to a smith to be 
shod, and of a package to an expressman to be carried, are 
familiar illustrations. 
(b) Constructive delivery takes place when because of the 
circumstances, or of the nature of the chattel, actual delivery 
is impossible or useless. The delivery of a key to a warehouse 
may be a constructive delivery of the goods therein, and the 
retention by the vendor of the goods sold constitutes him, so 
long as he retains possession, the bailee of such goods by con­
structive delivery, without any actual handling of the goods 
by either party. 
(c) Delivery by operation of law results from the finding 
of lost goods, or the seizure of goods under legal process. The 
finder, or the officer is, by operation of law, not by consent of 
the owner, bailee of the goods while they remain in his pos­
session. 
§ 5. --Acceptance.-No delivery is complete till accept­
ance by the bailee. One cannot be compelled to become a 
bailee without his consent. Even the finder of lost goods does 
not become the bailee unless he voluntarily takes possession of 
the goods. 
§ 4. King v. Jarman, 35 Ark. 190, 
37 Am. R. 11, 16, and note. 
§ 5. Michigan Central R. R. v. 
�'arrow, 73 III. 348, 24 Am, R. 248; 
2 
[ -] Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Ma118. 
479, 9 Am. D. 168 ; First National 
Bank v. Ocean National Bank, 60 
N. Y. 278, 19 Am. R. 181. 
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION. 6-8
§ 6. The subject-ma.tter.—This delivery must be one of per-
sonal chattels. Real estate can not be the subject of a bailment.
Formerly only corporeal property could be bailed, but at
the present time every species of personalty, corporeal or in-
corporeal, is bailable. Thus, stocks, bonds, and other evidences
of property, as well as debts and every sort of chose in action,
are now pledged, or otherwise held in bailment, under the
same principles as tangible property. Indeed while the bailed
property must be in existence, a contract of bailment as to
property not yet in existence will attach to such property
when it comes into existence, subject, perhaps, to the inter-
vening rights of third persons.
§ 7. Transfer of possession but not of title.-In a bailment
the owner delivers the chattel to the bailee who thereby ac-
quires possession, but not title. The ownership remains in the
bailor, and though the bailee may himself be the rightful
owner, yet so long as he retains possession as bailee he may not
dispute the bailor’s title.
§ 8. ——Bailment and sale.—The distinction between a
bailment and a sale is clear. A sale passes the title to the
vendee at once. He may acquire possession immediately, or
only a right to possession at a future time. A bailment passes
possession to the bailee at once. He does not acquire the title,
nor, except in a bailment with an option to purchase, does he
acquire any right to title in the future. In a sale title passes,
in a bailment it does not.
In practice the distinction is often troublesome. Difficulty
arises in finding a test by which to determine the intention of
the parties, for it is their intention that governs.
Three cases may be noted—-
(a) If the identical property is to be returned, either in
specie or in altered form, the transaction is a bailment.
(b) If other goods of the same or of diffierent kind are to
be returned, the transaction is what was known in the Roman
law as a mutuum, and is considered a sale and not a bailment.
§7. [—] Krause v. Common- 433, 57 Am. D. 530; [—] Bretz v.
wealth, 93 Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. Diehl, 117 Pa. St. 589, 11 Atl. R.
762; Simpson v. Wrenn, 50 I1l. 222, 893, 2 Am. St. R. 706. See also
99 Am. D. 511; [—] Pulliam v. Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St. 244,
Burlingame, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. R. 59 Am. D. 623; Ledyard v. Hib-
229. bard, 48 Mich. 421, 12 N. W. R.

















































































































































DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION. §§ 6-8 
§ 6. The subject-matter.-This delivery must be one of per­
sonal chattels. Real estate can not be the subject of a bailment. 
Formerly only corporeal property could be bailed, but at 
the present time every species of personalty, corporeal or in­
corporeal, is bailable . 'rhus, stocks, bonds, and other evidences 
of property, as well as debts and every sort of chose in action, 
are now pledged, or otherwise held in bailment, under the 
same principles as tangible property. Indeed while the bailed 
property must be in existence, a contract of bailment as to 
property not yet in existence will attach to such property 
when it comes into existence, subject, perhaps, to the inter­
vening rights of third persons. 
§ 7. Transfer of possession but not of title.-In a bailment 
the owner delivers the chattel to the bailee who thereby ac­
quires possession, but not title . The ownership remains in the 
bailor, and though the bailee may himself be the rightful 
owner, yet so long as he retains possession as bailee he may not 
dispute the bailor 's title. 
§ 8. --Bailment and sale.-The distinction between a 
bailment and a sale is clear. A sale passes the title to the 
vendee at once. He may acquire possession immediately, or 
only a right to possession at a future time. A bailment passes 
possession. to the bailee at once. He does not acquire the title, 
nor, except in a bailment with an option to purchase, does he 
acquire any right to title in the future. In a sale title passes, 
in a bailment it does not. 
In practice the distinction is often troublesome. Difficulty 
arises in finding a test by which to determine the intention of 
the parties, for it is their intention that governs. 
Three cases may be noted-
( a)  If  the identical property is  to  be returned, either in 
specie or in altered form, the transaction is a bailment. 
(b ) If other goods of the same or of different kind are to 
be returned, the transaction is what was known in the Roman 
law as a mutuum, and is considered a sale and not a bailment. 
§ 7. [-] Krause v. Common· 433, 57 Am. D. 530; [-] Bretz v. 
wealth, 93 Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. Diehl, 117 Pa. St. 589, 1 1  Atl. R. 
76�; Simpson v. Wrenn, 50 Ill. 222, 893, 2 Am. St. R. 706. See also 
H!1 Am. D. 511; [-] Pulliam v. Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St. 244, 
Burlingame, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. R. 59 Am. D. 623; Ledyard v. Hib-
229. bard, 48 Mich. 421, 12 N. W. R. 
§ 8. Foster v. Pettibone, 7 N. Y. 637, 42 Am. R. 474. 
3 
§§ 9-11 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
(c) If the goods are mixed with other goods, as grain in
an elevator, then the doctrine of confusion of goods applies,
and the owners of the grain so mixed become owners in common
of the mass, or else the transaction is a sale, and title to the
whole passes to the elevator owner.
It is often diflicult to determine whether the parties intended
title to pass. The cases on this point are irreconcilable. The
most useful test lies in determining with which party the con-
tract leaves that control of the goods which is consistent with
ownership. If the elevator owner may use out of the grain at
will under an agreement to return a like amount, or to pay the
market price, when demand is made, he has control, is the
owner, the transaction was a sale. If, however, the depositor
of the grain may at any time demand his proportion of the
mass of grain, or the market price, the elevator owner under-
taking at all times to keep on hand enough grain to cover
all deposits, then it is clear that the control remains in the
depositor, the title did not pass, the transaction was a bail-
ment.
The importance in many cases of determining whether the
transaction was a bailment or a sale will be apparent from the
cases.
§9. ?Special rules.—In some states, on the ground that
a bailment best represents the relation intended by the parties,
the courts have been inclined to hold all such deposits in an
elevator to be bailments. They are sometimes made bailments
by statute.
§ 10. Bailment purpose.—The specific purpose for which the
chattel is delivered to the bailee is called the bailment purpose.
This purpose must of course be a legal one and, as will presently
appear, it serves as the most satisfactory basis of classification
of bailments, and leads to most of the legal consequences of the
relation.
§11. Redelivery, or delivery 0ver.—Upon the accomplish-
ment of the bailment purpose, the chattel is to be dealt with
§9. See 2 Am. St. R. 711, note, Jones, Story and Kent as stated in
6 Am. Law Review, 450; Hall v. [—] Krause v. Commonwealth, 93
Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N. W. Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. 762;
R. 673, 9 Am. St. R. 209. [—] Pulliam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo.

















































































































































§§ 9-11 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
( c ) If the goods are mixed with other goods, as grain in 
an elevator, then the doctrine of confusion of goods applies, 
and the owners of the grain so mixed become owners in common 
of the mass, or else the transaction is a sale, and title to the 
whole passes to the elevator owner. 
It is often difficult to determine whether the parties intended 
title to pass. ']'he cases on this point are irreconcilable. The 
most useful test lies in determining with which party the con­
tract leaves that control of the goods which is consistent with 
ownership. If the elevator owner may use out of the grain at 
will under an agreement to return a like amount, or to pay the 
market price, when demand is made, he has control, is the 
owner, the transaction was a sale. If, however, the depositor 
of the grain may at any time demand his proportion of the 
mass of grain, or the market price, the elevator owner under· 
taking at all times to keep on hand enough grain to cove'!.:' 
all deposits, then it is clear that the control remains in tho 
depositor, the title did not pass, the transaction was a bail­
ment. 
The importance in many cases of determining whether tht· 
transaction was a bailment or a sale will be apparent from th� 
cases. 
§ 9. -Special rules.-In some states, on the ground that 
a bailment best represents the relation intended by the parties, 
the courts have been inclined to hold all such deposits in an 
elevator to be bailments. They are sometimes made bailments 
by statute. 
§ 10. Bailment purpose.- The specific purpose for which the 
chattel is delivered to the bailee is called the bailment purpose. 
This purpose must of course be a legal one and, as will presently 
appear, it serves as the most satisfactory basis of classification 
of bailments, and leads to most of the legal consequences of the 
relation. 
§ 11. Redelivery, or delivery over.- Upon the accomplish­
ment of the bailment purpose, the chattel is to be dealt with 
§ 9. See 2 Am. St. R. 711, note, 
6 Am. Law Review, 450 ; Hall v. 
Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N. W. 
R. 673, 9 Am. St. R. 209. 
§ 11. Compare the definitions of 
4 
Jones, Story and Kent as stated in 
[ -] Krause v. Commonwealth, 93 
Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. 762 ; 
[-] Pulliam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo. 
111, 51 Am. R. 229. 
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION. § 19
according to the ow'ner’s directions. In many cases it is to be
redelivered to the owner. In the case of delivery of goods to
a carrier, or consignment to a factor, they are to be delivered
to a third person, while in the case of a bailment with an option
to purchase they may be retained by the bailee himself.
In general the bailor is the true owner and the bailee must
deal with the goods according to his directions. If he delivers
them otherwise, he does so at his peril, and unless he can es-
tablish that they were delivered to one having paramount
right, he will be liable to the bailor.
§12. Classification.—Until very recent times the Common
Law of bailments was in a crude and formative condition. As
bailment law in Rome was well defined, early English legal
writers on the subject were greatly influenced by the Civil Law
and adopted the Roman division, which was a mere catalogue
rather than a scientific classification.
See Bracton (circ. 1260), Lord Holt (1703), Sir William
Jones (1781).
Judge Story, in his classic work on the subject, first sug-
gested a scientific classification based on the bailment pur-
pose. He divided bailments into three classes-
(a) Bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor, including
the Roman depositum and mandatum.
(b) Bailments for the sole benefit of the bailee, including
the Roman comrnodatum.
(c) Bailments for the mutual benefit of both parties, in-
cluding the Roman pignus, or pledge, and locatio, or hiring.
The Civil Law recognized also the mutuum, or the loan of
goods for consumption, to be replaced by other goods of the
same kind. It has been seen that, at the Common Law, this is
not a bailment but a sale. 4
There is not an exact correspondence between the Roman
and the Common Law bailments and this has sometimes led to
confusion. The Roman depositum and mandatum, especially,
involved distinctions and embraced relations not recognized in
the Common Law. Definitions of these various kinds of bail-
ments will be given in connection with their separate treat-
ment.
§12. See Schouler, Bailments and v. Commonwealth, 93 Pa. St. 418,

















































































































































D�FINI'fION AND CLASSIFICATION. § 12 
according to the owner's directions. In many cases it is to be 
redelivered to the owner. In the case of delivery of goods to 
a carrier, or consignment to a factor, they are to be delivert>d 
to a third person, while in the case of a bailment with an option 
to purchase they may be retained by the bailee himself. 
In general the bailor is the true owner and the bailee must 
deal with the goods according to his directions. If he delivers 
them otherwise, he does so at his peril, and unless he· can es­
tablish that they were delivered to one having paramount 
right, he will be liable to the bailor. 
§ 12. Classiftcation.-Until very recent times the Common 
Law of bailments was in a crude and formative condition. As 
bailment law in Rome was well defined, early English legal 
writers on the subject were greatly influenced by the Civil Law 
and adopted the Roman division, which was a mere catalogue 
rather than a scientific classification. 
See Bracton ( circ. 1260), Lord Holt ( 1703) , Sir William 
Jones (1781). 
Judge Story, in his classic work on the subject, first sug­
gested a scientific classification based on the bailment pur­
pose. He divided bailments into three classes-
(a) Bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor, including 
the Roman depositum and mandatum. 
(b) Bailments for the sole benefit of the bailee, including 
the Roman commodatum. 
( c ) Bailments for the mutual benefit of both parties, in­
cluding the Roman pignus, or pledge, and focatio, or hiring. 
The Civil Law recognized also the mutuum, or the loan of 
goods for consumption, to be replaced by other goods of the 
same kind. It has been seen that, at the Common Law, this is 
not a bailment but a sale. 
There is not an exact correspondence between the Roman 
and the Common Law bailments and this has sometimes led to 
confusion. 'rhe Roman depositum and mandatum, especially, 
involved distinctions and embraced relations not recognized in 
the Common Law. Definitions of these various kinds of bail­
ments will be given in connection with their separate treat­
ment. 
§ 12. See Schouler, Bailments and v. Commonwealth, 93 Pa. St. 4187 
Carriers, § 26, notes; [-] Krau11e 39 Am. R. 762. 
5 
§ 12 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
The various bailments and their relations to each other
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§ 12 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
The various bailments and their relations to each other 
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CHAPTER II.




§13. Contract principles apply. §26. (1) By act of both parties.
14. Principles applicable to all 27. (2) By act of bailee.
bailments. 28. (3) By act of bailor.
15. Care. 29. —Bailee’s wrong.
16 iThree degrees of d.ili- B. By operation of law.
gence. 30. 1. By changed status of the
17. ——The burden of proof. partiea
18. Consideration. 31' __-—Death.
19. Expenses. .
20. Defect in bailed chattel. 32. i.Ba]?kmPtcy’ marriage’
21. Right to use. msamty4
22. Property of bai1ee. 33. 2. Change of status of bailed
23. Liability to third persons. chattel-
24. Termination of bailment. 34. Redelivery.
-4- By wt of the z»arfivs- 35. ——What is to be redelivered.
1 Accomplishment of pm.‘ 36. ——Where returned.
pose, or e/flux 0 time. .
25. Bailment contract exgcuted. 37' To whom redehvered'
2. Rescrission of bailment 38- '_"'_"'Ad"°T5° claims-
contract. 39. Special contract.
§13. Contract principles apply.—’l‘he law of bailments is
a branch of the law of commercial contracts. Accordingly,
all the requisites of contracts, such as competent parties,
mutual assent, consideration, etc., apply to all classes of bail-
ments.
As any bailee may, and the great carrying corporations.
such as railways, steamship lines, express and forwarding
companies, constantly do, act by agent, the principles of
agency are always applicable. Without detailed notice, there-
fore, of the rules of contracts and agency, it will be under-
stood that they apply to every class of bailments. Further-
more, ,partnerships or corporations, as bailors or bailees, are



















































































































































OF THE LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION IN 
GENERAL. 
§ 13. Contract principles apply. 
14. Principles applicable to all 
bailments. 
15. Care. 
16. --Three degrees of dili-
gence. 
17. --The burden of proof. 
18. Consideration. 
19. Expenses. 
20. Defect in bailed chattel. 
21. Right to use. 
22. Property of bailee. 
23. Liability to third persons. 
24. Termination of bailment. 
A. By act of the parties. 
1 Accomplishment of pur­
pose, or efff,uz of t'1ne. 
25. Bailment contract executed. 
e. Bescisftoft of bailmeAt 
contract. 
§ 26. (1) By act of both parties. 
27. (2) By act of bailee. 
28. (3 )  By act of bailor. 
29. --Bailee 's wrong. 
B. By operation of law. 
30. 1. By changed status of the 
parties. 
31. --Death. 
32. --Bankruptcy, marriage, 
insanity. 
33. 2. Change of status of bailed 
chattel. 
34. Redelivery. 
35. --What is to be redelivered. 
36. --Where returned. 
37. --To whom redelivered. 
38. Adverse claims. 
39. Special contract. 
§ 13. Contract principles apply.-The law of bailments is 
a branch of the law of commercial contracts. Accordingly, 
all the requisites of contracts, such as competent parties, 
mutual assent, consideration, etc., apply to all classes of bail­
ments. 
As any bailee may, and the great carrying corporations. 
such as railways, steamship lines, express and forwarding 
companies, constantly do, act by agent, the principles of 
agency are always applicable. Without detailed notice, there­
fore, of the rules of contracts and agency, it will be under­
stood that they apply to every class of bailments. Further­
more, .partnerships or corporations, as bailors or bailees, are 
subject to the same rules of law that apply to them in other 
contract relations. 
7 
§§ 14-16 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
§14. Principles applicable to all bailments.—It will avoid
needless repetition to discuss in the present chapter those
principles which are applicable to bailments generally, leaving
for consideration in later chapters those legal‘ results pe-
culiar to the several classes of bailments.
§15. Gare.—A matter of prime importance in bailments
is the care of the bailed goods to be exercised by the bailee.
This does not admit of precise definition. Whether due care
has been exercised in a given case is ordinarily a question of
fact to be determined by the common sense of a jury in view
of all the circumstances surrounding the case.
Manifestly, the care to be exacted should vary with the
nature and value of the thing bailed, the use to which it is to
be put, the hazard of the bailment, and many other circum-
stances. Great stress is laid by the law on the benefit to be
derived from the bailment. The greatest diligence is, in gen-
eral, demanded of the bailee if he receives the sole benefit of
the bailment; less diligence is required if the bailment is mu-
tually beneficial to bailor and bailee; while comparatively
slight diligence suffices if the bailor alone profits by the bail-
ment. .
§ 16. ——Three degrees of diligence.—In the efiort to reach
some degree of certainty in this necessarily uncertain question,
the courts, from Lord Holt’s time down, have recognized
three degrees of care, which have been variously defined. Un-
fortunately, they have also recognized three degrees of negli-
gence, and by implication, at least, have held that there might
be negligence with no resulting legal liability.
The three degrees of diligence are slight, ordinary and
great. To these correspond gross, ordinary and slight negli-
W»! ..,.n~.> -
-...
§15. [—] Doorman v. Jenkins,
2 Ad. & El. 256, 29 E. C. L. 80;
[—~] Gray v. Merriam, 148 Ill. 179,
35 N. E. R. 810, 39 Am. st. R. 172;
[—] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S.
604; State v. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356,
100 Am. D. 298.
§16. [—] Steamboat New
World v. King‘, 16 How. (U. S.)
469; [—] Railway v. Lockwood, 17
Wall. (U. S.) 357; [—] Foster v.
Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; 9 Am. D.
168; [—] Gray v. Merriam, 148 Ill.
179; 39 Am. St. R. 172; [—] Wil-
son v. Brett, 11 Mees. and W. 113;
[—] Preston v. Prather, 137 U.
S. 604; First National Bank v.
Graham, 79 Pa. St. 106, 21 Am.
R. 49; Woodrufi v. Painter, 150


















































































































































§§ 14-16 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
§ 14. Principles applicable to all bailments.-It will avoid 
needless repetition to discuss in the present chapter those 
principles which are applicable to bailments genera:µy, leaving 
for consideration in later chapters those legal, results pe­
culiar to the several classes of bailments. 
§ 15. Ca.re.-A matter of prime importance in bailments 
is the care of the bailed goods to be exercised by the bailee. 
This does not admit of precise definition. Whether due care 
has been exercised in a given case is ordinarily a question of 
fact to be determined by the common sense of a jury in view 
of all the circumstances surrounding the case. 
Manifestly, the care to be exacted should vary with the 
nature and value of the thing bailed, the use to which it is to 
be put, the hazard of the bailment, and many other circum­
stances. Great stress is laid by the law on the benefit to be 
derived from the bailment. The greatest diligence is, in gen­
eral, demanded of the bailee if he receives the sole benefit of 
the bailment ; less diligence is required if the bailment is mu­
tually beneficial to bailor and bailee ; while comparatively 
slight diligence suffices if the bailor alone profits by the bail­
ment. 
§ 16. --Three degrees of diligence.-In the effort to reach 
some degree of certainty in this necessarily uncertain question, 
the courts, from Lord Holt 's time down, have recognized 
three degrees of care, which have been variously defined. Un­
fortunately, they have also recognized three degrees of negli­
gence, and by implication, at least, have held that there might 
be negligence with no resulting legal liability. 
The three degrees of diligence are slight, ordinary and 
great. To these correspond gross, ordinary and slight negli-
�"', ... .,..:, . 
§ 15. [-] Doorman v. Jenkins, 
2 Ad. & El. 256, 29 E. C. L. 80; 
[-] Gray v. Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 
3:> N. E. R. 810, 39 Am. St. R. 172; 
[ -] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 
604; State v. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356, 
100 Am. D. 298. 
§ 16. [-] Steamboat New 
World v. King, 16 Row. ( U. S.) 
469; [-] Railway v. Lockwood, 17 
Wall. (U. S.) 357; [-] Foster v. 
8 
Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 4 79; 9 Am. D. 
168; [-] Gray v. Merriam, 148 Ill. 
179; 39 Am. St. R. 172; [-] Wil­
son v. Brett, 11 Mees. and W. 113; 
[-] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. 
S. 604; First National Bank v. 
Graham, 79 Pa. St. 106, 21 Am. 
R. 49; Woodruff v. Painter, 150 
Pa. St. 91, 24 Atl. R. 621, '30 Am. 
St. R. 786. 
-LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION. §17
gence, each degree of negligence being regarded as the want of
the corresponding degree of care.
From the many definitions attempted, it is perhaps enough
to say that-
: Ordinary diligence is such as an ordinarily prudent man is
wont to exercise in the conduct of his own afiairs of like
kind. Less than this is slight diligence, more is great diligence.
It will be seen that this adds little to the definiteness of
the subject, and some courts have expressed dissatisfaction
with the distinctions, preferring to determine in each case
whether, in view of all the circumstances, the requisite care
has been exercised. Courts recognizing the three degrees
hold that-
In bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor slight care
is all that is required of the bailee, and he is liable only for
gross negligence.
In bailments for the sole benefit of the bailee great care
is required, and the bailee is responsible for slight negligence.
In mutual benefit bailments ordinary care is required, and
the bailee must answer for ordinary neglect.
In a later chapter it will appear that the innkeeper and
common carrier are subject to special rules.
§17. ——The burden of proof in showing negligence, at
the outset, rests upon the plaintiff. Some authorities say that
while the weight of evidence may shift, the burden of proof
never shifts, but remains throughout with the plaintiff. Others
say that the burden shifts. The plaintiff certainly must es-
tablish negligence by a preponderance of evidence.
According to most cases, the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case by showing loss or injury. The defendant must
then explain the loss or else show affirmatively that he exer-
cised due care.
§17. Compare [—] Claflin v.
Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, 31 Am. R.
467, and Higman v. Camody, 112
Ala. 267, 20 So. R. 480, 57 Am. St.
R. 33. See also Boies v. Hartford,
ctc., R. R., 37 Conn. 272; 9 Am.
E. 347; Cumins v. Woods, 44 Ill.
416, 92 Am. D. 189; Mills v. Gil-
breth, 47 Me. 320; 74 Am. D. 487;
[—] Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend.
(N. Y.) 268, 24 Am. D. 143; Hilde-
brand v. Carroll, 106 Wis. 324, 82
N. W. R. 145, 80 Am. St. R. 29;
Hislop v. Ordner, 28 Tex. Civ. App.
540, 67 S. W. R. 337; Willett v.
Rich, 142 Mass. 356, 7 N. E. R. 776,
















































































































































. LEGAL RESULTS OF TllE RELA'l'ION. § 17 
gence, each degree of negligence being regarded as the want of 
the corresponding degree of care. 
From the many definitions attempted, it is perhaps enough 
to say that-
• Ordinary diligence is such as an ordinarily prudent man is 
wont to exercise in the conduct of his own affairs of like 
kind. Less than this is slight diligence, more is great diligence. 
It will be seen that this adds little to the definiteness of 
the subject, and some courts have expressed dissatisfaction 
with the distinctions, preferring to determine in each case 
whether, in view of all the circumstances, the requisite care 
has been exercised. Courts recognizing the three degrees 
hold that-
In bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor slight care 
is all that is required of the bailee, and he is liable only for 
gross negligence. 
In bailments for the sole benefit of the bailee great care 
is required, and the bailee is responsible for slight negligence. 
In mutual benefit bailments ordinary care is required, and 
the bailee must answer for ordinary neglect. 
In a later chapter it will appear that the innkeeper and 
common carrier are subject to special rules. 
§ 17. --The burden of proof in showing negligence, at 
the outset, rests upon the plaintiff. Some authorities say that 
while the weight of evidence may shift, the burden of proof 
never shifts, but remains throughout with the plaintiff. Others 
say that the burden shifts. The plaintiff certainly must es­
tablish negligence by a preponderance of evidence. 
According to most cases, the plaintiff makes out a prima 
facie case by showing loss or injury. The defendant must 
then explain the loss or else show affirmatively that he exer­
cised due care. 
§ 17. Compare [-] Claflin v. [-] Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend. 
Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, 31 Am. R. (N. Y. ) 268, 24 Am. D. 143 ; Hilde· 
467, and Higman v. Camody, 112 brand v. Carroll, 106 Wis. 324, 82 
Ala. 267, 20 So. R. 480, 57 Am. St. K. W. R. 145, 80 Am. St. R. 29; 
R. 33. See also Boies v .  Hartford, Hislop v. Ordner, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 
etc., R. R., 37 Conn. 272 ; 9 Am. 540, 67 S. W. R. 337 ; Willett v. 
R. 347 ; Cumins v. Woods, 44 Ill. Rich, 142 Mass. 356, 7 N. E. R. 776, 
416, 92 Am. D. 189 ; Mills v. Gil· 56 Am. R. 684. 
bretb, 47 Me. 320 ; 74 Am. D. 487 ; 
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§§ 15-21 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
§18. Considera.ti0n.—Like every contractual relation the
bailment must be upon consideration. In gratuitous bailments
this consists, not in any benefit to the promisor, but in detri-
ment to the promisee. In the bailment for the sole benefit of
the bailor, this detriment arises from the fact that the bailee,
by undertaking the service, prevents the bailor from securing
another to perform it, while in a bailment for the benefit of
the bailee it is the bailee who is prevented from securing the
benefit at the hands of another. It follows, then, that until
the bailee, in the first case, has entered upon the undertaking",
or in the second, until the bailor has loaned the chattel, there
is no consideration. Hence there can be no liability for non-
feasance but only for misfeasance, in gratuitous bailments.
§19. Expenses.—In the absence of a special contract, or-
dinary expenses for caring for the chattel are to be borne by
the bailee, extraordinary expenses by the bailor, unless they
arise from default on the part of the bailee, when the latter
will be liable for the consequences of his own fault. It fol-
lows that, for extraordinary expenses necessary for proper
preservation of the bailed chattel, the bailee may bind the
bailor by a contract with third persons.
§20. Defect in bailed chattel.-—The bailor owes the bailee
the duty to inform him of defects in the bailed article which
are, or reasonably should be, known to the bailor, and which
are likely to be the source of danger to the bailee. For any
injury sufiered by the bailee in consequence of his failure so
to do, the bailor is liable, unless the defects were patent and
equally within the knowledge of both parties.
§ 21. Right to use.—The bailee has no right to use the chat-
tel unless it appears from the bailment contract, or from the
circumstances, that the consent of the owner to the use may
§18. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Dana, 69 N. H. 264, 39 Atl. R. 982,
Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 76 Am. St. R. 170.
199; [—] Thorne v. Deas, 4 §21. [—] Wentworth v. Mc-
Johns. (N. Y.) 84. Dufiie, 48 N. H. 402; [——] Spoonef
§19. Harter v. Blanchard, 64 v. Manchester, 133 Mass. 270, 43
Barb. (N. Y.) 617; [—] Leach v. Am. R. 514; Ray v. Tubbs, 50 Vt.
French, 69 Me. 389, 31 Am. R. 296. 688, 28 Am. R. 519; Alvord v.
§20. Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30.

















































































































































§§ 18-21 OF BAILMEN'llS IN GENERAL. 
§ 18. Consideration.-Like every contractual relation the 
bailment must be upon consideration. In gratuitous bailments 
this consists, not in any benefit to the promisor, but in detri­
ment to the promisee. In the bailment for the sole benefit of 
the bailor, this detriment arises from the fact that the bailee, 
by undertaking the service, prevents the bailor from securing 
another to perform it, while in a bailment for the benefit of 
the bailee it is the bailee who is prevented from securing the 
benefit at the hands of another. It follows, then, that until 
the bailee, in the first case, has entered upon the undertaking, 
or in the second, until the bailor has loaned the chattel, there 
is no consideration. Hence there can be no liability for non­
feasance but only for misfeasance, in gratuitous bailments. 
§ 19. Expenses.-In the absence of a special contract, or­
dinary expenses for caring for the chattel are to be borne by 
the bailee, extraordinary expenses by the bailor, unless they 
arise from default on the part of the bailee, when the latter 
will be liable for the consequences of his own fault. It fol­
lows that, for extraordinary expenses necessary for proper 
preservation of the bailed chattel, the bailee may bind the 
bailor by a contract with third persons. 
§ 20. Defect in bailed chattel.-The bailor owes the bailee 
the duty to inform him of defects in the bailed article which 
are, or reasonably should be, known to the bailor, and which 
are likely to be the source of danger to the bailee. For any 
injury suffered by the bailee in consequence of his failure so 
to do, the bailor is liable, unless the defects were patent and 
equally within the know ledge of both parties. 
§ 21. Right to use.-The bailee has no right to use the chat­
tel unless it appears from the bailment contract, or from the 
circumstances, that the consent of the owner to the use may 
§ 18. [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 
Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 
199 ; [-] Thorne v. Deas, 4 
Johns. (N. Y.) 84. 
§ 19. Harter v. Blanchard, 64 
Barb. ( N. Y. ) 617 ; [-] Leach v. 
French, 69 Me. 389, 31 Am. R. 296. 
§ 20. Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. 
586, 80 Am. D. 699; Gagnon v. 
Dana, 69 N. H. 264, 39 Atl. R. 982', 
76 Am. St. R. 1 70. 
§ 21. [-] Wentworth v. Mc­
Duffie, 48 N. H. 402 ; [ -] Spooner 
v. Manchester, 133 Mass. 270, 43 
Am. R. 514 ; Ray v. Tubbs, 50 Vt. 
688, 28 Am. R. 519 ; Alvord v. 
Davenport, 43 Vt. 30. 
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LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION. §§ 22-24
fairly be presumed. Such consent will be presumed in so far
as the use of the chattel is necessary to its preservation.
If the bailee without authority use the thing, or if having
authority he use it in a manner unauthorized, he does so at his
peril and is absolutely liable for any loss or injury that may
result. His wrongful use, as will appear later, in many cases
amounts to a conversion of the chattel.
§22. Property of ba.ilee.—In general, the bailee has a spe-
cial property in the thing bailed while the general property
remains in the bailor. It is a disputed point whether the pos-
sessory interest of the gratuitous bailee, or of the bailee at
will, amounts to a property interest. All agree, however, that
the interest of the bailee is such as to enable him to maintain
trespass or trover against third persons who interfere with
his possession. All, except gratuitous bailees, may also main-
tain replevin, an action foimded upon a property right, while
right of possession is sufficient basis for trespass or trover.
Even the bailee who is a finder has a title good against all the
world except the true owner and may maintain his possessory
rights by appropriate actions.
The bailor, also, has a right of action in replevin, trover,
trespass, or case, against a wrong-doer, but a recovery by
either is a bar to an action by the other.
§23. Liability to third persons.—If the bailee’s use of the
chattel result in injury to third persons he alone is responsible,
he alone has control of the chattel, and he is not, in its use,
the agent of the bailor. The bailee is also liable for injuries
resulting from the use of the chattel by his servants acting in
the course of their employment.
§22. [—] Armory v. Delamirie,
1 Strange 505, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas.
470; [—] Little v. Fossett, 34 Me.
545, 56 Am. D. 671; Baggett v. Mc-
Cormack, 73 Miss. 552, 19 So. R. 89,
55 Am. St. R. 554. See the early
rule in Hostler’s Adm ’r v. Skull,
2 Haywood (N. C.) 179, 1 Am. D.
583.
§23. Sproul v. Hemmingway, 14

















































































































































LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELA'rION. §§ 22-24 
fairly be presumed . Such consent will be presumed in so far 
as the use of the chattel is necessary to its preservation. 
If the bailee without authority use the thing, or if having 
authority he use it in a manner unauthorized, he does so at his 
peril and is absolutely liable for any loss or injury that may 
result. His wrongful use, as will appear later, in many cases 
amounts to a conversion of the chattel. 
§ 22. Property of bailee.-In general, the bailee has a spe­
cial property in the thing bailed while the general property 
remains in the bailor. It is a disputed point whether the pos­
sessory interest of the gratuitous bailee, or of the bailee at 
will, amounts to a property interest. All agree, however, that 
the interest of the bailee is such as to enable him to maintain 
trespass or trover against third persons who interfere with 
his possession. All, except gratuitous bailees, may also main­
tain replevin, an action founded upon a property right, while 
right of possession is sufficient basis for trespass or trover. 
Even the bailee who is a finder has a title good against all the 
world except the true owner and may maintain his possessory 
rights by appropriate actions. 
The bailor, also, has a right of action in replevin, trover, 
trespass, or case, against a wrong-doer, but a recovery by 
either is a bar to an action by the other. 
§ 23. Liability to third persons.-If the bailee 's use of the 
chattel result in injury to third persons he alone is responsible, 
he alone has control of the chattel, and he is not, in its use, 
the agent of the bailor. The bailee is also liable for injuries 
resulting from the use of the chattel by his servants acting in 
the course of their employment. 
§ 22. [-] Armory v. Delamirie, 
1 Strange 505, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 
470; [-] Little v. Fossett, 34 Me. 
545, 56 Am. D. 671; Baggett v. Me· 
Cormack, 73 Miss. 552, 19 So. R. 89, 
55 Am. St. R. 554. See the early 
rule in Hostler's Adm 'r v. Skull, 
2 Haywood (N. C.) 179, I Am. D. 
583. 
§ 23. Sproul v. Hemmingway, 14 
Piek. (Mass.) I, 25 Am. D. 350. 
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§§ 25-27 Or BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
§24. Termination of bai1ment.-—Like other contractual re-
lations, the bailment relation may be terminated—-
A. BY ACT Or THE PARTIES.
1. By the accomplishment of the bailment purpose
or the expiration of the time for which the prop-
erty was bailed.
2. By the rescission of the bailment contract. This
may be—— -
(1) By mutual consent of bailor and bailee.
(2) By redelivery of the chattel by the bailee.
(3) By abatement of the contract by the
bailor.
B. BY OPERATION Or LAW.
1. By change in the status of the parties.
2. By change in the status of the bailed chattel.
A. TERMINATION BY AcT Or THE PARTIES.
1. Accomplishment of purpose or efilua: of time.
§ 25. Bailment contract executed.—When the purpose of the
bailment is fully accomplished, or the time for which the
property was bailed has expired, the life of the bailment is
ended and the bailee is bound to dispose of the bailed chattel
as directed by the bailor,- or excuse his failure so to do. If he
does not, the bailor may treat his failure as conversion of the
property, or as a renewal of the bailment for a new period
on the same terms.
2. Rescission of the Bailment Contract.
§26. (1.) By act of both parties.—Like other contracts,
baihnents may be terminated at any time by mutual consent
of the parties. The law has no interest in requiring the full
performance of a contract which both parties desire to re-
nounce.
§27. (2.) By act of ba.i1ee.—The bailee has always the
§25. [—] Green v. Hollings- §26. See Story, Bailments &
worth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173, 30 Am. Carriers, §§ 418, 418a.
D. 680; Benje v. Creagh, 21 Ala. §27. Story, Bailments & Car-
151. See Sehouler, Bailments & riers, §§ 202, 258, 271.
Carriers, § 159; Story, Bailments &

















































































































































§§ 25-27 OF BAILMENTS 1N GEN:J!JRAL. 
§ 24. Termination of bailment.-Like other contractual re­
lations, the bailment relation may be terminated-
A. BY ACT OF THE PARTIES. 
1. By the accomplishment of the bailment purpose 
or the expiration of the time for which the prop­
erty was bailed. 
2. By the rescission of the bailment contract. This 
may be-
(1) By mutual consent of bailor and bailee. 
(2) By redelivery of the chattel by the bailee. 
( 3 )  By abatement of the contract by the 
bailor. 
B. BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
1. By change in the status of the parties. 
2. By change in the status of the bailed chattel. 
A. TERMINATION BY ACT OF THE PARTIES. 
1. Accompliskment of purpose or etftux of time. 
§ 25. Bailment contract executed.-When the purpose of the 
bailment is fully accomplished, or the time for which the 
property was bailed has expired, the life of the bailment is 
ended and the bailee is bound to dispose of the bailed chattel 
as directed by the bailor,, or excuse his failure so to do. If he 
does not, the bailor may treat his failure as conversion of the 
property, or as a renewal of the bailment for a new period 
on the same terms. 
2. Rescission of the Bailment Contract. 
§ 26. (1.) By act of both parties.-Like other contracts, 
bailments may be terminated at any time by mutual consent 
of the parties. The law has no interest in requiring the full 
performance of a contract which both parties desire to re­
nounce. 
§ 27. (2.) By act of bailee.-The bailee has always the 
§ 25. [-] Green v. Hollings­
worth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173, 30 Am. 
D. 680; Benje v. Creagh, 2'1 Ala. 
151. See Schouler, Bailments & 
Carriers, § 159; Story, Bailments & 
Carriers, § 259. 
§ 26. See Story, Bailments & 
Carriers, H 418, 418a. 
§ 27. Story, Bailments & Car­
riers, §§ 202, 2581 271. 
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power, though not usually the right, to terminate the bailment
at any time. The bailor has no action at law to compel the
bailee to retain the chattel and perform the bailment purpose.
And equity will not decree specific performance of personal
services, nor will it, where damages are adequate, grant an in-
junction to prevent the return of the chattel bailed. The
bailor is left to an action for such damages as he can show he
has suffered by reason of the bailee’s wrong.
In gratuitous bailments, the bailee need not enter upon th‘e
undertaking, and in bailments for his sole benefit even after
the chattel has been delivered to the bailee, he has the right
to return it at any time. A depositary or mandatary, how-
ever, though he is to receive no compensation, has no right
after he has entered upon the undertaking to abandon it to
the injury of the bailor. Common carriers and innkeepers
are subject to special rules.
§28. (3.) By act of bai10r.—The bailor’s power to ter-
minate the relation depends upon the nature of the contract.
In bailments at will and in bailments for his sole benefit, the
bailor may end the relation at any time. In bailments for the
benefit of the bailee for an indefinite term, there must be a
demand by the bailor and a reasonable time for the return
of the chattel by the bailee. The bailee’s rights cannot be
wantonly disregarded. In bailments for a definite time or
purpose, the bailee may hold the chattel even against the
bailor.
§ 29. ——Bailee’s wrong.—The bailee’s wrong, it is usually
held, does not terminate the relation but gives the bailor the
right to do so at any time. Thus, the use of the chattel in
a different manner or for a different purpose from that agreed
upon, its appropriation or sale by the bailee, his refusal to
redeliver it, may be treated by the bailor as ground for termi-
nating the bailment, and in many cases for suing the bailee
in trover for conversion.
§28. [—] Cobb v. Wallace, 5 §29. [—] Green v. Hollings-
Cold. (Tenn.) 539, 98 Am. D. 435; worth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173, 30 Am.
Smith v. Niles, 20 Vt. 315, 49 Am. D. 680; [—] Wentworth v. Mc-
D. 782; Story, Bailments & Carriers, Dufliie, 48 N. H. 402; Schouler,
§§ 119, 210; Schouler, Bailments & Bailments & Carriers, §§ 56, 156.

















































































































































LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION. §§ 28-30 
power, though not usually the right, to terminate the bailment 
at any time. The bailor has no action at law to compel the 
bailee to retain the chattel and perform the bailment purpose. 
And equity will not decree specific performance of personal 
services, nor will it, where damages are adequate, grant an in­
junction to prevent the return of the chattel bailed. The 
bailor is left to an action for such damages a.s he can show he 
has suffered by reason of the bailee 's wrong. 
In gratuitous bailments, the bailee need not enter upon th'b 
undertaking, and in bailments for his sole benefit even after 
the chattel has been delivered to the bailee, he has the right 
to return it at any time. A depositary or mandatary, how­
ever, though he is to receive no compensation, has no right 
after he has entered upon the undertaking to abandon it to 
the injury of the bail or. Common carriers and innkeepers 
are subject to special rules. 
§ 28. (3. ) By act of bailor.-The bailor 's power to ter­
minate the relation depends upon the nature of the contract. 
In bailments at will and in bailments for his sole benefit, the 
bailor may end the relation at any time. In bailments for the 
benefit of the bailee for an indefinite term, there must be a 
demand by the bailor and a reasonable time for the return 
of the chattel by the bailee. The bailee 's rights cannot be 
wantonly disregarded. In bailments for a definite time or 
purpose, the bailee may hold the chattel even against the 
bailor. 
§ 29. --Bailee's wrong.-The bailee 's wrong, it is usually 
held, does not terminate the relation but gives the bailor the 
right to do so at any time. Thus, the use of the chattel in 
a different manner or for a different purpose from that agreed 
upon, its appropriation or sale by the bailee, his refusal to 
redeliver it, may be treated by the bailor as ground for termi­
nating the bailment, and in many cases for suing the bailee 
in trover for conversion. 
§ 28. [-] Cobb v. Wallace, 5 
Cold. (Tenn.) 539, 98 Am. D. 435; 
Smith v. Niles, 20 Vt. 315, 49 Am. 
D. 782; Story, Bailments & Carriers, 
U 119, 210; Schouler, Bailments & 
Carriers, § 81. 
§ 29. [-] Green v. Hollings­
worth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173, 30 Am. 
D. 680; [-] Wentworth v. Mc­
Duffiie, 48 N. H. 402; Schouler, 
Bailments & Carriers, §§ 56, 156. 
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§§ 31-35 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
B. BY OPERATION Or LAW.
§30. 1. By changed status of the parties.—There are
cases in which the happening of some event so affects the
performance of the bailment contract as to terminate the re-
lation by operation of law. In other cases the happening of
the same event, though not ipso facto a termination of the
relation, is nevertheless a sufficient cause for the termina-
tion of the contract by one of the parties.
§31. iDeath.—The death of either bailor or bailee will
terminate the relation unless the .contract is of such a nature
that it can be performed by the personal representative of
the deceased. Thus, the hire of personal services about a
chattel involves a personal trust that ceases at the death of the
bailee. And death, if not ipso facto a termination of the re-
lation, is usually held to justify either party or‘ his repre-
sentative in terminating it, but not so as to absolve the parties
from antecedent liabilities of the bailment.
§32. ——Bankruptcy, marriage, insa.nity.—Any change in
legal status of either party, as by bankruptcy, marriage of
the woman at common law, insanity, probably terminates the
bailment relation as it does that of agency, at least so far as
the performance of the bailment purpose depends upon the
party whose status is thus affected.
§33. 2. Change of status of bailed chattel.—If the bailee
becomes full owner, or if the subject-matter of the contract is
destroyed, the bailment relation at once ceases. The liability
of the bailee when the subject-matter of the bailment is de-
stroyed will be hereafter considered.
§34. Rede1ivery.—It has already been said that upon ter-
mination of the bailment the bailee must deal with the chattel
according to the directions of the owner, upon peril of liability
for loss if he fails to do so. It is now in order to inquire what
is to be redelivered, and where and to whom the redelivery is
to be made.
§ 35. ——What is to be rede1ivered.—As already indicated,
the identical thing bailed is to be returned in its condition at
§30. Schouler, Bailments & Car- riers, §§ 277, 418, 419; Schouler,
riors, §§ 56, 61. Bailments & Carriers, § 156.

















































































































































§ §  31-35 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
B. BY OPERATION OF LA w. 
§ 30. 1. By changed status of the parties.-There are 
cases in which the happening of some event so affects the 
performance of the bailment contract as to terminate the re­
lation by operation of law. In other cases the happening of 
the same event, though not ipso facto a termination of the 
relation, is nevertheless a sufficient cause for the termina­
tion of the contract by one of the parties. 
§ 31. --Death.-The death of either bailor or bailee will 
terminate the relation unless the .contract is of such a nature 
that it can be performed by the personal representative of 
the deceased. Thus, the hire of personal services about a 
chattel involves a personal trust that ceases at the death of the 
bailee. And death, if not ipso facto a termination of the re­
lation, is usually held to justify either party or his repre­
sentative in terminating it, but not so as to absolve the parties 
from antecedent liabilities of the bailment. 
§ 32. --Bankruptcy, marriage, insanity.-Any change in 
legal status of either party, as by bankruptcy, marriage of 
the woman at common law, insanity, probably terminates the 
bailment relation as it does that of agency, at least so far as 
the performance of the bailment purpose depends upon the 
party whose status is thus affected. 
§ 33. 2. Change of status of bailed chattel.-If the bailee 
becomes full owner, or if the subj ect-matter of the contract is 
destroyed, the bailment relation at once ceases. The liability 
of the bailee when the subject-matter of the bailment is de­
stroyed will be hereafter considered. 
§ 34. Redelivery.-It has already been said that upon ter­
mination of the bailment the bailee must deal with the chattel 
according to the directions of the owner, upon peril of liability 
for loss if he fails to do so. It is now in order to inquire what 
i·� to be redelivered, and where and to whom the redelivery is 
to be made. 
§ 35. --What is to be redelivered.-As already indicated , 
the identical thing bailed is to be returned in its condition at 
§ 30. Schouler, Bailments & Car­
riers, §§ 5G, 61. 
§ 31. Story, Baifments & Car-
riers, §§ 277, 418, 419 ; Schouler, 
Bailments & Carriers, § 156. 
§ 35. Atkins v. Gamble, 42 Calif. 
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LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION. 36-38
the termination of the bailment. In the case of stocks or
bonds, others of different numbers but representing the same
property may be substituted for the stocks or bonds bailed.
In addition to the chattel itself, however, the bailee is bound
to return all increase of it, such as the young of animals and
dividends and interest from stocks and bonds. If the chattel
is returned in an injured or depreciated condition, the bailee
is always liable for such loss when it was clue to his failure to
use the requisite care.
§ 36. ‘Where returned.—The place where delivery is to
be made is to be gathered, if possible, from the contract.‘ In
the absence of a contract, custom, usage, and the nature of the
bailment often determine the place of delivery. In gratui-
tous bailments the party receiving no advantage should be
especially considered and his convenience consulted. In all
bailments there is a natural presumption, in the absence of
other indications, in favor of the place of business or resi-
dence of the bailor, or of the party to whom he has directed
delivery to be made.
§37. iTo whom rede1ivered.—The bailment contract
usually determines whether the property is to be redelivered
to the bailor or his agent, or to some third person. In the
case of a bailment with an option to purchase the property
may be retained by the bailee.
The exercise of care, however great, afiords no excuse for
delivery to the wrong person. All bailees must at their peril
deliver to the proper party. Failure to do so amounts to con-
version by the bailee, even though he may have acted in good
faith, and so does refusal to deliver to the rightful claimant.
In case of change of residence of the proper party the bailee
should make reasonable efforts to discover his new location
and in case of his death delivery should be made, ordinarily,
to his personal representative.
As already indicated, a bailee cannot set up against his
86, 10 Am. R. 282; [—] Allen v. Plains Co. v. R. R., 1 Gray (Mass.)
Delano, 55 Maine 113, 92 Am. D. 263, 61 Am. D. 423.
573; [—] Krause v. Commonwealth, §37. [—] Pulliam v. Burlin-
93 Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. 762. game, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. R. 229;
§36. [—] Esmay v. Fanning, 9 The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575, see Sec.

















































































































































LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION. §§ 36-38 
the termination of the bailment. In the case of stocks or 
bon<ls, others of different numbers but representing the same 
property may be substituted for the stocks or bonds bailed. 
In addition to the chattel itself, however, the bailee is bound 
to return all increase of it, such as the young of animals and 
dividends and interest from stocks and bonds. If the chattel 
is returned in an injured or depreciated condition, the bailee 
is always liable for such loss when it was due to his failure to 
use the requisite care. 
§ 36. --Where returned.-The place where delivery is to 
be made is to be gathered, if possible, from the contract.. In 
the absence of a contract, custom, usage, and the nature of the 
bailment often determine the place of delivery. In gratui­
tous bailments the party receiving no advantage should be 
especially considered and his convenience consulted. In all 
bailments there is a natural presumption, in the absence of 
other indications, in favor of the place of business or resi­
dence of the bailor, or of the party to whom he has directed 
delivery to be made. 
§ 37. --To whom redelivered.-The bailment contract 
usually determines whether the property is to be redelivered 
to the bailor or his agent, or to some third person. In the 
case of a bailment with an option to purchase the property 
may be retained by the bailee. 
The exercise of care, however great, affords no excuse for 
delivery to the wrong person. All bailees must at their peril 
deliver to the proper party. Failure to do so amounts to con­
version by the bailee, even though he may have acted in good 
faith, and so does refusal to deliver to the rightful claimant. 
In case of change of residence of the proper party the bailee 
should make reasonable efforts to discover his new location 
and in case of his death delivery should be made, ordinarily, 
to his personal representative. 
As already indicated, a bailee cannot set up against his 
86, 10 Am. R. 282; [-] Allen v. 
Delano, 55 Maine 113, 92 Am. D. 
573 ; [ -] Krause v. Commonwealth, 
93 Pa. St. 418, 39 Am. R. 762. 
§ 36. [ -] Esmay v. Fanning, 9 
Bnrb. (N. Y.) 176 ; [-] Norway 
Plains Co. v. R. R., 1 Gray (Mass. ) 
263, 61 Am. D. 423. 
§ 37. [-] Pulliam v. Burlin· 
game, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. R. 229 ; 
The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575, see Sec. 
7, ante. 
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§ 39 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL.
bailor the claims of himself or of any other parties, but he
will always be protected by delivery to the rightful owner.
§38. ——Adverse c1aims.—The bailee is justified in de-
livering to the bailor, even when he is not the owner, unless
he has notice of adverse claims. In such case he should notify
the bailor and give him opportunity to defend against such
adverse claimants, or if there be privity between the bailor
and the third parties the bailee may require them to inter-
plead.
§39. Special contract.—Fina1ly, it is important to notice
that the parties may always define their rights and liabilities
by special contract, unless such contract is illegal or con-
trary to public policy. A contract to hire property for an il-
legal purpose, or to relieve the bailee from all responsibility for
his negligence or fraud would be invalid. But the terms of
any legal contract entered into by the parties will govern
their relations in so far as those terms are clear in their im-
port. It must be understood, then, that the foregoing princi-
ples are within the above limits subject to enlargement or
retraction by the contract of the parties.
§38. [—] -Pulliam v. Burlin- Ball v. Liney, 48 N. Y. 6, 8 Am. R.

















































































































































§ 39 OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL. 
bailor the claims of himself or of any other parties, but he 
will always be protected by delivery to the rightful owner. 
§ 38. --Adverse claims.-The bailee is justified in de­
livering to the bailor, even when he is not the owner, unless 
he has notice of adverse claims. In such case he should notify 
the bailor and give him opportunity to defend against such 
adverse claimants, or if there be privity between the bailor 
and the third parties the bailee may require them to inter­
plead. 
§ 39. Special contract.-Finally, it is important to notice 
that the parties may always define their rights and liabilities 
by special contract, unless such contract is illegal or con­
trary to public policy. A contract to hire property for an il­
legal purpose, or to relieve the bailee from all responsibility for 
his negligence or fraud would be invalid. But the terms of 
any legal contract entered into by the parties will govern 
their relations in so far as those terms are clear in their im­
port. It must be understood, then, that the foregoing princi­
ples are within the above limits subj ect to enlargement or 
retraction by the contract of the parties. 
§ 38. [-) Pulliam v. Burlin- Ball v. Liney, 48 N. Y. 6, 8 Am. R. 
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§ 40. Glassifica.tion.—There are two classes of gratuitous
bailments—-
A. Gratuitous services by the bailee, or bailments for the sole
benefit of the bailor, including
1. Deposits, which are gratuitous bailments of goods
for custody or safe keeping, and
2. Mandates, which are bailments of goods for the
performance of some service upon them by the
bailee gratuitously.
B. Gratuitous loans by the bailor, which is the Roman com-
modatum, a bailment of .a chattel for use by the bailee
gratis.



















































































































































OF ORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
I. OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS. 
CHAPTER III. 
A. OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES. 
§ 40. Classification. § 47. Involuntary deposits. 
A. GratuitOUB Services. 
41. Deposits and mandates com­
pared. 
42. -Comparison with Latin 
depositmn and mandatum. 
43. The general principles of 
bailments apply. 
44. Division of the subject. 
1. Nature of deposits and 
mandates. 
45. No compensation. 
46. Special bank deposits. 
e. Rights and duties of the 
parties. 
48. Diligence. 
49. --Same care as of one '11 
own. 
50. --Special skill. 
51. --Facts e q u a  11 y within 
knowledge of both parties. 
52. --Misfeasance and nonfeas· 
ance. 
53. Right to use. 
S. Termination of the rela­
tion. 
54. Special rules. 
§ 40. Classiftea.tion.-There are two classes of gratuitous 
bailments-
A. Gratuitous services by the bailee, or bailments for the sole 
benefit of the bailor, including 
1 .  Deposits, which are gratuitous bailments of  goods 
for custody or safe keeping, and 
2. Mandates, which are bailments of goods for the 
performance of some service upon them by the 
bailee gratuitously. 
B. Gratuitous loans by the bailor, which is the Roman com­
modatum, a bailment of a chattel for use by the bailee 
gratis. 






1-43 OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS.
A. Or (}a.\TuITOos SERVICES.
§41. Deposits and mandates compared.—The bailor who
makes a deposit is called a depositor, his bailee, the depositary.
In mandates the corresponding parties are called the mandator
and mandatory.
Formerly, the two bailments were separately treated. The
deposit was said to consist in custody, the mandate in feasance.
But in fact, both custody and service of some sort are in-
volved in each bailment, and hence the obligations of the
parties are subject substantially to the same rules. The only
distinction is one of emphasis. In deposits custody is the
chief purpose, feasance is incidental. In mandates service is
primary, custody the incident.
§42. Comparison with Latin depositum and mandatum.-
The term deposit is, unfortunately, one of varied meanings.
The ordinary or general bank “deposit” creates the relation
of debtor and creditor, and is not a bailment at all. What
bankers call “special deposits” are bailments, but only those
for which the bank charges no compensation belong to the
bailment known as a deposit. The word is derived from the
Latin depositnm, but the depositum of the Roman law was of
broader application, and involved distinctions of no conse-
quence in our law. _
The term mandate is equally indefinite and varied in its
meaning. See the word “mandate” in a law dictionary. The
Roman mandatum, from which our word is borrowed, includes
any gratuitous agency, bailment or other.
§43. The general principles of bailments, already noted,
are applicable to gratuitous bailments. The essentials of a
contract as to competent parties, assent, and subject-matter,
call for no special notice here. As already seen (§ 18), the
consideration in gratuitous bailments is the detriment to the
promisee, who by the undertaking of the promisor is prevented
from securing the desired benefit at the hands of another.
§41. Story, Bailments & Car- §43. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2
riers, § 140. Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas.
§42. Story, Bailments & Car- 199.
riers, §§ 44, 45, 84, 88; Schouler,

















































































































































§§ 41-43 OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS. 
A. OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES. 
§ 41. Deposits and mandates compared.-The bailor who 
makes a deposit is called a depositor, his bailee, the depositary. 
In mandates the corresponding parties are called the mandator 
and mandatary. 
Formerly, the two bailments were separately treated. Tlie 
deposit was said to consist in custody, the mandate in feasarice. 
But in fact, both custody and service of some sort are in­
volved in each bailment, and hence the obligations of the 
parties are subject substantially to the same rules. The only 
distinction is one of emphasis. In deposits custody is the 
chief purpose, feasance is incidental. In mandates service is 
primary, custody the incident. 
§ 42. Comparison with Latin depositum and mandatum.­
The term deposit is, unfortunately, one of varied meanings. 
The ordinary or general bank ''deposit'' creates the relation 
of debtor and creditor, and is not a bailment at all. What 
bankers call ''special deposits'' are bailments, but only those 
for which the bank charges no compensation belong to the 
bailment known as a deposit. The word is derived from the 
Latin depositum, but the depositum of the Roman law was of 
broader application, and involved distinctions of no conse-
quence in our law. . 
The term mandate is equally indefinite and varied in its 
meaning. See the word "mandate" in a law dictionary. The 
Roman mandatum, from which our word is borrowed, includes 
any gratuitous agency, bailment or other. 
§ 43. The genera.I principles of bailments, already noted, 
are applicable to gratuitous bailments. The essentials of a 
contract as to competent parties, assent, and subject-matter, 
call for no special notice here. As already seen (§ 18), the 
consideration in gratuitous bailments is the detriment to the 
promisee, who by the undertaking of the promisor is prevented 
from securing the desired benefit at the hands of another. 
§ 41. Story, Bailments & Car· 
riers, § 140. 
§ 42. Story, Bailments & Car­
riers, §§ 44, 45, 84, 88 ; Sebouler, 
nailments & Carriers, § 261 note. 
§ 43. [ -] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 
Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 
199. 
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OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES. §§ 44-47
§44. Division of the subject.-—In the following sections
principles which apply particularly to bailments of gratuitous
services will be considered as follows: 1. The nature of the
relation. 2. Its resulting rights and duties. 3. Its termina-
tion.
1. Nature of Deposits and Mandates.
§45. No compensation.-—It is the absence of any recom-
pense, direct or indirect, that marks this class of bailments.
Any legal benefit to the promisor, even though an indirect one,
takes the bailment out of this class, and makes it a mutual
benefit bailment. It is not strange, therefore, that the cases
arising in this class of bailments are comparatively few.
§46. Special bank deposits.——Banks frequently receive for
deposit in their safes boxes or packages containing the money
or other valuables of favored individuals. For this the bank
receives no compensation, it has no right to use or even ex-
amine the contents, and upon demand of the depositor must
return the specific valuables in bulk as they were deposited.
These special deposits form no part of the bank’s regular
business, and no bank ofi‘icer has any authority to bind the
bank to such a bailment without the expressed or implied as-
sent of the directors. It is settled by the weight of authority
that where a cashier or other officer is known by the directors
to be in the habit of receiving such deposits, the bank is a
gratuitous bailee of all special deposits so received. The
contract is not ultra vires even in the case of national banks.
§47. Involuntary deposits arise when through flood or
other disaster goods are cast upon the land of one not their
owner. If this happens without fault of the owner, the de-
positary is a gratuitous bailee and must allow the owner to
§45. Compare [—] Newhall v. tional Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S.
Paige, 10 Gray (Mass.) 366; 699; [—] Preston v. Prather, 137
[—] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162; but com-
604; First National Bank v. Graham, pare First National Bank v. Ocean
100 U. S. 699; see also [—] Gray v. National Bank, 60 N. Y. 278, 19
Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. Am. R. 181. See also Goodwin v.
810, 39 Am. St. R. 172; Woodruif v. Ray, 108 Tenn. 614, 69 S. W. R.
Painter, 150 Pa. St. 91, 24 Atl. R. 730, 91 Am. St. R. 761.
621, 30 Am. St. R. 786. §47. See Story, Bailments é';
§46. [—] Foster v. Essex Bank, Carriers, § 83, a.

















































































































































OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES. §§ 44-47 
§ 44. Division of the subject.-In the following sections 
principles which apply particularly to bailments of gratuitous 
services will be considered as follows : 1. The nature of the 
relation. 2. Its resulting rights and duties. 3. Its termina­
tion. 
1. Nature of' Deposits and Mandates. 
§ 45. No compensation.-It is the absence of any recom­
pense, direct or indirect, that marks this class of bailments. 
Any legal benefit to the promisor, even though an indirect one, 
takes the bailment out of this class, and makes it a mutual 
benefit bailment. It is not strange, therefore, that the cases 
arising in this class of bailments are comparatively few. 
§ 46. Special bank deposits.-Banks frequently receive for 
deposit in their safes boxes or packages containing the money 
or other valuables of favored individuals. For this the bank 
receives no compensation, it has no right to use or even ex­
amine the contents, and upon demand of the depositor must 
return the specific valuables in bulk as they were deposited. 
These special deposits form no part of the bank's regular 
business, and no bank officer has any authority to bind the 
bank to such a bailment without the expressed or implied as­
sent of the directors. It is settled by the weight of authority 
that where a cashier OI' other officer is known by the directors 
to be in the habit of receiving such deposits, the bank is a 
gratuitous bailee of all special deposits so received. The 
contract is not ultra vires even in the case qf national banks. 
§ 47. Involuntary deposits arise when through flood or 
other disaster goods are cast upon the land of one not their 
owner. If this happens without fault of the owner, the de­
positary is a gratuitous bailee and must allow the owner to 
§ 45. Compare [-] Newhall v. 
Paige, 10 Gray (Mass. ) 366 ; 
[-] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 
604 ; First National Bank v. Graham, 
100 U. S. 699 ; see also [-] Gray v. 
Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. 
810, 39 Am. St. R. 172 ; Woodruff v. 
Painter, 150 Pa. St. 91, 24 Atl. R. 
621, 30 Am. St. R. 786. 
§ 46. [ -] Foster v. Essex Bank, 
J7 Mass. 479, 9 Am. D. 168 ; Na-
tional Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 
699 ; [ -] Preston v. Prather, 137 
U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162 ; but com­
pare First National Bank v. Ocean 
National Bank, 60 N. Y. 278, 19 
Am. R. 181. See also Goodwin v. 
Ray, 108 Tenn. 614, 69 S. W. R. 
730, 91 Am. St. R. 761. 
§ 47. See Story, Bailmentr; ::.: 
Carriers, § 831 a, 
19 
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remove the goods. If the owner was at fault, however, it
would seem that he has no right to enter and remove without
recompensing the depositary, but the latter has no right to
use or appropriate to himself the goods cast upon him.
2. Rights and. Duties of the Parties.
§48. Diligence.—It is the first duty of the bailee to take
reasonable care of the bailed chattel. As he receives no bene-
fit the care required is slight diligence, and it is said that he
is liable only for gross negligence. What is reasonable care
will depend on the nature and value of the bailed chattel, the
circumstances of the undertaking, and the contract of the
parties. This contract may enlarge or limit the liability so
as to make the bailee an insurer or free from any liability for
less than negligence amounting, in legal effect, to fraud, which
no contract can excuse.
§49. ?Same care as of one’s own.—It has often been
suggested that if the bailee takes the same care of the bailed
goods as of his own he is free from liability. But one may
take risks with his own that he has no right to take with
another’s property. Taking such care of the bailed goods as
of one’s own repels a presumption of gross negligence, but
this may be overcome and liability fastened upon the bailee,
nevertheless, by showing want of slight diligence. The ques-
tion is not one of the care exercised by an individual but by
a class. Slight care is not that which an individual may
bestow in a given case, but which men of a class are wont to
bestow in such a case.
§50. ——Special skil1.—It has been held that one holding
§ 48. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.
Ray. 909, 1 Sm. Ld. Cas. 199;
[—] Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass.
479, 9 Am. D. 168; [—] Gray v.
Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R.
810, 39 Am. St. R. 172; First Na-
tional Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S.
699; [—] Preston v. Prather, 137
U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162; Jenkins
v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373, 15 Am. R.
33; Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo. 487,
88 Am. D. 122; [—] Knowles v. At-
lantic etc. R. R. Co., 38 Me. 55, 61
.\m. D. 234.
§49. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2
Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. Ld. Cas. 199;
First National Bank v. Graham, 79
Pa. St. 106, 21 Am. R. 49;
[—] Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. 8a
El. 256, 29 E. C. L. 80; [—] Gray v.
Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R.
810, 39 Am. St. R. 172; Conner v.
Winton, 8 Ind. 315, 65 Am. D. 761;
[—] Knowles v. Atlantic etc. R. R.
Co., 38 Me. 55, 61 Am. D. 234.
§50. [—] Gray v. Merriam, 148

















































































































































§ §  4S-50 OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS. 
remove the goods. If the owner was at fault, however, it 
would seem that he has no right to enter and remove without 
recompensing the depositary, but the latter has no right to 
use or appropriate to himself the goods cast upon him. 
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties. 
§ 48. Diligence.-It is the first duty of the bailee to take 
reasonable care of the bailed chattel. As he receives no bene­
fit the care required is slight diligence, and it is said that he 
is liable only for gross negligence. What is reasonable care 
will depend on the nature and value of the bailed chattel, the 
circumstances of the undertaking, and the contract of the 
parties. This contract may enlarge or limit the liability so 
as to make the bailee an insurer or free from any liability for 
less than negligence amounting, in legal effect, to fraud, which 
no contract can excuse. 
§ 49. -Same care as of one 's own.-It has often been 
suggested that if the bailee takes the same care of the bailed 
goods as of his own he is free from liability. But one may 
take risks with his own that he has no right to take with 
another 's property. Taking such care of the bailed goods as 
of one 's own repels a presumption of gross negligence, but 
this may be overcome and liability fastened upon the bailee, 
nevertheless, by showing want of slight diligence. The ques­
tion is not one of the care exercised by an individual but by 
a class. Slight care is not that which an individual may 
bestow in a given case, but which men of a class are wont to 
bestow in such a case. 
§ 50. -Special skill.-It has been held that one holding 
§ 48. [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. 
Ray. 909, 1 Sm. Ld. Ca!. 199 ; 
[ -] Foster v. Es8ex Bank, 17 Mass. 
479, 9 Am. D. 168 ; [-] Gray v. 
Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. 
810, 39 Am. St. R. 172 ; First Na­
tional Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 
699 ; [ -] Preston v. Prather, 137 
U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162 ; Jenkins 
v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373, 15 Am. R. 
33 ; Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo. 487, 
88 Am. D. 122 ; [-] Knowles v. At­
lantic etc. R. R. Co., 38 Me. 55, 61 
.\m. D. 234. 
§ 49. [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 
Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. Ld. Cai. 199; 
First National Bank v. Graham, 79 
Pa. St. 106, 21 Am. R. 49; 
[-] Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. & 
El. 256, 29 E. C. L. 80 ; [-] Gray v. 
Merriam, 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. 
810, 39 Am. St. R. 172 ; Conner v. 
Winton, 8 Ind. 315, 65 Am. D. 761; 
[-] Knowles v. Atlantic etc. R. R. 
Co., 38 Me. 55, 61 Am. D. 234. 
§ 50. [-] Gray v. Merriam, 148 
Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. 810, 39 Am. St. 
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or GRATUITOUS SERVICES. §§ 51-53
himself out as having special skill must exercise such skill or
he will be liable, even though he receive no recompense for the
service. Want of skill in this case is said to be imputable to
gross negligence.
§ 51. ——Facts equally within the knowledge of both part-
ies.—And it is said that if the loss results from conditions
equally within the knowledge of the bailor and bailee the
former cannot maintain an action against the latter. Thus, if
the character and habits of the bailee, or the place where the
goods are to be deposited are known to the bailor, he is pre-
sumed to assent to such conditions and is estopped from set-
ting up any loss therefrom.
§52. illlisfeasance and nonfeasance.—While the detri-
ment to the bailee is held to furnish sufficient consideration to
uphold the contract, yet the law does not recognize this detri-
ment until the bailee has entered upon the undertaking. Until
that moment the bailor is still at liberty to secure another to
do the service. Accordingly the gratuitous bailee is not liable
for any injury arising from nonfeasance, from his entire fail-
ure to perform, but only from misfeasance, from his defective
performance amounting to gross negligence. The bailee is
liable for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance.
§53. Right to use.—Any advantageous use by the bailee
would make the relation a mutual benefit bailment. Only
such use as is incidental to the proper preservation of the
thing, as exercise of a horse, is allowed. If the bailee uses
the thing, not only does the bailment become a mutual benefit
bailment demanding of the bailee its larger measure of dili-
gence, but if the use be unauthorized the bailee becomes abso-
lutely liable for the safety of the chattel and is responsible
for loss to it arising from.any cause whatever.
R. 172; [—] Steamboat New World
v. King, 16 How. (U. S.) 469;
[—] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S.
604; Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100,
35 N. E. R. 1084, 38 Am. St. R. 766;
Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo. 487, 88
Am. D. 122; Shiells v. Blackburn, 1
H. Bl. 158.
§51. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2
Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. L. Gas. 199;
[—] Knowles v. Railroad, 38 Me. 55,
61 Am. D. 234; Parker v. Union Ice
and Salt Oo., 59 Kan. 626, 54 Pac. R.
672, 68 Am. st. R. 383.
§52. [—] Thorne v. Deas, 4
Johns. (N Y.) 84.
§ 53. [—-] Gray v. Merriam,
148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. 810, 39 Am.
St. R. 172; [—] Preston v. Pra-
ther, 137 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162;
Alvord v. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30;

















































































































































OF G:kA'i'UITOUS SERVICES. §§ 51-53 
himself out as having special skill must exercise such skill or 
he will be liable, even though he receive no recompense for the 
service. Want of skill in this case is said to be imputable to 
gross negligence. 
§ 61. --Facts equally within the knowledge of both p&rt­
ies.-And it is said that if the loss results from conaitions 
equally within the knowledge of the bailor and bailee the 
former cannot maintain an action against the latter. Thus, if 
the character and habits of the bailee, or the place where the 
goods are to be deposited are known to the bailor, he is pre­
sumed to assent to such conditions and is estopped from set­
ting up any loss therefrom. 
§ fi2. --ltlisfeasance and nonfeasance.-While the detri­
ment to the bailee is held to furnish sufficient consideration to 
uphold the contract, yet the law does not recognize this detri­
ment until the bailee has entered upon the undertaking. Until 
that moment the bailor is still at liberty to secure another to 
do the service. Accordingly the gratuitous bailee is not liable 
for any injury arising from nonfeasance, from his entire fail­
ure to perform, but only from misfeasance, from his defective 
performance amounting to gross negligence. The bailee is 
liable for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance. 
§ 53. Bight to use.-Any advantageous use by the bailee 
would make the relation a mutual benefit bailment. Only 
such use as is incidental to the proper preservation of the 
thing, as exercise of a horse, is allowed. If the bailee uses 
the thing, not only does the bailment become a mutual benefit 
bailment demanding of the bailee its larger measure of dili­
gence, but if the use be unauthorized the bailee becomes abso­
lutely liable for the safety of the chattel and is responsible 
for loss to it arising from. any cause whatever. 
R. 172 ; [-] Steamboat New World 61 Am. D. 234 ; Parker v. Union Ice 
Y. King, 16 How. (U. S.) 469 ; and Salt Co., 59 Kan. 626, 54 Pac. R. 
[-] Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 6 72, 68 Am. St. R. 383. 
604 ; Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100, § 52. [-] Thorne v. Deas, 4 
35 N. E. R. 1084, 38 Am. St. R. 766 ; Johns. (N Y. ) 84. 
Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo. 487, 88 § 53. [ -] Gray v. Merriam, 
Am. D. 122 ; Shiells v. Blackburn, 1 148 Ill. 179, 35 N. E. R. 810, 39 Am. 
H. BI. 158. St. R. 172 ; [-] Preston v. Pra· 
§ 51. [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 ther, 137 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162 ; 
Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. L. Cas. 199 ; Alvord v. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30 ; 
[-] Knowles v, Bailroad1 38 Me. 5ts, Story, Bailments & Carriers, I 89, 
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§54. OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS.
3. Termination of the Relation.
§54. Special rules.—The various modes of terminating a
baihnent have been already discussed (§ 24). In gratuitous
bailments the bailee has nothing to gain by continuing the re-
lation. The bailor, therefore, may terminate it at any time,
but must have regard for the convenience of the bailee, making
demand and allowing a reasonable time for the bailee to make
delivery. The same privilege of terminating the relation at
will belongs to the bailee, unless he has undertaken the cus-
tody for a fixed time or has agreed to carry to a definite place,
in which case he must after entering upon performance com-
plete it or he is liable to the bailor for any damage due to his
default. Redelivery must be made to the proper party at the
bailee’s peril.
§54. Winkley v. Foye, 33 N. H. St. R. 761; Story, Bailments & Car-
171, 66 Am. D. 715; Beardslee v. riers, § 208-210; Wear v. Gleason,
Richardson, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 25, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. R. 756, 20
25 Am. D. 596; Goodwin v. Ray, 108 Am. St. R, 186.

















































































































































§ 54 OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS. 
3. Termination of the Relation. 
§ 54. Special rules.-The various modes of terminating a 
bailment have been already discussed ( § 24). In gratuitous 
bailments the bailee has nothing to gain by continuing the re­
lation. The bailor, therefore, may terminate it at any time, 
but must have regard for the convenience of the bailee, making 
d�and and allowing a reasonable time for the bailee to make 
delivery. The same privilege of terminating the relation at 
will belongs to the bailee, unless he has undertaken the cus­
tody for a fixed time or has agreed to carry to a definite place, 
in which case he must after entering upon performance com­
plete it or he is liable to the bailor for any damage due to his 
default. Redelivery must be made to the proper party at the 
bailee 's peril. 
§ 54. Winkley v. Foye, 33 N. H. St. R. 761 ; Story, Bailments & Car· 
1 71,  66 Am. D. 715 ; Beardslee v. riers, § 208-210 ; Wear v. Gleason, 
Richardson, 1 1  Wend. (N. Y. ) 25, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. R. 756, 20 
25 Am. D. 596 ; Goodwin v. Ray, 108 Am.. St. R, 186. 
Tenn. 614, 69 S. W. R. 730, 91 Am. 
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CHAPTER IV.
B. OF GRATUITOUS LOANS.
§55. Definition of commodatmn. §59. Care.
1. Nature of the 1-e;amm. 60. ——Better care than of one ’s
own.
61. Right to use.
3. Termination of the rela-
56. Contract necessary.
57. No recompense.
58. Special property of bailee. tt(m.
2. Rights and duties of the 62. Special rules.
parties. 63. Restoration to bailor.
§55. Definition.——The gratuitous loan, or commodatum, is
the bailment of a chattel for use by the bailee gratis.
The English loan includes, beside the gratuitous loan for
use, the loan of money for hire, and the loan of goods for con-
sumption, the Latin mutuum, neither of which is a bailment.
The word “borrow” is also used in the three senses. In the
present chapter “loan” and “borrow” must be understood to
refer to the loaning or borrowing of a chattel for use by the
bailee, or borrower, without compensation to the bailor, or
lender. Following the classification of the last chapter, we
shall consider: 1, the nature of the relation; 2, its rights and
duties, and 3, its termination.
1. Nature of the Relation.
§ 56. Contract necessary.—The law will never impose upon
the owner the necessity of loaning his chattel gratuitously,
hence gratuitous loans arise only from contract. Any chattel
which would not be consumed in the use may be the subject
of a loan.
§57. No rec0mpense.—It is of the essence of this bailment
that it is for the sole benefit of the bailee. Any legal benefit
derived by the bailor would make the relation the more com-
§55. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 §57. [—] Thorne v. Deas, 4



















































































































































B. OF GRATUITOUS LOANS. 
§ 55. Definition of commodatum. § 59. Care. 
1.  Nature of the relation. 60. --Better care than of one 's 
56. Contract necessary. own. 
61. Right to use. 
57. No recompense. 3. Termination of the rela· 
58. Special property of bailee. tion. 
2. Rights and duties of the 62. Special rules. 
parties. 63. Restoration to bailor. 
§ 55. Deflnition.-The gratuitous loan, or commodatum, is 
the bailment of a chattel for use by the bailee gratis. 
The English loan includes, beside the gratuitous loan for 
use, the loan of money for hire, and the loan of goods for con­
sumption, the Latin mtttuum, neither of which is a bailment. 
The word ' ' borrow ' '  is also used in the three senses. In the 
present chapter ' ' loan ' '  and ' ' borrow ' '  must be understood to 
refer to the loaning or borrowing of a chattel for use by the 
bailee, or bor·rowe1·, without compensation to the bailor, or 
lender. Following the classification of the last chapter, we 
shall consider : 1,  the nature of the relation ; 2, its rights and 
duties, and 3, its termination. 
1. N afare of the Relation. 
§ 56. Contract necessary.-The law will never impose upon 
the owner the necessity of loaning his chattel gratuitously, 
hence gratuitous loans arise only from contract. Any chattel 
which would not be consumed in the use may be the subj ect 
of a loan. 
§ 57. No recompense.-It is of the essence of this bailment 
that it is for the sole benefit of the bailee. Any legal benefit 
derived by the bailor would make the relation the more com-
§ 55. [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 § 57. [-] Thorne v. Deas, 4 
Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. Johns. (N. Y.) 84. 
199, 
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§§ 53-60 OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS.
mon mutual benefit bailment. As the use is gratuitous it fol-
lows that there cannot be an executory contract for a loan,
for the consideration arises only when the undertaking has
been entered upon. '
§58. Special property of bailee.—Whether the borrower
has a special property in the thing bailed has been disputed.
In the loan at will the right of the bailee would seem to be
too precarious to amount to property. But when the loan is
for a definite period it would seem that the lender may not
terminate it before the expiration of that period or he will
be liable to the bailee for any resulting damage. No reason
is apparent for denying the property interest of such a bor-
rower. The borrower may maintain trespass or trover against
third persons who interfere with his possession of the loan.
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties.
§59. Ga.re.—'l‘he borrower, though not an insurer of the
goods, is held to the highest degree of care. As he enjoys their
use gratis, it is but fair to exact of him the diligence of the
most careful men in the conduct of their own affairs. For
even slight negligence he is responsible to the bailor for any
damage to the goods caused thereby.
§60. iBetter care than of one ’s own.—Whether the
borrower is liable if he saves his own goods from peril, such
as a fire, and allows the borrowed goods to be destroyed has
been much argued. It has been said that the goods of greatest
value should be saved first, but value is only one condition
and not always the controlling one. The real question, as sug-
gested by Judge Story, is whether the borrower has been
guilty of any negligence. The position of the chattels, their
weight, bulk, ctc., are often determining factors in deciding
which shall be rescued first. The conditions being the same,
the borrower could not be justified in saving his own in prefer-
ence to the lender ’s goods.
§58. [—] Little v. Fossett, 34 v. Schultz, 44 Mich. 529, 7 N. W. R.
Me. 545, 56 Am. D. 671. 225, 38 Am. R. 280. Compare
§59. [—] Green v. Hollings- [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray-
worth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173, 30 Am. mond, 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 199.
D. 680; [—] Wilson v. Brett, 11 §60. Story, Bailments & Carriers,
Mees & W. 113; Stewart v. Davis, § 245-251.

















































































































































§ §  58-60 OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS. 
mon mutual benefit bailment. As the use is gratuitous it fol­
lows that there cannot be an executory contract for a loan, 
for the consideration arises only when the undertaking has 
been entered upon. 
§ 58. Special property of bailee.-Whether the borrower 
has a special property in the thing bailed has been disputed. 
In the loan at will the right of the bailee would seem to be 
too precarious to amount to property. But when the loan is 
for a definite period it would seem that the lender may not 
terminate it before the expiration of that period or he will 
be liable to the bailee for any resulting damage. No reason 
is apparent for denying the property interest of such a bor­
rower. The borrower may maintain trespass or trover against 
third persons who interfere with his possession of the loan. 
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties. 
§ 59. Care.-1'he borrower, though not an insurer of the 
goods, is held to the highest degree of care. As he enjoys their 
use gratis, it is but fair to exact of him the diligence of the 
most careful men in the conduct of their own affairs. For 
even slight negligence he is responsible to the bailor for any 
damage to the goods caused thereby. 
§ 60. --Better care than of one 's own.-Whether the 
borrower is liable if he saves his own goods from peril, such 
as a fire, and allows the borrowed goods to be destroyed has 
been much argued. It has been said that the goods of greatest 
value should be saved first, but value is only one condition 
and not always the controlling one. The real question, as sug­
gested by Judge Story, is whether the borrower has been 
guilty of any negligence. The position of the chattels, their 
weight, bulk, etc., are often determining factors in deciding 
which shall be rescued first. The conditions being the same, 
the borrower could not be justified in saving his own in pref er­
ence to the lender 's goods. 
§ 58. [ -] Little v. Fossett, 34 
Me. 545, 56 Am. D. 671. 
§ 59. [-] Green v. Hollings· 
worth, 5 Dana (Ky. ) 173, 30 Am. 
D. 680 ; [-] Wilson v. Brett, 11 
Mees & W. 113 ; Stewart v. Davis, 
31 Ark. 518, 25 Am. R. 576 i Beller 
v. Schultz, 44 Mich. 529, 7 N. W. R. 
225, 38 Am. R. 280. Compare 
[-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray· 
mond, 909, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 199. 
§ 60. Story, Bailments & Carriers, 
§ 245-251. 
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Or GRATUITOUS LOANS. §§ 61-53
§ 61. Right to use.-—Use is the gist of this bailment, and the
bailee has the right to use the chattel in accordance with the
terms of the bailment contract. A slight departure from the
bailment purpose is at the peril of the bailee and makes him
absolutely liable for any damage to the property. There is
even greater reason why the borrower should be strictly con-
fined to the contemplated use of the chattel than exists in
the case of other bailees. So for any fraud in procuring the
loan the bailee is liable.
3. Termination of the Bailment.
§62. Special rules.—Unless the lending be for a definite
period or for a specified purpose, it would seem reasonable
that the bailor should be able to terminate the relation at
will. It has been suggested that he must not do this so as to
cause damage to the bailee, but justification of such a rule is
difficult in the absence of compensation or of any agreement
for a definite time or purpose, at least unless he flagrantly
disregards the needs of the borrower. If, however, the loan
was expressed to be for a certain period or purpose, the bor-
rower has the right to retain the chattel until the expiration
of the time or the accomplishment of the purpose, when it be-
comes his duty to restore it.
§63. Restoration to ba.ilor.—Restitution must be made to
the bailor even when he is not the owner of the thing. Own-
ers have sometimes attempted to recover property from the
wrongful possession of another by borrowing it and them re-
fusing to redeliver. But this is disputing the bailor’s title,
which the bailee may never do, except where he has yielded
to title paramount in some third person. The borrower must
restore the thing before he can set up any claim in himself.
§61. [—] Green v. Hollings-
worth, 5 Dana (Ky.) 173, 30 Am.
D. 680; Beller v. Schultz, 44
Mich. 529, 7 N. W. R. 225, 38 Am.
R. 280; Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark.
518, 25 Am. R. 576.
§62. [—] Pulliam v. Burlin-
game, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. R. 229;
Walker v. Wilkinson, 35 Ala. 725,
76 Am. D. 315; Root v. Chandler,
10 Wend. (N. Y.) 110, 25 Am. D.
546; Clapp v. Nelson, 12 Tex. 370,
62 Am. D. 530.
§63. Simpson v. Wrenn, 50 Ill.
222, 99 Am. D. 511; [—] Pulliam


















































































































































OF GRATUITOUS LOANS. §§ 61-63 
§ 61. Right to use.-Use is the gist of this bailment, and the 
bailee has the right to use the chattel in accordance with the 
terms of the bailment contract. A slight departure from the 
bailment purpose is at the peril of the bailee and makes him 
absolutely liable for any damage to the property. There is 
even greater reason why the borrower should be strictly con­
fined to the contemplated use of the chattel than exists in 
the case of other bailees. So for any fraud in procuring the 
loan the bailee is liable. 
3. Termination of the Bailment . 
§ 62. Special rules.-Unless the lending be for a definite 
period or for a specified purpose, it would seem reasonable 
that the bailor should be able to terminate the relation at 
will. It has been suggested that he must not do this so as to 
cause damage to the bailee, but justification of such a rule is 
difficult in the absence of compensation or of any agreement 
for a definite time or purpose, at least unless he flagrantly 
disregards the needs of the borrower. If, however, the loan 
was expressed to -be for a certain period or purpose, the bor­
rower has the right to retain the chattel until the expiration 
of the time or the accomplishment of the purpose, when it be­
comes his duty to restore it. 
§ 63. :Restoration to bailor.-Restitution must be made to 
the bailor even when he is not the owner of the thing. Own­
ers have sometimes attempted to recover property from the 
wrongful possession of another by borrowing it and them re­
fusing to redeliver. But this is disputing the bailor's title, 
which the bailee may never do, except where he has yielded 
to title paramount in some third person. The borrower must 
restore the thing before he can set up any claim in himself. 
§ 61. [ -] Green v. Hollings· 
worth, 5 Dana (Ky. ) 173, 30 Am. 
D. 680 ; Beller v. Schultz, 44 
Mich. 529, 7 N. W. R. 225, 38 Am. 
R. 280 ; Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 
518, 25 Am. R. 576. 
§ 62. [-] Pulliam v. Burlin· 
game, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. R. 229 ; 
Walker v. Wilkinson, 35 Ala. 725, 
76 Am. D. 315 ; Root v. Chandler, 
10 Wend. (N. Y. ) 110, 25 Am. D. 
546 ; Clapp v. Nelson, 12 Tex. 370, 
62 Am. D. 530. 
§ 63. Simpson v. Wrenn, 50 Ill. 
222, 99 Am. D. 511 ; [-] Pulliam 
v. Burlingame, 81  Mo. 111, 51 Am. 
R. 229. 
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II. OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS.
CHAPTER V.
CLASSIFICATION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
§64. Classes of mutual benefit 2. Rights and duties of the
bailments. parties.
1. Nature of the relation. §67. Care.
65. Recompense. 3. Termination of the rela-
66. Custody and service. tton.
68. Not precarious.
§64. Olasses.—Bailmen1;s for the mutual benefit of bailor
and bailee include—
A. Pignus, or pledge, and
B. Locatio, or hiring. Bailments for hire are-
1. Locatio rei, the hired use of a thing, and
2. Locatto operis, hired services about a thing.
a. Ordinary bailments for hire.
(1) Locatio custodiae, hired custody of a
thing.
(2) Locatio operts faciendi, hired services
upon a thing.
(3) Locatio operis mercium vehendarum,
hired carrying of a thing.
b. Extraordinary bailments for hire, which are
the bailments entered into by——
(1) Innkeepers as to the baggage of their
guests, and
(2) Common carriers of goods.
We shall also have to consider the relations of innkeepers
to the persons of their guests and of common carriers to their
passengers, which are not bailment relations, but are gov-
erned by similar principles. In the present chapter will be
considered some fundamental distinctions applying to all mu-
tual benefit bailments, as regards: 1, the nature of the rela-




















































































































































II .  OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
CHAPTER V. 
CLASSIFICATION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
Classes of mutual benefit 2. Rights and duties of the 
bailments. parties. 
1.  Nature of the relation. § 67. Care. 
Recompense. 3. Termination of the rela-
Custody and service. tion. 
68. Not precarious. 
§ 64. Classes.-Bailments for the mutual benefit of bailor 
and bailee include-
A. Pignus, or pledge, and 
B. Locatio, or hiring. Bailments for hire are-
1. Locatw rei, the hired use of a thing, and 
2. Locatw operis, hired services about a thing. 
a. Ordinary bailments for hire. 
( 1 ) Locatio custodiae, hired custody of a 
thing. 
( 2 ) Locatio operi,s faciendi, hired services 
upon a thing. 
( 3) Locatio operis mercium vehendarum, 
hired carrying of a thing. 
b. Extraordinary bailments for hire, which are 
the bailments entered into by-
( 1 ) Innkeepers as to the baggage of their 
guests, and 
( 2) Common carriers of goods. 
We shall also have to consider the relations of innkeepers 
to the persons of their guests and of common carriers to their 
passengers, which are not bailment relations, but are gov­
erned by similar principles. In the present chapter will be 
considered some fundamental distinctions applying to all mu­
tual benefit bailments, as regards : 1, the nature of the rela­
tion ; 2, its rights and duties, and 3, its termination. 
�G 
CLASSIFICATION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 65'67
1. The Nature of the Relation.
§65. Recompense.—It is characteristic of this baihnent
that there is compensation to the promisor. This may be slight,
indirect or incidental, but it must amount to a legal benefit.
Thus, if A lets his horse to B, nominally gratis, but really on
consideration that B will furnish feed and care for the horse,
the bailment is not a commodatum, but a locatio. So if B
agrees to keep A’s horse gratis, but uses it for his own pur-
poses, beyond the exercise needed to maintain the horse in
good condition, B is not a depositary, but a bailee for hire,
the bailment is a locatio rei, both bailor and bailee derive a
legal benefit.
§66. Custody and services.—Distinctions have often been
attempted between bailments for custody and for serv-
ices. There is no such absolute distinction. The leading
purpose in some bailments is custody, in others services, but
in all custody is necessary and some services as well. The
pledgee has custody primarily but must perform such serv-
ices as are needed to preserve the chattel, and the workman
employed primarily to repair a chattel must incidentally keep
it in his custody. The real question of importance is, not was
it a bailment for custody or for services, but has the bailee
fulfilled with the required diligence the bailment purpose,
both as regards custody and services.
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties.
§ 67. Gare.—In ordinary mutual benefit bailments the dili-
gence demanded of the bailee is ordinary care in view of all
the conditions. What this is has already been explained in
general (§§ 15, 16), and will later be more specifically illus-
trated.
In extraordinary mutual benefit bailments exceptional care
is required amounting, as will later appear, in the case of inn-
keepers and of common carriers of goods and baggage to in-
surance against losses to the goods while in the hands of the
bailee.
§65. [—] Newhall v. Paige, 10 lain v. Cobb, 32 Ia. 161, Vigo Agri-
Gray (Mass.) 366; Woodrufi v. cultural Society v. Brumfiel, 102 Ind.
Painter, 150 Pa. St. 91, 24 Atl. R. 146, 1 N. E. R. 382, 52 Am. R. 657.

















































































































































CLASSH'ICATION AND G�NERAL PlUNCIPLES. §§  65-67 
1.  The Nature of the Relation. 
§ 65. Recompense.-It is characteristic of this bailment 
that there is compensation to the promisor. This may be slight, 
indirect or incidental, but it must amount to a legal benefit. 
Thus, if A lets his horse to B, nominally gratis, but really on 
consideration that B will furnish feed and care for the horse, 
the bailment is not a commodaturn, but a locatio. So if B 
agrees to keep A's horse gratis, but uses it for his own pur­
poses, beyond the exercise needed to maintain the horse in 
good condition, B is not a depositary, but a bailee for hire, 
the bailment is a locatio rei, both bailor and bailee derive a 
legal benefit. 
§ 66. Custody and services.-Distinctions have often been 
attempted between bailments for custody and for serv­
ices. There is no such absolute distinction. The leading 
purpose in some bailments is custody, in others services, but 
in all custody is necessary and some services as well. The 
pledgee has custody primarily but must perform such serv­
ices as are needed to preserve the chattel, and the workman 
employed primarily to repair a chattel must incidentally keep 
it in his custody. The real question of importance is, not was 
it a bailment for custody or for services, but has the bailee 
fulfilled with the required diligence the bailment purpose, 
both as regards custody and services. 
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties. 
§ 67. Care.-In ordinary mutual benefit bailments the dili­
gence demanded of the bailee is ordinary care in view of all 
the conditions. What this is has already been explained in 
general ( §§  15, 16 ) , and will later be more specifically illus­
trated. 
In extraordinary mutual benefit bailments exceptional care 
is required amounting, as will later appear, in the case of inn­
keepers and of common carriers of goods and baggage to in­
surance against losses to the goods while in the hands of the 
bailee. 
§ 65. [-] Newhall v. Paige, 10 lain v .  Cobb, 32 Ia. 161, Vigo Agri­
Gray (Mass. ) 366 ; Woodruff v. cultural Society v. Brumfiel, 102 Ind. 
Painter, 150 Pa. St. 91, 24 Atl. R. 146, 1 N. E. R. 382, 52 Am. R. 657. 
6211 30 Am. St. B. 786 ; Chamber-
'2i 
§68 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS.
3. The Termination of the Relation.
§68. Not preca.ri0us.—Mutua1 benefit bailments are not
often at will. Each party gives value to the other and there-
by acquires legal rights of a substantial nature which the
other is bound to respect. The relation, therefore, is not to
be lightly terminated, either by one of the parties or by oper-
ation of law, until the time has expired or the purpose has
been accomplished. Subject to these conditions, the relation
may be terminated as has been previously pointed out (§§ 24-
38).

















































































































































� 68 OF M:UTU AL 13ENEF11' BAIL::MENTS. 
3. Tke Termination of the Relation. 
§ 68. Not precarioua.-Mutual benefit bailments are not 
often at will. Each party gives value to the other and there­
by acquires legal rights of a substantial nature which the 
other is bound to respect. The relation, therefore, is not to 
be lightly terminated, either by one of the parties or by oper­
ation -0f law, until the time has expired or the purpose has 
been accomplished. Subject to these conditions, the relation 
may be terminated as has been previously pointed out ( § §  24-
38) . 




























A. PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE.
Definition of pledge.




























‘The measure of dam-
ages.
§93. Pledgor warrants his title.
94. Property of pledgor.
3. Termination of the pledge.
95. Classification.
A. Termination by act of the
parties.
1. By act of the pledgor.
96. (1) Full performance.
97. (2) Default of pledgor.
98. illemedies of the pledgee.
99. —i—a. Suit on the debt.
b. Exercise power of
sale.
100. i——(a) Sale at com-
mon law.
101. i-iChoses in action.
102. -ab) Sale in equity.
103 —i(c) Special con-
tract.
104. ————(d) Statutory sale.
105. ——iEquitable principles
apply.





2. By act of the pledgee.
(1) Termination by consent
of pledgee.
(2) Wrong of pledgee.
Redelivery.
- §69. Definition.—A pignus, or pledge, is a bailment to
secure the performance of an obligation, with power of sale
in case of default.
§69. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 199; [—] Stearns v. Marsh, 4


















































































































































A. PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE. 
§ 69. Definition of pledge. 
1. Nature of tM relation. 
70. Bailment the incident. 
71. --The pledge contract. 
72. Distinction between pledge, 
chattel mortgage and lien. 
73. --Intention governs. 
74. Subject; matter. 
75. --Incorporeal property. 
76. Corporate stock. 
77. --Exceptions. 
78. Delivery. 
79. The obligation secured. 
80. --Limitations. 
�. Bights and duties of the 
parties. 
81. Custody. 
82. Profits and expenses. 
83. Right to use. 
84. ASBignment by the pledgee. 
85. --Negotiable instruments. 
86. -Corporate stock. 
87. Rights of pledgee. 
88. --Bills of lading, ware-
house receipts... 
89. Care. 
90. Proceeds of collateral. 
9�. Conversion by pledgee. 
92. --The measure of dam­
ages. 
� 93. Pledgor warrants his title. 
U4. Property of pledgor. 
3. Termination of the pledge. 
95. Classification. 
A. Termination by act of the 
parties. 
1. By act of the pledgor. 
96. ( l )  Full performance. 
97. ( 2 )  Default of pledgor. 
98. �Remedies of the pledgee. 
99. a. Suit on the debt. 
b. Exercise power of 
sale. 
100. (a)  Sale at com-
mon law. 
101. Choses in action. 
102. (b) Sale in equity. 
103. ( c) Special con­
tract. 
104. (d)  Statutory sale. 
105. Equitable principles 
apply. 
106. Equity of redemp-
tion. 
2. By act of the pledgee. 
107. ( 1 )  Termination by consent 
of pledgee. 
108. (2 )  Wrong of pledgee. 
109. Redelivery. 
§ 69. Deftnition.-A pignus, or pledge, is a bailment to 
secure the performance of an obligation, with power of sale · 
in case of default. 
§ 69. [-] Cogge v. Bernard, 2 199 ; [-] Stearne v. Marsh, 4 
Ld. Raymond 909, l Sm. Lead. Cas. Denio (N. Y. ) 227, 47 Am. D. 248 ; 
29 
§§ 70.72 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS.
Pawn, pledge, collateral security, are words of varying de-
grees of respectability designating essentially the same sort
of transaction. Whether the pawnor or pledgor deals with
the pawnee or pledgee under the historic, and sometimes un-
savory, name of pawnbroker, or with the modern collateral
security bank, or the great loan and security corporations,
or the banks that furnish in support of commercial enter-
prises vast sums whose repayment is secured by the deposit
of all sorts of personal property, the legal relations of the
parties are subject to the same rules.
1. The Nature of the Relation.
§70. Bailment the incident.—A pledge differs from other
bailments in that the bailment is secondary, a mere incident
to the primary contract the performance of which is secured
by the pledge. This primary contract is usually an undertak-
ing to pay a debt, but it may be any other engagement.
§71. -—-The pledge contract.—The pledge is first a con-
tract and second a bailment, and the general principles before
referred to, competency of parties, consideration, mutuality,
delivery, ctc., apply to the pledge. An agent may be author-
ized to pledge the property of his principal, a partner may
pledge the partnership goods to secure a partnership debt,
but not his personal engagement, and a corporation may
pledge its corporate property to secure the performance of
an obligation not ultra vires, subject to the usual restrictions
of agency, partnership, and corporate powers.
§72. The distinction between pledge, chattel mortgage,
and lien often becomes important because of diffierent meth-
ods of applying the security to extinguish the debt. The
chief distinction in law between the pledge and mortgage is
one of title. The pledgee secures only a special property ac-
[—] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 428, 48 Ala. 194, 28 So. R. 603, 85 Am. St.
Am. D. 235; Brewster v. Hartley, 37 R. 21; [—] Geilfuss v. Corrigan, 95
Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237. Wis. 651, 70 N. W. R. 306, 60 Am.
§70. See 49 Am. D. 730, note. St. R. 143; Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3
§71. Shaw v. Spencer, 100 ;\iass. Mich. 104, 61 Am. D. 480; Bryson
382, 97 Am. D. 107. v. Rayner, 25 Md. 424, 90 Am. D. 69;
§ 72. Lucketts v. Townsend, 3 Tex. Cilmcr v. Morris, 80 Ala. 78, 60 Am.
119; 49 Am. D. 723; [—] American R. 85; Wright v. Ross, 36 Calif. 414.

















































































































































§§ 70-72 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
Pawn, pledge, collateral security, are words of varying de­
grees of respectability designating essentially the same sort 
of transaction. Whether the pawnor or pledgor deals with 
the pawnee or pledgee under the historic, and sometimes un­
savory, name of pawnbroker, or with the mod ern collateral 
security bank, or the great loan and security corporations, 
or the banks that furnish in support of commercial enter­
prises vast sums whose repayment is secured by the deposit 
of all sorts of personal property, the legal relations of the 
parties are subject to the same rules. 
1. The Nature of the Relation. 
§ 70. Bailment the incident.-A pledge differs from other 
bailments in that the bailment is secondary, a mere incident 
to the primary contract the performance of which is secured 
by the pledge. This primary contract is usually an undertak­
ing to pay a debt, but it may be any other engagement. 
§ 71. --The pledge contract.-The pledge is first a con­
tract and second a bailment, and the general principles before 
referred to, competency of parties, consideration, mutuality, 
delivery, etc., apply to the pledge. An agent may be author­
ized to pledge the property of his principal, a partner may 
pledge the partnership goods to secure a partnership debt, 
but not his personal engagement, and a corporation may 
pledge its corporate property to secure the performance of 
an obligation not ultra vires, subject to the usual restrictions 
of agency, partnership, and corporate powers. 
§ 72. The distinction between pledge, chattel mortgage, 
and lien often becomes important because of different meth­
ods of applying the security to extinguish the debt. The 
chief distinction in law between the pledge and mortgage is 
one of title. 'fhe pledgee secures only a special property ac-
[ -] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 428, 48 
Arn. D. 235 ; Brewster v. Hartley, 37 
Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237. 
§ 70. See 49 Am. D. 730, note. 
§ 71. Shaw v. Spencer, 100 .Mass. 
38:?, 97 Am. D. 107. 
§ 72. Lucketts v. Townsend, 3 Tex. 
l 19 ; 49 Am. D. 723 ; [-] American 
Pig Iron, etc., Co. v. Ge1·man, 126 
Ala. 194, 28 So. R. 603, 85 Am. St. 
R. 21 ; [-] Geilfuss v. Corrigan, 95 
Wis. 651, 70 N. W. R. 306, 60 Am. 
St. R. 143 ; Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3 
Mich. 104, 61 Am. D. 480 ; Bryson 
v. Rayner, 25 Md. 424, 90 Am. D. 69 ; 
Gilmer v. Morris, 80 Ala. 78, 60 Am. 
R. 85 ; Wright v. Ross, 36 Calif. 414. 
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PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE. 73-74
companied by possession; the mortgagee acquires at once the
legal title with, or more often without, possession, subject to
be defeated upon performance of the condition. The title of
the mortgagee becomes absolute at law upon breach of the
condition; the title of the pledgee never becomes absolute,
but upon default he acquires a power of sale. Like the
pledgee, the lien-holder has a special property and possession
but he has no power of sale.
The mortgage, pledge, and lien are alike in that they are
intended as security for a debt and are in equity subject to
redemption upon payment of the debt, and it has been held
that the two forms of security, pledge and mortgage, may be
combined in one.
§73. ——Intention governs.——In construing such contracts
courts look to the intention of the parties. This, if clearly
apparent, governs, rather than any name applied by the par-
ties themselves. Thus, a bill of sale, a transfer of stock, an
assignment of an incorporeal chattel, have been regarded as
pledges or mortgages where other writings or the conduct
of the parties made it clear to the court that such was their
intention. If the debt be secured by delivery of possession
of the chattel, the law prefers to regard the transaction as a
pledge rather than a mortgage.
§74. Subject-matter.—“It has been doubted whether in-
corporeal things like debts, money and stocks, etc., which can
not be manually delivered, were the proper subjects of a
pledge. It is now held that they are so; and there seems to be
no reason why any legal or equitable interest whatever in per-
sonal property may not be pledged, provided the interest can
be put, by actual delivery or by written transfer, into the hands
or within the power of the pledgee.”
Property not yet in existence, strictly speaking, cannot be
pledged, but a contract of pledge is valid and when the prop-
erty comes into existence, and the debtor takes possession, his
§73. [—] Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307; [—] Hall
Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307; McCoy v. v. Page, 4 Ga. 428, 48 Am. D. 235;
Lassiter, 95 N. C. 88; British Co- Brewster v. Hartley, 37 Calif. 15, 99
lumbia Bank v. Marshall, 8 Sawyer Am. D. 237. See also 22 Am. &
(U. S.) 297; Wright v. Ross, 36 Eng. Encyc. of Law 846, and cases
Calif. 414. cited.

















































































































































PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE. §§ 73-74 
companied by possession ; the mortgagee acquires at once the 
legal title with, or more often without, possession, subject to 
be defeated upon performance of the condition. The title of 
the mortgagee becomes absolute at law upon breach of the 
condition ; the title of the pledgee never becomes absolute, 
but upon default h� acquires a power of sale. Like the 
pledgee, the lien-holder has a special property and possession 
but he has no power of sale. 
The mortgage, pledge, and lien are alike in that they are 
intended as security for a debt and are in equity subject to 
redemption upon payment of the debt, and it has been neld 
that the two forms of security, pledge and mortgage, may be 
combined in one. 
§ 73. --Intention governs.-In construing such contracts 
courts look to the intention of the parties. This, if clearly 
apparent, governs, rather than any name applied by the par­
ties themselves. Thus, a bill of sale, a transfer of stock, an 
assignment of an incorporeal chattel, have been regarded as 
pledges or mortgages where other writings or the conduct 
of the parties made it clear to the court that such was their 
intention. If the debt be secured by delivery of possession 
of the chattel, the law prefers to regard the transaction as a 
pledge rather than a mortgage. 
§ 74. Subject-matter.-' ' It has been doubted whether in­
corporeal things like debts, money and stocks, etc., which can 
not be manually delivered, were the proper subjects of a 
pledge. It is now held that they are so ; and there seems to be 
no reason why any legal or equitable interest whatever in per­
sonal property may not be pledged, provided the interest can 
be put, by actual delivery or by written transfer, into the hands 
or within the power of the pledgee. ' '  
Property not yet in existence, strictly speaking, cannot be 
pledged, but a contract of pledge is valid and when the prop­
erty comes into existence, and the debtor takes possession, bis 
§ 73. [-] Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307 ; [-] Hall 
Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307 ; McCoy v. v. Page, 4 Ga. 428, 48 Am. D. 235 ; 
Lassiter, 95 N. C. 88 ; British Co- Brewster v. Hartley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 
lumbia Bank v. Marshall, 8 Sawyer Am. D. 237. See also 22 Am. & 
(U. S.) 297 ; Wright v. Ross, 36 Eng. Eneye. of Law 846, and cases 
Calif. 414. cited. 
§ 74. [-] Wilson v. Little, 2 N. 
31 
§§ 75-77 Or MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS.
rights as pledgee immediately attach. Thus, future crops, the
increase of animals, and products of manufacture may be
contracted in pledge.
And property by statute exempt from execution may, never-
theless, be pledged, just as it may be mortgaged or sold. So
one having a special property in chattels may pledge his
interest, and with the owner’s consent one may pledge the
property of another.
§75. ——Incorporeal property is pledged by delivery of
the paper which represents the property. This should be ac-
companied by written assignment or indorsement, but it has
been held that this is not necessary, and manual delivery of
a promissory note, bill of lading, warehouse receipt, policy of
insurance, or savings-bank book, with the intention of pledg-
ing the property evidenced thereby, is an effectual pledge,
vesting an equitable interest in the pledgee.
§76. ifiorporate stock.—Subject to the liens and privi-
leges imposed upon it by law, corporate stock may be and
frequently is offered as collateral to secure debts. This is
usually done by a written transfer of title which, like the
delivery of possession, affords the evidence of the pledgee’s
special property in the chattel pledged. To make complete
transfer of the shares mere delivery of the stock certificate is
not enough. The by-laws of corporations usually require, in
addition to the written assignment, a transfer of title on the
books of the company; but this does not deprive the pledgor
of his general property in the stock nor of his interest in the
corporate funds.
§ 77. ——Exceptions.—For reasons of public policy the law
forbids the pledging of pensions and the pay of soldiers and
sailors. And our national banks are forbidden to accept their
own stock as security for a loan, unless it be necessary to
§75. [—] Wilson v. Little, 2 N.
Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307; [—] Geil-
fuss v. Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651, 70 N.
W. R. 306, 60 Am. St. R. 143; Crain
v. Paine, 4 Cush. (Mass) 483, 50
Am. D. 807; Collins v. Dawley, 4
Colo. 138, 34 Am. R. 72; White v.
Phelps, 14 Minn. 27, 100 Am. D.
190. But compare Brewster v.
Hartley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237.
§76. [—] Wilson v. Little, 2 N.
Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307; Brewster v.
Hartley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237.
§7 7. Merchants’ Bank v. Hall,
83 N Y. 338, a8 Am. R. 434;


















































































































































§§ 75-77 01'' MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
rights as pledgee immediately attach. Thus, future crops, the 
increase of animals, and products of manufacture may be 
contracted in pledge. 
And property by statute exempt from execution may, never­
theless, be pledged, just as it may be mortgaged or sold. So 
one having a special property in chattels may pledge his 
interest, and with the owner 's consent one may pledge the 
property of another. 
§ 75. --Incorporeal property is pledged by delivery of 
the paper which represents the property. This should be ac­
companied by written assignment or indorsement, but it has 
been held that this is not necessary, and manual delivery of 
a promissory note, bill of lading, warehouse receipt, policy of 
insurance, or savings-bank book, with the intention of pledg­
ing the property evidenced thereby, is an effectual pledge, 
vesting an equitable interest in the pledgee. 
§ 76. --Corporate stock.-Subject to the liens and privi­
leges imposed upon it by law, corporate stock may be and 
frequently is offered as collateral to secure debts. This is 
usually done by a written transfer of title which, like the 
delivery of possession, affords the evidence of the pledgee 's 
special property in the chattel pledged. To make complete 
transfer of the shares mere delivery of the stock certificate is 
not enough. The by-laws of corporations usually require, in 
addition to the written assignment, a transfer of title on the 
books of the company ; but this does not deprive the pledgor 
of his general property in the stock nor of his interest in the 
corporate funds. 
§ 77. --Exceptions .-For reasons of public policy the law 
forbids the pledging of pensions and the pay of soldiers and 
sailors. And our national banks are forbidden to accept their 
own stock as security for a loan, unless it be necessary to 
§ 75. [ -] Wilson v. Little, 2 N. 
Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307 ; [ -] Geil­
fnss v. Corrigan , 95 Wis. 651, 70 N. 
W. R. 306, 60 Am. St. R. 143 ; Crain 
v. Paine, 4 Cush. (Mass. ) 483, 50 
Am. D. 807 ; Collins v .  Dawley, 4 
Colo. 138, 34 Am. R. 72 ; White v. 
Phelps, 14 Minn. 27, 100 Am. D. 
190. But compare Brewster v. 
Hartley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237. 
§ 76. [-] Wilson Y. Little, 2 N. 
Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307 ; Brewster v. 
Hartley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237. 
§ 77. Merchants ' Bank v. Hall, 
83 N Y. 338, 38 Am. R. 434 ; 
Schouler, Bailments & Carriers, 
§ 177. 
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PIGNUS, On PLEDGE. §§ 73-30
secure a debt already contracted in good faith. By loans on
such security the assets of a bank might be seriously im-
paired.
§78. Delivery, actual or constructive, is vital to a good
pledge. As has before appeared, this may be manual delivery
of the property or of the evidence of the property, or con-
structive delivery. Delivery to a third person, who holds pos-
session as agent of the pledgee, is sufficient. In every case
there should be such change of possession and indications of
ownership as conditions permit. For the protection of the
pledgee against third persons having claims against the
pledgor, it is of prime importance that the property be placed
beyond the control of the pledgor.
§79. The obligation secured by the pledge may be the
payment of money or the performance of any other legal en-
gagement. The debt secured may be present, past or future,
absolute or conditional, one ’s own or that of another; it may
include many debts, a single debt or any part of a debt; the
security may be for obligations now outstanding, or be a con-
tinuing security against debts as they may arise.
However, if the debt be illegal the pledge is invalid; the
law will aid neither party, but will leave them where it finds
them. Neither can recover against the other if he must set
up the illegal contract to do so.
§80. ——Limitations.——But the pledge secures only the
debt for which it was pledged and can not be held as security
for other indebtedness, nor for a different or greater security
than was intended.
The pledge does secure the performance of the whole and
every part of the obligation, and no part of the pledge can
be reclaimed by the pledgee until the entire engagement is
performed.
§78. [—] Geilfuss v. Corrigan,
95 Wis. 651, 70 N. W. R. 306, 60
Am. St. R. 143; Brewster v. Hart-
ley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237, 22
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 857,
858.
§79. Third National Bank v.
Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 22 Am. R. 35;
Merchants’ Bank v. Hall, 83 N. Y.
338, 38 Am. R. 434.
§80. Ball v. Stanley, 5 Yerg.
(.Tenn.) 199, 26 Am. D. 263;
[—] Masonic Savings Bank v.

















































































































































PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE. §§ 78-80 
secure a debt already contracted in good faith. By loans oil 
such security the assets of a bank might be seriously im­
paired. 
§ 78. Delivery, actual or constructive, is vital to a good 
pledge. As has before appeared, this may be manual delivery 
of the property or of the evidence of the property, or con­
structive delivery. Delivery to a third person, who holds pos­
session as agent of the pledgee, is sufficient. In every case 
there should be such change of possession and indications of 
ownership as conditions permit. For the protection of the 
pledgee against third persons having claims against the 
pledgor, it is of prime importance that the property be placed 
beyond the control of the pledgor. 
§ 79. The obligation secured by the pledge may be the 
payment of money or the performance of any other legal en­
gagement. The debt secured may be present, past or future, 
absolute or conditional, one 's own or that of another ; it may 
include many debts, a single debt or any part of a debt ; the 
security may be for obligations now outstanding, or be a con­
tinuing security against debts as they may arise. 
However, if the debt be illegal the pledge is invalid ; the 
law will aid neither party, but will leave them where it finds 
them. Neither can recover against the other if he must set 
up the illegal contract to do so. 
§ 80. --Limitations.-But the pledge secures only the 
debt for which it was pledged and can not be held as security 
for other indebtedness, nor for a different or greater security 
than was intended. 
The pledge does secure the performance of the whole and 
every part of the obligation, and no part of the pledge can 
be reclaimed by the pledgee until the entire engagement is 
performed. 
§ 78. [ -] Geilfuss v. Corrigan, 
95 Wis. 651, 70 N. W. R. 306, 60 
Am. St. R. 143 ; Brewster v. Hart· 
ley, 37 Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237, 22 
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 857, 
858. 
§ 79. Third National Bank v. 
3 
Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 22 Am. R. 35 ; 
Merchants ' Bank v. Hall, 83 N. Y. 
338, 38 Am. R. 434. 
§ 80. Ball v. Stanley, 5 Yerg. 
( Tenn. ) 199, 26 Am. D. 263 ; 
[-] Masonic Savings Bank "· 
Bangs 's Adm 'r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am. 
33 
81-83 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS.
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties.
§81. Gustody.—The first right of the pledgee is exclusive
possession of the thing pledged. This right is good against
all the world, including the pledgor, and continues not only
during the time for which it was pledged, but until the debt
is fully satisfied. To vindicate his right the pledgee may
maintain replevin against anyone who deprives him of his
possession; or he may recover against his pledgor his dam-
ages, and against other disseisors trover for the full value of
the chattel, holding the surplus beyond his own interests in
trust for the pledgor.
§82. Profits and expenses.—The natural profits of the
pledge while retained by the pledgee become part of the
pledge security and must be used to reduce the debt. Such
are the young of animals, milk from cows, and dividends
from stock, if the stock stands in the name of the pledgee.
The expenses, too, reasonably necessary for the proper pres-
ervation of the pledge, must be borne by the pledgee, who
may, of course, look to the pledgor for reimbursement before
the pledged goods can be reclaimed. Profits become part of
the pledged property, expenses part of the debt secured.
§83. Right to use.-—The pledgee has no right to use the
property pledged to its injury. The old cases allow him such
use of it as is not detrimental thereto, but the modern view
is that he has no right to use it, further than is needful for
its proper care, unless the contract of pledge is such that the
owner’.s consent may be fairly inferred. Wrongful use does
not terminate the pledge, but makes the pledgee absolutely
liable for any resulting injury to the property.
St. R. 197; Collins v. Dawley, 4- -.16 Am. D. 689; Plucker v. Teller, 174
Colo. 138, 34 Am. R. 72; Merchantwg, Pa. St. 529, 34 Atl. R. 208, 52 Am.
Bank v. Hall, S3 N. Y. 338, 38 Am.' St. R. 825; [—] Allen v. Delano, 55
R. 434. Me. 113, 92 Am. D. 573.
§81. [—] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 7 §83. [—] Stearns v. Marsh, 4
428, 48 Am. D. 235; Treadwell v. Denio (N. Y.) 227, 47 Am. D. 248,
Davis, 34 Calif. 601, 94 Am. D. 770; 22 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 864;
Adams v. O’Connor, 100 Mass. 515, Schouler, Bailments and Carriers,
1 Am. R. 137. §§ 211, 212. Compare [—] Coggs v.
§82. [—] Houton v. Holliday, 2 Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm.
Murph. (N. C.) 111, 5 Am. D. 522; Lead. Cas. 199.

















































































































































§ §  81-83 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
2. Righ ts and Duties of the Parties. 
§ 81. Custody.-The first right of the pledgee is exclusive 
possession of the thing pledged. This right is good against 
all the world, includiI}.g the pledgor, and continues not only 
during the time for which it was pledged, but until the debt 
is fully satisfied. To vindicate his right the pledgee may 
maintain replevin against anyone who deprives him of his 
possession ; or he may recover against his pledgor his dam· 
ages, and against other disseisors trover for the full value of 
the chattel, holding the surplus beyond his own interests in 
trust for the pledgor. 
§ 82. Profits and expenses .-The natural profits of the 
pledge while retained by the pledgee become part of the 
pledge security and must be used to reduce the debt. Such 
are the young of animals, milk from cows, and dividends 
from stock, if the stock stands in the name of the pledgee. 
The expenses, too, reasonably necessary for the proper pres­
ervation of the pledge, must be borne by the pledgee, who 
may, of course, look to the pledgor for reimbursement before 
the pledged goods can be reclaimed. Profits become part of 
the pledged property, expenses part of the debt secured. 
§ 83. Right to use.-The pledgee has no right to use the 
property pledged to its injury. The old cases allow him such 
use of it as is not detrimental thereto, but the modern view 
is that he has no right to use it, further than is needful fnr 
its proper care, unless the contract of pledge is such that the 
owner '.s consent may be fairly inferred. Wrongful use does 
not terminate the pledge, but makes the pledgee absolutely 
liable for any resulting injury to the property. 
St. R. 197 ; Collins v. Dawley, 4 ;,1 6 Am. D. 689 ; Plucker v. Teller, 174 
Colo. 138, 34 Am. R. 72 ; Merchants ' jf• Pa. St. 529, 34 Atl. R. 208, 52 Am. 
Bank v. Hall, 83 N. Y. 338, 38 Am. St. R. 825 ; [-] Allen v. Delano, 55 
R. 434. �· Me. 113, 92 Am. D. 573. 
§ 81. [-] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. ' § 83. [-] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 
428, 48 Am. D. 235 ; Treadwell v. Denio (N. Y.) 227, 47 Am. D. 248, 
Davis, 34 Calif. 601, 94 Am. D. 770 ; 22 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 864 ; 
Adams v. 0 'Connor, 100 ·Mass. 515, 8chouler, Bailments and Carriers, 
1 Am. R. 137. §§ 211, 212. Compare [-] Coggs v . .  
§ 82. [ -] Routon v. Holliday, 2 Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 1 Sm. 
Murph. (N. C. ) 111,  5 Am. D. 522 ; Lead. Cas. 199. 
Sellick v. Munson, 2 Aik, (Vt. ) 150 ; 
34 
PIGNUS, On "PLEDGE. §§ 84.36
§84. Assignment by the pledgee.—The pledge is an inci-
dent of the debt and may be assigned with it. The pledgee
may sell, assign, or pledge all his interest in the pawn without‘
affecting the security. His assignee or pledgee acquires his
title, but no more. The usual exception exists in the case of
negotiable instruments taken bona fide in the course of~trade,
and of other property if the pledgor had clothed the pledgee
with apparent authority, or with the indicia of ownership.
The assignment of the debt should be accompanied by a
transfer of the pledge. If it is not, the assignee will still have
an equitable interest in the pledge which he can enforce
against all except an innocent holder.
§85. --—Negotiab1e instruments.—The pledgee taking ne-
gotiable instruments bona fide for value as security for a debt,
takes them free from equities, like any other transferee, and
may acquire a better title than his pledgor. Whether a pledge
to secure a pre-existing debt is a transfer for value is in dis-
pute, but the weight of authority is with the rule of the
United States Supreme Court to the effect that taking sc-
curity for a pre-existing debt constitutes the pledgee a holder
for value.
The courts that deny this admit that there is value if the
pledgee, when taking the negotiable security, gives up any
right. Thus, a pledgee is a holder for value if he accepted
the securities in payment of a pre-existing debt, or surren-
dered other securities, or extended the time for payment, or
forebore to sue. The fact that one is an accommodation in-
dorser is no defence against the pledgee.
§86. ——G0rpora.te stock.——Stock certificates are not ne-
gotiable instruments. Hence, unless the owner had clothed
him with the muniments of title, the pledgor can give his
pledgee no better title than he himself had. As to the part-ies
themselves, and others charged with knowledge of the transac-
tion, a pledge by delivery of the stock, accompanied by an
assignment and a power of attorney to make the transfer on
the books of the corporation. is effectual even where the by-
§84. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 29, of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters (U.
66 Am. D. 752; Homer v. Savings S.) 1, and Bay v. Coddington. 5
Bank, 7 Conn. 478. Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 54, 20 Johns. 637.

















































































































































PIGNUS, OR · PLEDGE. §§ 84-86 
§ 8-4. Assignment by the pledgee.-The pledge is an inci­
dent of the debt and may be assigned with it. The pledgee 
may sell, assign, or pledge all his interest in the pawn without' 
affecting the security. His assignee or pledgee acquires his 
title, but no more. The usual exception exists in the case of 
negotiable instruments taken bona fide in the course of · trade, 
and of other property if the pledgor had clothed the pledgee 
with apparent authority, or with the indicia of ownership. 
The assignment of the debt should be accompani�d by a 
transfer of the pledge. If it is not, the assignee will still have 
an equitable interest in the pledge which he can enforce 
against all except an innocent holder. 
§ 85. -Negotiable instruments.-The pledgee taking ne­
gotiable instruments bona fide for value as security for a debt, 
takes them free from equities, like any other transferee, and 
may acquire a better title than his pledgor. Whether a pledge 
to secure a pre-existing debt is a transfer for value is in dis­
pute, but the weight of authority is with the rule of the 
United States Supreme Court to the effect that taking se­
curity for a pre-existing debt constitutes the pledgee a holder . 
for value. 
The courts that deny this admit that there is value if the 
pledgee, when taking the negotiable security, gives up any 
right. Thus, a pledgee is a holder for value if he accepted 
the securities in payment of a pre-existing debt, or surren­
dered other securities, or extended the time for payment, or 
forebore to sue. 'l'he fact that one is an accommodation in­
dorser is no defence against the pledg�e. 
§ 86. --Corporate stock.-Stock certificates are not ne­
gotiable instruments. Hence, unless the owner had clotlied 
him with the muniments of title, the pledgor can give his 
pledgee no better title than he himself had. As to the parties 
themselves, and others charged with knowledge of the transac­
tion, a pledge by delivery of the stock, accompanied by an 
assignment and a power of attorney to make the transfer on 
the books of the corporation. is effectual even where the by-
§ 84. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 29, 
66 Am. D. 752 ; Homer v. Savings 
Bank, 7 Conn. 478. 
§ 85. Compare the leading cases 
of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters (U. 
� - )  1, and Bay v. Coddington. !i 









OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS.
laws of the corporation require a transfer on its books. But
as to the corporation and innocent third persons, transfer on
the books is necessary.
§ 87. ——Rights of pledgee.——'l‘he pledgee, under his power
of attorney, may compel a transfer to him on the books of
the corporation, after which he has the right to vote the
stock and collect the dividends, applying them to a reduction
of the debt secured. If he appears on the books as owner of
the stock, he not only acquires the rights but assumes the
liability of a stockholder.
As between the pledgor and pledgee, however, the pledgor
is still the general owner, the pledgee has a special property
only and upon payment of the debt this is extinguished.
§88. :Bil1s of lading, warehouse receipts, etc., are usu-
ally assigned like negotiable instruments by mere indorseinent,
but are not in other respects negotiable. They are merely
representatives of the goods, and when pledged are subject
to the same rules that govern the pledge of corporeal chat-
tels. The pledgee, in general, gets no better title than his
pledgor.
§89. Gare.—'l‘he ordinary care of a mutual benefit bail-
ment has been explained and little need be added here. If
the pledge property be choses in action, the duty of the
pledgee is not limited to their safe-keeping. He must take all
necessary steps at proper times to keep alive and to collect
the rights represented by the paper. Thus, in case of promis-
§86. Spreckels v. Nevada Bank, 100 Am. D. 363; Douglas v. Peo-
113 Calif. 272, 45 Pac. R. 329, 54
Am. St. R. 348; [—] Gemmell v./
Davis, 75 Md. 546, 23 Atl. R. 1032,
32 Am. St. R. 412.
§87. Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S.
328; Spreckels v. Nevada Bank, 113
Calif. 272, 45 Pac. R. 329, 54 Am.
St. R. 348; [—] Gemmell v. Davi,
75 Md. 546, 23 Atl. R. 1032, 32 Am.
St. R. 412; State v. Bank of New
England, 70 Minn. 398, 73 N. W. R.
153, 68 Am. St. R. 538, 542 note.
§88. Burton v. Curyea, 40 Ill.
320, 89 Am. D. 350; Davenport Na-
tional Bank v. Homeyer, 45 Mo. 145,
ple’s Bank, 86 Ky. 176, 5 S. W. R.
420, 9 Am. St. R. 276, post secs. 151,
‘J22 and cases there cited.
§89. [—] Preston v. Prather,
137 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162;
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters (U. S.) 1;
Third National Bank v. Boyd, 44
Md. 47, 22 Am. R. 35; Cooper v.
Simpson, 41 Minn. 46, 42 N. W. R.
601, 16 Am. St. R. 667; Ware v.
Squyer, 81 Minn. a88, 84 N. W.
R. 126, 83 Am. St. R. 390, note;
First National Bank v. O’Connell,
84 Iowa 377, 51 N. W. R. 162, 35

















































































































































§ �  87-89 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
laws of the corporation require a transfer on its books. But 
ns to the corporation and innocent third persons, transfer on 
the books is necessary. 
§ 87. --Rights of pledgee.-'l'he pledgee, under his power 
of attorney, may compel a transfer to him on the books of 
the corporation, after which he has the right to vote the 
stock and collect the dividends, applying them to a reduction 
of the debt secured. If he appears on the books as owner of 
the stock, he not only acquires the rights but assumes the 
liability of a stockholder. 
As between the pledgor and pledgee, however, the pledgor 
is still the general owner, the pledgee has a special property 
only and upon payment of the debt this is extinguished. 
§ 88. --Bills of lading, warehouse receipts, etc., are usu­
ally assigned like negotiable instruments by mere indorsement, 
but are not in other respects negotiable. They are merely 
representatives of the goods, and w,hen pledged are subject 
to the same rules that govern the pledge of corporeal chat­
tels. The pledgee, in general, gets no better title than his 
pledgor. 
§ 89. Care.-The ordinary care of a mutual benefit bail­
ment has been explained and little need be added here. If 
the pledge property be choses in action, the duty of the 
pledgee is not limited to their safe-keeping. He must take all 
necessary steps at proper times to keep alive and to collect 
the rights represented by the paper. Thus, in case of promis-
§ 86. Spreckels v. Nevada Bank, 100 Am. D. 363 ; Douglas v. Peo-
113  Calif. 272, 45 Pac. R. 329, 54 ple 's Bank, 86 Ky. 176, 5 S. W. R. 
Am. St. R. 348 ; [-] Gemmell v. f 420, 9 Am. St. R. 276, post secs. 151, 
Davis, 75 Md. 546, 23 Atl. R. 1032, 222 and cases there cited. 
3� Am. St. R. 412. § 89. [-] Preston v. Prather, 
§ 87. Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 137 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162 ; 
328 ; Spreckels v. Nevada Bank, 113 Swift v .  Tyson, 16 Peters (U.  S.)  1 ;  
Calif. 272, 45 Pac. R. 329, 54 Am. Third National Bank v. Boyd, 44 
St. R. 348 ; [-] Gemmell v. Davis, Md. 47, 22 Am. R. 35 ; Cooper v. 
75 Md. 546, 23 Atl. R. 1032, 32 Am. Simpson, 41 Minn. 46, 42 N. W. R. 
St. R. 412 ; State v. Bank of New 601, 16 Am. St. R. 667 ; Ware v. 
England, 70 Minn. 398, 73 N. W. R. Squycr, 81 Minn. 388, 84 N. W. 
153, 68 Am. St. R. 538, 542 note. R. 126, 83 Am. St. R. 390, note ; 
§ 88. Burton v. Curyea, 40 Ill. First National Bank v. O 'Connell, 
320, 89 Am. D. 350 ; Davenport Na· 84 Iowa 377, 51 N. W. R. 162, 35 
ti onal Bank v. Homeyer, 45 Mo. 145, Am. St. R. 313. 
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sory notes, proper steps must be taken to fix the liability of
indorsers and to collect interest and principal when due. And
in the case of pledged stocks, bonds, bills of lading, etc., ordi-
nary diligence must be exercised in securing the property and
profits represented by such paper. All this is only that care
which an ordinarily prudent business man is wont to exercise
in the conduct of his own affairs of like kind. Any loss
through the negligence of the pledgee may be recouped by the
pledgor by way of counterclaim in an action on the debt.
§90. Proceeds of collateral.—If collateral security be con-
verted into money, the law requires its application on the
debt. If there be a surplus it is money had and received to the
use of the pledgor and the law implies a promise to pay it
over. If the pledgee fails to do so, the pledgor has his choice
of suing in assumpsit for the balance or in equity for an ac-
counting.
§91. Conversion by p1edgee.—If there be a wrongful sale
or misapplication of the pledged property by the pledgee, the
pledgor may sue in assumpsit for the balance in excess of his
debt, or he may sue in trover for conversion. If the property
has been converted, he need not make demand or tender of
the debt before bringing suit.
§92. -——The measure of damages for conversion of the
property by the pledgee is the fair market value of the goods
less the amount of the debt.
Collateral securities, such as stocks, bonds, etc., which are
subject to fluctuating values, present a difficulty, and various
rules have been adopted by the courts as to the price at which
such securities should be valued in assessing damages for
§90. Hunt v. Nevers, 15 Pick.
(Mass.) 500, 26 Am. D. 616;
[—] .Masonic Savings Bank v.
Bangs ’s Adm ’r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am.
St. R. 197.
§91. [—] Stearns v. Marsh, 4
Denio (N. Y.) 227, 47 Am. 1). 248.
§92. [—] Wright v. Bank of
Metropolis, 110 N. Y. 237, 18 N. E.
R. 79, 6 Am.‘ St. R. 356; [—] Wil-
son v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am.
D. 307. See also Fowle v. Ward, 113
Mass. 548, 18 Am. R. 534, Sturges v.
Keith, 57 Ill. 451, 11 Am. R. 28,
Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, 13
Am. R. 507, Third National Bank
v. Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 22 Am. R. 35,
Dolliif v. Robbins, 83 Minn. 498,
86 N. W. R. 772, 85 Am. St. R. 466.
466. .
The Massachusetts and Illinois
cases represent the extreme views.
The New York ease takes the middle
ground and, on the whole, furnishes

















































































































































l>IGNtJS, OR PLEDGE. § §  90-92 
Emry notes, proper steps must be taken to fix the liability of 
indorsers and to collect interest . and principal when due. And 
in the case of pledged stocks, bonds, bills of lading, etc., ordi­
nary diligence must be exercised in securing the property and 
profits represented by such paper. All this is only that care 
which an ordinarily prudent business man is wont to exercise 
in the conduct of his own affairs of like kind. Any loss 
through the negligence of the pledgee may be recouped by the 
pledgor by way of counterclaim in an action on the debt. 
§ 90. Proceeds of collateral.-If collateral security be con­
verted into money, the law requires its application on the 
debt. If there be a surplus it is money had and received to the 
use of the pledgor and the law implies a promise to pay it 
over. If the pledgee fails to do so, the pledgor has his choice 
of suing in assumpsit for the balance or in equity for an ac­
ccunting. 
§ 91. Conversion by pledgee.-If there be a wrongful sale 
or misapplication oi the pledged property by the pledgee, the 
pledgor may sue in assumpsit for the balance in excess of his 
debt, or he may sue in trover for conversion. If the property 
has been converted, he need not make demand or tender of 
the debt before bringing suit. 
§ 92. --The measure of damages for conversion of the 
property by the pledgee is the fair market value of the goods 
less the amount of the debt. 
Collateral securities, such as stocks, bonds, etc ., which are 
subject to fluctuating values, present a difficulty, and various 
rules have been adopted by the courts as to the price at which 
such securities should be valued in assessing damages for 
§ 90. Hunt v. Nevers, 15 Pick. 
( Mass. ) 500, 26 Am. D. 616 ; 
[-] .Masonic Savings Bank v. 
Bangs 's Adm 'r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am. 
St. R. 197. 
§ 91. [-] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 
Denio (N. Y. ) 22i, 47 Am. D. 248. 
§ 92. [-] Wright v. Bank of 
Keith, 57 Ill. 451, 11 Am. R. 28, 
Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211,  13  
Am. R. 507, Third National Bank 
v. Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 22 Am. R. 35, 
Dolliff v. Robbins, 83 Minn. 498, 
86 N. W. R. 772, 85 Am. St. R. 466. 
466. 
The Massachusetts and Illinois 
M etropolis, 110 N. Y. 237, 18 N. E. cases represent the extreme views. 
Ji. 79, 6 Am: St. R. 356 ; [ -] Wil- '!'he New York case takes the middle 
son v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am. ground and, on the whole, furnishes 
D. 307. See also Fowle v. Ward, 113  the most equitable rule. 
�ass. 548, 18 Am. B. 534, Sturges v. 
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their conversion. On the whole, it seems just to allow the
damages that would naturally be sustained by the owner in
restoring himself to his former position, or in other words,
replacing the stock.
Accordingly, the rule supported by reason and the weight
of authority, is that in an action of trover for a conversion of
stocks or bonds, their value is the highest market price of the
securities within a reasonable time after the owner learns of
their conversion. This covers the natural and proximate loss
of the owner, but does not allow him to speculate on the
market and delay bringing suit in the hope that the securities
may reach a higher figure and so increase the damages he may
recover.
§ 93. The pledgor warrants his title, or at least, that he has
sufficient property to make the pledge. As the pledgee takes,
in general, subject to prior liens, the pledgor is liable to him
if they defeat the pledge, unless the pledgee took with knowl-
edge of such claims.
§94. Property of the pledgor.—The general property re-
mains in the pledgor, subject to the pledgee’s lien, even after
default, and he may assign his interest or sell the goods sub-
ject to the lien of the pledge. If the pledge has been deliv-
ered to the pledgee, the assignee will, of course, stand in the
same position as the pledgor. Execution creditors of the
pledgor cannot levy on the pledged property until they have
satisfied the pledgee’s claims. -
3. Termination of the Pledge.
§95. Classification.—The pledge relation may be termi-
nated—
A. By act of the parties. The pledge may be extinguished
by act of-
1. The pledgor, either by '
(1) Performance of the obligation, or
(2) Default in performance.
§93. Story, Bailments & Car-
riers, § 354.
§94. Brewster v. Hartley, 37
Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237; Lough-
borough v. McNevin, 74 Calif. 250,
14 Pac. R. 369, 5 Am. St. R. 435;
[—] Norton v. Baxter, 41 Minn.
146, 42 N. W. R. 865, 16 Am. St. R.
679; [—] Masonic Savings Bank v.
Bangs’s Adm ’r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am.
St. R. 197; [—] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga.

















































































































































§§ 93-95 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
their conversion. On the whole, it seems just to allow the 
damages that would naturally be sustained by the owner in 
restoring himself to his former position, or in other words, 
replacing the stock. 
Accordingly, the rule supported by reason and the weight 
of authority, is that in an action of trover for a conversion of 
stocks or bonds, their value is the highest market price of the 
securities within a reasonable time after the owner learns of 
their conversion. This covers the natural and proximate loss 
of the owner, but does not allow him to speculate on the 
market and delay bringing suit in the hope that the securities 
may reach a higher figure and so increase the damages he may 
recover. 
§ 93. The pledgor warrants his title, or at least, that he has 
sufficient property to make the pledge. As the pledgee takes, 
in general, subject to prior liens, the pledgor is liable to him 
if they defeat the pledge, unless the pledgee took with knowl­
edge of such claims. 
§ 94. Property of the pledgor.-The general property re­
mains in the pledgor, subject to the pledgee 's lien, even after 
default, and he may assign his interest or sell the goods sub­
ject to the lien of the pledge. If the pledge has been deliv­
ered to the pledgee, the assignee will, of course, stand in the 
same position as the pledgor. Execution creditors of the 
pledgor cannot levy on the pledged property until they have 
satisfied the pledgee 's claims. 
3. Termination of the Pledge. 
§ 95. Classification.-The pledge relation may be termi­
nated-
A. By act of the parties. The pledge may be. extinguished 
by act of-
1. The pledgor, either by 
( 1 )  Performance of the obligation, or 
(2)  Default in performance. 
§ 93. Story, Bailments & Car· 
riers, § 354. 
§ 94. Brewster v. Hartley, 37 
Calif. 15, 99 Am. D. 237 ; Lough­
borough v. McNevin, 74 Calif. 250, 
14 Pac. R. 369, 5 Am. St. R. 435 ; 
[-] Norton v. Baxter, 41 Minn. 
1461 42 N. W. R. 865, 16 Am. St. R. 
679 ; [-] Masonic Savings Bank v. 
Bangs 's Adm 'r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am. 
St. R. 197 ; [ -] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 
1128, 48 Am. D. 235. 
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2. The pledgee, who may
(1) Voluntarily relinquish the pledge with-
. out performance, or
(2) Forfeit the pledge by his own wrong.
B. By operation of law the destruction of the chattel works
an extinction of the pledge relation; but a change
in the status of the parties, as by death, marriage, in-
solvency, will not aflfect the pledge contract.
A. -TERMINATION BY Aer Or THE PARTIES.
1. By Act of the Pledgor.
§96. (1.) Full performance of his obligation by the
pledgor is the normal means of terminating the relation..Even
readiness to perform is enough; and tender of the debt at or
after maturity discharges the lien and makes the pledgee, if
he refuses to surrender the pledged property, guilty of con-
version. Nor is it necessary to the discharge of the lien, as
distinguished from the payment of the debt, that the tender be
kept good, or that the money be paid into court. The wrong-
ful refusal to accept payment and deliver the chattel is con-
version and makes the pledgee absolutely liable.
§97. (2.) Default of the pledgor in performance of the
obligation at its maturity gives the pledgee the right to con-
sider the pledge as terminated at once and to proceed to his
remedies. He may, however, treat the contract as still in
force and retain the pledge until the debt is paid, the relation
of the parties to each other and to the pledge continuing as
before default. Indeed, in the absence of an agreement to sell,
the pledgor has no right to complain if the pledgee refuses to
do so. But if securities are likely to perish or seriously shrink
in value, a sale may be compelled by bill in equity.
§98. iltemedies of the p1edgee.—Upon default the
pledged chattel is still a mere security, and does not become
§96. [—] Norton v. Baxter, 41 11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497;
Minn. 146, 42 N. W. R. 865, 16 Am. Schouler, Bailments & Carriers,
St. R. 679; Loughborough v. Mc- §244.
Nevin, 14 Calif. 250, 14 Pac. R. 369, §98. [—-] Robinson v.. Hurley,
5 Am. St. R. 435; Ball v. Stanley, 11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497; Luck-
5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 199, 26 Am. D. 263. etts v. Townsend, 3 Tex. 119, 49 Am.

















































































































































l>IGNUS, OR PLEDGE. 
2. The pledgee, who may 
§ §  96-08 
( 1 ) Voluntarily rel1'.nquish the pledge with­
out performance, or 
(2 )  Forfeit the pledge by his own wrong. 
B. By operation of law the destruclion of the chattel works 
an extinction of the pledge relation ; but a change 
in the status of the parties, as by death, marriage, in­
solvency, will not affect the pledge contract. 
A. · TERMINATION BY ACT OF THE PARTIES. 
1. By A.ct of the Pledgor. 
§ 96. (1.) Full performance of his obligation by the 
pledgor is the normal means of terminating the relation. Even 
readiness to perform is enough ; and tender of the debt at or 
after maturity discharges the lien and makes the pledgee, if 
he refuses to surrender the pledged property, guilty of con­
version. Nor is it necessary to the discharge of the lien, as 
distinguished from the payment of the debt, that the tender be 
kept good, or that the money be paid into court. The wrong­
ful refusal to accept payment and deliver the chattel is con­
version and makes the pledgee absolutely liable. 
§ 97. (2.) Default of the pledgor in performance of the 
obligation at its maturity gives the pledgee the right to con­
sider the pledge as terminated at once and to proceed to his 
remedies. He may, however, treat the contract as still in 
force and retain the pledge until the debt is paid, the relation 
of the parties to each other and to the pledge continuing as 
before default. Indeed, in the absence of an agreement to sell, 
the plecigor has no right to complain if the pledgee refuses to 
do so. But if securities are likely to perish or seriously shrink 
in value, a sale may be compelled by bill in equity. 
§ 98. --Remedies of the pledgee.-Upon default the 
pledged chattel is still a mere security, and does not become 
§ 96. [-] Norton v. Baxter, 41 
Minn. 146, 42 N. W. R. 865, 16 Am. 
Ett. R. 679 ; Loughborough v. Me· 
Nevin, 14 Calif. 250, 14 Pac. R. 369, 
5 Am. St. R. 435 ; Ball v. Stanley, 
5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 199, 26 Am. D. 263. 
§ 97. [-] Robinson v. Hurley, 
1 1  Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497 ; 
Schouler, Ra.ilments & Carriers, 
§ 244. 
§ 98. [-] Robinson v .. Hurley, 
1 1  Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497 ; Luck­
etts v. Townsend, 3 Tex. 119, 49 Am. 
D. 723. 
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the property of the pledgee. To realize on his debt he may——
a. Sue upon the debt.
b. Exercise his power of sale by-
(a) A sale at common law,
(b) A proceeding in equity,
(c) A special power given in the pledge contract, or
(d) A statutory sale.
§99. isuit on the debt.—The pledgee is not compelled
to rely on the security of his pledge. He may, without losing
his lien, sue the pledgor personally on the debt. The pledge
security continues until he has obtained not only judgment
but satisfaction on the debt.
§100. ——(a) Sale at common 1aw.—After default of the
pledgor, the pledgee may demand payment, and upon failure
of the debtor to comply, sell the goods at public sale after
reasonable notice to the debtor of the time and place of sale.
The purpose of the notice is to enable the pledgor to see that
the sale is fairly conducted and to find bidders to enhance
the price. If he knows of the sale therefore it is enough,
though if the pledgee fails to give such notice he assumes the
burden of showing actual knowledge by the pledgor. If the
pledgor cannot be found there must be a judicial sentence
to warrant the sale.
The public sale must be conducted with perfect fairness
and the pledgee cannot himself, either directly or indirectly,
be the purchaser. If he buys the sale is voidable, and the
pledgor may treat the pledge contract as still in force.
§101. Z-Ohoses in action.—The law requires a public
sale to insure the best terms for the pledgor. But such sale of
stocks, bonds, notes and the like might result in large sacri-
§99. [—] Robinson v. Hurley,
11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497; Wal-
lace v. Finnegan, 14 Mich. 170, 90
Am. D. 243. Note to 73 Am. St. R.
567; Fisher v. Fisher, 98 Mass. 303;
Ehrlich v. Ewald, 66 Cal. 97, 4 Pac.
R. 1062.
§100. [—] Robinson v. Hurley,
11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497;
[—] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio (N.
Y.) 227, 47 Am. D. 248; Lucketts
v Townsend, 3 Texas 119, 49 Am.
D. 721, 723; [—] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga.
428, 48 Am. D. 235; [-—] Mary-
land Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md.
242, 89 Am. D. 779; Whitlock v.
Heard, 13 Ala, 776, 48 Am. D 73;
Jeanes’s Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 573, 11
Atl. R. 862, 2 Am. St. R. 624.
§ 101. [—] Maryland Ins. Co. v.
Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242, 89 Am. D.
779; White v. Phelps, 14 Minn. 27,
100 Am. D. 190; Hunt v. Nevers,
1-7 Pick. (Mass.) 500, 26 Am. D. 616.

















































































































































§§  99-101 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS. 
the property of the pledgee. To realize on his debt he may-
a. Sue upon the debt. 
b. Exercise his power of sale by­
( a)  A sale at  common law, 
(b)  A proceeding in equity, 
( c )  A special power given in the pledge contract, or 
(d)  A statutory sale. 
§ 99. --Suit on the debt.-The pledgee is not compelled 
to rely on the security of his pledge. He may, without losing 
his lien, sue the pledgor personally on the debt. The pledge 
security continues until he has obtained not only judgment 
but satisfaction on the debt. 
§ 100. -- (a.) Sa.le at common la.w.-After default of the 
pledgor, the pledgee may demand payment, and upon failure 
of the debtor to comply, sell the goods at public sale after 
reasonable notice to the debtor of the time and place of sale. 
Th� purpose of the notice is to enable the pledgor to see that 
the sale is fairly conducted and to find bidders to enhance 
the price. If he knows of the sale therefore it is enough, 
though if the pledgee fails to give such notice he assumes the 
burden of showing actual knowledge by the pledgor. If the 
pledgor cannot be found there must be a judicial sentence 
to warrant the sale. 
The public sale must be conducted with perfect fairness 
and the pledgee cannot himself, either directly or indirectly, 
be the purchaser. If he buys the sale is voidable, and the 
pledgor may treat the pledge contract as still in force. 
§ 101. ---Choses in action.-The law requires a public 
sale to insure the best terms for the pledgor. But such sale of 
stocks, bonds, notes and the like might result in large sacri-
§ 99. [ -] Robinson v. Hurley, 
11 Iowa 41 0, 79 Am. D. 497 ; Wal­
lace v. Finnegan, 14 Mich. 1 70, 90 
Am. D. 243. Note to 73 Am. St. R. 
567 ; Fisher v. Fisher, 98 Mass. 303 ; 
Bhrlich v. Ewald, 66 Cal. 97, 4 Pac. 
R. 1062. 
§ 100. [ -] Robinson v. Hurley, 
11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497 ; 
[-] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio ( N. 
Y. ) 227, 47 Am. D. 248 ; Lucketts 
v Townsend, 3 Texas 1 1 9, 49 Arn . 
D. 721_. 723 ; [ -] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 
428, 48 Am. D. 235 ; [-] Mary­
land Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 
242, 89 Am. D. 779 ; Whitlock v. 
Heard, 13 Ala, 776, 48 Am. D 73 ; 
Jeanes 's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 573, 11  
Atl. R.  862, 2 Am. St.  R. 624. 
§ 101. (-] Maryland Ins. Co. v. 
Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242, 89 Am. D. 
779 ; White v. Phelps, 14 Minn. 27, 
100 Am. D. 190 ; Hunt v. Nevers, 
J .'i Pick. (Mass. ) 500, 26 Am. D. 616, 
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PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE. §§ 102-105
fice of value. Accordingly, by the better opinion it is held
that in the case of stocks and bonds a sale after notice on the
stock exchange according to the custom of brokers is the
proper procedure. Negotiable notes should be held till ma-
turity and collected, unless they can be sold for full value.
.§102. ——(b) Sale in equity.—Sale by proceeding in
equity under a decree of foreclosure is cumbersome, and should
be resorted to only when there are conflicting claims, where
title is doubtful, or where notice can not be given to the
pledgor. The pledgee is not entitled to go into equity if he
has an adequate remedy at law.
§103. i(c) Special contract.—’l‘he parties may agree
in the pledge contract on the method of sale in case of de-
fault. Such stipulations, if not unconscionable and oppress-
ive, will govern. Thus, it may be agreed that the sale shall be
private, that demand and notice shall be waived, that the
property may be purchased by the pledgee; but not that the
pledge shall become irredeemable.
§104. ——(d) Statutory sa.le.—In many of the states sale
of the pledge upon default of the pledgor is regulated by stat-
ute. This is sometimes an additional remedy, and in some cases
abrogates the right of sale at the common law.
§105. ——Equitab1e principles govern.—The principles
applied in sale by any of the means mentioned are founded in
equity and the rights of the pledgor are always safeguarded.
If the pledge is divisible only so much may be sold as will
satisfy the debt. The pledgee is bound to proceed so as to
realize as much as possible for the pledgor and to turn over
to him any excess remaining after the debt is satisfied.
§102. [—] American Pig Iron,
etc., Co. v. German, 126 Ala. 194, 28
So. R. 603, 85 Am. St. R. 21;
[—] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio (N.
Y.) 227, 47 Am. D. 248; Lucketts
v. Townsend, 3 Tex. 119, 49 Am. D.
723; [—] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 428,
48 Am. D. 235; [—] Robinson v.
Hurley, 11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497.
§103. Lucketts v. Townsend 3
R. 667; [—] Maryland Ins. 'Co. v.
Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242, 89 Am. D.
779; [—] Robinson v. Hurley, 11
Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497; Jeanes’s
Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 573, 11 Atl. R.
8t-:2, 2 Am. st. R. 624.
§105. [—] Masonic Savings
Bank v. Bangs ’s Adm ’r, 84 Ky. 135,
4 Am. St. R. 197; [—] Whitlock v.
geard, 13 Ala. 776, 48 Am. D 73'
7 ' 7
Tex. 119, 49 Am. D. 723; Cooper v. [Maryland lns. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25
Simpson, 41 Minn. 46; 16 Am. St.

















































































































































PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE. §§  102-105 
fice of value. Accordingly, by the better opinion it is held 
that in the case of stocks and bonds a sale after notice on the 
stock e'xchange according to the custom of brokers is the 
proper procedure. Negotiable notes should be held till ma-' 
turity and collected, unless they can be sold for full value . 
. § 102. -- (b) Sale in equity.-Sale by proceeding in 
equity under a decree of foreclosure is cumbersome, and should 
be resorted to only when there are conflicting claims, where 
title is doubtful, or where notice can not be given to the 
pledgor. The pledgee is not entitled to go into equity if he 
has an adequate remedy at law. 
§ 103. --(c) Specia.l contract.-The parties may agree 
in the pledge contract on the method of sale in case of de­
fault. Such stipulations, if not unconscionable and oppress­
ive, will govern. Thus, it may be agreed that the sale shall be 
private, that demand and notice shall be waived, that the 
property may be purchased by the pledgee ; but not that the 
pledge shall become irredeemable. 
§ 104. -- (d) Statutory sale.-In many of the states sale 
of the pledge upon default of the pledgor is regulated by stat­
ute. This is sometimes an additional remedy, and in some cases 
abrogates the right of sale at the common law. 
§ 105. --Equitable principles govern.-The principles 
applied in sale by any of the means mentioned are founded in 
equity and the rights of the pledgor are always safeguarded. 
If the pledge is divisible only so much may be sold as will 
satisfy the debt. The pledgee is bound to proceed so as to 
realize as much as possible for the pledgor and to turn over 
to him any excess remaining after the debt is satisfied. 
§ 102. [-] American Pig Iron, R. 667 ; [-] Maryland Ins. ·co. v. 
etc., Co. v. German, 126 Ala. 1941 28 Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242, 89 Am. D. 
So. R. 603, 85 Am. St. R. 21 ; 779 ; [ -] Robinson v. Hurley, 1 1  
(-] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio (N. Iowa 410, 'i9 Am. D. 497 ; Jeanes 's 
Y. ) 227, 47 Am. D. 248 ; Lucketts Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 573, 11 Atl. R. 
v. Townsend, 3 Tex. 119, 49 Am. D. 862, 2 Am. St. R. 624. 
7l:a ; [-] Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 428, § 105. [-] Masonic Savings 
4fol Am. D. 235 ;  [-] Robinson v. Bank v. Bangs 's Adm 'r, 84 Ky. 135, 
Hurley, 11 Iowa 410, 79 Am. D. 497. 4 Am. St. R. 197 ; [-] Whitlock v. 
§ 103. Lucketts v. Townsend, 3 �eard, 13 Ala. 776, 48 Am. D. 73 ; 
Tex. 119, 49 Am. D. 723 ; Cooper v. t !faryland Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 
Simpson1 41 Mi.D.n. 46 ; 16 Am. St. Md. 2421 89 Am. D. 779 • 
.:11 
§§106-109 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAlLMENTS.
§106. ——Equity of redemption.—The p1edgor’s right to
redeem the pledge by performance of the obligation can be de-
feated only by actual sale after default. It has been said that
he has his lifetime in which to redeem, but the better rule
denies him the privilege of sleeping on his rights until his de-
mand becomes stale. A stipulation in the pledge contract de-
priving the pledgor of his equity of redemption is void as
against public policy. If the statute of limitations has run
against the debt the pledgor must nevertheless pay the debt
to redeem the pledge.
2. By Act of the Pledgee.
§107. (1.) Termination by consent of the p1edgee.—The
pledgee may, of course, consent to yield his security at any
time. He may voluntarily surrender possession of the pledge
before payment of the debt, take other security in lieu of the
former, or waive or release his rights. A release of the debt,
of course, operates as a release of the pledge, but not the mere
taking of new security, nor the substitution of a new note for
the debt unless such was the intention of the parties.
§ 108. (2.) Wrong of the p1edgee.—Any wrong of the
pledgee resulting in injury to the pledge, or in its conversion,
operates at once as a termination of the pledge if the pledgor
so chooses. And the destruction of the thing itself, of course,
extinguishes the pledge.
§ 109. Rede1ivery.—Possession by the pledgee is essential
to the life of a pledge. Redelivery at any time to the pledgor,
§106. Lucketts v. Townsend, 3
Tex. 119, 49 Am. D. 723, note;
[—] Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443,
51 Am. D. 307; [—] Stearns v.
Marsh, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 227, 47 Am.
D. 248; Gilmer v. Morris, 80 Ala.
78, 60 Am. R. 85. But compare
Wright v. Ross, 36 Calif. 414 and
Hancock v. Franklin Ins. C0., 114
Mass. 155.
§107. Treadwell v. Davis, 34
Calif. 601, 94 Am. D. 770; Story,
Bailments & Carriers, § 360, 365;
Schouler, Bailments & Carriers,
§263.
§108. [—] Whitlock v. Heard,
13 Ala. 776, 48 Am. D. 73.
§109. [—] American Pig Iron,
ctc., Co., v. German, 126 Ala. 194,
28 So. R. 603, 85 Am. St. R. 21;
[—] Masonic Savings Bank v.
Bangs ’s Adm ’r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am.
St. R. 197; [—] Wilson v. Little, 2
N. Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307;
[—] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio (N.
Y.) 227, 47 Am. D. 248; [—] Hou-
ton v. Holliday, 2 Murph. (N. C.)
111, 5 Am. D. 522; [—] Allen v.

















































































































































� §  106-109 OF MUTUAL BENEFIT BAiLMENT9. 
§ 106. --Equity of redemption.-The pledgor 's right tt> 
redeem the pledge by performance of the obligation can be de­
feated only by actual sale after default. It has been said that 
he has his lifetime in which to redeem, but the better rule 
denies him the privilege of sleeping on his rights until his de­
mand becomes stale. A stipulation in the pledge contract de­
priving the pledgor of his equity of redemption is void as 
against public policy. If the statute of limitations has run 
against the debt the pledgor must nevertheless pay the debt 
to redeem the pledge. 
2. By Act of the Pledgee. 
§ 107. (1 .)  Termination by consent of the pledgee.-The 
pledgee may, of course, consent to yield his security at any 
time. He may voluntarily surrender possession of the pledge 
before payment of the debt, take other security in lieu of the 
former, or waive or release his rights. A release of the debt, 
of course, operates as a release of the pledge, but not the mere 
taking of new security, nor the substitution of a new note for 
the debt unless such was the intention of the parties. 
§ 108. (2.) Wrong of the pledgee.-Any wrong of the 
pledgee resulting in injury to the pledge, or in its conversion, 
operates at once as a termination of the pledge if the pledgor 
so chooses. And the destruction of the thing itself, of course, 
extinguishes the pledge. 
§ 109. Redelivery.-Possession by the pledgee is essential 
to the life of a pledge. Redelivery at any time to the pledgor, 
§ 106. Lucketts v. Townsend, 3 
Tex. 119, 49 Am. D. 723, note ; 
[-] Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 
51 Am. D. 307 ; [-] Stearns v. 
Marsh, 4 Denio (N. Y. ) 227, 47 Am. 
D. 248 ; Gilmer v. Morris, 80 Ala. 
78, 60 Am. R. 85. But compare 
Wright v. Ross, 36 Calif. 414 and 
Hancock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 114 
Mass. 155. 
§ 107. Treadwell v. Davis, 34 
Calif. 601, 94 Am. D. 770 ; Story, 
Bailments & Carriers, § 360, 365 ; 
Schouler, Bailments & Carriers, 
§ 263. 
§ 108. [-] Whitlock v. Heard, 
l 3 Ala. 776, 48 Am. D. 73. 
§ 109. [ -] American Pig Iron, 
etc., Co., v. German, 126 Ala. 194, 
28 So. R. 603, 85 Am. St. R. 21 ; 
[-] Masonic Savings Bank v. 
Bangs 's Adm 'r, 84 Ky. 135, 4 Am. 
St. R. 197 ; [-] Wilson v. Little, 2 
N. Y. 443, 51 Am. D. 307 ; 
[-] Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio (N. 
Y. ) 227, 47 Am. D. 248 ; [-) Hou· 
ton v. Holliday, 2 Murph. (N. C. ) 
111, 5 Am. D. 522 ; [-] Allen v. 
Delano, 55 Me. 113, 92 Am. D. 573, 
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save for some temporary purpose such as leaving a chattel
with the owner for repair, at once puts an end to the pledge,
but a wrongful taking by the pledgor does not affect the
pledgee’s right.
When by any of the means mentioned the pledge relation is
terminated, it becomes the duty of the pledgee to return the
identical thing pledged in as good condition as when it was
received save for such wear and deterioration as can not be
charged to lack of ordinary care on the part of the pledgee.
And with the thing should be returned any interest, rent,
profit, or increase from the thing while in the pledgee’s hands.
The pledgor is entitled to the return of his chattel and all in-


















































































































































PIGNUS, OR Pt.EDGE. § 109 
save for some temporary purpose such as leaving a chattel 
with the owner for repair, at once puts an end to the pledge, 
but a wrongful taking by the pledgor does not affect the 
pledgee 's right. 
When by any of the means mentioned the pledge relation is 
terminated, it becomes the duty of the pledgee to return the 
identical thing pledged in as good condition as when it was 
received save for such wear and deterioration as can not be 
charged to lack of ordinary care on the part of the pledgee. 
And with the thing should be returned any interest, rent, 
profit, or increase from the thing while in the pledgee 's hands. 
The pledgor is entitled to the return of his chattel and all in­
crements added during the pledge relation. 
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§110. Definition of locatto bail- §117. Trover for conversion.
ments, 118 Contract void or
111 Distinctions. voidable.
1. Nature of the relation. 119. Other actions.
112. The essentials. 120. Assignment by bailee.
- Z. Rights and duties of the 121. Bailee and third persons.
parties. 122. Compensation.
113 Title and enjoyment. 123. -‘Contract incomplete.
114. Expenses. 3. Termination of the rela-
115 Right to use. tion.
116 Conversion. 124. Duty of the bailee.
§110. Definition.—A locatio, or hiring, is a bailment of
a chattel for a reward. It includes (§ 64): 1. Locatio ret,
in which the bailment purpose is the use of a thing, and
2. Locatio operis, in which the bailment purpose is service
about the thing. Of these in their turn.
§111. DiStincti0ns.—L0cati0 rel is the hired use of a
thing. There is no English word that applies precisely to
this bailment. Hiring and letting include not only the locatio
bailments but also the hiring and letting of personal services
and of real estate, which, of course, are not bailments. The
locatio bailment involves the letting of a chattel by the bailor,
or letter, and the hiring of that chattel by the bailee, or hirer.
1. Nature of the Relation.
§112. The essentials of this relation are, (a) a chattel to
be hired, (b) a contract of hire, and (c) a recompense.
(a) Any chattel, corporeal or incorporeal, which is not

















































































































































B. LOCATIO, OR HIRING. 
CHAPTER VII. 
OF LOCATIO REL 
§ 1 10. Definition of locatio bail- § 1 17. --Trover for conversion. 
ments. 1 18. Contract void or 
111.  Distinctions. 
1. Nature of the relation. 
1 12. The essentials. 
£. Rights and duties of the 
parties. 
1 1 3. Title and enjoyment. 
1 14. Expenses. 
1 15. Right to use. 
1 16. -Conversion. 
voidable. 
1 19. --Other actions. 
1 20. Assignment by bailee. 
121.  Bailee and third persons. 
1 22. Compensation. 
123. --Contract incomplete. 
3. Termination of the rela­
tion. 
1 24. Duty of the bailee. 
§ 110. De:ftnition.-A locatio, or hiring, is a bailment of 
a chattel for a reward. It includes ( §  64) : 1. Locatio rei, 
in which the bailment purpose is th� use of a thing, and 
2. Locatio operis, in which the bailment purpose is service 
about the thing. Of these in their turn. 
§ 111. Distinctions.-Locatio rei is the hired use of a 
thing. There is no English word that applies precisely to 
this bailment. Hiring and letting include not only the locatio 
bailments but also the hiring and letting of personal servfoes 
and of real estate, which, of course, are not bailments. The 
locatio bailment involves the letting of a chattel by the bailor, 
or letter, and the hiring of that chattel by the bailee, or hirer. 
1. Nature of the Relation. 
§ 112. The essentials of this relation are, (a)  a chattel to 
be hired, (b)  a contract of hire, and (c )  a recompense. 
(a)  Any chattel, corporeal or incorporeal, which is not 
§ 112. See Chapters 1, 21 5. 
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consumed in the use, may be hired. A very large proportion
of the cases arise out of the hire of horses.
(b) The general principles of bailment contracts apply
to contracts of hire and need not be here restated.
(c) Compensation, which is the essential element of all
mutual benefit bailments, in loeatio rei bailments is usually
money, but it may be goods, services or any substantial benefit.
It may be agreed upon or merely presumed from the contract
of hiring; and, in general, the law favors the presumption
that the use of another’s chattel is a use for hire.
2. Rights and Duties of the Parties.
§113. Title and enjoyment.—A bailor warrants that he
has title suflicient for the purpose of the letting and has been
said to warrant the thing as fit for the use to which it is to
be put. Modern cases excuse the letter for defects which are
not known to him, and could not have been discovered by
the exercise of due care. This is the more true if the defects
were equally known by the hirer. .
§ 114. Expenses in putting the hired chattel in proper con-
dition for use and keeping it so are chargeable to the letter,
as are extraordinary expenses reasonably incurred in preserv-
ing the chattel from injury due to unexpected causes for
which the hirer was not at fault. But the letter is not bound
to provide against ordinary wear and tear from the use, nor
furnish the ordinary keep of hired animals. Custom and the
nature of the contract of hire usually determine who should
bear expenses.
§115. Right to use.—Use of the hired chattel is the very
purpose of this bailment. The first right of the hirer, there-
§1l3. Lynch v. Richardson, 163 ‘ §114. [—] Leach v. French, 69
Mass 160 39 N E R 801 47 Am ,' Me. 389, 31 Am. R. 296; Harring-
. , . . . , .
St. R. 444; Copeland v. Draper, 157
Mass. 558, 32 N. E. R. 944, 34 Am.
St. R. 314; Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt.
586, 80 Am. D. 699; Nye v. Iowa
City Alcohol Works, 51 Iowa 129, 50
N. W. R. 988, 33 Am. R. 121; Hig~
man v. Camody, 112 Ala. 267, 20
So. R. 480, 57 Am. St. R. 33;
[—] Leach v. French, 69 Me. 389, 31
Am. R. 296.
ton v. Snyder, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 380.
§1]5. Woodman v. Hubbard, 25
N. H. 67, 57 Am. D. 310, [—] Cobb
v. Vllallace, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 539, 98
Am. D. 435; McConnell v. Maxwell,
3 Black. (Ind.) 419, 26 Am. D. 428;
Banfield v. Whipple, 10 Allen
(Mass.) 27, 87 Am. D. 618; Story,
Bailments and Carriers, §§ 395, 396;

















































































































































LOCATIO REI. §§ 113-115 
consumed in the use, may be hired. A very large proportion 
of the cases arise out of the hire of horses. 
( b) The general principles of bailment contracts apply 
to contracts of hire and need not be here restated. 
( c ) Compensation, which is the essential element of all 
mutual benefit bailments, in locatio 1·ei bailments is usually 
money, but it may be goods, services or any substantial benefit. 
It may be agreed upon or merely presumed from the contract 
of hiring ; and, in general, the law favors t�e presumption 
that the use of another 's chattel is a use for hire. 
2. Righ ts and Duties of the Parties. 
§ 113. Title and enjoyment.-A bailor warrants that lie 
has title sufficient for the purpose of the letting and has been 
said to warrant the thing as fit for the use to which it is to 
be put. Modern cases excuse the letter for defects which are 
not known to him, and could not have been discovered by 
the exercise of due care. This is the more true if the defects 
were equally known by the hirer. 
§ 114. Expenses in putting the hired chattel in proper con­
dition for use and kel'ping it so are chargeab!P. to the letter, 
as are extraordinary expenses reasonably incurred in preserv­
ing the chattel from injury due to unexpected causes for 
which the hirer was not at fault. But the letter is not bound 
to provide against ordinary wear and tear from the use, nor 
furnish the ordinary keep of hired animals. Custom arid the 
nature of the contract of hire usually determine who should 
bear expenses. 
§ 115. Right to use.-Use of the hired chattel is the very 
purpose of this bailment. The first right of the hirer, there-
§ 1 13. Lynch v. Richardson, 163 • § 114. [-] Leach v. French, 69 
Mass. 160, 39 N. E. R. 801 , 47 Am. / M e. 389, 31 Am. R. 296 ; Harring· 
8t. R. 444 ; Copeland v. Draper, 157 ton v .  Snyder, 3 Barb. (N. Y. ) 380. 
l\Iass. 558, 32 N. E. R. 944, 34 Am. § 1 1 5. Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 
St. R. 311 ; Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. :N. H. 67, 57 Am. D. 310, [-] Cobb 
586, 80 Am. D. 699 ; Nye v. Iowa v. Wallace, 5 Cold. (Tenn. ) 539, 98 
City Alcohol Works, 51 Iowa 1 29, 50 Am. D. 435 ; McConnell v. Maxwell, 
N. W. R. 988, 33 Am. R. 121 ; Rig· 3 Black. (Ind. ) 419, 26 Am. D. 428 ; 
man v. Camody, 112 Ala. 267, 20 Banfield v. Whipple, 10 Allen 
So. R. 480, 57 Am. St. R. 33 ; ( Mass. ) 27, 87 Am. D. 618 ; Story, 
1-] Leach v. French, 69 Me. 389, 31 Bailments and Carriers, §§ 395, 396 ; 
Am. R. 296. Beach v. Railroad, 37 N. Y. 457. 
4.5 
§§ 116-117 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS.
fore, is the right to “the exclusive use and control of the
hired thing during the period of hire,” and this right he may
defend against all the world including the letter.
But this use is limited to the purpose of hiring; using the
thing for another purpose is conversion. The manner and
extent of the use, too, must conform to the terms, expressed
or implied, of the bailment contract. Any departure by the
hirer, or his servants in the course of their employment‘, makes
the hirer absolutely liable for injuries to the chattel.
§116. ——G0nVersi0n.—The departure from the contract
may amount to conversion of the property, or it may be
merely a trespass. What acts amount to a conversion is often
far from clear. Not every wrongful dealing with another’s
chattel is a conversion. But “acts which themselves imply
an assertion of title or of a right of dominion over personal
property, such as a sale, letting or destruction of it, amount
to a conversion, even though the defendant may have honestly
mistaken his rights;” and so does any other act done with
intent to deprive the owner of his property, permanently or
temporarily. And a neglect or refusal to deliver property
when demanded is evidence of conversion, because these acts
are evidence that the defendant in withholding it claims the
right to, which is a claim of a right to dominion over it.
Many cases hold that intentionally driving a horse beyond
the point for which he was hired, or in a different direction, or
keeping it beyond the time, will constitute conversion. The
rule is often a harsh one and some recent cases have taken
the ground that such an act was not necessarily of itself con-
version.
§ 117. ——Trover for conversion.—Upon conversion by the
§l16. [—] Spooner v. Man- §117. Hart v. Skinner, 16 Vt.
chester, 133 Mass. 270, 43 Am. R.
514; [—] Wentworth v. McDuffic,
48 N. H. 402; Woodman v. Hub-
bard, 25 N. H. 67, 57 Am. D. 310;
[—] Cobb v. Wallace 5 Cold.
(Tenn.) 539, 98 Am. D. 435; East-
man v. Sanborn, 3 Allen (Mass.)
594, 81 Am. D. 677; Irish v. Cloyes,
8 Vt. 30, 30 Am. D. 446. But see
Doolittle v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 348, 60
N. W. R. 621, 54 Am. St. R. 562.
138, 42 Am. D. 500; Woodman v.
Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67, 57 Am. D.
310; [—] Cobb v. Wallace, 5 Cold.
(Tenn.) 539, 98 Am. D. 435;
[—] Spooner v. Manchester, 133
Mass. 270, 43 Am. R. 514; Rotch v.
Hawes, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 136, 22
Am. D. 414. But compare Farkas
v. Powell, 86 Ga. 800, 13 S. E. R.


















































































































































§ §  116-117 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. 
fore, is the right to "the exclusive use and control of the 
hired thing during the period of hire, " and this right he may 
defend against all the world including the letter. 
But this use is limited to the purpose of hiring ; using the 
thing for another purpose is conversion. The . manner aQ.d 
extent of the use, too, must conform to the terms, expressed 
or implied, of the bailment contract. Any departure by the 
hirer, or his servants in the course of their employment', m�kes 
the hirer absolutely liable for injuries to the chattel. 
§ 116. --Conversion.-The departure from the contract 
may amount to conversion of the property, or it may be 
merely a trespass. What acts amount to a conversion is often 
far from clear. Not every wrongful dealing with another 's 
chattel is a conversion. But "acts which themselves imply 
an assertion of title or of a right of dominion over personal 
property, such as a sale, letting or destruction of it, amount 
to a conversion, even though the defendant may have honestly 
mistaken his rights ;'' and so does any other act done with 
intent to deprive the owner of his property, permanently or 
temporarily. And a neglect or refusal to deliver property 
when demanded is evidence of conversion, because these acts 
are evidence that the defendant in withholding it claims the 
right to, which is a claim of a right to dominion over it. 
Many cases hold that intentionally driving a horse beyond 
the point for which he was hired, or in a different direction, or 
keeping it beyond the time, will constitute conversion. The 
rule is often a harsh one and some recent cases have taken 
the ground that such an act was not necessarily of itself con­
version. 
§ 117. --Trover for conversion.-Upon conversion by the 
§ 116. [-] Spooner v. Man-
chester, 133 Mass. 270, 43 Am. R. 
514 ; [-] Wentworth v. McDuffie, 
48 N. II. 402 ; Woodman v. Hub­
bard, 25 N. H. 67, 57 Am. D. 310 ; 
[-] Cobb v. Wallace 5 Cold. 
(Tenn. ) 539, 98 Am. D. 435 ; East­
man v. Sanborn, 3 Allen ( Mass. ) 
504, 81 Am. D. 677 ; Irish v. Cloyes, 
8 Vt. 30, 30 Am. D. 446. But see 
Doolittle v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 348, 60 
N. W. R. 621, 54 Am. St. R. 562. 
§ 117. Hart v. Skinner, 16 Vt. 
138, 42 Am. D. 500 ; Woodman v. 
Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67, 57 Am. D. 
31 0 ;  [-] Cobb v .  Wallace, 5 Cold. 
( Tenn.) 539, 98 Am. D. 435 ; 
[-] Spooner v. Manchester, 133 
Mass. 270, 43 Am. R. 514 ; Rotch v. 
Hawes, 12 Piek. (Mass. ) 136, 22 
Am. D. 414. But compare Farkas 
v. Powell, 86 Ga. 800, 13 S. E. R. 
200 ; Harvey v. Epes, 12 Gratt. 
(Va. ) 153. 
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hirer, the letter acquires a vested right of which he can not
be deprived without his consent. Return to the terms of the
contract will not avail the bailee. The bailor may treat the
act as practically a sale and sue in trover for the full value
of the property.
The letter is not compelled to receive back converted prop-
erty, but if he does, this is not of itself waiver of his right.
It merely lessens the damages he can recover by the value of
the chattel as it was returned.
§ 118. ——Contra.ct void or voida.b1e.—It affords the bailee
no excuse that the contract was a Sunday contract and there-
fore void. The action is not on the contract but for the tor-
tious dealing with chattels not belonging to him in a manner
inconsistent with the rights of the true owner, and it is un-
necessary to set up the contract in order to show the right of
action. The defendant must set up the illegal contract to show
his excuse and this he is not allowed to do. Neither party can
rely on an illegal contract to prevail in his suit. For the
same reason -infancy is no defence to an action for conversion.
The infant is liable for his torts.
Neither is it a defence that the loss would have occurred if
there had been no conversion, nor that the hirer was guilty
of no neglect. Upon conversion the property is practically
his and at his risk.
§119. i0ther acti0ns.—The bailor, in any case where
loss is due to want of ordinary care on the part of the bailee,
or to his failure to keep within the terms of the bailment, may
bring action of trespass or case and recover for any loss suf-
fered even to the full value of the thing if it has been de-
stroyed. These principles prevail as well in code states where
distinctions between actions founded upon tort have been
abolished. Under the single civil action of the code the same
recovery may be had as under the various common law actions
before mentioned.
§118. Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark.
518, 25 Am. R. 576; Hall v. Cor-
coran, 107 Mass. 251, 9 Am. R. 30;
Ray v. Tubbs, 50 Vt. 688, 28 Am. R.
519; Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355,
56 Am. D. 85; [—] Davis v. Garrett,
6 Bing. 716.
§119. Crocker v. Gullifer, 44 Me.
491, 69 Am. D. 118; Rotch v.
I-lawes, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 136, 22
Am. D. 414; Stewart v. Davis, 31

















































































































































LOCAT IO REI. §§ 118-119 
hirer, the letter acquires a vrsted right of which he can not 
be deprived without his consent. Return to the terms of the 
contract will not avail the bailee. 'fhe bailor may treat the 
act as practically a sale and sue in trover for the full value 
of the property. 
The letter is not compelled to receive back converted prop­
erty, but if he does, this is not of itself waiver of his right. 
It merely lessens the damages he can recover by the value of 
the chattel as it was returned. 
§ 118. --Contract void or voidable.-! t affords the bailee 
no excuse that the contract was a Sunday contmct and there­
fore void. 'l'he action is not on the contract but for the tor­
tious dealing with chattels not belonging to him in a manner 
inconsistent with the rights of the true owner, and it is un­
necessary to set up the contract in order to show the right of 
action. The defendant must set up the illegal contract to show 
his excuse and this he is not allowed to do. Neither party can 
rely on an illegal contract to prevail in his suit. For the 
same reason ·infancy is no defence to an action for conversion. 
The inf ant is liable for his torts. 
Neither is it a defence that the loss would have occurred if 
there had been no conversion, nor that the hirer was guilty 
of no neglect. Upon conversion the property is practical ly 
his and at his risk. 
§ 119. --Other actions.-The bailor, in any case where 
loss is due to want of ordinary care on the part of the bailee, 
or to his failure to keep within the terms of the bailment, may 
bring action of trespass or case and recover for any loss suf­
fered even to the full value of the thing if it has been de­
stroyed. These principles prevail as well in code states where 
distinctions between actions founded upon tort have been 
abolished. Under the single civil action of the code the same 
recovery may be had as under the various common law actions 
before mentioned. 
§ 118. Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 
518, 25 Am. R. 576 ; Hall v. Cor­
eoran, 107 �fass. 251, 9 Am. R. 30 ; 
R.ay v. Tubbs, fJO Vt. 688, 28 Am. R. 
519 ; Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355, 
5G Am. D. 85 ; [-] Davis v. Garrett, 
6 Bing. 716. 
§ 119. Crocker v. Gullifer, 44 Me. 
491, 69 Am. D. 118 ; Rotch v. 
Hawes, 12 Pick. (Mass.)  136, 22 
Am. D. 414 ; Stewart v. Davis, 31 
Ark. 5181 25 Am. R. 576. 
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§120. Assignment by bailee.—Any attempt by the bailee,
without the consent of the bailor, to sell or pledge the hired
chattel amounts to its conversion; but where the hiring is not
personal and is for a definite term the bailee may, in general,
assign his beneficial interest, and the assignee will secure all
the rights of his assignor. The bailee, however, remains liable
to the owner for any loss due to the neglect of the bailee’s
assignee or servants. This has been put on the ground of
want of privity between the bailor and subusers of the bailee,
but it is more satisfactorily explained on the principles of
agency or of master and servant. The assignee is treated as
a sub-agent or servant of the bailee for whose acts he is, in
general, responsible.
§121. Bailee and third persons.—The hirer has a special
property in the thing hired, and for the time stands to
strangers in the relation of owner. For any injury from the
hired chattel to third persons due to the neglect ofthe bailee
or his servants he, and not the bailor, is liable. And during
the continuance of the term he, and not the bailor, may bring
an action against a third person for injury to the thing, re-
covering pay to the full value of the chattel if it be destroyed
by such wrong of the third person. This right rests both on
the hirer’s right to the use of the thing and the fact that he
is answerable over to the general owner. In bailments for an
indefinite term, and in case of injuries that permanently im-
pair the chattel, the bailor also has his action against third
persons.
§122. Compensation to the promisor is the characteristic
feature of all mutual benefit bailments. In locatio rei bail-
ments the hirer is bound to pay the letter for the use of the
thing at the contract price, if there be one. If no price has
been fixed, then the customary price is implied; or in the ab-
§120. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H.
29, 66 Am. D. 752; Sanborn v. Col-
man, 6 N. H. 14, 23 Am. D. 703;
Swift v. Moseley, 10 Vt. 208, 33
Am. D. 197; McKenzie v. Nevins,
2:2 Me. 138, 38 Am. D. 291; Schouler,
Bailments & Carriers, § 145. But
sec Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236, 15
Am. R. 488; Dunlap v. Gleason, 16
Mich. 158, 93 Am. D. 231.
§121. [—] Little v. Fossett, 34
Me. 545, 56 Am. D. 671; American
District Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 72
Md. 454, 20 Atl. R. 1, 20 Am. St. R.
479; Strong v. Adams, 30 Vt. 221,
73 Am. D. 305; McConnell v. Max-
well, 3 Black. (Ind.) 419, 26 Am. D.
428; Brewster v. Warner, 136 Mass.

















































































































































§ §  120-122 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. 
§ 120. Assignment by bailee.-Any attempt by the bailee, 
without the consent of the bailor, to sell or pledge the hired 
chattel amounts to its conversion ; but where the hiring is not 
personal and is for a definite term the bailee may, in general , 
assign his beneficial interest, and the assignee will secure all 
the rights of his assignor. The bailee, however, remains liable 
to the owner for any loss due to the neglect of the bailee 's 
assignee or servants. This has be�n put O!! the ground of 
want of privity between the bailor and subusers of the bailee, 
but it is more satisfactorily explained on the principles of , 
agency or of master and servant. The assignee is treated as 
a sub-agent or servant of the bailee for whose acts he is, in 
general, responsible. 
§ 121. Bailee and third persons .-The hirer has a special 
property in the thing hired, and for the time stands to 
strangers in the relation of owner. For any injury from the 
hired chattel to third persons due to the neglect of . the bailee 
or his servants he, and not the bailor, is liable. And during 
the continuance of the term he, and not the bailor, may bring 
an action against a third person for injury to the thing, re­
covering pay to the full value of the chattel if it be destroyed 
by such wrong of the third person. This right rests both on 
the hirer 's right to the use of the thing and the fact that he 
is answerable over to the general owner. In bailments for an 
indefinite term, and in case of injuries that permanently im­
pair the chattel, the bailor also has his action against third 
persons. 
§ 122. Compensation to the promisor is the characteristic 
feature of all mutual benefit bailments. In locatio rei bail­
ments the hirer is bound to pay the letter for the use of the 
thing at the contract price, if there be one. If no price has 
been fixed, then the customary price is implied ; or in the ab-
§ 1 20. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 
29, 66 Am. D. 752 ; Sanborn v. Col­
man, 6 N. H. 14, 23 Am. D. 703 ; 
Swift v. Moseley, 10  Vt. 208, 33 
A m. D.  197 ; McKenzie v. Nevius, 
2:..! Me. 138, 38 Am. D. 291 ; Schouler, 
Bailments & Carriers, § 145. But 
see Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236, 15 
Am. R. 488 ; Dunlap v.  Gleason, 16 
.Mich. 158, 93 Am. D. 231. 
§ 121.  [-] Little v .  Fossett, 34 
Me. 545, 56 Am. D. 671 ; American 
District Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 72 
:Md. 454, 20 Atl. R. 1, 20 Am. St. R. 
479 ; Strong v. Adams, 30 Vt. 221, 
73 Am. D. 305 ; McConnell v. Max­
well, 3 Black. ( Ind. ) 419, 26 Am. D. 
428 ; Brewster v. Warner, 136 Mass. 
57, 49 Am. R. 5. 
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sence of a custom a reasonable compensation must be paid.
What is reasonable is a question of fact to be determined from
the circumstances of the hiring.
§123. ——Contract incomp1ete.—If the hiring was for a
fixed term and the chattel was destroyed or rendered unfit
for use without the fault of either party, the hirer, if the
contract is divisible, must pay for the use had pro tanto and has
no claim for damages against the letter. If the bailee, how-
ever, was at fault he must pay the full price less any amount
the letter may be able to secure from the hire of the thing to
others during the term; but if the fault is chargeable to the
letter, and the contract divisible, the bailee must pay for the
use pro tanto and may recoup any damages he has suffered.
If the contract was entire, it has been held that the bailee must
pay all or nothing, depending upon the conditions under which
complete fulfillment became impossible. But the better rule is
that for any beneficial services received the bailee should pay
its reasonable worth, deducting any damages he may have
suffered through the fault of the bailor.
3. Termination of the Relation. .
§124. The duty of the bai1ee.—The relation may be ter-
minated under various conditions, as stated in § 24 and the
following. When the bailee has had the use according to the
terms of the contract, it becomes his duty to redeliver the
chattel and to pay the proper compensation. These duties
may, of course, be modified by stipulations made in the con-
tract of hire.
§123. Story, Bailments & Car- Cold. (Tenn.) 539, 98 Am. D. 435;
riers, §§ 416, 417 a; Schouler, Bail- Sanborn v. Colman, 6 N. H. 14, 23
ments & Carriers, §§ 160, 161. Am. D. 703.

















































































































































LOCATIO REI. § §  123-124 
sence of a custom a reasonable compensation must be paid. 
What is reasonable is a question of fact to be determined from 
the circumstances of the hiring. 
§ 123. -Contract incomplete.-If the hiring was for a 
fixed term and the chattel was destroyed or rendered unfit 
for use without the fault of either party, the hirer, if the 
contract is divisible, must pay for the use had pro tanto and has 
no claim for damages against the letter. If the bailee, how­
ever, was at fault he must pay the full price less any amount 
the letter may be able to secure from the hire of the thing to 
others during the term ; but if the fault is chargeable to the 
letter, and the contract divisible, the bailee must pay for the 
use pro tanto and may recoup any damages he has suffered. 
If the contract was entire, it has been held that the bailee must 
pay all or nothing, depending upon the conditions under which 
complete fulfillment became impossible. But the better rule is 
that for any beneficial services received the bailee should pay 
its reasonable worth, deducting any damages he may have 
suffered through the fault of the bailor. 
3. Termination of the Relation . .  
§ 124. The duty of the bailee.-The relation may be ter­
minated under various conditions, as stated in § 24 and the 
following. When the bailee has had the use according to the 
terms of the contract, it becomes his duty to redeliver the 
chattel and to pay the proper compensation. These duties 
may, of course, be modified by stipulations made in the con-
tract of hire. 
· 
§ 123. Story, Bailments & Car­
riers, §§ 416, 417 a ;  Schouler, Bail­
ments & Carriers, H 160, 161. 
§ 124. [-] Cobb v. Wallace, 5 
Cold. (Tenn. ) 539, 98 Am. D. 435 ; 
Sanborn v. Colman, 6 N. H. 14, 23 























1. Nature of the relation.
The essentials.
Accession.




(1) According to contract.
(2) Not according to con-
tract.
b. Work left incomplete.
(1) Destruction of the
thing.
(2) Fault of bailor.
(3) Fault of bailee.
Lien. .
‘Who can give a lien.
——Basis of the lien.









































———Duration of the relation.
Other special bailees for
hire.
Wharfingers.






§ 125. Distinctions.—The second of the locatio bailments is
locatio operis or the bailment of a chattel for the performance
of services upon it for a reward. As before noticed (§ 64),
locatio operis bailments are ordinary or extraordinary, and of
the ordinary three classes have been made according to the
nature of the services to be performed—
(1) Locat-to cnstocliae, the hired custody of a thing,


















































































































































OF LOCATIO OPERIS. 
§ 125. Distinctions. 
1 26. General principles apply. 
1. Natv.re of the relation. 
127. The essentials. 
1 28. Accession. 
2. Rights and duties of the 
parties. 
129. Compensation. 
a. Service completed. 
130. ( 1) According to contract. 
131.  ( 2 )  Not according to con· 
tract. 
b. Work left incomplete. 
132. ( 1 )  Destruction of the 
thing. 
1 33. ( 2 )  Fault of bailor. 
134. ( 3 )  Fault of bailee. 
1 35. Lien. 
136. --Who can give a lien. 
137. --Basis of the lien. 
138. Does not extend to 
agisters and liverymen. 
139. Statutory exten-
sions. 
140. --Kinds of lien. 
141. ---How regarded. 
� 142. --Extent of the lien. 
143. --Enforcement of lien. 
144. --Waiver of lien. 
145. --Termination of lien. 
146. Property rights of bailor 
and bailee. 
147. Care. 
148. Special loc,atio custodiae 
bailments. 
Warehousemen, elevator own­
ers, cold storage co11i­
panies. 
149. Warehousemen, etc. 
150. --Effect of usage. 
151. --Warehouse receipts. 
152. --Confusion of goods. 
153. --Care. 
l 54. --Lien. 
155. --Duration of the relation. 
Other special bailees for 
hire. 
l 56. Wharfingers. 
157. Factors or commission mer· 
chants. 
158. Safe-deposit companies. 
1 59. Agisters and liverymen. 
§ 125. Distinctions.-The second of the locatio bailments is 
locatio operis or the bailrnent of a chattel for the performance 
of services upon it for a reward. As before noticed ( §  64) , 
locatio operis bailm�nts are ordinary or extraordinary, and of 
the ordinary three classes have been made according to the 
nature of the services to be performed-
(1) 
(2) 
Locat·io custodiae, the hired custody of a thing, 
Locatio operis f aciendi, the hire of work and labor upon 
a thing, and 
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(3) Locatio operis mercium vehendarnm, the hired carriage
of a thing.
Reserving the extraordinary bailments for separate treat-
ment, we shall consider the rules of law relating to the familiar
relations of bailors: (1) to warehousemen, wharfingers, safe-
deposit companies, factors and bailiffs (agisters); (2) to artis-
ans employed to manufacture chattels from materials furn-
ished, or to repair chattels; (3) to private carriers of goods.
For the most part these will be treated together. But brief
special consideration will be needed, and this will be given
after the consideration of the general principles of loeatio operis
bailments.
§126. General principles a.pply.—It should be borne in
mind that, by 'a few changes of terms and phrases because of
the different bailment purposes, nearly all that was said in the
discussion of locatio rei bailments equally applies here. By spe-
cial contract the relations of the parties may be modified 1%
any extent not forbidden by public policy. The remaining
chapters of the subject will be concerned largely in applying
to specific cases the general principles already stated, but it is
precisely this application that causes all bailment litigation,
and that forms the substance of every new decision.
1. l\lA'1‘URE Or THE RELATION.
§127. The essentials of every locatio operis bailment are:
(a) services to be performed upon the chattel, (b) a contract
for such services, and (c) a price or reward. It is the services
about the chattel and the compensation to the bailee that are
distinctive of this bailment and mark it off from all the others.
The contract for services, as a contract, does not differ from
contracts in general.
§128. Accession.—If in the performance of the service the
bailee adds materials to the chattel, and before his service is
completed the chattel is destroyed, it becomes important to
determine upon whom the loss of the materials must fall. It
is the rule, on the doctrine of accession, that the materials and
labor become part of the chattel; and this is so even though the
materials exceed in value the chattel itself. So, too, if the
§128. Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Me. Snell, 140 N. Y. 193, 35 N. E. R.

















































































































































LOCATIO OPERIS. § §  126-128 
(3)  Locatio operis merciitm vehendarum, the hired carriage 
of a thing. 
Reserving the extraordinary bailments for separate treaf­
ment, we shall consider the rules of law relating to the familiar 
relations of bailors : ( 1 )  to warehousemen, whar:fingers, safe­
deposit companies, factors and bailiffs (agisters ) ; (2 )  to artis­
ans employed to manufacture chattels from materials furn­
ished, or to repair chattels ; ( 3 )  to private carriers of goods. 
For the most part these will be treated together. But brief 
special consideration will be needed, and this will be given 
after the consideration of the general principles of locatio operi.� 
bailments. 
§ 126. General principles apply.-It should be borne in 
mind that, by ·a few changes of terms and phrases because of 
the different bailment purposes, nearly all that was said in the 
discussion of locatio rei bailments equally applies here. By spe­
cial contract the relations of the parties may be modified th 
any extent not forbidden by public policy. The remaining 
chapters of the subject will be concerned largely in applying 
to specific cases the general principles already stated, but it is 
precisely this application that causes all bailment litigation, 
and that forms the substance of every new decision. 
1. NATURE OF THE RELATION. 
§ 127. The essentials of every locatio operis bailment are : 
(a )  services to be performed upon the chattel, (b )  a contract 
for such services, and ( c) a price or reward. It is the services 
about the chattel and the compensation to the bailee That are 
distinctive of this bailment and mark it off from all the others. 
The contract for services, as a contract, does not differ from 
contracts in general. 
§ 128. Accession.-If in the performance of the service the 
bailee adds materials to the chattel, and before his service is 
completed the chattel is destroyed, it becomes important to 
determine upon whom the loss of the materials must fall. It 
is the rule, on the doctrine of accession, that the materials and 
labor become part of the chattel ; and this is so even though the 
materials exceed in value the chattel itself. So, too, if the 
§ 128. Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Me. Snell, 140 N. Y. 193, 35 N. E. R .  
404, 54  A m. D. 582, note ; Mack v. 493, 37 Am. St. R. 534. 
51 
129-130 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS.
bailor furnishes the raw materials, his title follows them up
to the finished product, the increased value from the labor
being added by accession. But if the workman himself furn-
ishes the materials for making a chattel there is no bailment
but an agreement for a sale. Until the chattel is completed and
delivered to the vendee, the title remains in the workman.
' 2. RIGHTS AND Dorms Or THE PARTIES.
§ 129. Compensation.—It is the distinctive feature of locatio
operis bailments that the bailee receives a recompense. The
usual rules as to this compensation have been before stated.
But when one has been employed to perform work and labor
upon a chattel, and for some cause the performance is inter-
rupted before the contract is fully executed, special questions
arise. It may be that—
a. The work was fully completed
(1) According to the contract,
(2) Not according to the mutual intent,
b. The work is left incomplete because of
(1) Destruction of the thing without the fault of the
bailee,
(2) The fault of the bailor in preventing the service,
(3) The fault of the bailee in abandoning the work.
a. Service Completed.
§130. (1) According to contract.—If the bailment con-
tract is fully executed, the bailee, of course, is entitled to his
hire according to the agreement. But it may be that after
the work on the chattel was completed, the thing was destroyed
without the fault of either party. In accordance with the
doctrine of accession, the chattel and all that has been added
to it belong to the bailor, and he must bear the loss. The
workman can recover for his labor and materials. Res perit
domino.
However, the workman may have taken the work by the
job. The contract is entire, and he can recover only when he
§130. Central Lithographing, Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. (N.
etc., Co. v. Moore, 75 Wis. 170, 43 Y.) 165, 7 Am. D. 299; McConihe
N. W. R. 1124, 17 Am..St. R. 186; v. R. R., 20 N. Y. 495, 75 Am. D.
[—] Sickels v. Pattison, 14 Wend. 420.

















































































































































� §  129-130 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. 
bailor furnishes the raw materials, his title follows them up 
to the finished product, the increased value from the labor 
being added by accession. But if the workman himself furn­
ishes the materials for making a chattel there is no bailment 
but an agreement for a sale. Until the chattel is completed and 
delivered to the vendee, the title remains in the workman. 
2. Rimrrs AND DUTIES OF THE p ARTIES. 
§ 129. Compensation.-It is the distinctive feature of wcatio 
operis bailments that the bailee receives a recompense. The 
usual rules as to this compensation have been before stated. 
But when one has been employed to perform work and labor 
upon a chattel, and for some cause the performance is inter­
rupted before the contract is fully executed, special questions 
arise. It may be that-
a. The work was fully completed 
( 1 )  According to the contract, 
(2) Not according to the mutual intent, 
b. The work is left incomplete because of 
( 1 ) Destruction of the thing without the fault of the 
bailee, 
(2 ) The fault of the bailor in preventing the service, 
(3 )  The fault of  the bailee in abandoning the work. 
a. Service Completed. 
§ 130. ( 1 )  According to contract.-If the bailment con­
tract is fully executed, the bailee, of course, is entitled to his 
hire according to the agreement. But it may be that after 
. the work on the chattel was completed, the thing was destroyed 
without the fault of either party. In accordance with the 
doctrine of accession, the chattel and all that has been added 
to it belong to the bailor, and he must bear the loss. The 
workman can recover for his labor and materials. Res perit 
domino. 
However, the workman may have taken the work by the 
job. The contract is entire, and he can recover only when he 
§ 130. Central Lithographing, Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. (N. 
etc., Co. v. Moore, 75 Wis. 110, 43 Y. ) 165, 7 Am. D. 299 ; McConihe 
K. W. R. 1124, 1 7  Am . . St. R. 186 ; v. R. R., 20 N. Y. 4951 75 Am. D. 
[-] Sickels v. Pattison, 14 Wend. 420. 
(N. Y. ) 257, 28 Am. D. 527 ; Mc-
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has fully performed. The thing perishes to the employer, the
work to the mechanic. So, too, if he furnishes all the mate-
rials, the workman is the owner and res perit domino, the em-
ployer is not liable.
§131. (2) Not according to the contract.—If the service
is completed, but not according to the mutual intent of the
parties, the bailee may still recover on a quantum meruit. If the
deviation was due to the fault of the bailor, or with his con-
sent, the bailce is entitled to the reasonable worth of his serv-
ices. But if the bailee was at fault, the bailor may recoup any
damages caused by the deviation from the contract. If the
service was of no benefit, or if the damages equal or exceed
the advantages, there can be no recovery. But for any excess
of the benefit over the loss, the bailee is entitled to his reward.
The same principles apply to services not completed within
the stipulated time. The bailee is liable to the bailor for losses
due to the delay. No compensation can be recovered for extra
services or for more valuable materials furnished without the
acquiescence of the bailor. .
b. Work Left Incomplete.
§132. (1) Destruction of the thing.—According to the
principles before stated, if the thing perish before completion
without the fault of either party, the laborer is entitled to com-
pensation pro tanto for labor and materials already expended.
Res perit domino.
Under an entire contract there can be no recovery by a work-
man who, for any cause, leaves the work incomplete. The.ten-
dency of the courts, however, is in favor of relaxing the strict-
ness of the early cases, and allowing one who has performed
a beneficial service compensation at least in so far as the
benefit of the service exceeds the detriment. There is also a
tendency to interpret contracts of service as divisible rather
than entire where the terms and conditions admit of such in-
terpretation. As is always the case when rules of law are
under process of modification, the cases at present are in hope-
less conflict.
§131. Taft v. Montague, 14 Mass. Am. D. 527. Compare Britton v.
282, 7 Am. D. 215; [—] Sickels v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. D. 713,


















































































































































LOCA 'tlO OPERtS. § §  131-132 
has fully performed. The thing perishes to the employer, the 
work to the mechanic. So, too, if he furnishes all the mate­
rials, the workman is the owner and res perit domino, the em­
ployer is not liable. 
§ 131. (2 )  Not according to the contract.-If the service 
is completed, but not according to the mutual intent of the 
parties, the bailee may still recover on a quantum meruit. If the 
deviation was due to the fault of the bailor, or with his con­
sent, the bailee is entitled to the reasonable worth of his serv­
ices. But if the bailee was at fault, the bailor may recoup any 
damages caused by the deviation from the contract. If the 
service was of no benefit, or if the damages equal or exceed 
the advantages, there can be no recovery. But for any excess 
of the benefit over the loss, the bailee is entitled to his reward. 
The same principles apply to services not completed within 
the stipulated time. The bailee is liable to the bailor for losses 
due to the delay. No compensation can be recovered for extra 
services or for more valuable materials furnished without the 
acquiescence of the bailor. 
b. Work Left Incomplete. 
§ 132. (1 )  Destruction of the thing.-According to the 
principles before stated, if the thing perish before completion 
withont the fault of either party, the laborer is entitled to com­
pensation pro tanto for labor and materials already expended. 
Res perit domino. 
Under an entire contract there can be no recovery by a work­
man who, for any cause, leaves the work incomplete. The . ten­
dency of the courts, however, is in favor of relaxing the strict­
ness of tile early cases, and allowing one who has performed 
a beneficial service compensation at least in so far as the 
benefit of the service exceeds the detriment. There is also a 
tendency to interpret contracts of service as divisible rather 
than entire where the terms and conditions admit of such in­
terpretation. As is always the case when rules of law are 
under process of modification, the cases at present are in hope­
less conflict. 
§ 131. Taft v. Montague, 14 Mass. Am. D. 527. Compare Britton v. 
282, 7 Am. D. 215 ; [-] Sickels v. Turner, 6 N. H. 4811 26 Am. D. 713, 
Pattison, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 257, 28 note. 
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§§ 133-136 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. '
§ 133. (2) Fault of bailor.—If the fault of the bailor pre-
vents the completion of the services, the bailee, according to the
principles of agency, may recover for the services rendered
and for any loss naturally resulting from the bailor’s wrong.
§134. (3) Fault of bailee.—If the bailee abandons the
work, even according to some authorities wilfully and malici-
ously, some cases allow him to recover the worth of services
actually rendered less all loss caused to the bailor by the
abandonment of the service. If, on the whole, the service is
beneficial, it must be paid for. Other cases hold that this rule
applies only when the abandonment was involuntary, and many
still adhere to the strict rule denying him any recovery.
§135. Lien.—Not only is the bailee entitled to compensa-
tion for his services upon a chattel, but the law now gives to
practically every bailee who has ‘performed such services a
security for his wages in a lien on the chattel. A lien is the
right to retain possession of another ’s property until satisfac-
tion is secured for some charge thereon.
A lien, at common law, is founded upon possession, actual or
constructive; this must be uninterrupted while the lien exists;
except in the case of fraud or mistake, a lien once lost can not
be restored by resumption of possession. It is not assignable,
for as soon as the possession essential to a lien is surrendered
to the assignee, the assignor loses his lien and has nothing to
assign.
§ 136. Who can give a lien.—“A lien is a proprietary inter-
est, a qualified ownership, and in general can only be created
by the owner or by some person by him authorized.” Neither
a thief, nor a bailee, unless authorized or clothed with the
§133. Story, Bailments & Car-
riers, § 441; Schouler, Bailments &
Carriers, § 111.
§134. Hillyard v. Crabtree’s
Adm ’r, 11 Tex. 264, 62 Am. D. 475.
Compare Steeples v. Newton, 7
Oreg. 110, 33 Am. R. 705, and Brit-
ton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am.
D. 713. See also 2 Kent ’s Commen-
taries, 591.
§135. [—] Sensenbrenner v.
Matthews, 48 Wis. 250, 3 N. W. R.
599, 33 Am. R. 809; Miller v. Mar-
ston, 35 Me. 153, 56 Am. D. 694.
§136. [—] Small v. Robinson,
69 Me. 425, 31 Am. R. 299; Sargent
v. Usher, 55 N. H. 287, 20 Am. R.
208; [—] Williams v. Allsup, 10 C.
B. (N. S.) 417, 100 E. C. L. 417;
Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, 26
N. E. R. 680, 22 Am. st. R. 615;
Hale v. Barrett, 26 Ill. 195, 79 Am.
D. 367; McKenzie v. Nevins, 22

















































































































































� §  133-136 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. 
� 133. ( 2 )  Fault of bailor.-If the fault of the bailor pre­
vents the completion of the services, the bailee, according to the 
principles of agency, may recover for the services rendered. 
and for any loss naturally resulting from the bailor 's wrong. 
§ 134. (3)  Fault of bailee.-If the bailee abandons the 
work, even according to some authorities wilfully and malici­
ously, some cases allow him to recover the worth of services 
actually rendered less all loss caused to the bailor by the 
abandonment of the service. If, on the whole, the service is 
beneficial, it must be paid for. Other cases hold that this rule 
applies only when the abandonment was involuntary, and many 
still adhere to the strict rule denying him any recovery. 
§ 135. Lien.-Not only is the bailee entitled to compensa­
tion for his services upon a chattel, but the law now gives to 
practically every bailee who has ·performed such services a 
security for his wages in a lien on the chattel. A lien is the 
right to retain possession of another 's property until satisfac­
tion is secured for some charge thereon. 
A lien, at common law, is founded upon possession, actual or 
constructive ; this must be uninterrupted while the lien exists ; 
except in the case of fraud or mistake, a lien once lost can not 
be restored by resumption of possession. It is not assignable, 
for as soon as the possession essential to a lien is surrendered 
to the assignee, the assignor loses his lien and has nothing to 
assign. 
§ 136. Who can give a lien.-' ' A lien is a proprietary inter­
est, a qualified ownership, and in general can only be created 
by the owner or by some person by him authorized. " Neither 
a thief, nor a bailee, unless authorized or clothed with the 
§ 133. Story, Bailments & Car­
riers, § 441 ; Schouler, Bailments & 
Carriers, § 111.  
§ 134. Hillyard v.  Crabtree 's 
Adm 'r, 11 Tex. 264, 62 Am. D. 475. 
Compare Steeples v. Newton, 7 
Oreg. 110, 33 Am. R. 705, and Brit­
ton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. 
D. 713. See also 2 Kent 's Commen· 
taries, 591. 
§ 135. [ -] Sensenbrenner v. 
Matthews, 48 Wis. 250, 3 N. W. R. 
599, 33 Am. R. 809 ; Miller v. Mar­
ston, 35 Me. 153, 56 Am. D. 694. 
§ 136. [-] Small v. Robinson, 
69 Me. 425, 31 Am. R. 299 ; Sargent 
v. Usher, 55 N. H. 287, 20 Am. R. 
208 ; [-] Williams v. Allsup, 10 C. 
B. (N. S. ) 417, 100 E. C. L. 417 ; 
Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 1 16, 26 
N. E. R. 680, 22 Am. St. R. 615 ; 
Hale v. Barrett, 26 Ill. 195, 79 Am. 
D. 367 ; McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 
Me. 138, 38 Am. D. 291. 
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indicia of ownership or authority by the owner, can create a
lien on goods not his own.
But where one is entrusted with property for safekeeping or
use and hires repairs necessary to its preservation or utility,
the owner’s consent to such employment is presumed and the
mechanic has a lien for his services. A lien for services created
by one who had a right to subject the property to it is prior to
all other claims against the property.
§137. ——Basis of the lien.—The right of lien originated
in cases where the party was bound by law to receive goods,
such as innkeepers and common carriers; it was later extended
so that every bailee for hire who by his labor and skillhad
enhanced the value of the goods had a lien upon them for his
compensation. Still later, on principle the lien was entended
to the warehouseman to secure his storage; and now, it has
been said, “the lien is given by the common law to anyone
who takes property in the way of his trade or occupation to
bestow labor and expense upon it,” whether the remuneration
is fixed by an agreement or by an implied contract to pay a
reasonable price. The law considers the laborer worthy of his
hire and secures it to him by allowing him to retain the goods
upon which he has expended time and labor until he has
received his reward. “The lien rests on principles of natural
equity and commercial necessity.”
§ 138. iAgisters, liverymen.—The lien does not extend to
agisters and livery stable keepers for the reason that they do
not impart additional value to the animals. A liveryman who
takes a horse to breed or train does enhance his value and
accordingly has a lien for such services and for the board of
the horse during the time. This reason for denying agisters
and liverymen a lien is unsatisfactory, for no more do ware-
housemen add to the value, but it is a more serious objection
§137. [—] Grinnell v. Cook, 3
Hill (N. Y.) 485 38 Am. D. 663-
§138. [—] Grinnell v. Cook, 3
Hill (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. D. 663;
7 7
[—] Bur-dict v. Murray, 3 Vt. 302,
21 Am. D. 588; [—] Steinman v.
Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42
Am. D. 254; Mathias v. Sellers, 86
Pa. St. 486, 27 Am. R. 723; Arians
\'. Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N. W. R.
188, 56 Am. R. 611.
Jackson v. Cummins, 5 Mees. and W.
341; Miller v. Marston, 35 Me. 153,
56 Am. D. 694; Lord v. Jones, 24
Me. 439, 41 Am. D. 391; Harris v.


















































































































































LOCATIO OPER1S. § §  137-138 
indicia of ownership or authority by the owner, can create a 
lien on goods not his own. 
But where one is entrll;Sted with property for safekeeping or 
use and hires repairs necessary to its preservation or utility, 
the owner 's consent to such employment is presumed and the 
mechanic has a lien for his services. A lien for services created 
by one who had a right to subject the property to it is prior to 
all other claims against the property. 
§ 137. --Basis of the lien.-The right of lien originated 
in cases where the party was bound by law to receive goods, 
such as innkeepers and common carriers ; it was later extended 
so that every bailee for hire who by his labor and skill · had 
enhanced the value of the goods had a lien upon them for his 
compensation. Still later, on principle the lien was entended 
to the warehouseman to secure his storage ; and now, it has 
been said, " the lien is given by the common law to anyone 
who takes property in the way of his trade or occupation to 
bestow labor and expense upon it, ' '  whether the remuneration 
is fixed by an agreement or by an implied contract to pay a 
reasonable price. 'fhe law considers the laborer worthy of his 
hire and secures it to him by allowing him to retain the goods 
upon which he has expended time and labor until he bas 
received his reward. ' ' The lien rests on principles of natural 
equity and commercial necessity. ' '  
§ 138. --Agisters, liverymen.-The lien does not extend to 
agisters and livery stable keepers for the reason that they do 
not impart additional value to the animals. A liveryman who 
takes a horse to breed or train does enhance his value and 
accordingly has a lien for such services and for the board of 
the horse during the time. This reason for denying agisters 
and liv�rymen a lien is unsatisfactory, for no more do ware­
housemen add to the value, but it is a more serious objection 
§ 137. [-) Grinnell v. Cook, 3 
Hill (N. Y. ) 485, 38 Am. D. 663 ; 
[-) Burdict v. Murray, 3 Vt. 302, 
21 Am. D. 588 ; [ -) Steinman v. 
Wilkins, 'i Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 
A m. D. 254 ; Mathias v. Sellers, 86 
Pa. St. 486, 27 Am. R. 723 ; Arians 
'"· Brickley, 65 Wis. 26, 26 N. W. R. 
188, 56 Am. R. 611. 
§ 138. [-) Grinnell v. Cook, 3 
Hill (N. Y. ) 485, 38 Am. D. 663 ; 
.Jackson v. Cummins, 5 Mees. and W. 
341 ; Miller ''· Marston, 35 Me. 153, 
56 Am. D. 694 ;  Lord v. Jones, 24 
Me. 439, 41 Am. D. 391 ; Harris v. 
Woodruff, 124 Mass. 205, 26 Am. R. 
658. 
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that the liverymon does not have that uninterrupted posses-
sion of the animals that is essential to the life of a lien. By
special contract the right of lien may be reserved to agisters
and liverymen.
§139. ——By statute the lien has been very generally ex-
tended to agisters and liverymon, and every bailee who per-
forms services upon a chattel for hire has now a lien for his
compensation.
§140. ———Kinds of lien.—Liens are general or special. A
general lien is security for the payment of a general balance of
account growing out of a series of transactions of a particular
kind. It does not extend to debts arising in a diffierent kind
of transaction.
A special lien is security for services performed in relation
to the particular property to which it attaches. ~
§141. ——I-Iow regarded.—Gencral liens “are discounte-
nanced by the courts as encroaehments on the common law,”
except those “fastened on the law merchant by inveterate
usage.” Such are the liens of factors, insurance brokers, bank-
ers and wharfingers.
A special or particular lien has been pronounced so just be-
tween debtor and creditor that it can not be too much favored.
“It is founded upon the principles of natural justice and tends
to the security and encouragement of commerce.”
§1Q. ——Extent of the 1ien.—The lien extends to. the
whole and every part of the goods to secure the whole and
every part of the debt. If several articles are delivered under
one contract, each is security not only for its portion of the
cost but for the services expended on all the rest. A release
§ 139. Sargent .v. Usher, 55 N. H.
287, 20 Am. R. 208; Lambert v.
Nicklass, 45 W. Va. 527, 72 Am. st.
R. 828.
§ 141. [—] Steinman v. Wilkins,
7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. D.
254; McIntyre v. Carver, 2 Watts &
S (Pa.) 392, 37 Am. D. 519; Mc-
Kenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 138, 38
Am. D. 291; [—] Masonic Savings
Bank v. Bangs ’s Adm ’r, 84 Ky. 135,
4 Am. St. R. 197.
§142. [—] Schmidt v.-Blood, 9
Wend. (N. Y.) 268, 24 Am. D. 143;
New Haven and Northampton Co.
v. Campbell, 128 Mass. 104, 35 Am.
R.. 360; [—] Steinman v. Wilkins,
7' Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. D.
254; Hensel v. Noble, 95 Pa. St.
345, 40 Am. R. 659; Hale v. Bar-
rett, 26 Ill. 195, 79 Am. D. 367;
[—] Potts v. N. Y. and N. E. Rail-


















































































































































§§  139-142 OF LOCATIO BAIL:MENTS. 
that the liverymon does not have that uninterrupted posses­
sion of the animals that is ess�ntial to the life of a lien. By 
special contract the right of lien may be reserved to agisters 
and liverymen. 
§ 139. --By statute the lien has been very generally ex­
tended to agisters and liverymen, and every b!l.ilee who per­
forms services upon a chattel for hire has now a lien for his 
compensation. 
§ 140. --Kinds of lien.-Liens are general or special. A 
general lien is security for the payment of a general balance of 
account growing out of a series of transactions of a particular 
kind. It does not extend to debts arising in a different kind 
of transaction. 
A special lien is security for services performed in relation 
to the particular property to which it attaches. 
§ 141. --How regarded.-General liens ' ' are discounte­
nanced by the courts as encroachments on the common law, " 
except those ' ' fastened on the law merchant by inveterate 
usage. " Such are the liens of factors, insurance brokers, bank­
ers and wharfingers. 
A special or particular lien has been pronounced so just be­
tween debtor and creditor that it can not be too much favored. 
' ' It is founded upon the principles of natural justice and tends 
to the security and encouragement of commerce. ' '  
§ 142. --Extent of the lien.-The lien extends to the 
whole and every part of the goods to secure the whole and 
every part of the debt. If several articles are delivered under 
one contract, each is security not only for its portion of the 
cost but for the services expended on all the rest. A release 
§ 139. Sargent .v. Usher, 55 N. H. 
287, 20 Am. R. 208 ; Lambert v. 
Nicklaee, 45 W. Va. 527, 72 Am. St. 
R. 828. 
§ 141. [ -] Steinman v. Wilkins, 
1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. D. 
254 ; Mcintyre v. Carver, 2 Watts & 
S (Pa. ) 392, 37 Am. D. 519 ; Mc· 
Kenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 1381 38 
Am. D. 291 ; [-] Masonic Savings 
Bank v. Bangs 'e Adm 'r, 84 Ky. 135, 
4 Am. St. R. 197. 
§ 142. [-] Schmidt v. ·Blood, 9 
W end. (N. Y. ) 268, 24 Am. D. 143 ; 
New Haven and Northampton Co. 
Y. Campbell, 128 Mass. 104, 35 Am . 
R.. 360 ; [ -] Steinman v. Wilkins, 
7 Watte & S. (Pa. ) 466, 42 Am. D. 
254 ; Hensel v. Noble, 95 Pa. St. 
345, 40 Am. R. 659 ; Hale v. Bar· 
rett, 26 Ill. 195, 79 Am. D. 367 ; 
[-] Potts v. N. Y. and N. E. Rail· 
road Co., 131 Mase. 455, 41 Am. R. 
�47. 
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of part of the goods does not release the lien pro tanto, but the
lien for the whole debt attaches to the goods not released. On
the other hand, payment of part of the debt will not release the
goods pro tanto, but the bailee may keep all the goods till the
full debt is paid.
§143. ‘Enforcement of lien.—At common law the lien-
holder had but a mere right to retain the goods until his
account was paid, but no right of sale. The lien is an addi-
tional security; the bailee may sue on his debt and if he recov-
ers judgment the lien affords him the advantage of assuring
him property of the debtor on which he may levy execution.
By statute the right of sale is often given, but being in deroga-
tion of the common law the statute must be strictly followed.
By contract provision may be made for a sale by the lien-
holder.
§144. -—Waiver of lien.—“Lien can not survive posses-
sion; and except in case of fraud, and perhaps mistake, such a
lien can not be restored by resumption of possession. There-
fore the voluntary parting with possession of the goods will
amount to waiver by surrender of the lien.” By mutual con-
sent the lien could be revived, but not so as to affect the inter-
vening rights of third persons.
Moreover, “an agreement to give credit, or a special contract
for a particular mode of payment inconsistent with a lien, is a
waiver of it.” And the bailee by express consent, or by con-
duct from which consent may justly be implied, may waive the
lien. Indeed, any act of the bailee inconsistent with the exist-
ence of a lien is evidence of a waiver thereof.
§ 145. ——Termination of the lien.—Payment or tender of
the debt by the bailor discharges the lien and makes the bailee
if he refuses to surrender possession of the goods liable in
§143. [—] Whitlock v. Heard,
13 Ala. 776; 48 Am. D. 73; Knapp
v. McCafl:.rey, 178 Ill. 107, 52 N.
E. R. 898, 69 Am. St. R. 290;
[—] Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray
(Mass.) 382.
§144. [—] Sensenbrenner v.
Matthews, 48 Wis. 250, 3 N. W. R.
599, 33 Am. R. 809; Miller v; Mar-
ston, 35 Me. 153, 56 Am. D. 694;
Stoddard Woolen Manufactory v.
Huntley, 8 N. H. 441, 31 Am. D.
198; Hale v. Barrett, 26 Ill. 195, 79
Am. D. 367; Chandler v. Belden, 18
Johns. (N. Y.) 157, 9 Am. D. 193;
Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, .63 Am.
D. 410; McKenzie v. Nevins, 22 Me.
138, a8 Am. D. 291.
§145. [—] Whitlock v. Heard,

















































































































































LOCATIO OPERIS. §§ 143-145 
of part of the goods does not release the lien pro tanto, but the 
lien for the whole debt attaches to the goods not released. On 
the other hand, payment of part of the debt will not release the 
goods pro tanto, but the bailee may keep all the goods till the 
full debt is paid. 
§ 143. --Enforcement of lien.-At common law the lien­
holder had but a mere right to retain the goods until his 
account was paid, but no right of sale.  The lien is an addi­
tional security ; the bailee may sue oil his debt and if he recov­
ers j udgment the lien affords him the advantage of assuring 
him property or the debtor on which he may levy execution. 
By statute the right of sale is often given, but being in deroga­
tion of the common law the st�tute must be strictly followed. 
By contract provision may be made for a sale by the lien­
holder. 
§ 144. --Waiver of lien.-" Lien can not survive posses­
sion ; and except in case of fraud, and perhaps mistake, such a 
lien can not be restored by resumption of possession. There­
fore the voluntary parting with possession of the goods will 
amount to waiver by surrender of the lien. ' '  By mutual con­
sent the lien could be revived, but not so as to affect the inter­
vening rights of third persons. 
Moreover, " an agreement to give credit, or a special contract 
for a particular mode of payment inconsistent with a lien, is a 
waiver of it. ' '  And the bailee by express consent, or by con­
duct from which consent may justly be implied, may waive tlie 
lien. Indeed, any act of the bailee inconsistent with the exist­
ence of a lien is evidence of a waiver thereof. 
§ 145. --Termination of the lien.-Payment or tender of 
the debt by the bailor discharges the lien and makes the bailee 
if he refuses to surrender possession of the goods liable in 
§ 143. [-] Whitlock v. Heard, 
13 Ala. 776 ; 48 Am. D. 73 ; Knapp 
v Mccaffrey, 178 Ill. 107, 52 N. 
E. R. 898, 69 Am. St. R. 290 ; 
[-] Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray 
(Mass. ) 382. 
· 
§ 144. [-] Sensenbrenner v. 
Matthews, 48 'Wis. 250, 3 N. W. R. 
599, 33 Am. R. 809 ; Miller v; Mar· 
eton, 35 Me. 1531 56 Am. D. 694 ; 
Stoddard Woolen Manufactory v. 
Huntley, 8 N. H. 441, 31 Am. D. 
198 ; Hale v. Barrett, 26 Ill. 1 95, 79 
Am. D. 367 ; Chandler v. Belden, 18 
Johns. (N. Y. ) 157, 9 Am. D. 193 ; 
Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, . 63 Am. 
D. 410 ; McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 
1 38, 38 Am. D. 291. 
§ 145. [-] Whitlock v. Heard, 
1 3  Ala. 7761 48 Am. D. 73 ; Hanna 
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§ 146 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. '
trover for conversion. The lien-holder by any act inconsistent
with the character of his possession and denying the title of the
owner destroys his lien; and any act amounting to a waiver of
the lien, of course, works its extinction. By mutual consent
of the parties the lien may be terminated at any time.
§ 146. Property rights of bailor and ba.i1ee.—The bailee for
hired services has a right to retain the chattel and to earn
his compensation. This amounts to a special property in the
chattel which he may maintain against all the world including
the bailor. He is also answerable over to the bailor for the
chattel, and so may recover from third persons for injury to
the property or for its conversion. He may also insure the
property for its full value. In any case, he may recover not
only the amount of his own interest, but the full amount of the
loss or insurance, and after satisfying his own claim hold the
balance as trustee for the bailor.
The bailor, too, has property in the chattel which he may
vindicate against the whole world including the bailee. As
against third persons, a recovery by either bailor or bailee is
a bar to an action by the other party. As against the bailee
for a fixed term, the bailor need make no demand before bring-
ing suit, and the same is true if the bailee has converted the
property to his own use. In other cases demand must be made
before suit is brought. No right of action accrues until such
termination of the term, or conversion by the bailee, or demand
by the bailor, and the statute of limitations will not begin to
run in favor of the bailee until such right exists. But demand
must be made within a reasonable time or the laches of the
bailor will defeat his right to relief.
v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. D. 410;
McKenzie v. Nevins, 22 Me. 138, 38
Am. D. 291; McIntyre v. Carver, 2
V\’atts & S. (Pa.) 392, 37 Am. D.
519.
§146. [—] Burdict v. Hurray,
3 Vt. 302, 21 Am. D. 588; Waring v.
The Indemnity Fire Insurance Co., 45
N. Y. 606, 6 Am. R. 146; Fire Insur-
ance Co.v. Transportation Co., 66 Md.
339, 7 Atl. R. 905, 59 Am. R. 162;
Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236, 15 Am.
488; Reizenstein v. Marquardt,
75 Iowa 294, 39 N. W. R. 506, 9
Am. St. R. 477; Goodwin v. Ray,
108 Tenn. 614, 69 s. W. R. 730, 91
Am. St. R. 761; [—] American
District Telegraph O0. v. Walker,
72 Md. 454, 20 Atl. R. 1, 20 Am. st.
R. 479; Halyard v. Dechelman, 29
Mo. 459, 77 Am. D. 585 ; Lancaster
Mills v. Merchants’, etc., O0., 89




















































































































































§ 146 OP LOCATIO BAILMENTS. 
trover for conversion. The lien-holder by any act inconsistent 
with the character of his possession and denying the title of the 
owner destroys his lien ; and any act amounting to a waiver of 
the lien, of course, works its extinction. By mutual consent 
of the parties the l ien may be terminated at any time. 
§ 146. Property rights of bailor and ba.ilee.-The bailee for 
hired services has a right to retain the chattel and to earn 
his compensation . This amounts to a special property in the 
chattel which he may maintain against all the world including 
the bailor. He is also answerable over to the bailor for the 
chattel, and so may recover from third persons for injury to 
the property or for its conversion. He may also insure the 
property for its full value. In any case, he may recover not 
only the amount of his own interest, but the full amount of the 
loss or insurance, and after satisfying his own claim hold the 
· balance as trustee for the bailor. 
The bailor, too, has property in the chattel which he may 
vindicate against the whole world including the bailee. As 
against third persons, a recovery by either bailor or bailee is 
a bar to an action by the other party. As against the bailee 
for a fixed term, the bailor need make no demand before bring­
ing suit, and the same is true if the bailee has converted the 
property to his own use. In other cases demand must be made 
before suit is brought. No right of action accrues until such 
termination of the term, or conversion by the bailee, or demand 
by the bailor, and the statute of limitations will not begin to 
run in favor of the bailee until such right exists. But demand 
must be made within a reasonable time or the laches of the 
bailor will defeat his right to relief. 
v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21, 63 Am. D. 410 ; 488 ; Reizenstein v. Marquardt, 
McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 138, 38 75 Iowa 294, 39 N. W. R. 506, 9 
Am. D. 291 ; Mcintyre v. Carver, 2 Am. St. R. 4 77 ; Goodwin v. Ray, 
Watts & S. ( Pa. ) 392, 37 Am. D. 108 Tenn. 614, 69 S. W. R. 730, 91 
519. Am. St. R. 761 ; [ -] American 
§ 146. [-] Burdict v. Murray, District Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 
3 Vt. 302, 21 Am. D. 588 ; Waring v. 7Z Md. 454, 20 Atl. R. 1,  20 Am. St. 
The Indemnity Fire Insurance Co., 45 R.. 479 ; Halyard v. Dechelman, 29 
N. Y. 606, 6 Am. R. 146 ; Fire Insur- Mo. 459, 77 Am. D. 585 ; Lancaster 
ance Co.v. Transportation Co., 66 Md. Mills v. Merchants ', etc., Co., 89 
339, 7 Atl. R. 905, 59 Am. R. 162 ; Tenn. 1, 14 S. W. R. 317, 24 Am, 
Baird v. Dall, 57 N. Y. 2367 15 Am. 8t. R. 586, 
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LOCATIO OPERIS. 147-149
WNW. 6F R523. LEW E.E33£llY.
§147. Care.—The ordinary ca-re required in mutual benefit
bailments has been explained in its general principles. By
way of special application to locatio operis bailments it may
be noted that the bailee must use the care ordinarily exercised
under like conditions by the class to which he belongs. The
skill professed by a carriage painter and by the painter of a
costly picture differs greatly, and so does the care to be de-
manded of a watch repairer and a blacksmith. Each must use
ordinary care according to his profession; and this not because
of any contract to that effect, but because of the duty laid upon
the party by law. By the established and well known usages
of trade or by contract this liability may be modified; but not
so as to excuse the bailee from the exercise of any care, and not
by a condition promulgated by the bailee after entering upon
the undertaking. The hired bailee is liable for nonfeasance as
well as for misfeasance for the acts of his servants and agents
in the course of their employment as well as for his own acts.
The burden of proof in showing neglect by the bailee has been
sufliciently explained (§ 17). is
§148. Special locatio custodiae ba.ilments.-—There are cer¥”l~
tain bailees who are engaged in the business, often quasi-public,%‘
of providing for the safe-keeping of the goods of those who
choose to employ them. Such are warehousemen, wharfingers,
safe-deposit companies, factors, commission merchants, agist-
ers and liverymen. They are subject for the most part to the
principles governing other bailees for hired custody, but their
rights and duties are in some respects peculiar.
Warehousemen, Elevator Owners, Cold Storage Companies.
§149. Warehousemen are bailees whose business it is to
keep goods and merchandise in storage for hire. In some of
the states grain elevators serving the public indiffierently in the
§147. [—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 R. 306, 14 Am. St. R. 688; Hal-
Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. Ld. Cas. 199; yard v. Dechclman, 29 Mo..459, 77
Kelton v. Taylor, 11 Lea (Tenn.) Am. D. 585. '
264, 47 Am. R. 284; [—] American §149. [—] Schmidt iv. Blood, 9
District Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 72 Wend. (N. Y.) 268, 24 Am. D. 143;
Md. 454, 20 Atl. R. 1, 20 Am. St. Yockey v. Smith, 181 Ill. 564, 54
R. 479; Swann v. Brown, 6 Jones’s N. E. R. 1048, 72 Am. St. R. 286;
Law (N. C.) 150, 72 Am. D. 568; [——] Schwerin v. McKie, 51 N. Y.






























































































































































LOCA TIO OPER!S. § §  147-149 
§ 147. Care.-The ordinary care required in mutual benefit 
bailments has been explained in its general principles. By 
way of special application to locatio operis bailments it may 
be noted that the bailee must use the care ordinarily exercised 
un<ler like conditions by the class to which he belongs. The 
skill professed by a carriage painter and by the painter of a 
costly picture differs greatly, and so does the care to be de­
manded of a watch repairer and a blacksmith. Each must use 
ordinary care according to his profession ; and this not because 
of any contract to that effect, but because of the duty laid upon 
the party by law. By the established and well known usages 
of trade or by contract this liability may be modified ; but not 
so as to excuse the bailee from the exercise of any care, and not 
by a condition promulgated by the bailee after entering upon 
the undertaking. The hired bailee is liable for nonfeasance as 
well as for misfeasance for the acts of his servants and agents 
in the course of their employment as well as for his own acts. 
The burden of proof in showing neglect by the bailee has been 
sufficiently explained ( §  17) .  
& § 148. Special locatio custodiae bailments .-There are ce�lt/
. 
� - � 
lain bailees who are engaged in the business, often qWU1i-publie,4._llt­
of providing for the safe-keeping of the goods of those who · · · 
choose to employ them. Such are warehousemen, wharfingers, 
safe-deposit companfos, factors, commission merchants, agist-
ers and liverymen. They are subject for the most part to the 
principles governing other bailees for hired custody, but their 
rights and duties are in some respects peculiar. 
Warehousemen, Elevator Owners, Cold Storage Companies. 
§ 149. Warehousemen are bailees whose business it is to 
keep goods and merchandise in storage for hire. In some of 
the states grain elevators serving the public indifferently in the 
§ 147: [-] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 R. 306, 14 Am. St. R. 688 ; Hal­
Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. Ld. Cae. 199 ; yard v. Dechelman, 29 Mo. - �59, 77 
Kelton v .  Taylor, 11 Lea (Tenn.) Am. D. 585. 
· 
264, 47 Am. R. 284 ; [-] American § 149. [-] Schmidt v. Blood, 9 
District Telegraph Co. v. Walker, 72 Wend. (N. Y. ) 268, 24 Am. D. 143 ; 
Md. 454, 20 Atl. R. 1, 20 Am. St. Yockey v. Smith, 181 Ill. 564, 54 
R. 479 ; Swann v. Brown, 6 Jonee 's N. E. R. 1048, 72 Am. St. R. 286 ; 
Law (N. C. ) 150, 72 Am. D. 568 ; [-] Schwerin v. McKie, 51 N. Y, 
Dale v. See, 51 N. J. L. 378, 18 Atl. 1801 10 Am. R. 581, 
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§§ 150'151 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTs.
storage of grain are made public warehouses with duties of a
public nature; but warehousemen are generally private bailees
like other bailees for hired custody. Even owners of bonded
warehouses, designated by the government for the storage of
dutiable goods in bond until the revenue is paid, and put in
charge of the government storekeeper, are private warehouse-
men liable as ordinary bailees for hire; and so are cold storage
companies erecting warehouses for the keeping for hire of per-
ishable goods by means of artificial cold. Railroad compa-
nies, as soon as they cease to be common carriers, become ware-
housemen of the goods until the goods carried have been re-
ceived by the consignee.
§ 150. iEfi'ect of usag'e.—The general principles govern-
ing locatio custodiae bailments apply to warehouse storage, but
in determining the relations undertaken usage and custom are
of particular force. Those making contracts with reference to
a particular business are presumed to know of the uniform
practices of such business; “this usage may therefore, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, reasonably be sup-
posed to have entered into and formed part of their contracts
and understandings in relation to such business as ordinary
incidents thereto. And where usage in a particular trade or
business is known, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to
law, or opposed to public policy, evidence of such usage may be
considered in ascertaining the otherwise uncertain meaning
of a contract unless the proof of such usage contradicts the
express terms of the agreement.” But usage will not be al-
lowed to contradict or vary a general rule of law.
§151. ——Wa.reh01J.se receipts describing the property, its
ownership, charges for storage and the undertaking of the
warehonseman, are commonly issued to one storing goods in
:3
§150. [—] Morning Star v.
Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328, 11 N. E.
R. 593, 59 Am. R. 211; Drudge v.
I-eiter, 18 Ind. App. 694, 49 N. E.
R. 34, 63 Am. St. R. 359; Pribble v.
Kent, 10 Ind. 325, 71 Am. D. 327;
Kelton v. Taylor, 11 Lea (Tenn.)
264, 47 Am. R. 284; Chase v. Wash-
burn, 1 Ohio St. 244, 59 Am. D. 623.
§ 151. [—] Shaw v. Railway Co.,
»
101 U. S. 557; Anderson v. Port-
land Flouring Mills Co., 37 Oreg.
483, 60 Pac. R. 839, 82 Am. St. R.
771; Dollifl’ v. Robbins, 83 Minn.
498, 86 N. W. R. 772, 85 Am. St. R.
466; Burton v. Curyea, 40 Ill. 320,
89 Am. D. 350; [-—] Geilfuss v.
Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651, 70 N. W. R.
306 60 Am. St. R. 143; Insurance


















































































































































§ §  150-151 OF .LOCATIO lUILMENTS. 
storage of grain are made public warehouses with duties of a 
public nature ; but warehousemen are generally private bailees 
like other bailees for hired custody. Even owners of bonded 
warehouses, designated by the government for the storage of 
dutiable goods in bond until the revenue is paid, and put in 
charge of the government storekeeper, are private warehouse­
men liable as ordinary bailees for hire ; and so are cold storage 
companies erecting warehouses for the keeping for hire of per­
ishable goods by means of artificial cold. Railroad compa­
nies, as soon as they cease to be common carriers, become ware­
housemen of the goods until the goods carried have been re­
ceived by the consignee. 
§ 150. --Effect of usage.-The general principles govern­
ing locatio custodiae bailments apply to warehouse storage, but 
in determining the relations undertaken usage and custom are 
of particular force. Those making contracts with reference to 
a particular business are presumed to know of the uniform 
practices of such business ; ' ' this usage may the ref ore, in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary, reasonably be sup­
posed to have entered into and formed part of their contracts 
and understandings in relation to such business as ordinary 
incidents thereto. And where usage in a particular trade or 
business is known, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to 
law: or opposed to public policy, evidence of such usage may be 
considered in ascertaining the otherwise uncertain meaning 
of a contract unless the proof of such usage contradicts the 
express terms of the agreement. ' '  But usage will not be al­
lowed to contradict or vary a general rule of law. 
§ 151. --Warehouse receipts describing the property, its 
ownership, charges for storage and the undertaking of the 
warehouseman, are commonly issued to one storing goods in 
t'") 
§ 150. [-] Morning Star v. 101 U. S . .  557 ; Anderson v. Port· 
Cunningham, 110  Ind. 328, 11 N. E. Jnnd Flouring Mills Co., 37 Oreg. 
R. 593, 59 Am. R. 211 ; Drudge v. 483, 60 Pac. R. 839, 82 Am. St. R. 
I .eiter, 18 Ind. App. 694, 49 N. E. 771 ; Dolliff v. Robbins, 83 Minn. 
R. 34, 63 Am. St. R. 359 ; Pribble v. 498, 86 N. W. R. 772, 85 Am. St. R. 
Kent, 10 Ind. 325, 71 Am. D. 327 ; 466 ; Burton v. Curyea, 40 Ill. 320, 
Kelton v. Taylor, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 89 Am. D. 350 ; [-] Geilfuss v. 
264, 47 Am. R. 284 ; Chase v. Wash- Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651, 70 N. W. R. 
burn, 1 Ohio St. 244, 59 �· D. 623. 306 t 60
. 
Am. St. R. 143 ; Insurance 
§ 151. (-] Shaw v. Railway Co., ('o. . Kiger, 103 U. S. 352, 
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LOCATIO OPERIS. §§ 152-153
a warehouse. Only warehousemen can issue them. They are
not, like negotiable instruments, representatives of money, but
of the goods, and like bills of lading are regarded as so much
merchandise. Their delivery for the purpose of transfer has
the same effect as a delivery of the property itself, no more, no
less; it passes to the transferee all the title and rights of the
transferer and those only.
They are not negotiable at common law, and when made so
by statute it has been held that they are not so in the sense
that bills, notes and other representatives of money are negoti-
able, but in the sense that they are all like bills and notes trans-
ferable by indorsement and delivery. They are contracts as well
as receipts, and often contain terms defining and restricting
the liabilities of the warehouseman. These, when not con-
trary to public policy, will be efiectual between the parties.
Compare Sec. 222, post.
§152. ——Confusion of goods.—Like other bailees the
warehouseman is bound to return the identical goods stored.
It has already been seen (§ 8) that grain of diffierent owners
stored in an elevator is commonly mixed in one mass, each
depositor becoming owner in common of his share of the whole.
The elevator owner is bound to keep in the bins enough grain
to satisfy the demands of all the depositors. Failure to do this
is conversion to the extent of the deficiency.
§ 153. ——Ga.re.—The warehouseman does not undertake to
keep the goods safely, but only to use ordinary diligence .in
keeping them, and is not liable for loss arising from theft or
accident for which he was not
§152. See in addition to the
cases cited in § 8, Drudge v. Leiter,
18 Ind. App. 694, 49 N. E. R. 34,
63 Am. St. R. 359; [—] Morning
Star v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328,
1l. N. E. R. 593, 59 Am. R. 211.
§153. [—] Schmidt v. Blood, 9
IVend. (N. Y.) 268, 24 Am. D. 143;
[—] Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260,
31 Am. R. 467; Willett v. Rich, 142
Mass. 356, 7 N. E. R. 776, 56 Am.
R. 684; Moulton v. Phillips, 10 R.
I. 218, 14 Am. R. 663; [—] Schwer-
in v. McKie, 51 N. Y. 180, 10 Am.
in fault. He undertakes that
R. 581; Parker v. Union Ice and
Salt Co., 59 Kas. 626, 54 Pac. R.
672, 68 Am. St. R. 383; Marks v.
New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107
La. 172, 31 So. R. 671, 90 Am. St.
R. 285; Allen v. Somers, 73 Conn.
355, 47 Atl. R. 653, 84 Am. St. R.
158; Minnesota Butter and Cheese
Co. v. St. Paul Cold Storage Ware-
house Co., 75 Minn. 445, 77 N. W.
R. 977, 74 Am. St. R. 515; Taussig
v. Bode, 134 Calif. 260, 66 Pac. R.
259, 86 Am. St. R. 250; Lancaster

















































































































































LOCA TIO OPERIS. §§ 152-153 
a warehouse. Only warehousemen can issue them. They are 
not, like negotiable instruments, representatives of money, but 
of the goods, and like bills of lading are regarded as so much 
merchandise. Their delivery for the purpose of transfer has 
the same effect as a delivery of the property itself, no more, no 
less ; it passes to the transferee all the title and rights of the 
transferer and those only. 
They are not negotiable at common law, and when made so 
by statute it has been held that they are not so in the sense 
that bills, notes and other representatives of money are negoti­
able, but in the sense that they are all like bills and notes trans­
ferable by indorsement and delivery. They are contracts as well 
as receipts, and often contain terms defining and restricting 
the liabilities of the warehouseman. These, when not con­
trary to public policy, will be effectual between the parties. 
Compare Sec. 222, post. 
§ 152. -Confusion of goods .-Like other bailees the 
warehouseman is bound to return the identical goods stored. 
It has already been seen ( § 8 )  that grain of different owners 
stored in an elevator is commonly mixed in one mass, each 
depositor becoming owner in common of his share of the whole. 
The elevator owner is bound to keep in the bins enough grain 
to satisfy the demands of all the depositors. Failure to do this 
is conversion to the extent of the deficiency. 
§ 153. --Care.-The warehouseman does not undertake to 
keep the goods safely, but only to use ordinary diligence .in 
keeping them, and is not liable for loss arising from theft or 
accident for which he was not in fault. He undertakes that 
§ 152. See in addition to the R. 581 ; Parker v. Union Ice and 
cases cited in § 8, Drudge v. Leiter, Salt Co., 59 Kas. 626, 54 Pac. R. 
18 Ind. App. 694, 49 N. E. R. 34, 672, 68 Am. St. R. 383 ; Marks v. 
63 Am. St. R. 359 ; [ -] Morning New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 
Star v .  Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328, La. 172, 31 So. R. 671, 90 Am. St. 
1 1  N. E. R. 593, 59 Am. R. 211. R. 285 ; Allen v. Somers, 73 Conn. 
§ 153. [-] Schmidt v. Blood, 9 355, 47 Atl. R. '653, 84 Am. St. R. 
Wend. (N. Y. ) 268, 24 Am. D. 143 ; 158 ; Minnesota Butter and Cheese 
[-] Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, Co. v. St. Paul Cold Storage Ware-
31 Am. R. 467 ; Willett v. Rich, 142 house Co., 75 Minn. 445, 77 N. W. 
Mass. 356, 7 N. E. R. 776, 56 Am. R. 977, 74 Am. St. R. 515 ; Taussig 
R. 684 ; Moulton v. Phillips, 10 R. v. Bode, 134 Calif. 260, 66 Pac. R. 
I. 218, 14 Am. R. 663 ; [ -] Schwer· 259, 86 Am. St. R. 250 ; Lancaster 
in v. McKie, 51 N. Y. 180, 10 Am. MiUs v. Merchants ', etc.1 Co., 89 
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§§ 154-155 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS. i
the warehouse is reasonably safe, fit for its purpose and free
from defects which could have been discovered by ordinary
care. It should be equipped with modern appliances and im-
provements in general use by his class of custodians for the
protection of the goods against injury by theft, fire, rats, heat
and other destroying agents. If he keeps a cold storage ware-
house he undertakes to maintain the necessary temperature or,
if for good cause that is impossible, to give his customers time-
ly warning to remove their property. If the bailor has equal
knowledge of the defect and fails to protect his property, his
contributory negligence will preclude his holding the ware-
houseman liable. The warehouseman may insure the goods
stored for their full value, but in the absence of a contract he is
not compelled to do so. By contract the warehouseman may
make himself liable in every event, or excuse liability except
for his or his servants’ positive negligence. - '
§154. iLien.—The warehouseman’s lien, as already
pointed out, is specific, not general, and is restricted to the
services rendered in relation to the whole quantity deposited
at one time or under one contract.
§ 155. ——Duration of the relation.—The duties of the
warehouseman begin as soon as the property has been delivered
into his control and accepted by him and continue until he has
yielded control to one entitled to receive the goods. He may
assume control by actual acceptance of the goods in his ware-
house, by a custom to accept goods left in a given place in the
warehouse, or by actually taking them in charge before they
come to the warehouse. His control may be terminated in a
similar manner. It is held that when the crane of the ware-
house is attached to the goods to raise them into the ware-
house, the warehouseman’s liability begins; and when grain
reaches the spout carrying it from the elevator, the elevator
owner ’s liability as a warehouseman ends.
'l‘enn. 1, 24 Am. St. R. 586; Hickey [——] Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts &
v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454, 7 N. E. S. (Pa.) 466, 42 Am. D. 254.
R. 321, 55 Am. R. 824; Pope v. §155. Ducker v. Barnett, 5 Mo.
Milling Co., 130 Calif. 139, 62 Pac. 97, The R. G. Winslow, 4 Biss. (U.
R. 384, 80 Am. St. R. 87. S.) 13; Rodgers v. Stophel, 32 Pa.
§154. [—] Schmidt v. Blood, 9 St. 111; 72 Am. D. 775; Blin v.

















































































































































§ §  154-155 OF LOCA TIO BAILMENTS. 
the warehouse is reasonably safe, fit for its purpose and free 
from defects which could have been discovered by ordinary 
care. It should be equipped with modern appliances and im­
provements in general use by his class of custodians for the 
protection of the goods against injury by theft, fire, rats, heat 
and other destroying agents. If he keeps a cold storage ware­
house he undertakes to maintain the necessary temperature or, 
if for good cause that is impossible, to give his customers time­
ly warning to remove their property. If the bailor has equal 
knowledge of the defect and fails to protect his property, his 
contributory negligence will preclude his holding the ware­
houseman liable. The warehouseman may insure the goods 
stored for their full value, but in the absence of a contract he is 
not compelled to do so. By contract the warehouseman may 
make himself liable in every event, or excuse liability except 
for his or his servants ' positive negligence. 
· 
§ 154. --Lien.-The warehouseman 's lien, as already 
pointed out, is specific, not general, and is restricted to the 
services rendered in relation to the whole quantity deposited 
at one time or under one contract. 
§ 155. --Duration of the relation.-The duties of the 
warehouseman begin as soon as the property has been delivered 
into his control and accepted by him and continue until he has 
yielded control to one entitled to receive the goods. He may 
assume control by actual acceptance of the goods in his ware­
house, by a custom to accept goods left in a given place in the 
warehouse, or by actually taking them in charge before they 
come to the warehouse. His control may be terminated in a 
similar manner. It is held that when the crane of the ware­
house is attached to the goods to raise them into the ware­
house, the warehouseman 's liability begins ; and when grain 
reaches the spout carrying it from the elevator, the elevator 
owner 's liability as a warehouseman ends. 
'l'enn. 1, 24 Am. St. R. 586 ; Hickey 
v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454, 7 N. E. 
R. 321, 55 Am. R. 824 ; Pope v. 
Milling Co., 130 Calif. 139, 62 Pac. 
R. 384, 80 Am. St. R. 87. 
§ 154. [-] Schmidt v. Illoo<l, 9 
Weml. (N. Y.) 268, 24 Am. D. 143 ; 
[-] Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & 
S. (Pa. ) 466, 42 Am. D. 254. 
§ 155. Ducker v. Barnett, 5 Mo. 
97, The R. G. Winslow, 4 Biss. (U. 
S. ) 13 ; Rodgers v. Stophel, 32 Pa. 
St. 111 ; 72 Am . .  D. 775 ; Blin v. 
Mayo, 10 Vt. 56, 33 Am. D. 175. 
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LOCATIO Ornms. §§ 153.155
Other Special Bailees for Hire.
§ 156. Wharfingers are those who keep wharves for the pur-
pose of receiving goods for hire. Their undertaking as bailees
is essentially that of warehousemen, and their rights and duties
are subject to the rules just stated. Usage has large place in
connection with the undertaking of the wharfinger, but it must
not be in conflict with established rules of law.
§ 157. Factors or commission merchants make it their busi-
ness to receive goods for sale upon commission. As custodians
of the goods they are bound to store them in safe warehouses,
and must use the diligence of warehousemen in caring for
them. The factor is one of the few bailees whom the usages of
trade have given a general lien on the goods in his possession
to secure a general balance of account.
§ 158. Safe-deposit companies undertake for hire to furnish
a drawer or box in burglar-proof safes or vaults in which
papers or other valuables may be safely kept. Notwithstand-
ing they have not that full control of the property usually given
to bailees, their relation to the depositor is held to be that of
bailee to bailor. They are not depositaries since the service is
not gratuitous. They undertake to exercise ordinary care
which, in view of the nature of the business, means a high
degree of diligence and watchfulness. In the absence of a spe-
cial agreement they are not insurers of the safety of the valu-
ables deposited in the rented boxes. They must provide what
they profess to furnish, must keep pace with improvements and
safety appliances and use that high care that ordinarily pru-
dent men are wont to bestow on property of such special value.
§156. Chapman v. State, 104
Calif. 690, 38 Pac. R. 457, 43 Am.
St. R. 158; Willey v. Allegheny City,
118 Pa. st. 490, 12 Atl. R. 453, 4
Am. St. R. 608; Wooster v. Blossom,
9 Jones ’s L. (N. C.) 244, 72 Am. D.
549; Blin v. Mayo, 10 Vt. 56, 33
Am. D. 175; Rodgers v. Stophel, 32
Pa. St. 111, 72 Am. D. 775; Cox v.
O’Reiley, 4 Ind. 368, 58 Am. D. 633.
§157. McKenzie v. Nevins, 22
Me. 138, 38 Am. D. 291; Vincent v.
Rather, 31 Tex. 77, 98 Am. D. 516;
[—] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray-
mond 909, 1 Sm. L. Cas. 199.
§l58. [—] Preston v. Prather,
137 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162; Safe
Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. St.
391, 27 Am. R. 660; Cussen v.
Southern California Savings Bank,
133 Calif. 534, 65 Pac. R. 1099, 85
Am. St. R. 221; Mayer v. Bern-
singer, 180 Ill. 110, 54 N. E. R. 159,

















































































































































LOCATIO OPERIS. § §  158-158 
Other Special Bailees for Hire. 
§ 156. Wharftngers are those who keep wharves for the pur­
pose of receiving goods for hire. Their undertaking as bailees 
is essentially that of warehousemen, and their rights and duties 
are subject to the rules just stated. Usage has large place in 
connection with the undertaking of the wharfinger, but it must 
not be in conflict with established rules of law. 
§ 157. Factors or commission merchants make it their busi­
ness to receive goods for sale upon commission. As custodians 
of the goods they are bound to store them in safe warehouses, 
and must use the diligence of warehousemen in caring for 
them. The factor is one of the few bailees whom the usages of 
trade have given a general lien on the goods in his possession 
to secure a general balance of account. 
§ 158. Safe-deposit companies undertake for hire to furnish 
a drawer or box in burglar-proof safes or vaults in which 
papers or other va1uables may be safely kept. Notwithstand­
ing they have not that full control of the property usually given 
to bailees, their relation to the depositor is held to be that of 
bailee to bailor. They are not depositaries since the service is 
not gratuitous. They undertake to exercise ordinary care 
which, in view of the nature of the business, means a high 
degree of diligence and watchfulness. In the absence of a spe­
cial agreement they are not insurers of the safety of the valu­
ables deposited in the rented boxes. They must provide what 
they profess to furnish, must keep pace with improvements and 
safety appliances and use that high care that ordinarily pru­
dent men are wont to bestow on property of such special value. 
§ 156. Chapman v. State, 104 
Calif. 690, 38 Pac. R. 457, 43 Am. 
St. R. 158 ; Willey v. Allegheny City, 
118 Pa. St. 490, 12 Atl. R. 453, 4 
Am. St. R. 608 ; Wooster v. Blossom, 
9 Jones 's L. ( N. C.)  244, 72 Am. D. 
549 ; Blin v. Mayo, 10 Vt. 56, 33 
Am. D. 175 ; Rodgers v. Stophel, 32 
Pa. St. 111,  72 Am. D. 775 ; Cox v. 
0 'Reiley, 4 Ind. 368, 58 Am. D. 633. 
§ 157. McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 
Me. 138, 38 Am. D. 291 ; Vincent v. 
Rather, 31 Tex. 77, 98 Am. D. 516 ; 
[--] Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray­
mond 909, 1 Sm. L. Cas. 199. 
§ 158. [ -] Preston v. Prather, 
l 37 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162 ; Safe 
Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. St. 
391, 27 Am. R. 660 ; Cussen v. 
E.louthern California Savings Bank, 
133 Calif. 534, 65 Pac. R. 1099, 85 
Am. St. R. 221 ; Mayer v. Bern­
singer, 180 Ill. 1 10, 54 N. E. R. 159, 
72 Am. St. R. 196. 
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§ 159 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTS.
§ 159. Agisters and liveryman as bailees for hire need little
special mention. As already noted they formed almost the
only classes of hired bailees that at the common law had no
lien on the bailed chattels as security for their compensation;
but now by statute they have been given such a lien. The
agister must keep his pasture properly enclosed, and the livery-
man his stable in proper condition and the animals properly
secured therein.
§159. Cecil v. Prcuch, 4 Martin R. 951, 72 Am. St. R. 828; Costello
(N. S.) (La.) 256, 16 Am. D. 171; v. Ten Eyck, 86 Mich. 348, 49 N. W.
Swann v. Brown, 6 Jones ’s L. (N. R. 152, 24 Am. St. R. 128; Halty v.
C.) 150, 72 Am. D. 568; Lambert Markel, 44 Ill. 225, 92 Am. D. 182.

















































































































































§ 159 OF LOCATIO BAILMENTB. 
§ 159. Agisters and liverymen as bailees for hire need little 
special mention. As already noted they formed almost the 
only classes of hired bailees that at the common law had no 
lien on the bailed chattels as security for their compensation ; 
but now by statute they have been given such a lien. The 
agister must keep his pasture properly enclosed, and the livery­
man his stable in proper condition and the animals properly 
secured therein. 
§ 159. Cecil v. Preuch, 4 Martin R. 951, 72 Am. St. R. 828 ; Costello 
(N. S. ) (La.) 256, 16 Am. D. 171 ; v. Ten Eyck, 86 Mich. 348, 49 N. W. 
Swann v. Brown, 6 .Tones 's L. (N. R. 152, 24 Am. St. R. 128 ; Halty v. 
C. ) 150, 72 Am. D. 568 ; Lambert Markel, 44 Ill. 225, 92 Am. D. 182. 





OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS.
§160. Summary. §174. Duration of the relation.
161. Historical. 2. Rights and duties of the
162 Distinctions. parties.
1. The nature of the rela-
tion.








Duty to receive guest.
iExcuses for refusal.
Duty to receive goods.
Liability of innkeeper.
163- Definition of i11111<@@l>er- 179. Liability to guest personally.
164. The accommodations. 180 Liability for goods‘
165. Who are not innkeepers. . . . .
166. ——Sleeping car companies. 181' 'iExcept10nal h8‘b1hty'
167 ——Steamboat companies. 132 iE1°°Pl71o115-
168 Boarding and lodging 183. iBurden of proof.
houses and restaurants. 184 ipor what Property Ha.
169. Holding out as innkeeper. b1e.
(b) .1jhe guest‘ 185 —i—Owner’s custody.
170 Definition. . . . . . .
171‘ Transients. 186 iL1m1tatlon of liability.
172 ___Acceptance by the ;m,. 187 Compensation and lien.







§160. A summary of the previous chapters shows that we
have considered gratuitous bailments, in which the promisor
(bailor or bailee) receives no compensation, and mutual benefit
bailments, in which the promisor has his reward. Of the latter
class are locatio rei and locatio operis bailments, and of the sec-
ond of these those that are ordinary have been already treated.
But extraordinary locatio operis bailments, in which the prom-
isor stands in an exceptional relation, still remain for examina-


















































































































































O:F EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
CHAPTER IX. 
OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. 
§ 160. Summary. § 174. Duration of the relation. 
161. Historical. 
162. Distinctions. 
1. The nature of the rela­
tion. 
(a) The innkeeper and his 
accommodations. 
163. Definition of innkeeper. 
164. The accommodations. 
165. Who are not innkeepers. 
166. --Sleeping car companies. 
167. --Steamboat companies. 
168. --Boarding and lodging 
houses and restaurants. 
169. Holding out as "innkeeper. 
(b) The guest. 
170. Definition. 
171. --Transients. 
172. --Acceptance by the inn­
keeper. 
173. --Non-acceptance as a 
guest. 
t. Rights and duties of the 
parties. 
1 75. Duty to receive guest. 
1 76. --Excuses for refusal. 
177. Duty to receive goods. 
1 78. Liability of innkeeper. 
179. Liability to guest personally. 
180. Liability for goods. 
181. --Exceptional liability. 
182. --Exceptions. 
183. --Burden of pro?f. 
184. --For what property lia-
ble. 
1 85. Owner 's custody. 
186. --Limitation of liability. 
187. Compensation and lien. 
3. Termination of the rela­
tion. 
188. How terminated. 
§ 160. A snmma.ry of the previous chapters shows that we 
have considered gratuitous bailments, in which the promisor 
(bailor or bailee ) receives no compensation, and mutual benefit 
bailments, in which the promisor has his reward. Of the latter 
class are locat io rei and locatio ope1·is bailments, and of the sec4 
ond of these those that are ordinary have been already treated. 
But extraordinary locatio operis bailments, in which the prorn­
isor stands in an exceptional relation, still remain for examina­
tion. Reserving for consideration in later chapters the subject 
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161-162 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS.
of common carriers, we take up now the innkeeper as an
exceptional bailee with reference to the baggage of his guest;
and it will be convenient in this connection also to consider the
relation of the innkeeper to his guest personally, which is not
one of bailment.
§ 161. Hist0rica.l.—Formerly all bailees were strictly ac-
countable to the bailor for the bailed goods (Holmes’s Common
Law). This liability, modified largely as to most bailees, still
attaches with some diminution to innkeepers and common car-
riers. The reason they have not been relieved of this extraor-
dinary liability is the peculiar opportunity offered them for
fraud and plunder in the lawless times of the Middle Ages when
the highways to London were so infested with thieves and
robbers that traveling without an armed escort was unsafe.
The only safe haven on the Continent was the monastery, the
inns being rather places where thieves divided their plunder
and planned their raids, than places of repose and safety for
travelers. In England the strict accountability of the inn-
keeper made the English inn a place of security and comfort.
Though conditions have become more settled, still the guest is
peculiarly at the mercy of the innkeeper and his servants,
and the increased facilities for travel have so multiplied the
number of transients seeking our modern hotels that there is
scarcely less need of the protection of the law for the wayfarer
in a strange place. Statutes in most of our states have modi-
fied some of the harsh features of the old common law with
reference to the innkeeper; yet the courts on the whole have
been loath to depart from the rigid regulations formerly ap-
plied to them.
§ 162. Distincti0ns.— Tavern, inn, hotel, are words of differ-
ent origin. The first originally applied to places furnishing
food and drink rather than lodging; inn was the recognized
word in the law; while hotel has been adopted from the French
within the past century and has come to be the word in
popular us.e:. In this country the three words have come to
have practically the same meaning.
§16]. Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 §162. See these words in any
Daly (N. Y.) 15; Hulett v. Swift, dictionary, and the historical account
33 N. Y. 571, 88 Am. D. 405; of Daly, J. in Cromwell v. Stephens,
[—] Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. 2 Daly (N. Y.) 15.

















































































































































� §  161-162 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
of common carriers, we take up now the innkeeper as an 
exceptional bailee with reference to the baggage of his guest ; 
and it will be convenient in this connection also to consider the 
relation of the innkeeper to his guest personally, which is not 
one of bailment. 
§ 161. Historical-Formerly all bailees were strictly ac­
countable to the bailor for the bailed goods (Holmes 's Common 
Law) .  This liability, modified largely as to most bailees, still 
attaches with some diminution to innkeepers and common car­
riers. The reason they have not been relieved of this extraor­
dinary liability is the peculiar opportunity offered them for 
fraud and plunder in the lawless times of the Middle Ages when 
the highways to London were so infested with thieves and 
robbers that traveling without an armed escort was unsafe. 
The only safe haven on the Continent was the monastery, the 
inns being rather places where thieves divided their plunder 
and planned their raids, than places of repose and safety for 
travelers. In England the strict accountability of the inn­
keeper made the English inn a place of security and comfort. 
Though conditions have become more settled, still the guest is 
peculiarly at the mercy of the innkeeper and his servants, 
and the increased facilities for travel have so multiplied the 
number of transients seeking our modern hotels that there is 
scarcely less need of the protection of the law for the wayfarer 
in a strange place. Statutes in most of our states have modi­
fied some of the harsh features of the old common law with 
reference to the innkeeper ; yet the courts on the whole have 
been loath to depart from the rigid regulations formerly ap­
plied to them. 
§ 162. Distinctions.- Tavern, inn, hotel, are words of differ­
ent origin. The first originally applied to places furnishing 
food and drink rather than lodging ; inn was the recognized 
word in the law ; while hotel has been adopted from the French 
within the past century and has come to be the word in 
popular us�at . In this country the three words have c
'
ome to 
have practically the same meaning. 
§ 161. Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 
Daly (N. Y. ) 15 ; Hulett v. Swift, 
33 N. Y. 571, 88 Am. D. 405 ; 
[-] Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. 
)fonroe (Ky. ) 72, 48 Am. D. 416. 
§ 162. See these words in any 
dictionary, and the historical account 
of Daly, J. in Cromwell v. Stephens, 
2 Daly (N. Y. ) 15. 
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Or mus AND INNKEEPERS. §§ 163-155
In conformity with the general plan of the work we shall
consider, 1, the nature of the relation; 2, its rights and duties;
and 3, its termination. The nature of the relation calls for a
definition (a) of the innkeeper and the accommodation he
offers, and (b) of the guest.
1. THE NATURE Or THE RELATION.
(a) The Innkeeper and His Accommodations.
§163. Definition.—The innkeeper is one who holds himself
out to furnish lodging, or lodging and other entertainment, to
transients for hire.
§164. The acc0mm0dations.—Formerly the inn offered all
the entertainment the traveler might require for himself, his
beast, and his traveling equipments. Changes in the modes of
travel and conditions of life have called for the modification
of the definition of an inn. The inn of to-day may furnish all
and more than its predecessor; but it is nevertheless an inn
though it provide no entertainment for the traveler’s horse,
though it keep no liquors, though it be run on the “European
plan” and furnish lodging only, though it be open for the
summer or the winter season. But it is essential as to the
entertainment that it should furnish lodging and usually meals
for the traveler, though the development of the European
hotel seems likely to modify this last requirement.
§165. Who not innkeepers.—But one is not an innkeeper
who furnishes occasional entertainment only; who keeps a




' §163. [—] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 72, 48
Am. D. 416; [—] Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill, 360, 24 Am.
R. 258; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex.
798, 73 Am. D. 218; Pinkerton v.
Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D.
657; [—] Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N.
Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244; [—] Fay v.
Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal.
253, 26 Pac. R. 1099, 28 Pac. R.
943, 27 Am. St. R. 198.
§164. [—] Fay v. Pacific Im-
provement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac.
R. 1099, 28 Pac. R. 943, 27 Am. St.
R. 198; [—] Kisten v. Hildebrand,
9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. D.
416; Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal.
557, 91 Am. D. 657; Hancock v.
Rand, 94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. R. 112.
§165. [—] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 72, 48
Am. D. 416; [—] Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am.
IR. 258; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex.
798, 73 Am. D. 218; Meacham v.
Galloway, 102 Tenn. 415, 52 S. \\'.

















































































































































OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. § §  163-165 
In conformity with the general plan of the work we shall 
consider, 1, the nature of the relation ; 2, its rights and duties ; 
and 3, its termination. The nature of the relation caTui for a 
definition ( a) of the innkeeper and the accommodation he 
offers, and ( b) of the guest. 
1. THE NATURE OF THE REI.iA.TION. 
( a) The Innkeeper and His Accommocla.tions. 
§ 163. Deftnition.-The innkeeper is one who holds himself 
out to furnish lodging, or lodging and other entertainment, to 
transients for hire. 
§ 164. The accommodations. -Formerly the inn offered all 
the entertainment the traveler might require for himself, his 
beast, and his traveling equipments. Changes in the modes of 
travel and conditions of life have called for the modification 
of the definition of an inn. The inn of to-day may furnish all 
and more than its predecessor ; but it is nevertheless an inn 
though it provide no entertainment for the traveler 's horse, 
though it keep no liquors, though it be run on the ' ' European 
plan ' '  and furnish lodging only, though it be open for the 
summer or the winter season. But it is essential as to the 
entertainment that it should furnish lodging and usually meals 
for the traveler, though the development of the European 
hotel seems likely to modify this last requirement. 
§ 165. Who not innkeepers.-But one is not an innkeeper 
who furnishes occasional entertainment only ; who keeps a 
restaurant or coffee-house providing food only ; who keeps a 
. ' �-·' . . . - . 1 · 
' 
§ 163. [-] Kisten v. Hilde­
brand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky.)  72, 48 
Am. D. 416 ; [-] Pullman Palace 
Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill, 360, 24 Am. 
R. 258 ; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 
798, 73 Am. D. 218 ; Pinkerton v. 
Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. 
657 ; [-] Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. 
Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244 ; [-] Fay v. 
Pacific Improvement Co., 9� Cal. 
253, 26 Pac. R. 1099, 28 Pac. R. 
943, 27 Am. St. R. 198. 
§ 164. [-] Fay v. Pacific Im­
provement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 
R. 1099, 28 Pac. R. 943, 27 Am. St. 
R. 198 ; [-] Kisten v. Hildebrand, 
9 B. Monroe (Ky. ) 72, 48 Am. D. 
416 ; Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 
557, 91 Am. D. 657 ; Hancock v. 
Rand, 94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. R. 112. 
§ 165. [-] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky. ) 72, 48 
Am. D. 416 ; [-] Pullman Palace 
Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. 
R. 258 ; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 
798, 73 Am. D. 218 ; Meacham v. 
Galloway, 102 Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. 
R. 859, 73 Am. St. R. 886. 
67 
§§ 166-155 Or EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS.
boarding house for the entertainment of regular boarders
merely—though one may be an innkeeper as to transients and
not an innkeeper as to boarders kept in the house—; who
keeps an apartment house for regular lodgers even though a
transient may occasionally be accommodated.
§166. ——S1eeping car compa.nies.—Neither are sleeping
car companies considered in law as innkeepers. Every reason
for excluding them has been eifectually refuted save one, but
it is well settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that
they are not innkeepers, nor subject to their liability. The
most cogent reason for this rule is that the “peculiar liability
of the innkeeper is one of great rigor and should not be ex-
tended beyond its proper limits.” The difference between the
European hotel and the modern compartment sleeper is that
one is stationary, the other on wheels; but one is an inn, the
other is not.
§ 167. ——Steamboat companies, too, by the weight of au-
thority, are not innkeepers. They are common carriers “and
no one is subject to both liabilities at the same time and with
regard to the same property,” but in one case it was said, “The
relations between a steamboat company and its passengers who
have procured state rooms dilfer in no essential respect from
those that exist between the innkeeper and his guests.”
§ 168. ——Boarding and lodging houses and restaurants, as
already intimated, are not inns. A boarding house keeper
does not hold himself out to entertain transients; the keeper
of a restaurant offers no lodging. They are bailees for hire
and are required to exercise with reference to the eifects of
§166. Compare [—] Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360,
24 Am. R. 258, and Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 44 N.
W. R. 226, 26 Am. St. R. 325. See
also [—] Blum v. Southern Pull-
man Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.)
500; Lawson on Bailments and Oar-
riers; Adams v. New Jersey Steam-
boat Co., 151 N. Y. 163, 45 N. E. R.
369, 56 Am. St. R. 616.
§167. [—] Compare Clark v.
Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. R.
456, with Adams v. New Jersey
Steamboat C0., 151 N. Y. 163, 45 N.
E. R. 369, 56 Am. St. R. 616.
§168. [—] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 72, 48
Am. D. 416; Meacham v. Galloway,
102 Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. R. 859, 73
Am. St. R. 886; Taylor v. Downey,
104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. R. 716, 53
Am. St. R. 472; Shefier v. Wil-
loughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. R.
253, 54 Am. St. R. 483; Moore v.
Long Beach Development Co., 87


















































































































































§ §  166-168 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
boarding house for the entertainment of regular boarders 
merely-though one may be an innkeeper as to transients and 
not an innkeeper as to boarders kept in the house- ; who 
keeps an apartment house for regular lodgers even though a 
transient may occasionally be accommodated. 
§ 166. -Sleeping car compa.nies.-Neither are sleeping 
car companies considered in law as innkeepers. Every reason 
for excluding them has been effectually refuted save one, but 
it is well settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that 
they are not in•keepers, nor subject to their liability. The 
most cogent reason for this rule is that the ' ' peculiar liability 
of the innkeeper is one of great rigor and should not be ex. 
tended beyond its proper limits. ' '  The difference between the 
European hotel and the modern compartment sleeper is that 
one is stationary, the other on wheels ; but one is an inn, the 
other is not. 
§ 167. -Steamboat companies, too, by the weight of au­
thority, are not innkeepers. 'l'hey are common carriers ' ' and 
!IO one is subject to both liabilities at the same time and with 
regard to the same property, " but in one case it was said, " The 
relations between a steamboat company and its passengers who 
have procured state rooms differ in no essential respect from 
those that exist between the innkeeper and his guests. ' '  
§ 168. --Boarding a.nd lodging houses and restaurants, as 
nl ready intimated, are not inns. A boarding house keeper 
does not hold himself out to entertain transients ; the keeper 
of a restaurant offers no lodging. They are bailees for hire 
and are required to exercise with reference to the effects of 
§ 166. Compare [-] Pullman 
Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 I ll. 360, 
24 Am. R. 258, and Pullman Palace 
Car Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 44 N. 
W. R. 226, 26 Am. St. R. 325. See 
also [-] Blum v. Southern Pull· 
man Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 
500 ; Lawson on Bailments and Car· 
ri ers ; Adams v. New Jersey Steam· 
boat Co., 151 N. Y. 163, 45 N. E. R. 
369, 56 Am. St. R. 616. 
§ 167. [-] Compare Clark v. 
Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. R. 
456, with Adams v. New Jersey 
Steamboat Co., 151 N. Y. 163, 45 N. 
E. R. 369, 56 Am. St. R. 616. 
§ 168. [-] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky. ) 72, 48 
Am. D. 416 ; Meacham v. Galloway, 
10� Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. R. 859, 73 
Am. St. R. 886 ; Taylor v. Downey, 
104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. R. 716, 53 
Am. St. R. 472 ; Sheffer v. Wil­
loughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. R. 
253, 54 Am. St. R. 483 ; Moore v. 
Long Beach Development Co., 87 
Cal. 483, 26 Pac. R. 92, 22 Am. St. 
R. 265. 
68 
Or INNS AND INNKEEPERS. §§ 169-171
the sojourner ordinary care in view of the nature of their
undertaking. As to regular boarders in a hotel the proprietor
is in the relation of boarding house keeper, not of innkeeper.
§169. I-Iolding out as innkeeper.—It is the fact that he
holds himself out to receive all transients who may chose to
seek his inn, who come in proper condition, able and willing
to pay for their accommodation, that is the final test in deter-
mining whether one is an innkeeper or not. If he so holds
himself out he is an innkeeper though he may make special
contracts with part of his customers, or furnish some with
board only. It he does not so hold himself out he is not an
innkeeper though he may accommodate transients occasionally.
He may hold himself out by his actions as well as by his declara-
tions or the use of the sign in front of his inn.
(b) The Guest.
§170. Definition.—Having considered the innkeeper and
the accommodation he offers to furnish, we next inquire who is
a guest? A guest is a transient who resorts to an inn as such
and is accepted by the innkeeper. This definition leads to an
inquiry as to who is meant by a transient and what is accept-
ance by the innkeeper.
§171. ——Transients.—-Exact definition of a transient is
difiicult. He has. been referred to as a traveler, a wayfarer,
§169. [—] Fay v. Pacific Im-
provemcnt Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac.
Ii. 1099, 28 Pac. R. 943, 27 Am. St.
R. 198; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex.
798, 73 Am. D. 218: Pinkerton v.
VVoodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D.
657; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H.
523, 31 Am. D. 209; Houser v. Tully,
62 Pa. St. 92, 1 Am. R. 390.
§170. Manning v. Wells, 9
Humph. (Tenn.) 746, 51 Am. D.
688; [—] Curtis v. Murphy, 63
Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 53 Am. R.
242. '
§ 171. [—] Curtis v. Murphy, 63
Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 53 Am. R.
242; [—] Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B.
Monroe (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. D. 416;
Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush
(Ky.) 41, 96 Am. D. 327; Magee v.
Pacific Improvement Co., 98 Cal. 678,
33 Pac. R. 772, 35 Am. St. R. 199;
[—] Fay v. Pacific‘ Improvement
Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. R. 1099, 28
Pac. R. 943, 27 Am. St. R. 198;
Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va.
671, 26 S. E. R. 442, 57 Am. St. R.
878; Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52,
83 Am. D. 762; Pinkerton v. Wood-
ward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. 657;
Meacham v. Galloway, 102 Tenn.
415, 52 S. W. R. 859, 73 Am. St. R.
886; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1,


















































































































































OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. § §  169-171 
the sojQurner ordinary care in view of the nature of their 
undertaking. As to regular boarders in a. hotel tqe prop:rietor 
is in the relation of boarding house keeper, not of innkeeper. 
§ 169. :a;olding out as innkeeper.-It is the fact that he 
holds himself out to receive all transients who may chose to 
seek his inn, who come in proper condition, able and willing 
to pay for their accommodation, that is the final test in deter­
mining whether one is an innkeeper or not. If he so holds 
himself out he is an innkeeper though he may make special 
contracts with part of his customers, or furnish some with 
board only. It he does not so hold himself out he is not an 
innkeeper though he may accommodate transients occasionalJy. 
He may hold himself out by his actions as well as by his declara­
tions or the use of the sign in front of his inn. 
( b ) The Guest. 
§ 170. D�finition.-Having considered the innkeeper and 
the accommodation he offers to furnish, we next inquire who is 
a guest 1 A guest is a transient who resorts to an inn as such 
and is accepted by the innkeeper. This definition leads to an 
inquiry as to who is meant by a transient and what is accept­
ance by the innkeeper. 
§ 171. --Transients.-Exact definition of a transient is 
difficult. He has · been referred to as a traveler, a wayfarer, 
§ 169. [-] Fay v. Pacific Im· _ Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush 
provement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. (Ky.) 41 , 96 Am. D. 327 ;  Magee v. 
R. 1099, 28 Pac. R. 943, 27 Am. St. Pacific Improvement Co., 98 Cal. 678, 
I\ . .  198 ; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 33 Pac. R. 772, 35 Am. St. R. 199 ; 
7!18, 73 Am. D. 218 : Pinkerton v. [-] Fay v. Pacific- Improvement 
Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. R. 1099, 28 
657 ; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. Pac. R. 943, 27 Am. St. R. 198 ; 
523, 31 Am. D. 209 ; Hornier v. Tully, Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va. 
62 Pa. St. 92, 1 Am. R. 390. 671, 26 S. E. R. 442, 57 Am. St. R. 
§ 170. Manning v. Wells, 9 878 ; Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52, 
Humph. (Tenn. ) 746, 51 AJD. D. 83 Am. D. 762 ; Pinkerton v. Wood-
688 ; [-J Curtis v. Murphy, 63 ward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. 657 ; 
Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 53 Am. R. Meacham v: Galloway, 102 Tenn. 
242. 415, 52 S. W. R. 859, 73 Am. St. R. 
§ 171. [-] Curtis v. Murphy, 63 886 ; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1 ,  
Wis. 4, 2 2  N. W. R. 825, 5 3  Am. R. 46 Am. R. 1 12 ; Lusk v. Belote, 22 
242 ;  [-] Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Minn. 468. 
Monroe (Ky. ) 72, 48 Am. D. 416 ; 
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g§172-173 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS.
a temporary lodger or stranger, a temporary sojourner whose
stay is precarious and uncertain. It may be for a day, a week
or a month, on special terms or with no advance agreement, for
the purpose of taking lodging, refreshment, or both. He may
be a resident of the same town with the innkeeper if he comes
as a traveler, and not as a neighbor or friend. One who comes
on a special contract to board is usually a boarder, but a
transient may inquire in advance the charge for his entertain-
ment and receive special rates. The only essential is that he
be a transient whose stay is more or less temporary and uncer-
tain.
§ 172. ——Acceptance by the innkeeper.—A transient may
become a guest before calling for a room, or registering his
name, or even entering the inn, though these are the usual
steps taken by a traveler in becoming a guest. The porter by
taking charge of his baggage at the station may accept him as
a guest for the innkeeper. If he intends to resort to the inn
as such, the entertainment he receives may be lodging and
board, lodging alone or board only; it may be for a single meal,
or merely for a drink at the bar, though resorting to the inn
for that purpose alone could scarcely make him a guest; he may
change his plan altogether and leave before receiving any
entertainment; in any of these cases, if he went to the inn for
entertainment as a transient and was accepted by the innkeeper
he became a guest. '
§173. ——Non-acceptance as a g'uest.—But not every one
who resorts to an inn is a guest. Regular boarders, social
guests of the innkeeper, those attending a ball or banquet at
the inn, one going to the inn to carry on a regular business or to
find a safe depository for money, and one resorting to the inn
§l72. [—] Bennett v. Mellor, 5 R. 80; [—] Mowers v. Fethers, 61
T. R. 273; Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt.
15, 98 Am. D. 560; Coskery v.
Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S. E. R. 491,
20 Am. St. R. 333; [—] Dickinson
v. Winchester, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 114,
50 Am. D. 760; [—] Bowell v. De
Wald, 2 Ind. App. 303; 28 N. E. R.
430.
§173. [—] Grinnell v. Cook, 3
Hill (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. D. 663;
Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489, 28 Am.
N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244; Mason
v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280,
20 Am. D. 471; Arcade Hotel Co. v.
Wiatt, 44 Ohio St. 32, 4 N. E. R.
398; 58 Am. R. 785; [—] Curtis v.
Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825;
53 Am. R. 242; Moore v. Long
Beach Development Co., 87 Cal, 483,
26 Pac. R. 92, 22 Am. St. R. 265;
Neal v. Wilcox, 4 Jones ’s L. (N. C.)

















































































































































� §  172-173 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
a temporary lodger or stranger, a temporary sojourner whose 
stay is precarious and uncertain. It may be for a day, a week 
or a month, on special terms or with no advance agreement, for 
the purpose of taking lodging, refreshment, or both. He may 
be a resident of the same town with the innkeeper if he comes 
as a traveler, and not as a neighbor or friend. One who comes 
on a special contract to board is usually a boarder, but a 
transient may inquire in advance the charge for his entertain­
ment and receive special rates. The only essential is that he 
be a transient whose stay is more or less temporary and uncer­
tain. 
§ 172. --Acceptance by the innkeeper.-A transient may 
become a guest before calling for a room, or registering his 
name, or even entering the inn, though these are the usual 
steps taken by a traveler in becoming a guest. The porter by 
taking charge of his baggage at the station may accept him as 
a guest for the innkeeper. If he intends to resort to the inn 
as such, the entertainment he receives may be lodging and 
board, lodging alone or board only ; it may be for a single meal, 
or merely for a drink at the bar, though resorting to the inn 
for that purpose alone could scarcely make him a guest ; he may 
change his plan altogether and leave before receiving any 
entertainment ; in any of these cases, if he went to the inn for 
entertainment as a transient and was accepted by the innkeeper 
he became a guest. 
§ 173. --Non-acceptance as a guest.-But not every one 
who resorts to an inn is a guest. Regular boarders, social 
guests of the innkeeper, those attending a ball or banquet at 
the inn, one going to the inn to carry on a regular business or to 
find a safe depository for money, and one resorting to the inn 
§ 172. [-] Bennett v. Mellor, 5 
T. R. 273 ; Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 
15, 98 Am . D. 560 ; Coskery v. 
Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S. E. R. 491, 
20 Am. St. R. 333 ; [ -] Dickinson 
, .. Winchester, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 1 14, 
50 Am. D. 760 ; [-] Bowell v. De 
Wald, 2 Ind. App. 303 ; 28 N. E. R. 
430. 
§ 173. [ -] Grinnell v. Cook, 3 
Hill (N. Y. ) 485, 38 Am. D. 663 ; 
Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489, 28 Am. 
R. 80 ; [-] Mowers v. Fathers, 61 
N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244 ; Mason 
v. Thompson, 9 Piek. (Mass. ) 280, 
20 Am . D. 471 ; Arcade Hotel Co. v. 
Wiatt, 44 Ohio St. 32, 4 N. E. R. 
398 ; 58 Am. R. 785 ; [ -1 Curtis v. 
Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825 ; 
53 Am. R. 242 ; Moore v. Long 
Beach Development Co., 87 CaJ, 483, 
26 Pae. R. 92, 22 Am. St. R. 265 ; 
Neal v. Wilcox, 4 Jones 's L. (N. C.) 
J 46, 67 Am. D. 266. 
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or INNS AND INNKEEPERS. §§ 174-176
for an unlawful purpose have been held not to be guests. One
sending his horse to the inn stables but himself stopping with
a friend, has been held to be a guest; but this doctrine is very
generally criticised. Unless he personally, or some member
of his family visits the inn for entertainment one is scarcely
a guest.
§174. The duration of the re1a.tion.—A traveler who as a
transient requests entertainment at an inn and is accepted
becomes instantly a guest. He remains such until the relation
is terminated by one of the acts to be later noticed. Leaving
the inn for a temporary purpose does not ordinarily terminate
the relation, nor does the length of time a man remains at the
inn if he retains his transient character.
2. RIGHTS AND Dorms Or THE Pmrms.
175. Duty to receive.—The innkeeper having taken upon
himself a public employment must serve the public. His first
duty is to receive indifierently to his inn as guests such travel-
ers as may ask for entertainment. He has no general right to
select his guests. This is not the result of a contract, but it is
a duty imposed by law for a violation of which the innkeeper
is liable in such damages as will compensate the traveler for
the wrong, and punitive damages besides if there are aggravat-
ing circumstances.
§176. jlflxcuses for refusa1.—But the innkeeper is not
bound to receive every one who calls at his inn. His duty
extends only to transients, who come in proper condition, for a
proper purpose, ready, able and willing to pay for their
§174. [—] ‘ Grinnell v. Cook, 3 D. 416; [—] Mowers v. Fethers, 61
Hill (N. Y.) 485, 38 Am. D. 663;
[—] Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. D. 416;
[—] Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22
N. W. R. 825, 53 Am. R. 242; 1\-Ic-
Daniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62
Am. D. 574; Coskery v. Nagle, 83
Ga. 696, 10 S. E. R. 491, 20 Am. St.
R. 333; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y.
1, 46 Am. R. 112; O’Brien, v. Vaill,
22 Fla. 627, 1 Am. St. R. 219..
§175. [—] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am.
“b
Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244; Hancock
V. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. R. 112;
[—] Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Smith, 73 Ill. 360, -24 Am. R. 2
[—] Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22
N. W. R. 825, 53 Am. R. 242.
§176. [—] Curtis v. Murphy,
63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 53
Am. R. 242; [—] Mowers v. I<‘eth-
ers, 61 N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244;
Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, 49
Am. R. 634; McHugh v. Schlosser,



















































































































































OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. § §  174-176 
for an unlawful purpose have beeµ held not to be guests. One 
sending his horse to the inn stables but himself stopping with 
a friend, has been held to be a guest ; but this doctrine is very 
generally criticised. Unless he personally, or some member 
of his family visits the inn for entertainment one is scarcely 
a guest. 
§ 174. The duration of the relation.-A traveler who as a 
transient requests entertainment at an inn and is accepted 
becomes in�tantly a guest. He remains such until the relation 
is terminated by one of the acts to be later noticed. Leaving 
the inn for a temporary purpose does not ordinarily terminate 
the relation, nor does the length of time a man remains at the 
inn if he retains his transient character. 
2. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES. 
§ 175. Duty to receive.-The innkeeper having taken upon 
himself a public employment must serve the public. His first 
duty is to receive indifferently to his inn as guests such travel­
ers as may ask for entertainment. He has no general right to 
select his guests. This is not the result of a contract, but it is 
a duty imposed by law for a violation of which the innkeeper 
is liable in such damages as will compensate the traveler for 
the wrong, and punitive damages besides if there are aggravat­
ing circumstances. 
§ 176. --Excuses for refusal.-But the innkeeper is not 
bound to receive every one who calls at his inn. His duty 
extends only to transients, who come in proper condition, for a 
proper purpose, ready, able and willing to pay for their 
§ 174. [-] · Grinnell v. Cook, 3 
Hill (N. Y. ) 485, 38 Am. D. 663 ; 
r-J Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. 
Mon. (Ky. ) i2, 48 Am. D. 416 ; 
[-] Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 
N'. W. R. 825, 53 Am. R. 242 ; �f c­
Daniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 
Am. D. 574 ; Coskery v. Nagle, 83 
Ga. 696, 10 S. E. R. 491, 20 Am. St. 
R. 333 ; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 
l ,  46 Am. R. 112 ; O 'Brien, v. Vaill, 
2:? Fla. 627, 1 Am. St. R. 219. 
§ 175. [-] Kisten v. Hilde-
brand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky. ) 72, 48 Am. 
D. 416 ;  [-] Mowers v. Fethers, 61 
N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244 ; Hancock 
1:, Rand, 94 N. Y. l, 46 Am. R. 112 ; 
[-] Pullman Palace Car Uo. v. 
Smith, 73 III. 360, 24 Am. R. 258 ; 
[ -] Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 
N.  W. R. 825, 53 Am. R. 242. 
§ 176. [-] Curtis v. Murphy, 
63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 53 
Am. R. 242 ; [-] Mowers v. Feth· 
ers, 61 N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244 ; 
Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, 49 
Am. R. 634 ; McHugh v. Schlosser, 
1 59 Pa. St. 480, 28 Atl. R. 291, 39 
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§§ 177-179 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS.
keep. And they must take such accommodations a the inn
afiords and have no right to demand admittance after the
accommodations of the inn are fully taken. The innkeeper
owes no duty to persons who are drunken and disorderly, or
affected with a contagious disease, who seek the inn to expose
their commodities for sale, or resort to it for an illegal pur-
pose, or who are not able to pay for their entertainment. But
he cannot negligently or wantonly eject from the inn one
already a guest on the ground that he is unfit to remain.
§177. Duty to receive goods.—The duty to receive the
goods of the traveler is part and parcel of the innkeeper’s duty
to receive the traveler himself. Though the courts have hesi-
tated to decide that goods and money of any value may be
forced into the custody of the innkeeper, it is settled by the
great weight of authority that the traveler is not limited to the
goods and money that he needs for the purposes of the jour-
ney.
§178. Liability of innkeeper.—The duty of the innkeeper
does not end with receiving the guest and his goods. His
duty continues so long as the transient remains a guest, or the
goods remain at the inn. It now becomes our business to
inquire into the nature and extent of this liability.
§179. Liability to the guest persona11y.—To the guest the
innkeeper owes the duty to provide proper accommodations
and entertainment so long as the relation endures. This in-
volves keeping the inn in a safe and sanitary condition, pro-
viding wholesome food and using all reasonable efforts to pro-
tect the person of the guest from harm. For unwarranted
assaults upon the guest by himself or his servants the inn-
keeper is liable in damages; and he must take all reasonable
Am. St. R. 699, and compare Mark-
ham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am.
D. 209, with State v. Steele, 106 N.
C. 766, 11 S. E. R. 478, 19 Am. St. R.
573.
§17 7. [—] Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. R.
258; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1,
46 Am. R. 112; Mateer v. Brown, 1
Cal. 221, 52 Am. D. 303.
§179. Weeks v. McNulty, 10]
Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. R. 809, 70 Am.
St. R. 693; Gilbert v. Hofiman, 66
Iowa, 205, 23 N. W. R. 632, 55 Am.
R 263; Sheifer v. Willoughby, 163
I11. 518, 45 N. E. R. 253, 54 Am. St.
R. 483; McHugh v. Schlosser, 159
Pa. St. 480, 28 Atl. R. 291, 39 Am.
St. R. 699; Rommel v. Schambacher,
120 Pa. St. 579, 11 Atl. R. 779, 6

















































































































































§ §  177-17!) OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
keep. And they must take such accommodations as the inn 
affords and have no right to demand admittance after the 
accommodations of the inn are fully taken. The innkeeper 
owes no duty to persons who are drunken and disorderly, m­
affected with a contagious disease, who seek the inn to expose 
their commodities for sale, or resort to it for an illegal pur­
pose, or who are not able to pay for their entertainment. But 
he cannot negligently or wantonly eject from the inn one 
already a guest on the ground that he is unfit to remain. 
§ 177. Duty to receive goods .-The duty to receive the 
goods of the traveler is part and parcel of the innkeeper 's duty 
to receive the traveler himself. Though the courts have hesi­
tated to decide that goods and money of any value may be 
forced into the custody of the innkeeper, it is settled by the 
great weight of authority that the traveler is not limited to the 
goods and money that he needs for the purposes of the jour­
ney. 
§ 178. Liability of innkeeper.-The duty of the innkeeper 
does not end with receiving the guest and his goods. His 
duty continues so long as the transient remains a guest, or the 
goods remain at the inn. It now becomes our business to 
inquire into the nature and extent of this liability. 
§ 179. Liability to the guest personally.-To the guest the 
innkeeper owes the duty to provide proper accommodations 
and entertainment so long as the relation endures. This in­
volves keeping the inn in a safe and sanitary condition, pro­
viding wholesome food and using all reasonable efforts to pro­
tect the person of the guest from harm. For unwarranted 
assaults upon the guest by himself or his servants the inn­
keeper is liable in damages ; and he must take all reasonable 
Am. St. R. 699, and compare Mark­
ham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. 
D. 209, with State v. Steele, 106 N. 
C. 766, 11 S. E. R. 478, 19 Am. St. R. 
573. 
§ 177. [ -] Pullman Palace Car 
Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. R. 
258 ; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1, 
4G Am. R. 112 ; Mateer v. Brown, 1 
Cal. 221, 52 Am. D. 303. 
§ 179. Weeks v. McNulty, 101 
Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. R. 809, 70 Am. 
St. R. 693 ; Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 
Iowa, 205, 23 N. W. R. 632, 55 Am. 
R 263 ; Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 
Ill. 518, 45 N. E. R. 253, 54 Am. St. 
R. 483 ; McHugh v. Schlosser, 159 
Pa. St. 480, 28 Atl. R. 291, 39 Am. 
St. R. 699 ; Rommel v. Schambacher, 
120 Pa. St. 579, 11 Atl. R. 779, 6 
Am. St. R. 732. 
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precautions to protect his guests from attack by fellow-guests
or strangers. If he harbors drunken or vicious men he will be
liable for the natural results. He is not an insurer of the
personal security of his guest, but he undertakes to use reason-
able care to protect him from injury.
§ 180. Liability for goods.—As to the goods brought to the
inn by a boarder or one not a guest, or by a guest for show
or sale, and for goods left in the inn by a former guest the
innkeeper is an ordinary bailee and subject to ordinary lia-
bility. But as to the goods brought to the inn by the guest
he is an exceptional bailee with liabilities which call for spe-
cial consideration.
§ 181. ——Exceptional liability.—It is the duty of the inn-
keeper not only to receive, but to keep safely the goods of his
guests so long as they are within the inn, infra hospitium. De-'
cisions are not in harmony as to the extent of the innkeeper’s
liability for losses to the goods. Three rules have been sug-
gested :
(1) That the innkeeper is prima facie liable for the loss of
goods in his charge, but he may excuse himself by showing that
he was free from negligence.
(2) That the innkeeper is excused if he can show the loss
was due to inevitable accident or irresistible force.
§ 180. [—] Curtis v. Murphy, 63
Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 58 Am. R.
242; Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52,
83 Am. D. 762; Amey v. Winches-
ter, 68 N. H. 447, 39 Atl. R. 487, 73
Am. St. R. 614; Taylor v. Downey,
104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. R. 716, 53
Am. St. R. 472; [—] Mowers v.
Fethers, 61 N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244;
Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489, 28 Am.
R. 80; Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt,
44 Ohio St. 32, 4 N. E. R. 398, 58
Am. R. 785; Neal v. Wilcox, 4
Jones’s Law (N. C.) 146; 67 Am.
D. 266; Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221,
52 Am. D. 303; Wear v. Gleason, 52
Ark. 364, 12 S. W. R. 756, 20 Am.
St. R. 186; Murray v. Marshall, 9
Colo. 482, 59 Am. R. 152.
§181. [—] Sibley v. Aldrich, 33
N. H. 553, 66 Am. D. 745; [—] Kis-
ten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.)
72, 48 Am. D. 416; MeDaniels v.
Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. D.
574; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571,
88 Am. D. 405; [—] Cutler v. Bon-
ney, 30 Mich. 259, 18 Am. R. 127;
[—] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car
Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500; Mateer v.
Brown, 1 Cal. 221; 52 Am. D. 303;
[—] Bowell v. DeWald, 2 Ind. App.
303, 28 N. E. R. 430; Coskery v.
Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S. E. R. 491,
20 Am. St. R. 333; Shaw v. Berry, 31
Me. 478, 52 Am. D. 628; Pinkerton v.
Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D.
657; Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind. 212,
71 Am. D. 323; Shultz v. Wall, 134
Pa. St. 262, 19 Atl. R. 742, 19 Am.

















































































































































OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. § §  180-1$1 
precautions to protect his guests from attack by fellow-guests 
or strangers. If he harbors drunken or vicious men he will be 
liable for the natural results. He is not an insurer of the 
personal security of his guest, but he undertakes to use reason­
able care to protect him from injury. 
§ 180. Liability for goods.-As to the goods brought to the 
inn by a boarder or one not a guest, or by a guest for show 
or sale, and for goods left in the inn by a former guest the 
innkeeper is an ordinary bailee and subject to ordinary lia­
bility. But as to the goods brought to the inn by the guest 
he is an exceptional bailee with liabilities which call for spe­
cial consideration. 
§ 181. --Exceptional liability.-It is the duty of the inn­
keeper not only to receive, but to keep safely the goods of his 
guests so long as they are within the inn, infra hospitium. De­
cisions are not in harmony as to the extent of the innkeeper ':s 
liability for losses to the goods. Three rules have been sug­
gested : 
( 1 )  That the innkeeper is prima f acie liable for the loss of 
goods in his charge, but he may excuse himself by showing that 
he was free from negligence. 
( 2 )  That the innkeeper is excused if he can show the loss 
was due to inevitable accident or irresistible force. 
§ 180. [-] Curtis v .  Murphy, 63 N. H. 553, 66 Am. D. 7 45 ; [ -] Kis­
Wis. 4, 22 N. W. R. 825, 58 Am. R. ten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. ( Ky. ) 
242 ; Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52, 72, 48 Am. D. 416 ; McDaniels v. 
83 Am. D. 762 ; Amey v. Winches- Robinson , 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. D. 
ter, 68 N. H. 447, 39 Atl. R. 487, 73 574 ; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571, 
.A m. St. R. 614 ; Taylor v. Downey, 88 Am. D. 405 ; [-] Cutler v. Bon-
104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. R. 716, 53 ney, 30 Mich. 259, 18 Am. R. 127 ; 
Am. St. R. 472 ; [-] Mowers v. [-] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car 
},ethers, 61 N. Y. 34, 19 Am. R. 244 ; Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.)  500 ; Mateer v. 
Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489, 28 Am . Brown, 1 Cal. 2 2 1 ; 52 Am. D. 303 ; 
R. 80 ; Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, [-] Bowell v. DeWald, 2 Ind. App. 
44 Ohio St. 32, 4 N. E. R. 398, 58 303, 28 N. E. R. 430 ; Coskery v. 
Am. R. 785 ; Neal v. Wilcox, 4 Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S. E. B. 491, 
Jones 's Law (N. C . )  146 ; 67 Am. 20 Am. St. R. 333 ; Shaw v. Berry, 31 
D. 266 ; Mateer v .  Brown, 1 Cal. 221, Me. 478, 52 Am. D. 628 ; Pinkerton "'· 
5� Am. D. 303 ; Wear v. Gleason, 52 Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. 
Ark. 364, 12  S. W. R. 756, 20 Am. 657 ; Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind. 212, 
St. R. 186 ; Murray v .  Marshall, 9 71 Am. D. 323 ; Shultz v. Wall, 134 
Colo. 482, 59 Am. R. 152. Pa. St. 262, 19 AU. R. 742, 19 Am. 
§ 181. [-] Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 St. R. 686. 
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(3) That the innkeeper is an insurer of the goods against
all losses not due to the act of God, the public enemy, or the
negligence of the guest.
The weight of authority is probably with the last rule, but
the weight of reason and the trend of legislation is with the
second. In New York after the case of Hulett v. Swift, the rule
was modified by statute so as to excuse innkeepers from lia-
bility for loss by accidental fires.
§182. __Exceptions.—The scope in bailment law of the
terms act of God, public enemy and negligence of the owner
will be considered in connection with the liability of the com-
mon carrier (§§ 231-240). For the present it is enough to
say that the authorities are agreed that for losses due to
those causes the innkeeper is not liable, unless his negligence
contributed to the result.
If the loss is caused by the negligence of the guest, his
servant or companion, the innkeeper is excused; but it is not
as matter of law negligence in the guest to leave his door
unlocked. The inn should be safe, and if the guest’s prop-
erty is stolen by the inn servants, fellow-guests or strangers,
the innkeeper is liable. What constitutes negligence of the
guest in a given ease is a mixed question of law and fact to be
determined by the jury under instructions from the court.
The effect of loss by inevitable accident, such as fire, or
superior force, such as robbery, is in dispute. By the better
rule in such cases no legal liability attaches if the innkeeper
can prove that he was free from negligence.
§ 183. ?Burden of pr00f.—Whatever the rule of liability
and whatever the cause of the loss the burden of proving that
he is excepted from liability is on the innkeeper; the guest has
§ 182. See cases cited in Sec. 181,
and Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W.
Va. 671, 26 S. E. R. 442, 57 Am. St.
R. 878; Epps v. Hinds, 27 Miss.
657, 61 Am. D. 528; [—] Murchison
v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. R.
754; Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex.
547, 86 Am. D. 654; Read v. Ami-
don, 41 Vt. 15; 98 Am. D. 560;
Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186, 13
N. E. R. 479, 1 Am. St. R. 451.
§183. [.—"l Bowell v. De Wald,
2 Ind. App. 303, 28 N. E. R. 430;
Shefier v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518,
4 N. E. R. 253, 54 Am. St. R. 483;
Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 N.
Vt4. R. 109, 41 Am. R. 772; Shultz
v. Wall, 134 Pa. St. 262, 19 Atl. R.
742, 19 Am. St. R. 686; [—] Mur-
chison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am.
R. 754 ; Carhart v. Wainman, 114


















































































































































§ §  182-183 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMEN'l'S. 
(3) That the innkeeper is an insurer of the goods against 
all losses not due to the act of God, the public enemy, or the 
negligence of the guest. 
The weight of authority is probably with the last rule, but 
the weight of reason and the trend of legislation is with the 
second. In New York after the case of Hulett v. Swift, the rule . 
was modified by statute so as to excuse innkeepers from lia­
bility for loss by accidental fires. 
§ 182. --Exceptions.-The scope in bailment law of the 
terms act of God, public enemy and negligence of the owner 
will be considered in connection with the liability of the com­
mon carrier ( § §  231-240) . For the present it is enough to 
say that the authorities are agreed that for losses due to 
those causes the innkeeper is not liable, unless his negligence 
contributed to the result. 
If the loss is caused by the negligence of the guest, his 
servant or companion, the innkeeper is excused ; but it is not 
as matter of law negligence in the guest to leave his door 
unlocked. The inn should be safe, and if the guest 's prop­
erty is stolen by the inn servants, fellow-guests or strangers, 
the innkeeper is liable. What constitutes negligence of the 
guest in a given case is a mixed question of law and fact to be 
determined by the jury under instructions from the court. 
The effect of loss by inevitable accident, such as fire, or 
superior force, such as robbery, is in dispute. By the better 
rule in such cases no legal liability attaches if the innkeeper 
can prove that he was free from negligence. 
§ 183. --Burden of proof.-Whatever the rule of liability 
and whatever the cause of the loss the burden of proving that 
he is excepted from liability is on the innkeeper ; the guest has 
§ 182. See cases cited in See. 181, 
and Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. 
Va. 671, 26 S. E. R. 442, 57 Am. St. 
R. 878 ; Epps v. Hinds, 27 Miss. 
657, 61 Am. D. 528 ; [-] Murchison 
v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. R. 
754 ; Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 
547, 86 Am. D. 654 ; Read v. Ami­
don, 41 Vt. 15 ; 98 Am. D. 560 ; 
Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186, 13 
N. E. R. 479, 1 Am. St. R. 451. 
§ 183, [-] Bowell v. De Wald, 
2 Ind. App. 303, 28 N. E. R. 430 ; 
Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 
4 N. E. R. 253, 54 Am. St. R. 483 ; 
Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. 
W. R. 109, 41 Am. R. 772 ; Shultz 
v. Wall, 134 Pa. St. 262, 19 Atl. R. 
742, 19 Am. St. R. 686 ; [-] Mur­
chison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. 
R. 754 ; Carhart v. Wainman, 114 
Ga. 632, 40 S. E. R. 781, 88 Am. St. 
R. 45. 
OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. §§ 134-185
only to establish his loss. The law presumes that the loss was
one for which the innkeeper was liable.
§ 184. iFor what property.—'l‘he extraordinary liability
of the innkeeper, as has been seen (§ 180), extends only to
the goods of the guest. And he must have a general or
special property in them; it is enough if he has the prop-
erty as agent, servant or bailee of the owner. For the goods
and money of the guest within the inn the innkeeper is respon-
sible, and he “is not restricted to any particular or limited
amount of goods or money,” nor to goods or money carried
by the guest for the purpose of his journey, but he will be
liable for goods of whatever kind that are brought within the
inn by the guest.
But the goods must be within the inn, infra hospitinm. The
liability attaches to goods in every part of the inn; and under
some circumstances goods not within the walls of the house
but in the yard or in an adjoining building,.have been held to
be infra hospitium. If the innkeeper or his authorized agent
assume control before the goods reach the inn at all, the goods
come within the protection of the rule.
§185. —--0wner’s custody.—“'l‘he innkeeper’s responsi-
bility is co-extensive with his custody and control,” and he
may be exonerated if the guest takes upon himself exclusive
custody of the goods. But this does not prevent the guest
from retaining possession of property for his personal use
without releasing the innkeeper from his liability. The inn-
keeper may provide a safe for the deposit of valuables not
§ 184. Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33
Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. 657; Arcade
Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 44 Ohio St. 32,
4 N. E. R. 398, 58 Am. R. 785;
[—] Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.)
485; 38 Am. D. 663; Wilkins v.
Earle, 44 N. Y. 172, 4 Am. R. 655;
Neal v. Wilcox, 4 Jones ’s Law (N.
C.) 146, 67 Am. D. 266; Cohen v.
Manuel, 91 Me. 274, 39 Atl. R. 1030,
64 Am. St. R. 225; Clute v. Wig-
gins, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 174, 7 Am.
D. 448; Albin v. Presby, 8 N. H.
408, 29 Am. D. 679; Epps v. Hinds,
27 Miss. 657, 61 Am. D. 528; Minor
v. Staples, 71 Me. 316, 36 Am. R.
318, but see contra, Pettigrew v.
Barnum, 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. D. 212.
§185. Weisenger v. Taylor, 1
Bush (Ky.) 275, 89 Am. D. 626;
[—] Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co.,
93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. R. 1099, 28 Pac.
R. 943, 27 Am. St. R. 198; [—] Pull-
man Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill.
360, 24 Am. R. 258; Read v. Amidon,
4] Vt. 15, 98 Am. D. 560; Vance v.
Throckmorton, 5 Bush (Ky.) 41, 96
Am. D. 327; [—] Murchison v. Ser-

















































































































































OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. § §  184-185 
only to establish his loss. The law presumes that the loss was 
one for which the innkeeper was liable. 
§ 184. --For what property.-The extraordinary liability 
of the innkeeper, as has been seen ( §  180) , extends only to 
the goods of the guest. And he must have a general or 
special property in them ; it is enough if he has the prop­
erty as agent, servant or bailee of the owner. For the goods 
and money of the guest within the inn the innkeeper is respon­
sible, and he ' ' is not restricted to any particular or limited 
amount of goods or money, " nor to goods or money carried 
by the guest for the purpose of his journey, but he will be 
liable for goods of whatever kind that are brought within the 
inn by the guest. 
But the goods must be within the inn, infra hospitium. The 
liability attaches to goods in every part of the inn ; and under 
some circumstances goods not within the walls of the house 
but in the yard or in an adjoining building, have been held to 
be infra hospit-ium. If the innkeeper or his authorized agent 
assume control before the goods reach the inn at all, the goods 
come within the protection of the rule. 
§ 185. ---Owner 's custody.-' ' '1,he innkeeper 's responsi­
bility is co-extensive with his custody and control, ' '  and he 
may be exonerated if the guest takes upon himself exclusive 
custody of the goods. But this does not prevent the guest 
from retaining possession of property for his personal use 
without releasing the innkeeper from his liability. The inn­
keeper may provide a safe for the deposit of valuables not 
§ 184. Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 
Cal. 557, 91 Am. D. 657 ; Arcade 
Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 44 Ohio St. 32, 
4 N. E. R. 398, 58 Am. R. 785 ; 
[-] Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y. ) 
485 ; 38 Am. D. 663 ; Wilkins v. 
Earle, 44 N. Y. 1721 4 Am. R. 655 ; 
Neal v. Wilcox, 4 Jones 's Law (N. 
C. ) 146, 67 Am. D. 266 ; Cohen v. 
Manuel, 91 Me. 2 74, 39 Atl. R. 1030, 
64 Am. St. R. 225 ; Clute v. Wig· 
gins, 14 Johns. ( N. Y.) 174, 7 Am. 
D. 448 ; Albin v. Presby, 8 N. H. 
408, 29 Am. D. 679 ; Epps v. Hinds, 
27 Miss. 657, 61 Am. D. 528 ; Minor 
v. Staples, 71 Me. 316, 36 Am. R. 
318, but see contra, Pettigrew v. 
Barnum, 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. D. 212. 
§ 185. Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 
Bush (Ky. ) 275, 89 Am. D. 626 ; 
[-] Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 
93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. R. 1099, 28 Pac. 
R. 943, 27 Am. St. R. 198 ; [-] Pull· 
man Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 111. 
360, 24 Am. R. 258 ; Read v. Amidon, 
41 Vt. 15, 98 Am. D. 560 ; Vance v. 
Throckmorton, 5 Bush (Ky.) 41, 96 
Am. D. 327 ; [ -] Murchison v. Ser· 
gent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. R. 754. 
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needed for daily use, if he does so and informs his guests, then
he cannot be held liable, in the absence of negligence or the
wrong of his servants, for the loss of such valuables if the guest
has preferred not to entrust them to his safe provided for the
purpose. And generally the innkeeper may be excused where
he has been denied control; but as to most of the property
a deposit in the room of the guest in the inn is a deposit with
the innkeeper.
§186. ——Limitation of 1ia.bi1ity.—By special contract no
doubt the innkeeper, like the common carrier, may limit his
liability; and so he may by notice brought home to the guest of
reasonable rules and regulations, such as requiring the room to
be securely fastened and valuables to be deposited in a safe
provided for the purpose. But the guest must have notice of
such regulations or they are not binding on him.
By statute now it is very generally provided that the inn-
keeper may protect himself by providing a safe for the deposit
of certain valuables, usually described in the statute, and post-
ing a notice to the guests that such valuables must be left in
the safe. Some statutes limit the maximum amount of the
innkeeper’s liability, and others restrict it to money and
property carried by the guest for his purpose on the journey.
Being in derogation of the common law these statutes are
strictly construed and must be literally complied with. If the
statute requires notice to be posted in the room notice printed
on the hotel register will not avail; but actual notice to the
guest is sufficient.
The effect of these statutes is to put the burden of proving
the fault on the guest, but they do not excuse the innkeeper
for losses due to the wrong of himself or his servants. The
statutes requiring goods to be deposited do not apply to articles
and money needed for daily use.
§ 187. Compensation and 1ien.—“Compelled to afford enter-
tainment to whomsoever may apply, the law as an indemnity
§186. See the statutes of the
various states, also 16 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, 541; [—] Murchison
v. . Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. R.
754; Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N. Y.
539, 3 Am. R. 728; Noble v. Milli-
ken, 74 M6. 225, 43 Am. R. 581;
\Vilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172, 4
Am. R. 665; Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa.
St. 262, 19 Atl. R. 742, 19 Am. St.
R 686.
§ 187. Cook v. Kane, 13 Ore. 482,
11 Pac. R. 226, 57 Am. R. 28;


















































































































































§ §  186-187 OF E�TRAORDIN ARY '.BAILMEN'l"S. 
needed for daily use, if he does so and informs his guests, then 
he cannot be held iiable, in the absence of negligence or the 
wrong of his servants, for the loss of such valuables if the guest 
has preferred not to entrust them to his safe provided for the 
purpose. And generally the innkeeper may be excused where 
he has been denied control ; but as to most of the property 
a deposit in the room of the guest in the inn is a deposit with 
the innkeeper. 
§ 186. --Limitation of liability.-By special contract no 
doubt the innkeeper, like the common carrier, may limit his 
liability ; and so he may by notice brought home to the guest of 
reasonable rules and regulations, such as requiring the room to 
be securely fastened and valuables to be deposited in a safe 
. provided for the purpose. But the guest must have notice of 
such regulations or they are not binding on him. 
By statute now it is very generally provided that the inn­
keeper may protect himself by providing a safe for the deposit 
of certain valuables, usually described in the statute, and post­
ing a notice to the guests that such valuables must be left in 
the safe. Some statutes limit the maximum amount of the 
innkeeper 's liability, and others restrict it to money and 
property carried by the guest for his purpose on the journey. 
Being in derogation of the common law these statutes are 
strictly construed and must be literally complied with. If the 
statute requires notice to be posted in the room notice printed 
on the hotel register will not avail ; but actual notice to the 
guest is sufficient. 
The effect of these statutes is to put the burden of proving 
the fault on the guest, but they do not excuse the innkeeper 
for losses due to the wrong of himself or his servants. The 
statutes requiring goods to be deposited do not apply to articles 
and money needed for daily use. 
� 187. Compensation a.nd lien.-' '  Compelled to afford enter­
tainment to whomsoever may apply, the law as an indemnity 
§ 186. See the statutes of the Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172, 4 
various states, also 16 Am. & �ng. Am. R. 665 ; Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 
Ency. of Law, 541 ; [-) Murchison · St. 262, 19 AtJ. R. 742, 19 Am. St. 
v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. R. R 886. 
754 ; Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N. Y. § 187. Cook v. Kane, 13 Ore. 482, 
539, 3 Am. R. 728 ; Noble v. Milli- 11 Pac. R. 226, 57 Am. R. 28 ; 
ken, 14 Me. 2251 43 Am. R. 581 ;  f-] Grinnell v. Cook, S Hill (N. Y. ) 
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for the extraordinary liabilities which it imposes, has clothed
the innkeeper with extraordinary privileges. It gives him as
a security for unpaid charges a lien upon the property of his
guest, and upon goods put by the guest into his possession.
Nor is the lien confined to property only owned by the guest,
but it will attach to the property of third persons for whom
the guest is bailee, provided only he received the property on
the faith of the innkeeping relation. But the lien will not at-
tach if the innkeeper knew the property taken into his custody
was not owned by his guest, who had no right to deposit it as
bailee or otherwise, except perhaps some proper charge in-
curred against the specific chattel.”
But it is said the lien will attach to things suitable for the
traveler’s luggage, even though the innkeeper knew they did
not belong to the guest. The lien secures the entire charges
against the guest for entertainment and accommodations in the
inn of every kind, but it avails only in the case of a guest and
not as to boarders. By statutes it is now generally extended
to boarding and lodging house keepers as well as innkeepers,
and is made enforcible by a sale of the goods according to
prescribed regulations.
3. TERMINATION Or THE RELATION.
§ 188. How terminated.—Except for cause that would have
justified him in refusing to receive the guest the innkeeper
has no right to terminate the relation after it is established.
As he is bound to receive so he is bound to keep all transients
desiring entertainment under proper conditions.
But the guest may terminate the relation at will. When
he pays his bill and has his name stricken from the hotel
register he ceases to be a guest. Temporary absence of the
guest from the inn does not necessarily terminate the relation,
485, 38 Am. D. 663; Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N. W.
R. 56, 38 Am. St. R. 568; Brown
Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586, 72
1\'. W. R. 765, 64 Am. St. R. 198;
Swan v. Bournes, 47 Iowa 501, 29
Am. R. 492; Hurray v. Marshall, 9
Colo. 482, 59 Am. R. 152.
§188. O'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla.
627, 1 Am. St. R. 219; Miller v.
Peoples, '60 Miss. 819, 45 Am. R.
423; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt.
316, 62 Am. D. 574; [—] Grinnell
v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, a8 Am.
D. 663; Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65,
5 Am. R. 524; Murray v. Marshall,
9 Colo. 482, 59 Am. R. 152; Wear v.
Gleason, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. R.

















































































































































OF INNS AND INNKEEPERS. § 188 
for the extraordinary liabilities which it imposes, has clothed 
the innkeeper with extraordinary privileges. It gives him as 
a security for unpaid charges a lien upon the property of his 
guest, and upon goods put by the guest into his possession. 
Nor is the lien confined to property only owned by the guest, 
but it will attach to the property of third persons for whom 
the guest is bailee, provided only he received the property on 
the faith of the innkeeping relation. But the lien will not at­
tach if the innkeeper knew the property taken into his custody 
was not owned by his guest, who had no right to deposit it as 
bailee or otherwise, except perhaps some proper charge in­
curred against the specific chattel. ' '  
But it is said the lien will attach to things suitable for the 
traveler 's luggage, even though the innkeeper knew they did 
not belong to the guest. The lien secures the entire charges 
against the guest for entertainment and accommodations in the 
inn of every kind, but it avails only in the case of a guest and 
not as to boarders. By statutes it is now generally extended 
to boarding and lodging house keepers as well as innkeepers, 
and is made enforcible by a sale of the goods according to 
prescribed regulations. 
3. 'fERMINATION OF THE RELATION. 
§ 188. How terminated.-Except for cause that would have 
justified him in refusing to receive the guest the innkeeper 
has no right to terminate the relation after it is established. 
As he is bound to receive so he is bound to keep all transients 
desiring entertainment under proper conditions. 
But the guest may terminate the relation at will. When 
he pays his bill and has his name stricken from the hotel 
register he ceases to be a guest. Temporary absence of the 
guest from the inn does not necessarily terminate the relation, 
485, 38 Am. D. 663 ; Singer M:fg. 
Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N. W. 
R. 56, 38 Am. St. R. 568 ; Brown 
Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586, 72 
l\ .  W. R. 765, 64 Am. St. R. 198 ; 
Swan v. Bournes, 4 7 Iowa 501, 29 
Am. R. 492 ; Murray v. Marshall, 9 
Colo. 482, 59 Am. R. 152. 
§ 188. 0 'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla. 
627, 1 Am. St. R. 219 ; Miller v. 
Peeples, ·eo Miss. 819, 45 Am. R. 
423 ; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 
316, 62 Am. D. 574 ;  [-] Grinnell 
v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y. ) 485, 38 Am. 
D. 663 ; Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65, 
f:J Am. R. 524 ; Murray v. Marshall, 
9 Colo. 482, 59 Am. R. 152 ; Wear v. 
Gleason, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. R. 
756, 20 Am. St. R. 186. 
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but as soon as the innkeeper ceases to derive a profit for his
entertainment the relation of innkeeper and guest ends. The
innkeeper’s liability for the guest’s baggage does not cease


















































































































































§ 188 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS. 
but as soon as the innkeeper ceases to derive a profit for his 
entertainment the relation of innkeeper and guest ends. The 
innkeeper 's liability for the guest 's baggage does not cease 
until there has been a reasonable opportunity for the guest to 
remove it. 
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OF COMMON CARRIERS.
CHAPTER X.
OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS.
§189 Definition and classification. §194 (3) Kind of goods carried.
19O. Private can.;ers. 195 (4) Customary means and
C°”""°" °‘"”m °f g°‘?d"" 196. (5) Adistiliiiefor refusal.
1. Nature of the relation. .




(2 ) For hire.
198.
rier.
—Those who are not com-
mon carriers.
§ 189. Definitions and Gla.ssifications.— A carrier is one who
undertakes to transport chattels or persons from place to place.
Various classifications may be made:
(a) Carriers by land and by water.
(b) Private carriers and public or common carriers.
(c) Initial carriers and connecting carriers.
(d) Carriers of goods and of persons.
Carriers by land and by water are for the most part subject
to the same rules, but call for special consideration in certain
features which will be mentioned as the topics are reached.
Carriers of goods undertake either the gratuitous service of
the mandatum bailment, or the service for hire _of the Zocatio
operis meroium vehendarzmi bailment. Of the carriers for hire
private carriers are subject to the general rules governing all
tocatio bailments; common carriers are subject to those rules
and more. Because one who entrusts his property to the car-
rier is in the nature of the case so helpless to protect himself
against the negligence or fraud of the carrier, the law imposes
upon the common carrier an exceptional liability. The appli-
cation of steam as a motive power has so increased the impor-

















































































































































OF EXTRAORDINARY LOCATIO BAILMENTS. 
OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
CHAPTER X. 
OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. 
§ 189. Definition and classification. § 194. (3)  Kind of  goods carried. 
190. Private carriers. 195. (4) Customary means and 
route. 
196. (5)  Action for refusal. 
Common carriers of goods. 
1. Nature of the relati<Yn. 
197. Illustrations of common ear-
191. The common carrier defined. rier. 
192. ( 1 )  Public employment. 198. --Those who are not com· 
193. ( 2 )  For hire. mon carriers. 
§ 189. Definitions and Olassiftcations.- A carrier is one who 
undertakes to transport chattels or persons from place to place. 
Various classifications may be made : 
( a) Carriers by land and by water. 
(b) Private carriers and public or common carriers. 
( c ) Initial carriers and connecting carriers. 
( d ) Carriers of goods and of persons. 
Carriers by land and by water are for the most part subject 
to the same rules, but call for special consideration in certain 
features which will be mentioned as the topics are reached. 
Carriers of goods undertake either the gratuitous service of 
the mandatum bailment, or the service for hire . of the locatw 
operis mercium vehendarum bailment. Of the carriers for hire 
private carriers are subject to the general rules governing all 
locatio bailments ; common carriers are subject to those rules 
and more. Because one who entrusts his property to the car­
rier is in the nature of the case so helpless to protect himself 
against the negligence or fraud of the carrier, the law imposes 
upon the common carrier an exceptional liability. The appli­
cation of steam as a motive power has so increased the impor­
tance of the carrier to society that the law of common carriers 
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in its extent and variety easily overshadows that of all other
bailments together.
Initial carriers are those to whom the consignor delivers his
goods for shipment. Connecting carriers are any except the
initial over whose lines the goods pass between the initial place
and their destination. The last of the connecting carriers is
called the terminal carrier.
Carriers of goods are bailees and so are properly considered
under the subject of bailments. Carriers of passengers are not,
as such, bailees, but their duties are very similar to those of the
bailee and such carriers are usually carriers of goods as well,
so that it is convenient if not strictly logical to consider them
side by side. Hence the title of this work, “Bailments and
Carriers.”
§190. Private carriers are such as undertake by special
agreement in particular instances only to transport goods or
passengers from place to place. As they are subject to no
exceptional liabilities they call for no further consideration
than that already given them in preceding chapters.
COMMON CARR1nRs Or GOOns.
1. The Nature of the Relation.
§ 191. The common carrier is one who holds himself out to
transport for hire the goods of such as choose to employ him.
The definition furnishes the following essential character-
istics of the common carrier;
(1) He carries as a public employment.
(2) The carriage is for hire.
The law then attaches the conditions that: .
(3) He must carry goods offered of the kind he professes
to carry.
§190. Hutch-inson on Carriers,
Sec. 35; [—] Fish v. Chapman, 2
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393; [—] Allen
v. Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341; Shelden
v. Robinson, 7 N. H. 157, 26 Am. D.
7 26; Samms v. Stewart, 20 Ohio 70,
55 Am. D. 445; Beckman v. Shouse,
5 Rawle (Pa.) 179, 28 Am. D. 655.
§191. Dwight v. Brewster, 1
Pick. (Mass.) 50, 11 Am. D. 133;
[—] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46
Am. D. 393; [—] Allen v. Sack-
rider, 37 N. Y. 341; Shelden v. Rob-
inson, 7 N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 726;
[—] Hale v. New Jersey Steam N av-
igation Co., 15 Conn. 539, 39 Am.
D. 398; Doty v. Strong, 1 Pinn.
(Wis.) 313, 40 Am. D. 773; Jack-
son etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.


















































































































































§ §  190-191 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
in its extent and variety easily overshadows that of all other 
bailments together. 
Initial carriers are those to whom the consignor delivers his 
goods for shipment. Connecting carriers are any except the 
initial over whose lines the goods pass between the initial place 
and their destination. The last of the connecting carriers is 
called the terminal carrier. 
Carriers of goods are bailees and so are properly considered 
under the subject of bailments. Carriers of passengers are not, 
as such, bailees, but their duties are very similar to those of the 
bailee and such carriers are usually carriers of goods as well, 
so that it is convenient if not strictly logical to consider them 
side by side. Hence the title of this work, " Bailments and 
Carriers. ' '  
§ 190. Private carriers are such as undertake by special 
agreement in particular instances only to transport goods or 
passengers from place to place. As they are subject to no 
exceptional liabilities they call for no further consideration 
than that already given them in preceding chapters. 
COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. 
1. The Nature of the Relation. 
§ 191. The common carrier is one who holds himself out to 
transport for hire the goods of such as choose to employ him. 
The definition furnishes the following essential character-
istics of the common carrier : 
( 1 ) He carries as a public employment. 
(2 )  The carriage is for hire. 
The law then attaches the conditions that : 
( 3 )  H e  must carry goods offered of the kind he professes 
to carry. 
§ 190. Hutchinson on Carriers, Am. D. 393 ; [-] Allen v. Sack­
Sec. 35 ; [ -] Fish v. Chapman, 2 rider, 37 N. Y. 341 ; Shelden v. Rob­
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; [ -] Allen inson, 7 N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 726 ; 
v. Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341 ; Shelden [-) Hale v. New Jersey Steam Nav­
v. Robinson, 7 N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. igation Co., 15 Conn. 539, 39 Am. 
726 ; Samms v. Stewart, 20 Ohio 70, D. 398 ; Doty v. Strong, 1 Pinn. 
55 Am. D. 445 ; Beckman v. Shouse, (Wis. ) 313, 40 Am. D. 773 ; Jack-
5 Rawle (Pa.) 1 79, 28 Am. D. 653. son etc. Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N. 
§ 191. Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Y. 34, 52 N. E. R. 665, 70 Am. St. 
I'ick. ( Mass. ) 50, 11 Am. D. 133 ; Rep. 432. 
[-] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 
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COMMON CARRIERS Or GOODS. §§ 192-194
(4) By the means and over the route he has established.
(5) An action lies against him if he refuses without legal
justification to perform such carriage.
§ 192. (1) Public employment.—He must hold himself out,
expressly or by his conduct, to carry for all persons indiffer-
ently, and not merely for particular persons; at any time while
he is a carrier, and not for special occasions only; as a busi-
ness and not as a casual occupation. It matters not that he will
carry only to a particular place or by a particular route or in
a special method, nor that he carries only during a limited
time or only a certain kind of goods. If the carrier ofiers
his services to the public indifferently, so long as he.has
facilities, he is a common carrier. If he does not, he is a
private carrier, an ordinary bailee for hire.
§193. (2) For hire.—As to certain goods, or on special
occasions, one who is a common carrier may carry gratui-
tously, and as to goods so carried he is not a common carrier,
but a mandatary held to slight care. But the common carrier
serves for reward, and if the carriage be for any pecuniary
advantage, either directly or indirectly, the common carrier
assumes full liability; and that equally when the compensa-
tion is paid in advance and when there is merely an express
or implied promise to pay it, when each part of the service is
recompensed and when one part is performed free in order to
secure the advantage of another part.
§194. (3) Kinds of goods car-ried.—To constitute one a
common carrier it is not essential that all kinds of goods be
§192. Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P.
Div. 27; [—] Thompson-Houston
Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25
Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86;
[—] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46
Am. D. 393; Shelden v. Robinson, 7
N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 726; Self v.
Dunn, 42 Ga. 528, 5 Am. R. 544;
[—] Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W. .R. 432,
5 Am. St. R. 226; [—] Allen v.
Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341.
For the rules peculiar to Pennsyl-
vania and Tennessee see Gordon v.
Hutchinson, 1 Watts & S. (Pa.)
285, 37 Am. D. 464, and Moss v.
Bettis, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 661, 13 Am.
R. 1.
§193. Citizens’ Bank v. Nan-
tucket Steamboat Co., 2 Story (U.
S.) 16; Knox v. Rives, 14 Ala. 249,
4.8 Am. D. 97; Central Railroad and
Banking Co. v. Lampley, 76 Ala.
357, 52 Am. R. 334; Self v. Dunn,
42 Ga. 528, 5 Am. R. 544; [—] Rail-
road v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.)
357; [—] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga.
349, 46 Am. D. 393; Pierce v. Rail-
way Co., 23 Wis. 387.

















































































































































COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. § §  192-194 
( 4) By the means and over the route he has established. 
( 5 ) An action lies against him if he refuses without legal 
justification to perform such carriage. 
§ 192. (1) Public employment.-He must hold himself out, 
expressly or by his conduct, to carry for all persons indiffer­
ently, and not merely for particular persons ; at any time while 
he is a carrier, and not for special occasions only ; as a busi­
ness and not as a casual occupation. It matters not that he will 
carry only to a particular place or by a particular route or in 
a special method, nor that he carries only during a limited 
time or only a certain kind of goods. If the carrier offers 
his services to the public indifferently, so long as he _ has 
facilities, he is a common carrier. If he does not, he is a 
private carr�er, an ordinary bailee for hire. 
§ 193. (2) For hire.-As to certain goods, or on special 
occasions, one who is a common carrier may carry gratui­
tously, and as to goods so carried he is not a common carrier, 
but a mandatary held to slight care. But the common carrier 
serves for reward, and if the carriage be for any pecuniary 
advantage, either directly or indirectly, the common carrier 
assumes full liability ; and that equally when the compensa­
tion is paid in advance and when there is merely an express 
or implied promise to pay it, when each part of the service is 
recompensed and when one part is performed free in order to 
secure the advantage of another part. 
§ 194. (3) Kinds of goods carried.�To constitute one a 
common carrier it is not essential that all kinds of goods be 
§ 192. Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. 
Div. 27 ; [-] Thompson-Houston 
Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25 
Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86 ; 
[ -] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 
Am. D. 393 ; Shelden v. Robinson, 7 
N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 726 ; Self v. 
Dunn, 42 Ga. 528, 5 Am. R. 544 ; 
[ -] Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W . .  R. 432, 
5 Am. St. R. 226 ; [-] Allen v. 
Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341. 
J<'or the rules peculiar to Pennsyl­
vania and Tennessee see Gordon v. 
Hutchinflnn, 1 Watts & S. ( Pa. ) 
285, 37 Am. D. 464, and Moss v. 
Bettis, 4 Heisk. ( Tenn. ) 661, 13 Am. 
R. 1 .  
§ 193. Citizens ' Bank v .  Nan­
tucket Steamboat Co., 2 Story (U. 
S. ) 16 ; Knox v. Rives, 14 Ala. 249, 
4� Am. D. 97 ; Central Railroad and 
Banking Co. v. Lampley, 76 Ala. 
357, 52 Am. R. 334 ; Self v. Dunn, 
42 Ga. 528, 5 Am. R. 544 ; [-] Rail­
road v. Loekwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 
357 ; [-] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga . 
349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; Pierce v. Rail­
way Co., 23 Wis. 387. 
§ 194. Honeyman v. Oregon & 
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195-197 OF COMMON CARRIERS.
carried. If he offers to carry only particular kinds he may
be compelled to accept such goods, but not goods of a sort he
does not profess to carry.
§195. (4) Customary means and route.—The wagoner
does not ofier to carry by rail, nor the railroad by water; nor
need a railroad from X to Y undertake to carry from X to Z.
The law compels the carrier to accept goods for carriage only
by the means and over the road to which his business is con-
fined.
§196. (5) Action for refusal.—As a result of the public
employment of the common carrier he is within certain limits
bound to carry the goods of any person offering to pay his
hire. If he refuse to carry he is liable in an action for dam-
ages; and this liability to be sued for a refusal to carry has
been suggested as the safest test of his character. It seems
more logical to say it is the result of his character. If it be
established that he is a common carrier then an action lies for
a refusal to carry, but in deciding whether an action lies it
must first be determined whether he is a common carrier.
Once let it be established that he is a common carrier and the
law lays upon him the duty to carry for all. '1‘o compel this
an action lies against a common carrier for refusing to per-
form this duty.
§ 197. Il1ustrations.—lt is no test of the common carrier that
he should make regular trips, between fixed points, in any
particular kind of vehicle, or for any definite length of time.
California R. R. Co., 13 Ore. 352,
10 Pac. R. 628, 57 Am. R. 20;
[—] Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Nichols, 9 Kan. 235, 12 Am. R. 494;
[—] Michigan Southern& N. I. R. R.
C0. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 4
Am. R. 466; Sheldon v. Robinson, 7
N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 726; [—] Fish
v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. D.
393; [—] Thompson-Houston Elec-
tric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25 Pac.
R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86.
§195. Hutchinson on Carriers,
Sec. 56 b.
§196. [—] Fish v. Chapman, 2
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393; Sheldon v.
Robinson, 7 N. H. 157, 26 Am. D.
726; [—] Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.
Y. 341. -
§197. [—] Thompson-Houston
Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25
Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86; Par-
sons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N. Y.)
215, 28 Am. D. 521; Beckman v.
Shouse, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 179, 28 Am.
D. 653; Bonce v. The Dubuque Street
Ry. Co., 53 Iowa 278, 5 N. W. R.
177, 36 Am. R. 221; Jackson etc.
Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y. 34, 52
N E. R. 665, 70 Am. St. R. 432;
Robertson v. Kennedy, 2 Dana (Ky.)

















































































































































§ §  195-197 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
carried. If he offers to carry only particular kinds he may 
be compelled to accept :such goods, but not goods of a sort he 
does not profess to carry. 
§ 195. (4) Customary means and route.-The wagoner 
does not offer to carry by rail, nor the railroad by water ; nor 
need a railroad from X to Y undertake to carry from X to Z. 
'l'he law compels the carrier to accept goods for carriage only 
by the means and over the road to which his business is con­
fined. 
§ 196. (5) Action for refusal.-As a result of the public 
employment of the common carrier he is within certain limits 
bound to carry the goods of any person offering to pay his 
hire. If he refuse to carry he is liable in an action for dam­
ages ; and this liability to be sued for a refusal to carry has 
been suggested as the safest test of his character. It seems 
more logical to say it is the result of his character. If it be 
established that he is a common carrier then an action lies for 
a refusal to carry, but in deciding whether an action lies it 
must first be determined whether he is a common carrier. 
Once let it be established that he is a common carrier and the 
law lays upon him the duty to carry for all. To compel this 
an action lies against a common carrier for refusing to per­
form this duty. 
§ 197. mustrations.-It is no test of the common carrier that 
he should make regular trips, between fixed points� in any 
particular kind of vehicle, or for any definite length of time. 
California R. R. Co., 13 Ore. 352, 
10 Pac. R. 628, 57 Am. R. 20 ; 
[-] Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Nichols, 9 Kan. 235, 12 Am. R. 494 ; 
[-) Michigan Southern & N. I. R. R. 
Co. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 4 
Am. R. 466 ; Shelden v. Robinson, 7 
N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 726 ; [ -] Fish 
v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 
393 ; [-] Thompson· Houston Elec­
tric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25 Pac. 
R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86. 
§ 195. Hutchinson on Carriers, 
Sec. 56 b. 
§ 196. [-] Fish v. Chapman, 2 
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; Shelden v. 
Robinson, 7 N. H. 157, 26 Am. D. 
726 ; [-] Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N. 
Y. 341. 
§ 197. [-] Thompson-Houston 
Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25 
Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86 ; Par­
sons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N. Y. ) 
215, 28 Am. D. 521 ; Beckman v. 
Shouse, 5 Rawle (Pa. ) 179, 28 Am. 
D. 653 ; Bonce v. The Dubuque Street 
Ry. Co., 53 Iowa 278, 5 N. W. R. 
177, 36 Am. R. 221 ; Jackson ete. 
Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y. 34, 52 
N E. R. 665, 70 Am. St. R. 432 ;  
Robertson v. Kennedy, 2 Dana ( Ky. ) 
430, 26 Am. D. 466 ; Hayes v. Wells, 
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COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. §198
It has been held that the following are in general common
carriers: boatmen, owners of stage coaches, omnibuses, hacks,
drays and express wagons, railway, express, street car and
steamboat companies. Local carriers of passengers like street
railways, hackmen and ferrymen, are common carriers of the
baggage of their passengers, but not of goods generally unless
they make a business of receiving such goods for transporta-
tion.
§ 198. -——Those who are not common ca.rriers.—'l‘he follow-
ing have been held not to be in general common carriers:
warehousemen, wharfingers, forwarders, sleeping car com-
panies, telegraph and telephone companies, postmasters and
mail carriers, owners of towing boats, log-driving and boom-
ing companies, bridge, canal and turnpike companies. None
of these are entrusted with goods for carriage in such sense
as to make them public carriers. But a common carrier can-
not escape liability as such by assuming some other name.
The real test is the nature of the undertaking, and any of the
above may be common carriers if as part of their business they
undertake to carry indifierently for such as choose to employ
them.
Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 185, 83 Am. D.
89; [—] Christenson v. American
Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. R.
122; Levi v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co.,
11 Allen (Mass.) 300, 87 Am. D.
713; [—] Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass.
275, 19 Am. R. 456; Crosby v. Fitch,
12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. D. 745;
[—] Hale v. New Jersey Steam Nav-
igation Co., 15 Conn. 538, 39 Am.
D. 398; Parmelee v. Lowitz, 74 Ill.
11.6, 24 Am. R. 276; Harvey v. Rose,
25 Ark. 3, 7 Am. R. 595.
§198. Roberts v. Turner, 12
Johns. (N. Y.) 232, 7 Am. D. 311;
[—] Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. R. 258;
Leonard v. Hendrickson, 18 Pa. St.
40, 55 Am. D. 587; Central Railroad
& Banking Company v. Lampley, 76
Ala. 357, 52 Am. R. 334; Mann v.
Log & Booming Co., 46 Mich. 38,
8 N. W. R. 550, 41 Am. R. 141;
[—] Smith v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R.
126; [—] Christenson v. American


















































































































































COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. § 198 
It has been held that the following are in general common 
carriers : boatm�n, owners of stage coaches, omnibuses, hacks, 
drays and express wagons, railway, express, street car and 
steamboat companies. Local carriers of passengers like street 
railways, hackmen and ferrymen, are common carriers of the 
baggage of their passengers, but not of goods generally unless 
they make a business of receiving such goods for transporta­
tion. 
§ 198. --Those who are not common carriers .-The follow­
ing have been held not to be in general common carriers : 
warehousemen, wharfingers, forwarders, sleeping car com­
panies, telegraph and telephone companies, postmasters and 
mail carriers, owners of towing boats, log-driving and boom­
ing companies, bridge, canal and turnpike companies. None 
of these are entrusted with goods for carriage in such sense 
as to make them public carriers. But a common carrier can­
not escape liability as such by assuming some other name. 
The real test is the nature of the undertaking, and any of the 
above may be common carriers if as part of their business they 
undertake to carry indifferently f�r such as choose to employ 
them. 
Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 185, 83 Am. D. 
89 ; [ -] Christenson v. American 
Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. R. 
1 22 ;  Levi v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 
11 Allen (Mass. ) 300, 87 Am. D. 
713 ; [-] Clark v. Burns, 118  Mass. 
275, 19 Am. R. 456 ; Crosby v. Fitch, 
12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. D. 745 ; 
[-] Hale v. New Jersey Steam Nav· 
igation Co., 15 Conn. 538, 39 Am. 
D. 398 ; Parmelee v. Lowitz, 7 4 Ill. 
116, 24 Am. R. 276 ; Harvey v. Rose, 
26 Ark. 3, 1 Am. R. 595. 
§ 198. Roberts v. Turner, 12 
Johns. ( N. Y. ) 232, 7 Am. D. 311 ; 
[ -J Pullman Palace Car Co. v. 
�mith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. R. 258 ; 
Leonard v. Hendrickson, 18 Pa. St. 
40, 55 Am. D. 587 ; Central Railroad 
& Banking Company v. Lampley, 76 
Ala. 357, 52 Am. R. 334 ; Mann v. 
Log & Booming Co., 46 Mich. 38, 
8 N. W. R. 550, 41 Am. R. 141 ; 
L-J Smith v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 
126 ; [ -] Christenson v. American 


























OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS.
CHAPTER XI
OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COMMON
CARRIER.
Classification.
A. The common law rights
and duties of the common
carrier.
Various kinds of rights and
duties.
(1 ) Right to compensation.












Who liable for freight.
Carrier ’s lien.
——Connecting carriers.
——Storing goods held on
lien.
——Goods shipped by one
not the owner.























































(4) Liability for loss.
Common law rule.
iExceptions.








——(d) Act of shipper.
——————Concealing value.































































































































































OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. 
CHAPTER XI. 
2. OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COMMON 
CARRIER. 
§ 199. Classification. 
A. The common law rights 
and duties of the common 
carrier. 
200. Various kinds of rights and 
duties. 
(1) Bight to compensation. 
201. Carrier 'e right to compensa-
tion. 
202. Amount of compensation. 
203. -Statutory control. 
204. Demurrage. 
205. Discrimination. 
206. --What diecrimintaion ie 
unlawful. 
207. --Interstate Commerce 
Act. 
208. -State Statutes. 
209. On what goods. 
210. Who liable for freight. 
211. Carrier 'e lien. 
212. -Connecting carriers. 
213. -Storing goods held on 
lien. 
214. -Goode shipped by one 
not the owner. 
(t) Duty to carry for all. 
215. Public employment. 
216. Conditions for commence­
ment of duty. 
(a) When liability as com­
mon carrier begins. 
217. Delivery and acceptance. 
218. --Delivery where. 
(b) Evidence of accept-
a nee. 
219. Bill of lading. 
220. --Issued without goods. 
§ 221. --As a contract. 
84 
222. --All8ignability and nego· 
tiability. 
223. --Nature. 
224. --Duplicate bills. 
(3) Accommodations. 
225. Suitable accommodations. 
226. Sufficient accommodations. 
227. --Preferences. 
228. Unusual demand for 
facilities. 
229. The Express cases. 
(4) Liability for lo88. 
230. Common law rule. 
231. --Exceptions. 
232. -- (a) Act of God. 
233. Inevitable accident. 
234. Proximate cause. 
235. Diligence of carrier. 
236. -- (b) The public enemy. 
237. Negligence of the 
carrier. 
238. -- (c)  Public authority. 
239. -- (d) Act of shipper. 
240. Concealing value. 
241. -- ( e) Inherent nature of 
goo de. 
242. Live animals. 
243. Liability for live 
stock. 
244. Burden of proof. 




247. --Reasonable time. 
248. --Delay not sole cause of 
loss. 
RIGHTS OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 199-201
§ 199. Cla.ssifica.tion.—In discussing the rights and duties of
the common carrier a distinction is taken between
(A) The strict rules of the common law, and
(B) The limited liability under a special contract.
It is the purpose of the present chapter to set forth the
common law liability of the common carrier of goods.
A. THE COmmOn LAW RIGHTS AND Dorms or THE COmmOn
» CARRIER.
§ 200. The various kinds of rights and duties.—The common
carrier has all the rights, duties and liabilities of the ordinary
bailee for hire. These have already been sufficiently consid-
ered and will not be repeated. In addition he has exceptional
rights and liabilities which will be considered as follows:
(1) Right to compensation.
(2) Duty to carry for all.
(3) Duty to furnish accommodations.
(4) Liability for loss.
(5) Liability for deviation and delay.
(1) Right to Compensation.
§201. Garrier’s right to compensa.tion.—The primary right
of the carrier is that to his reward. He may if he choose de-
mand this in advance and refuse to accept the goods until he
has received his hire for their carriage. If however he waives
his right to pre-payment, then he must fully perform his
service before he can demand his pay, and he is then entitled
to recover his compensation before giving up possession of the
goods. Unless the carrier has in some way fallen short of
performance of his full duty the party liable for the freight
cannot secure the goods till the payment of the full charges.
Payment of the freight and delivery of the goods are concomi-
tant acts, and the owner need not tender the freight before
demanding the goods. It is enough that he is ready to pay.
§201. [—] Galena etc. R. R.
(lo. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488, a8 Am. D.
574; Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Douglas
(Mich.) 1, 40 Am. D. 33; Wilson v.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 56 Me. 60,
96 Am. D. 435; [—-] Illinois Cen-
tral R. R. C0. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill.
88, 5 Am. R. 92; Grand Rapids etc.
R. R. Co. v. Diether, 10 Ind. App.
206, 37 N. E. R. 39, 53 Am. St. R.
385; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Wol-
cott, 141 Ind. 267, 39 N. E. R. 451,
50 Am. St. R. 320; China Mutual
lns. Co. v. Force, 142 N. Y. 90, 36
N. E. R. 874, 40 Am. St. R. 576;
Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. (Mass.)

















































































































































RIG'JITS OF COMMON CARR1ER. § §  199-201 
§ 199. Classiftcation.-In discussing the rights and duties of 
the common carrier a distinction is taken between 
(A) The strict rules of the common law, and 
(B) The limited liability under a special contract. 
It is the purpose of the present chapter to set forth the 
common law liability of the common carrier of goods. 
A. THE COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COMMON 
CARRIER. 
§ 200. The various kinds of rights and duties,__,.The common 
carrier has all the rights, duties and liabilities of the ordinary 
bailee for hire. These have already been sufficiently consid­
ered and will not be repeated. In addition he has exceptional 
rights and liabilities which will be considered as follows : 
( 1 )  Right to compensation. 
( 2) Duty to carry for all. 
(3) Duty to furnish accommodations. 
( 4) Liability for loss. 
(5 )  Liability for deviation and delay. 
( 1 ) Right to Compensation. 
§ 201. Canier's right to compensation.-The primary right 
of the carrier is that to his reward. He may if he choose de­
mand this in advance and refuse to accept the goods until he 
has received his hire for their carriage. If however he waives 
his right to pre-payment, then he must fully perform his 
service before he can demand his pay, and he is then entitled 
to recover his compensation before giving up possession of the 
goods. Unless the carrier has in some way fallen short of 
performance of his full duty the party liable for the freight 
cannot secur·e the goods till the payment of the full charges. 
Payment of the freight and delivery of the goods are concomi­
tant acts, and the owner need not tender the freight before 
demanding the goods. It is enough that he is ready to pay. 
§ 201. [-] Galena etc. R. R. 206, 37 N. E. R. 39, 53 Am. St. R. 
Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 385 ; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Wol· 
574 ; Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Douglas cott, 141 Ind. 267, 39 N. E. R. 451, 
( Mich. ) 1, 40 Am. D. 33 ; Wilson v. 50 Am. St. R. 320 ; China Mutual 
Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 56 Me. 60, Jns. Co. v. Force, 142 N. Y. 90, 36 
P.6 Am. D. 435 ; [ -] Illinois Cen· N. E. R. 874, 40 Am. St. R. 576 ; 
tral R. R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. ( Mass. ) 
88, 5 Am. R. 92 ; Grand Rapids ete. 215, 57 Am. D. 41. 
R. R. Co. v, Diether1 10 Ind. App. 
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§§ 203-205 OF COMMON CARRIERS.
§202. Amount of compensation.—Except as controlled by
statute the rate fixed by the contract governs. It is usual to
publish a schedule of rates, and the rate is often specified in
the bill of lading, and these if according to the intention of the
parties will govern. If there be no contract then it is im-
plied that the usual rates shall be paid, or in the absence of
custom, a reasonable rate. What is a reasonable rate is a
question of fact for the jury.
§203. ——Statutory contr0l.——The common carrier is not
always allowed to fix the amount of his compensation by con-
tract. In many of the states statutes have fixed maximum
rates. These statutes are valid unless they violate the con-
stitutional provision against depriving the owner of his prop-
erty without due process of law. This they may do by
fixing the maximum rate unreasonably low so as to amount in
efiect to a confiscation of the property of the carrier.
§204. Demurrage.—It is the duty of the consignee to be
ready to receive the goods. Compensation to the carrier for
delay on the part of the consignee is called demurrage. This
is by law allowed to carriers by water as reasonable compen-
sation for improper delay by the consignee. The carrier by
land has no demurrage except by special contract or by stat-
ute. The reason for the distinction is found in the fact that
railroad companies habitually have warehouses in which they
discharge their freight. Carriers by water formerly did not,
though shipments by water are now to a considerable extent
made by companies maintaining such warehouses. In such
cases it is apprehended demurrage could be collected only un-
der a contract to that efiect.
§ 205. Discrimination in charges was not forbidden at com-
mon law. Provided the charges to him were reasonable the
§202. [—] Louisville etc. Rail-
road Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ind. 352, 21
N. E. R. 341; Peters v. R. R. Co.,
42 Ohio St. 275, 51 Am. R. 814;
Baldwin v. Steamship Co., 74 N. Y.
125, 30 Am..R. 277; Killmer v. Rail-
road Co., 100 N. Y. 395, 3 N. E. R.
293, 53 Am. R. 194; [—] Cook v.
Railway Co., 81 Iowa 551, 46 N.
W. R. 1030, 25 Am. st. R. 512;
Hutchinson on Carriers, 443.
§203. [—] Compare Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, with [—-] Chi-
cago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup.
Ct. 462.
§204. Hutchinson on Carriers,
473 and 473a; [—] Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 103 Ill. 588.
§205. [—] Scofield v. Railway
Co., 43 Ohio St. 571, 3 N. E. R. 907,

















































































































































§§  202-205 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
§ 202. Amount of compens&tion.-Except as controlled by 
statute the rate fixed by the contract governs. It is usual to 
publish a schedule of rates, and the rate is often specified in 
the bill of lading, and these if according to the intention of the 
parties will govern. If there be no contract then it is im­
plied that the usual rates shall be paid, or in the absence of 
custom, a reasonable rate. What is a reasonable rate is a 
question of fact for the jury. 
§ 203. --Statutory cqntrol.-The common carrier is not 
always allowed to fix the amount of his compensation by con­
tract. In many of the states statutes have fixed maximum 
rates. These statutes are valid unless they violate the con­
stitutional provision against depriving the owner of his prop­
erty without due process of law. This they JJ18Y do by 
fixing the maximum rate unreasonably low so as to amount in 
effect to a confiscation of the property of the carrier. 
§ 204. Demurrage.-It is the duty of the consignee to be 
ready to receive th<' goods. Compensation to the carrier for 
delay on the part of the consignee is called demurrage. This 
is by law allowed to carriers by water as reasonable compen­
sation for improper delay by the consignee. The carrier by 
land has no demurrage except by special contract or by stat­
ute. The reason for the distinction is found in the fact that 
railroad companies habitually have warehouses in which they 
discharge their freight. Carriers by water formerly did not, 
though shipments by water are now to a considerable extent 
made by companies maintaining such warehouses. In such 
cases it is apprehended demurrage could be collected only un­
der a contract to that effect. 
§ 205. Discrimination in charges was not forbidden at com­
mon law. Provided the charges to him were reasonable the 
§ 202. [ -] Louisville etc. Rail· 
road Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ind. 352, 21 
N. E. R. 341 ; Peters v. R. R. Co., 
42 Ohio St. 275, 51 Am. R. 814 ; 
Baldwin v. Steamship Co., 74 N. Y. 
125, 30 Am . . R. 277 ; Killmer v. Rail· 
road Co., 100 N. Y. 395, 3 N. E. R. 
293, 53 Am. R. 194 ; [-] Cook v. 
Railway Co., 81 Iowa 551, 46 N. 
W. R. 1080, 25 Am. St. R. 512 ; 
Hutchinson on Carriers, 443. 
§ 203. [-] Compare Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, with [-] Chi· 
cago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. 
v. Minneriota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. 
Ct. 462. 
§ 204. Hutchinson on Carriers, 
473 and 473a ; [-] Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 103 Ill. 588. 
§ 205. [-] Scofield v. Railway 
Co., 43 Ohio St. 571, 3 N. E. R. 907, 
!i-1 Am. R. 846 ; Cleveland etc. Rail· 
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RIGHTS OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 2()6-2()3
shipper could not complain that goods were carried for another
at a less rate. The development of carriage by railway with
the resulting power put in the hands of the carrying corpora-
tions to make or ruin competing shippers has made the ques-
tion one of vast importance. From the cases, which are con-
flicting in many points, the following may be deduced:
For reasons of public policy any discrimination in rates be-
tween shippers that is oppressive or unjust, or that has a ten-
dency to create a monopoly, is illegal. Mere difference in rates
is not of itself unjust discrimination; but a difference for dif-
ferent shippers for transporting the same class of goods under
like conditions is unjust and illegal. It amounts to unduly
favoring one party at the expense of another.
§ 206. -——What discrimination is un1awful.—The cases are
not wholly reconcilable, but by the better opinion a discrimina-
tion is unjust if it is based merely on the amount of freight
offered, or if it has a tendency to destroy the trade of one ship-
per by giving a more favored shipper a practical monopoly, or
if a secret rebate is allowed certain shippers. But it is not
undue preference to discriminate between local and through
freight, between a short haul and a long haul.
§207. ——Interstate Commerce Act.—In the United States
the Interstate Commerce Act (1887) undertakes to regulate this
question by prohibiting as unlawful every unjust and unreason-
able charge; all rebates and unequal charges to different per-
sons for like and contemporaneous services under substantially
similar circumstances; all undue and unreasonable preferences
or advantages; any greater charge for a shorter than for a
longer distance, the shorter being included within the longer
distance.
In England the Railway and Canal Traflic Act (1854) pro-
hibits “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or
in favor of any particular person or company, or any particular
description of traffic in any respect whatever.”
§208. ——State statutes.—The Interstate Commerce Act
way Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 26 Co., 8 Vroom (N. J.) 531, 18 Am.
N. E. R. 159, 22 Am. St. R. 593; R. 754.
[—] Cook v. Railway Co., 81 Iowa, §206. See cases cited under
551, 46 N. W. R. 1080, 25 Am. St. § 205.

















































































































































RIGlITS OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 206-208 
shipper could not complain that goods were carried for another 
at a less rate. The development of carriage by railway with 
the resulting power put in the hands of the carrying corpora· 
tions to make or ruin competing shippers has made the ques­
tion one of vast importance. From the cases, which are con­
flicting in many points, the.  following may be deduced : 
For reasons of public policy any discrimination in rates be­
tween shippers that is oppressive or unjust, or that has a ten­
dency to create a monopoly, is illegal. Mere difference in rates 
is not of itself unjust discrimination ; but a difference for dif­
ferent shippers for transporting the same class of goods under 
like conditions is unjust and illegal. It amounts to unduly 
favoring one party at the expense of another. 
§ 206. --What discrimination is unlawful.-The cases are 
not wholly reconcilable, but by the better opinion a discrimina­
tion is · unjust if it is based merely on the amount of freight 
offered, or if it has a tendency to destroy the trade of one ship­
per by giving a more favored shipper a practical monopoly, or 
if a secret rebate is allowed certain shippers. But it is not 
undue preference to discriminate between local and through 
freight, between a short haul and a long haul. 
§ 207. --Interstate Commerce Act.-In the United States 
the Interstate Commerce Act ( 1887) undertakes to regulate this 
question by prohibiting as unlawful every unjust and unreason­
able charge ; all rebates and unequal charges to different per­
sons for like and contemporaneous services under substantially 
similar circumstances ; all undue and unreasonable preferences 
or advantages ; any greater charge for a shorter than for a 
longer distance, the shorter being included within the longer 
distance. 
In England the Railway and Canal Traffic Act ( 1854) pro­
hibits " lmdue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or 
in favor of any particular person or company, or any particular 
description of traffic in any respect whatever. " 
§ 208. --State statutes.-The Interstate Commerce Act 
way Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 26 
N. E. R. 159, 22 Am. St. R. 593 ; 
I-] Cook v. Railway Co., 81 Iowa, 
551, 46 N. W. R. 1080, 25 Am. St. 
R. 512 ; Messenger v. Pa. Railroad 
Co., 8 Vroom ( N. J. ) 531, 18 Am. 
R. 754. 
§ 206 . See cases cited under 
§ 205. 
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§§ 299-310 OF COMMON CARRIERS.
applies to traffic between different states, but not to transporta-
tion wholly within a single state. The state legislatures have
very generally passed statutes touching this matter, often fixing
a maximum rate. This they have a right to do unless such
maximum rate is unreasonably low, amounting to a confiscation
of the carrier’s property. A requirement that a carrier shall
do business at less than will yield a reasonable return on the
carrier ’s investment will be taking property without due pro-
cess of law, and therefore is unconstitutional.
§209. On what goods.—The contract of afireightment is in
general held to be indivisible and the shipper is liable for the
full amount of the freight after the carrier has accepted the
goods for immediate shipment, or in the case of the carrier by
water, after the ship has broken ground on the voyage.
On the other hand, the carrier is in general entitled to freight
only on goods carried to the destination, or in the case of
connecting carriers, to the terminal point on his portion of
the journey. If any waste occur en route he will be allowed
freight only for the portion delivered, and the loss from waste
may be set ofi against the freight. But if the waste or failure
to deliver be due to the fault of the shipper or his consignee,
or if the contract call for a lump freight, then full recovery
may be had, unless the carrier consent to a pro rata freight for
the distance the goods were carried. If the goods are actually
delivered, but are worthless for causes for which the carrier is
not liable, he is entitled to his full freight for such goods.
§210. Who liable for freight.—Prima facie the consignee is
the owner of the goods and is therefore liable for the freight.
Acceptance of the goods by the consignee with knowledge of
§ 209. [—] Gibson v. Sturge, 10
Exch. 622; Griswold v. New York
Ins. Co., 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 321, 3 Am.
D. 490; Knight v. Providence and
Worcester R. R. Co., 13 R. I. 572,
43 Am. R. 46; China Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Force, 142 N. Y. 90, 36 N. E. R.
874, 40 Am. St. R. 576; Dakin v.
Oxley, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 646, 109 E.
C. L. 646; Parsons v. Hardy, 14
Wend. (N. Y.) 215, 28 Am. D. 521;
Hill v. Leadbetter, 42 Me. 572, 66
Am. D. 305; Bennett v. Byram, 38
Miss. 17, 75 Am. D. 90; Hutchinson
on Carriers, 444-5.
§210. Hill v. Leadbetter, 42 Me.
572, 66 Am. D. 305; Wooster v. Tarr,
8 Allen (Mass.) 270, 85 Am. D. 707;
Holt v. Westcott, 43 Me. 445, 69 Am.
D. 74; Hayward v. Middleton, 3
McCord (S. C.) 121, 15 Am. D. 615;
Barker v. Havens, 17 Johns. (N. Y.)
234, 8 Am. D. 393; [—] Union
Freight R. R. Co. v. Winkley, 159



















































































































































§ §  209-210 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
appl ies to traffic between different states, but not to transporta­
tion wholly within a single state. The state legislatures have 
very generally passed statutes touching this matter, often fixing 
a maximum rate. 'rhis they have a right to do unless such 
maximum rate is unreasonably low, amounting to a confiscation 
of the carrier 's property. A requirement that a carrier shall 
do business at less than will yield a reasonable return on the 
carrier 's investment will be taking property without due pro­
cess of law, and therefore is unconstitutional. 
§ 209. On what goods.-The contract of affreightment is in 
general held to be indivisible and the shipper is liable for the 
full amount of the freight after the carrier has accepted the 
goods for immediate shipment, or in the case of the carrier by 
water, after the ship has broken ground on the voyage. 
On the other hand, the carrier is in general entitled to freight 
only on goods carried to the destination, or in the case of 
connecting carriers, to the terminal point on his portion of 
the journey. If any waste occur en route he will be allowed 
freight only for the portion delivered, and the loss from waste 
may be set off against the freight. But if the waste or failure 
to deliver be due to the fault of the shipper or his consignee, 
or if the contract call for a lump freight, then full recovery 
may be had, unless the carrier consent to a pro rat a freight for 
the distance the goods were carried. If the goods are actually 
delivered, but are worthless for causes for which the carrier is 
not liable, he is entitled to his full freight for such goods. 
§ 210. Who liable for freight.-Prima facie the consignee is 
the owner of the goods and is therefore liable for the freight. 
Acceptance of the goods by the consignee with knowledge of 
§ 209. [ -] Gibson v. Sturge, 1 0  
Exch. 622 ; Griswold v .  New York 
Ins. Co., 3 Johns. (N. Y. ) 321, 3 Am. 
D. 490 ; Knight v. Providence and 
Worcester R. R. Co., 13 R. I. 572, 
43 Am. R. 46 ; China Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. Force, 142 N. Y. 90, 36 N. E. R. 
874, 40 Am. St. R. 576 ; Dakin v. 
Oxley, 15 C. B. (N. S. ) 646, 109 E. 
V. L. 646 ; Parsons v. Hardy, 14 
Wend. ( N. Y. ) 215, 28 Am. D. 521 ; 
Hill v. Leadbetter, 42 Me. 572, 66 
Am. D. 305 ; Bennett v. Byram, 3R 
Miss. 1 7, 75 Am. D. 90 ; Hutchinson 
on Carriers, 444-5. 
§ 210. Hill v. Leadbetter, 42 Me. 
572, 66 Am. D. 305 ; Wooster v. Tarr, 
8 Allen ( Mass.) 270, 85 Am. D. 707 ; 
Holt v. Westcott, 43 Me. 445, 69 Am. 
D. 74 ; Hayward v. Middleton, 3 
McCord (S. C. ) 121, 15 Am. D. 615 ; 
Barker v. Havens, 17  Johns. (N. Y.) 
234, 8 Am. D. 393 ; [-] Union 
Freight R. R. Co. v. Winkley, 159 
Mass. 133, 34 N. E. R. 91, 38 Am. 
Rt. R. 398. 
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RIGHTS Or COMMON CARRIER. §§ 211-212
the essential facts carries with it the obligation to pay the
freight unless the consignee is known to be a mere agent.
The presumption that the consignee is the owner may be re-
butted and liability fastened on the consignor or a third per-
son. The carrier may always, in the absence of any other
party to whom it may look, demand the freight of the con-
signor, for he made the contract of afireightment and is liable
if no one else can be held. The consignee can never be made
liable merely by being made consignee without his consent.
§211. Carrier's lien.—The carrier, being compelled to ac-
cept goods offiered, has been given by law a lien upon the goods
as security for ‘his hire. “This is co-extensive with his right to
claim and recover freight,” and accordingly, except by special
contract or established custom, the carrier ’s lien is a special and
not a general one. It extends to his charges and advances for
the particular goods carried, or to the goods carried under one
contract, but not to any claims for demurrage or warehouse
charges, nor to damages suffered by the carrier through the
wrong of the shipper or through his failure to perform all the
conditions of the bill of lading. The consignee may set ofi
against the lien any damage to the goods for which the carrier
is liable.
§ 212. ‘Connecting carriers.—The lien extends to all the
carrying charges. Where goods are shipped over the lines of
several connecting carriers, and the last carrier advances the
charges of the preceding carriers, he may retain the goods until
his full charges and advances are paid, unless he has notice
not to pay such charges, or through the bill of lading or other-
wise it appears that such charges have been prepaid by the
shipper.
§211. Dyer v. Grand Trunk Ry.
Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. R. 671, 12 Am.
Co., 42 Vt. 441 1 Am R 350' Ames
St. R. 885; [—] Chicago & N. W.
7 ‘ ' 7
v. Palmer, 42 Me. 197, 66 Am. D.
271; [—] Galena etc. Railroad Co.
v. Rae, 13 111. 433, e8 Am. D. 574;
Gregg v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.,
147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. R. 343, 37 Am.
St. R. 238; [—] Potts v. N. Y. 85
N. E. R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41
Am. R. 247; Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush.
(Mass.) 215, 57 Am. D. 41; Penn-
sylvania R. R. Co. v. Oil Works, 126
Ry. Co. v.~ Jenkins, 103 Ill. 588;
Hutchinson on Carriers, 478.
§212. [—] Potts v. N. Y. & N.
E. R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am.
R. 247; [—] Briggs v. Boston etc.
R. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246, 83
Am. D. 626; Knight v. Providence
and Worcester R. R. Co., 13 R. I.

















































































































































RIGHTS OF COMMON CARR!ER. § §  211-212 
the essential facts carries with it the obligation to pay the 
freight unless the cunsignee is known to be a mere agent. 
The presumption that the consignee is the owner may be re­
butted and liability fastened on the consignor or a third per­
son. The carrier may always, in the absence of any other 
party to whom it may look, demand the freight of the con­
signor, for he made the contract of affreightment and is liable 
if no one else can be held. 'l'he consignee can never be made 
liable merely by being made consignee without his consent. 
§ 
·
211. Carrier 's lien.-The carrier, being compelled to ac­
cept goods offered, has been given by law a lien upon the goods 
as security for 'his hire. ' ' This is co-extensive with his right to 
claim and recover freight, ' '  and accordingly, except by special 
contract or established custom, the carrier 's lien is a special and 
not a general one. It extends to his charges and advances for 
the particular goods carried, or to the goods carried under one 
contract, but not to any claims for demurrage or warehouse 
charges, nor to damages suffered by the carrier through the 
wrong of the shipper or through his failure to perform all the 
conditions of the bi11 of lading. The consignee may set off 
against the lien any damage to the goods for which the carrier 
is liable. 
§ 212. --Connecting carriers.-'l'he lien extends to all the 
carrying charges. Where goods are shipped over the lines of 
several connecting carriers, and the last carrier advances the 
charges of the preceding carriers, he may retain the goods until 
his full charges and advances are paid, unless he has notice 
not to pay such charges, or through the bill of lading or other­
wise it appears that such charges have been prepaid by the 
shipper. 
§ 211.  Dyer v. Grand Trunk Ry. 
Co., 42 Vt. 441, 1 Am. R. 350 ; Ames 
v. Palmer, 42 Me. 197, 66 Am. D. 
271 ; [-] Galena etc. Railroad Co. 
v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 574 ; 
Gregg v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 
147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. R. 343, 37 Am. 
St. R. 238 ; [-] Potts v. N. Y. & 
N. E. R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 
Am. R. 247 ; Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. 
(Mass. ) 215, 57 Am. D. 41 ; Penn-
51lvania R. R. Co. v. Oil Works, 126 
Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. R. 671, 12 Am. 
St. R. 885 ; [-] Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co. V; Jenkins, 103 Ill. 588 ; 
Hutchinson on Carriers, 478. 
§ 212. (-] Potts v. N. Y. & N. 
F:. R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. 
R. 24 7 ;  [-] Briggs v. Boston etc. 
R. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass. ) 246, 83 
Am. D. 626 ; Knight v.  Providence 
and Worcester R. R. Co., 13 R. I. 




213-215 or COMMON CARRIERS.
§213. ——Storing goods held on lien.—If the carrier ten-
ders the goods and the consignee or owner fails to pay the
charges, they may be retained and delivered to a warehouse-
man for storing. The warehouseman holds them as bailee of
the carrier and the owner, and must not, except upon the order
of the carrier, deliver them to the owner until the carrier has
been paid his charges for transportation. 'l‘he goods are also
liable to the warehouseman for the charges of their storage.
§214. ——Goods shipped by one not the owner.-—This lien
is good as against the owner, even though the goods have been
wrongfully shipped by another, provided the owner had clothed
such other with the indicia of ownership, or given him appar-
ent authority to ship the goods. Where however goods are
shipped by one without color of right, by the better opinion the
carrier is in no better position than the vendee of goods pur-
chased from one having no color of title. The carrier is not
bound to carry the goods if they are offered by a wrongdoer,
and therefore in such case has no lien for his charges. No
man ’s property can be taken from him by another without his
consent.
The carr-ier’s lien is prior to any rights of the consignor,
consignee, owner, or creditors of any of these. When goods
are stopped in transitu, or taken by an officer under process,
the carrier may insist upon his charges before giving possession
of the goods. The lien however is personal to the carrier and he
alone can set it up as a defence against the owner who seeks
to recover his goods or their worth. Loss of possession ter-
minates the lien.
(2.) Duty to Carry for All.
§215. Public emp1oyment.—“A common carrier is a pub-
lic carrier. He engages in a public employment, takes upon
§213. -Gregg v. Illinois Central
R. R. Co., 147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. R.
343, 37 Am. St. R. 238; Rankin v.
Memphis 8a Cincinnati Packet Co., 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 564, 24 Am. R. 339.
§ 214. Fitch v. N ewberry, 1 Doug-
las (Mich.) 1, 40 Am. D. 33; Robin-
son v. Baker, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 137,
51 Am. D. 54; Hale v. Barrett, 26
Ill. 195, 79 Am. D. 367; [—] Potts
v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co., 131
-l\/Iass. 455, 41 Am. R. 247; Saltus
v. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267,
32 Am. D. 541; Ames v. Palmer, 42
Me. 197, 66 Am. D. 271; Pennsyl-
vania R. R. Co. v. Oil Works, 126
Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. R. 671, 12 Am.
St. R. 885; [—] Rucker v. Donovan,
13 Kan. 251, 19 Am. R. 84.
§215. See cases cited under Sec.
192, and [—] New Jersey Steam

















































































































































§ §  213-215 OF COMMON CARRlERS. 
§ 213. --Storing goods held on lien.-lf the carrier ten­
ders the goods and the consignee or owner fails to pay the 
charges, they may be retained and delivered to a warehouse­
man for storing. The warehouseman holds them as bailee of 
the carrier and the owner, and must not, except upon the order 
of the carrier, deliver them to the owner until the carrier has 
been paid his charges for transportation. The goods are also 
liable to the warehouseman for the charges of their storage. 
§ 214. --Goods shipped by one not the owner.-This lien 
is good as against the owner, even though the goods have been 
wrongfully shipped by another, provided the owner had clothed 
such other with the indicia of ownership, or given him appar­
ent authority to ship the goods. Where however goods are 
shipped ·by one without color of right, by the better opinion the 
carrier is in no better position than the vendee of goods pur­
chased from one having no color of title. The carrier is not 
bound to carry the goods if they are offered by a wrongdoer, 
and therefore in such case has no lien for his charges. No 
man 's property can be taken from him by another without his 
consent. 
The carrier 's lien is prior to any rights of the consignor, 
consignee, owner, or creditors of any of these. ·when goods 
are stopped in transitu, or taken by an officer under process, 
the carrier may insist upon his charges before giving possession 
of the goods. The lien however is personal to the carrier and he 
alone can set it up as a defence against the owner who seeks 
to recover his goods or their worth. Loss of possession ter­
minates the lien. 
(2. ) Duty to Carry fo1· All. 
§ 215. Public employmeni.-' ' A  common carrier is a pub­
lic carrier. He engages in a public employment, takes upon 
§ 213 . .  Gregg v. Illinois Central - Mass. 455, 41 Am. R. 247 ; Saltus 
R. R. Co., 147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. R. - v. Everett, 20 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 267, 
343, 37 Am. St. R. 238 ; Rankin v. 32 Am. D. 541 ; Ames v. Palmer, 42 
Memphis & Cincinnati Packet Co., 9 Me. 197, 66 Am. D. 271 ; Pennsyl­
Heisk. (Tenn. ) 564, 24 Am. R. 339. vania R. R. Co. v. Oil Works, 126 
§ 214. Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug- Pa. St. 485, 17 Atl. R. 671, 12 Am. 
las (Mich. ) 1, 40 Am. D. 33 ; Robin· St. R. 885 ; [-) Rucker v. Donovan, 
eon v. Baker, 5 Cueh. (Maee. ) 137, 1 3  Kan. 251, 19 Am. R. 84. 
51 Am. D. 54 ; Hale v. Barrett, 26 § 215. See cases cited under Sec. 
Ill. 195, 79 Am. D. 367 ; [-) Potts 192, and [-] New J ereey Steam 
v N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co.1 131 l\'avigation Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 
90 
norms OF cOmmOn CARRIER. §§ 216-213
himself a public duty and exercises a sort of public office. He
is bound to carry at reasonable rates such commodities as are
in his line of business, for all persons who offer them, as early
as his means will allow. The very definition of common car-
riers implies indiffierence as to whom they may serve, and an
equal readiness to serve all who may apply and in the order of
their application.” Refusal to perform this duty lays the car-
rier liable to an action for damages; or mandamus will lie to
compel him to serve all indiffierently. ‘
§ 216. Conditions for commencement of the duty.—The pri-
mary and most characteristic duty of the common carrier then
is his duty to carry for all who offer goods under proper con-
ditions. Such being his duty it is important to determine
(a) When he has entered upon his undertaking, and
(b) ‘What evidence of his undertaking is usual or necessary.
(a) When Liabiltiy as Common C(u'm'er Begins.
§217. Delivery and accepta.nce.—The duties and liabilities
of the common carrier as such, begin with the delivery of the
goods to him or to his authorized agent, and their acceptance
for immediate transportation. If something yet remains to be
done by the shipper the delivery is not complete and the strict
liability of the common carrier does not attach. But delivery
cannot be affected by the fact that the carrier for his own con-
venience does not immediately begin the transportation.
§218. —-—Delivery where.—The goods must be delivered
at the place and in the manner provided by the carrier, or else
6 How. (U. S.) 344; Fitch v. New-
berry, 1 Douglas (Mich.) 1, 40 Am.
D. 33; [—] Hollister v. Nowlen, 19
VVend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. D. 455;
McDufiee v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H.
430, 13 Am. R. 72; [—] Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co. v. People, 56 Ill.
365, 8 Am. R. 690; Messenger v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 8 Vroom
(N. J.) 531, 18 Am. R. 754.
§217. Merriam v. Hartford etc.
R. R. Co., 20 Conn. 354, 52 Am. D.
344; Blossom v. Griflin, 13 N. Y.
569, 67 Am. D. 75; [—] Judson v.
Western etc. Railroad Corporation, 4
Allen (Mass.) 520, 81 Am. D. 718;
Illinois Central R. R: Co. v. Smyser,
38 Ill. 354, 87 Am. D. 301;
[—] Montgomery etc. Ry. Co. v.
Kolb, 73 Ala. 396, 49 Am. R. 54;
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36
Ga. 635, 91 Am. D. 783; Fitchburg
etc. Ry. Co. v. Hanna, 6 Gray
(Mass.) 539, 66 Am. D. 427; Rail-
way Co. v. Murphy, 6.0 Ark. 333, 30
s W. R. 419, 46 Am. st. R. 202 ;
Ladue v. Griflith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82
Am. D. 360.
§218. Merriam v. Hartford etc.

















































































































































DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. § §  216-218 
himself a public duty and exercises a sort of public office. He 
is bound to carry at reasonable rates such commodities as are 
in his line of business, for all persons who offer them, as early 
as his means will allow. The very definition of common car­
riers implies indifference as to whom they may serve, and an 
equal readiness to serve all who may apply and in the order of 
their application. "  Refusal to perform this duty lays the car­
rier liable to an action for damages ; or mandamus- will lie to 
compel him to serve all indifferently. 
§ 216. Conditions for commencement of the duty. -The pri­
mary and most characteristic duty of the common carrier then 
is his duty to carry for all who offer goods under proper con­
ditions. Such being his duty it is important to determine 
(a )  When he has entered upon his undertaking, and 
(b ) ·What evidence of his undertaking is usual or necessary. 
(a )  When Liability as Common Carrier Begins. 
§ 217. Delivery a.nd acceptance.-The duties and liabilities 
of the common carrier as such, begin with the delivery of the 
goods to him or to his authorized agent, and their acceptance 
for immediate transportation. If something yet remains to be 
done by the shippet' the delivery is not complete and the strict 
liability of the common carrier does not attach. But delivery 
cannot be affected by the fact that the carrier for his own con­
venience does not immediately begin the transportation. 
§ 218. --Delivery where.-The goods must be delivered 
at the place and in the manner provided by the carrier, or else 
6 How. (U. S.) 344 ; Fitch v. New· 
berry, 1 Douglas (Mich. ) 1, 40 Am. 
D. 33 ; [-] Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 
Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. D. 455 ; . 
McDuff'ee v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 
430, 13  Am. R. 72 ; [ -] Chicago & 
N. W. Ry. Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 
365, 8 Am. R. 690 ; Messenger v. 
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 8 Vroom 
(N. J. ) 531, 18 Am. R. 754. 
§ 217. Merriam v. Hartford etc. 
R. R. Co., 20 Conn. 354, 52 Am. D. 
344 ; Blossom v. Griffin, 13 N. Y. 
569, 67 Am. D. 75 ; [-] Judson v. 
Western etc. Railroad Corporation, 4 
Allen (Mass. ) 520, 81 Am. D. 718 ; 
Illinois Central R. R� Co. v. Smyser, 
38 Ill. 354, 87 Am. D. 301 ; 
[-] Montgomery etc. Ry. Co. v .  
Kolb, 73 Ala. 396, 49 Am. R. 54 ; 
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 
Ga. 635, 91 Am. D. 783 ; Fitchburg 
etc. Ry. Co. v. Hanna, 6 Gray 
(Mass. ) 539, 66 Am. D. 427 ; Rail· 
way Co. v. Murphy, 60 Ark. 333, 30 
S W. R. 419, 46 Am. St. R. 202 ; 
Ladue v. Griffith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82 
Am. D. 360. 
§ 218. Merriam v. Hartford etc. 
R. R. Co., 20 Conn. 3541 52 Am. D. 
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§§ 219-220 Or COMMON CARRIERS. .
they must be delivered personally to his agent authorized to
receive them. Unless the carrier has established such a cus-
tom, leaving the goods upon the premises, or on the depot plat-
form, is not complete delivery, nor is it full delivery to deposit
them with an agent of the carrier not authorized to receive
them. The shipper has a right to regard those employed at the
carrier’s usual place for receiving goods as having ample au-
thority to so receive them.
(b) Evidence of Acceptance.
§ 219. Bill of 1ading.—No writing is necessary to a complete
delivery. When the goods are properly deposited for transpor-
tation the carricr’s liability begins. But it is customary to en-
ter into some special contract of carriage by means of what is
usually denominated a bill of lading, which is both a receipt for
the goods and a contract for their carriage.
The bill of lading as a receipt is prima facie evidence of de-
livery to the carrier of a certain quantity of goods of a certain
description and value, for transportation to a consignee there-
in named. But like all receipts it can be varied or contradicted
by parol evidence of mistake or fraud as to any or all of its
terms descriptive of the goods.
§ 220. ——Bi11 of lading issued without goods.—If the agent
of the carrier, conniving with the consignor, fraudulently issue
a bill of lading without the delivery of any goods, or of the
goods described, such consignor and persons taking from him
with knowledge acquire no rights by force of the bill of lading.
344; [—] Galena etc. R. R. Co. v. Am. St. R. 293; [—] Morganton
Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 574;
[—] Tate v. Yazoo etc. Railroad Co.,
78 Miss. 842, 29 So. R. 392, 84 Am.
St. R. 649; Railway Co. v. Murphy,
60 Ark. 333, 30 S. W. R. 419, 46
Am. St. R. 202.
§219. [—] Tate v. Yazoo etc.
Railroad Co., 78 Miss. 842, 29 So.
R. 392, 84 Am. St. R. 649; O’Brien
v. Gilchrist, 34 Me. 554, 56 Am. D.
676; [—] Montgomery etc. Ry. Co.
v. Kolb, 73 Ala. 396, 49 Am. R. 54;
Sonia Cotton Oil Co. v. Steamer Red
River, 106 La. 42, 30 So. R. 303, 87
Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River etc. Ry. Co.,
121 N. C. 514, 28 S. E. R. 474, 61
Am. St. R. 679; [—] Louisville etc.
Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ind. 352,
21 N. E. R. 341.
§220. [—] Friedlander v. Rail-
way Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct.
570; contra, Bank of Batavia v. Rail-
road Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. R.
433, 60 Am. R. 440. See also
[—] National Bank of Commerce v.
Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N. W.





















































































































































§ §  219-220 OF' COMMON CARRIERS. 
they must be delivered personally to his agent authorized to 
receive them. Unless the carrier has established such a cus­
tom, leaving the goods upon the premises, or on the depot plat­
form, is not complete delivery, nor is it full delivery to deposit 
them with an agent of the carrier not authorized to receive 
them. The shipper has a right to regard those employed at the 
carrier 's usual place for receiving goods as having ample au­
thority to so receive them. 
( b )  Evidence of Acceptance. 
§ 219. Bill of lading.-No writing is necessary to a complete. 
delivery. When the goods are properly deposited for transpor­
tation the carrier 's liability begins. But it is customary to en­
ter into some specia� contract of carriage by means of what is 
usually denominated a bill of lading, which is both a receipt for 
the goods and a contract for their carriage. 
The bill of lading as a receipt is prima f acie evidence of de­
livery to the carrier of a certain quantity of goods of a certain 
description and value, for transportation to a consignee there­
in named. But like all receipts it can be varied or contradicted 
by 1Jarol evidence of mistake or fraud as to any or all of its 
terms descriptive of the goods. 
§ 220. --Bill of lading issued without goods.-If the agent 
of the carrier, conniving with the consignor, fraudulently issue 
a bill of lading without the delivery of any goods, or of the 
goods described, such consignor and persons taking from him 
with knowledge acquire no rights by force of the bill of lading. 
344 ; [-] Galena etc. R. R. Co. v. 
Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 574 ; 
[-] Tate v. Yazoo etc. Railroad Co., 
78 Miss. 842, 29 So. R. 392, 84 Am. 
St. R. 649 ; Railway Co. v. Murphy, 
60 Ark. 333, 30 S. W. R. 419, 46 
Am. St. R. 202. 
§ 219. [-] Tate v. Yazoo etc. 
Railroad Co., 78 Miss. 842, 29 So. 
R. 392, 84 Am. St. R. 649 ; 0 'Brien 
v. Gilchrist, 34 Me. 554, 56 Am. D. 
676 ; [ -] Montgomery etc. Ry. Co. 
v. Kolb, 73 Ala. 396, 49 Am. R. 54 ; 
Sonia Cotton Oil Co. v. Steamer Red 
}qver, 106 La. 42, 30 So. R. 303, 87 
Am. St. R. 293 ; [ -] Morganton 
Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River etc. Ry. Co., 
121 N. C. 514, 28 S. E. R. 474, 61 
Am. St. R. 679 ; [ -] Louisville etc. 
Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ind. 352, 
21 N. E. R. 341. 
§ 220. [-] Friedlander v. Rail­
\\ ay Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 
570 ; contra, Bank of Batavia v. Rail­
road Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. R. 
433, 60 Am. R. 440. See also 
[-] National Bank of Commerce v. 
Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N. W. 
R. 342, 20 Am. St. R. 566, and eases 
<>ited therein. 
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DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. 221-222
Whether an innocent transferee of the bill of lading may hold
the railroad liable according to the terms of the bill of lading
is a disputed question. By the weight of authority he has no
such right, for the agent of the carrier acts within the scope
of his authority in issuing a bill of lading only when goods
have been received. Some cases set forth strong reasons for
holding the carrier liable on such a bill of lading on the ground
that he is estopped to deny that his agent received the goods.
§ 221. iBi1l of lading as a contract.—The efiect of stipu-
lations in a bill of lading limiting the carrier’s liability will be
considered in another chapter. It is important here to notice,
that like other written contracts it is a merger of prior and con-
temporaneous agreements" of the parties, and in the absence of
fraud or mistake its terms may not be varied or contradicted
by parol evidence of an oral agreement.
§222. ——Assignability and negotiability of bill of lading.
—A bill of lading is a quasi-negotiable instrument. It is negotia-
ble in that it is transferred by indorsement and delivery, but
in other respects it is non-negotiable. The assignment of a bill
ol’ lading indorsed thereon passes to the assignee at once the
title to the goods represented by the bill as completely as by
delivery of the goods themselves. But as against third persons
the assignee acquires the title of the assignor, no more, no less;
he takes subject to all the equities that would have availed
against his assignor. As between the parties mere delivery
of "the bill without indorsement with the intention to pass title
is a good transfer of the goods.
Statutes in some states -declare bills of lading to be negoti-
able. Such statutes are strictly construed, and are held not to
change the character of the instrument, but to prescribe the
mode of transfer by indorsement like negotiable instruments.
§221. [—] Morganton Mfg Co.
v. Ohio River etc. Ry. Co., 121 N. C.
514, 253$. E. R. 474, 61 Am. St. R.
619;‘ uisville etc. Railroad Co. v.
Wilson, 119 In(l. 352, 21 N. E. R.
341; Sonia Cotton Oil Co. v. Steamer
Red River, 106 La. 42, 30 So. R.
303, 87 Am. St. R. 293.
§222. [—] Shaw v. Railroad
Co., 101 U. S. 557; [—] Friedlander
v. Railway Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup.
Ct. 570; Burton v. Curyea, 40 Ill.
320, 89 Am. D. 350; Missouri Pa-
cific Ry. Co. v. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex.
195, 17 S. W. R. 608, 27 Am. St.
R. 861; [—] National Bank of
Commerce v. Railroad Co., 44 Minn.
224, 46 N. W. R. 342, 20 Am. St.

















































































































































DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. § §  221-222 
Whether an innocent transferee of the bill of lading may hold 
the railroad liable according to the terms of the bill of lading 
is a disputed question. By the weight of authority he has no 
such right, for the agent of the carrier acts within the scope 
of his authority in issuing a bill of lading only when goods 
have been received. Some cases set forth strong reasons for 
holding the carrier liable on such a bill of lading on the ground 
that he is estopped to deny that his agent received the goods. 
§ 221. --Bill of lading as a contract.-The effect of stipu­
lations in a bill of lading limiting the carrier 's liability will be 
considered in another chapter. It is important here to notice, 
that like other written contracts it is a merger of prior and con­
temporaneous agreements of the parties, and in the absence of 
fraud or mistake its terms may not be var}ed or contradicted 
by parol evidence of an oral agreement. 
§ 222. -Assignability a.nd negotiability of bill of lading. 
-A bill of lading is a quasi-negotiable instrument. It is negotia­
ble in that it is transferred by indorsement and delivery, but 
in other respects it is non-negotiable. The assignment of a bil l 
o r  lading indorsed thereon passes to the assignee at once the 
title to the goods r(�presented by the bill as completely as by 
delivery of the goods themselves. But as against third persons 
the assignee acquires the title of the assignor, no more, no less ; 
he takes subject to all the equities that would have availed 
against his assignor. As between the parties mere delivery 
of the bill without indorsement with the intention to pass title 
is a good transfer of the goods. 
Statutes in some states ·declare bills of lading to be negoti­
able. Such statutes are strictly construed, and are held not to 
change the character of the instrument, but to prescribe the 
mode of transfer by indorsement like negotiable instruments. 
§ 221. [-] Morganton Mfg Co. 
v. Ohio River etc. Ry. Co., 121 N. C. 
514, 2.§. S. E. R. 474, 61 Am. St. R. 
679 ;tOmisville etc. Railroad Co. v. 
Wilson, 119 Ind. 352, 21 N. E. R. 
341 ; Sonia Cotton Oil Co. v. Steamer 
Red River, 106 La. 42, 30 So. R. 
303, 87 Am. St. R. 293. 
§ 222. [-] Shaw v. Railroad 
Co., 101 U. S. 557 ; [-] Friedlander 
v. Railway Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. 
Ct. 570 ; Burton v. Curyea, 40 Ill. 
320, 89 Am. D. 350 ; Missouri Pa· 
cific Ry. Co. v. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 
195, 17 S. W. R. 608, 27 Am. St. 
R. 861 ; [-] National Bank of 
Commerce v. Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 
224, 46 N. W. R. 342, 20 Am. St. 











§223. ——Na.ture of bill of lading.—This grows out of the
nature of a bill of lading. It is a mere symbol, a representative
of the property, a substitute for the goods and not, like nego-
tiable paper, a representative of money. When properly in-
dorsed and delivered for the purpose of transferring the title
to the property it amounts to a constructive delivery of the
goods themselves. The carrier must respect such a transfer if
properly made, and deliver the goods according to the indorsed
order.
§ 224. iDuplicate bi1ls.——It is a common practice for the
consignor to ship to himself as consignee, taking duplicate
bills of lading. One he sends unendorsed as notice of the ship-
ment to the real consignee; the other he endorses, attaches to it
a draft on the real consignee and sends the endorsed bill of
lading and draft to a bank in the city to which the goods are
consigned, with directions to the bank to deliver the endorsed
bill of lading upon payment of the draft.
If the carrier delivers the goods upon presentation of the
duplicate unindorsed bill of lading it is liable to the consignor
in case of loss. And this is true even where the vendee with-
out paying the draft has fraudulently obtained the indorsed
bill of lading, since he thereby obtained no title. The carrier
is justified in delivering only upon presentation of the original
indorsed bill of lading by the vendee after he has paid the
attached draft.
(3) Duty to Furnish. Accommodations.
§225. Suitable accommodations:-Before the day of rail-
roads common carriers might furnish such accommodations as
they chose, provided they were safe and suited to the under-
§223. [—] Shaw v. Railroad 573, 39 N. W. R. 899, 9 Am. St.
Co., 101 U. S. 557; Weyand v. Atchi-
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 75
Iowa 573, 39 N. W. R. 899, 9 Am.
St. R. 504; [—] Friedlander v. Rail-
way Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct.
570, The Idaho, 93 U. s. 575.
§224. The Thames, 14 Wall. (U.
S.) 98; [—] Shaw v. Railroad Co.,
101 U. S. 557; Weyand v. Atchison,
'l‘opeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 75 Iowa
R. 504.
§225. Hutchinson on Carriers,
292-295d; [—] Chicago & N. W.
Railway Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365,
8 Am. R. 690; Wood v. C., M. &
St. P. Ry. Co., 68 Ia. 491, 56 Am.
R. 861; Le Barron v. East Boston
Ferry Co., 11 A11en (Mass.) 312, 87
Am. D. 717; Beard v. Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 79 Ia. 518, 44 N.


















































































































































§ § 223-225 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
§ 223. --Nature of bill of lading.-This grows out of the 
nature of a bill of lading. It is a mere symbol, a representative 
of the property, a substitute for the goods and not, like nego� 
tiable paper, a representative of money. When properly in­
dorsed and delivered for the purpose of transferring the title 
to the prop�rty it amounts to a constructive delivery of the 
goods themselves. •rhe carrier must respect such a transfer if 
properly made, and deliver the goods according to the indorsed 
Ol'der. 
§ 224. --Duplicate bills.-It is a common practice for the 
consignor to ship to himself as consignee, taking duplicate 
bills of lading. One he sends unendorsed as notice of the ship­
ment to the real consignee ; the other he endorses, attaches to it 
a draft on the real consignee and sends the endorsed bill of 
l ::tding and draft to a bank in the city to which the goods are 
consigned, with directions to the bank to deliver the endorsed 
bill of lading upon payment of the draft. 
If the carrier delivers the goods upon presentation of the 
duplicate unindorsed bill of lading it is liable to the consignor 
in case of loss. And this is true even where the vendee with­
out payin g the draft has fraudulently obtained the indorsed 
bill of lading, since he thereby obtained no title. The carrier 
is justified in delivering only upon presentation of the original 
indorsed bill of lading by the vendee after he has paid the 
attached draft. 
(3 )  Duty to Furnish Accommodations. 
§ 225. Suitable accommoda.tions.-Before the day of rail­
roads common carriers might furnish such accommodations as 
they chose, provided they were safe and suited to the under-
§ 223. [-] Shaw v. Railroad 
Co., 101 U. S. 557 ; Weyand v. Atchi­
son, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 75 
Iowa 573, 39 N. W. R. 899, 9 Am. 
St. R. 504 ; [-] Friedlander v. Rail­
way Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 
570, The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575. 
§ 224. The Thames, 14 Wall. (U. 
8.)  98 ; [-] Shaw v .  Railroad Co., 
1 01 U. S. 557 ; Weyand v. Atchison, 
'l'opeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 75 Iowa 
573, 39 N. W. R. 899, 9 Am. St. 
R. 504. 
§ 225. Hutchinson on Carriers, 
292-295d ; [-] Chicago & N. W. 
Railway Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365, 
8 Am. R. 690 ; Wood v. C., M. & 
St. P. Ry. Co., 68 Ia. 491, 56 Am. 
R. 861 ; Le Barron v. East Boston 
}'erry Co., 11 Allen ( Mass. ) 312, 87 
Am. D. 717 ; Beard v. Illinois Cen­
tral Railroad Co., 79 Ia. 518, 44 N. 
W. R. 800, 18 Am. St. R. 381. 
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DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. 226228
I
taking the carriers professed themselves ready to perform. But
the railroad is a quasi-public corporation exercising the right
of eminent domain. It exists under a charter granting large
privileges and in turn exacting unusual services. While it is
not compelled to receive dangerous goods, or merchandise un-
suitable for shipment, yet it is compelled to provide suitable
accommodations for the transportation of every article of com-
merce. Its vehicle must be safe and suitable for the business.
Open cars for carrying stock, refrigerator cars for fruit and
perishable goods, and proper stational facilities as well, the
law requires the railroad to provide, and it must keep pace with
the march of progress.
§ 226. Sufiicient accommodations.—'l‘he Wagoner at the
early common law might provide as much or as little accommo-
dations as he pleased. He could not be compelled to accept
goods for transportation beyond his facilities. The railroad
however must furnish facilities sufficient to accommodate such
traffic as should reasonably be anticipated. This does not imply
that it must at all times have facilities to respond at‘ once to an
unusual and unexpected press of business. A
§ 227. Preferences.—“The very definition of a common car-
rier excludes the right to grant monopolies or to give special
or unequal preferences. It implies indifference as to whom he
may serve and an equal readiness to serve all who may apply
a11d in the order of their application.”
§228. iUnusua1 demand for facilities.—-If a shipper ap-
plies for cars the railroad is not required to furnish them at
once if it can be done only by depriving other shippers of their
facilities. One shipper and one town have no right to demand
§226. [—] Ayres v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N.
\V. R. 432, 5 Am. St. R. 226;
[—] Galena etc. Railroad Co. v. Rae,
18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 574; Ballen-
tine v. Railroad Co., 40 Mo. 491, 93
Am. D. 315; Chicago etc. R. R. Co.
v. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 39 N. E.
R. 451, 50 Am. St. R. 320; [—] Illi-
nois Central Railroad Co. v. Franken-
berg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 Am. R. 92.
§227. New England Express Co.
v. Maine Central Railroad, 57 Me.
188, 2 Am. R. 31; [—] New Jersey
Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’
Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 344; Mc-
Dufiee v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H.
430, 13 Am. R.-72; Messenger v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 8 Vroom
(N. J.) 531, 18 Am. R. 754.
§228. See the cases cited under
See. 226 and Harrison v. Missouri
Pacific Railway Co., 74 Mo. 364, 41
Am. R. 318; Michigan Central R. R.


















































































































































DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 226-228 
taking the carriers professed themselves ready to perform. But 
the railroad is a quasi-public corporation exercising the right 
of eminent domain. It exists under a charter granting large 
privileges and in turn exacting unusual services. While it is 
not compelled to receive dangerous goods, or merchandise un­
suitable for shipment, yet it is compelled to provide suitable 
accommodations for the t.ransportation of every article of com­
merce. Its vehicle must be safe and suitable for the business. 
Open cars for carrying stock, refrigerator cars for fruit and 
perishable goods, and proper stational facilities as well, the 
law requires the railroad to provide, and it must keep pace with 
the march of progress. 
§ 226. Sufficient accommoda.tions.-The wagoner at the 
early common law might provide as much or as little accommo­
dations as he pleased. He could not be compelled to accept 
goods for transportation beyond his facilities. The railroad 
however must furniSh facilities sufficient to accommodate such 
traffic as should reasonably be anticipated. This does not imply 
that it must at all times have facilities to respond at once to an 
unusual and unexpected press of business. 
§ 227. Preferences.-' ' The very definition of a common car­
rier excludes the right to grant monopolies or to give special 
or unequal preferences. It implies indifference as to whom he 
may serve and an equal readiness to serve all who may apply 
and in the order of their application. ' '  
§ 228. --Unusual demand for f&cilities.-If a shipper ap­
plies for cars the railroad is not required to furnish them at 
once if it can be done only by depriving other shippers of their 
facilities. One shipper and one town have no right to demand 
§ 226. [-] Ayres v. Chicago & 
N. W. Ry. Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. 
W. R. 432, 5 Am. St. R. 226 ; 
[-] Galena etc. Railroad Co. v. Rae, 
18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 574 ; Ballen­
tine v. Railroad Co., 40 Mo. 491, 93 
Am. D. 315 ; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. 
v. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 39 N. E. 
R. 451, 50 Am. St. R. 320 ; [-] Illi­
nois Central Railroad Co. v. Franken­
berg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 Am. R. 92. 
§ 227. New England Express Co. 
v. Maine Central Railroad, 57 Me. 
188, 2 Am. R. 31 ; [-] New Jersey 
Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants ' 
Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 344 ; Mc­
Duffee v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 
430, 13 Am. R . .  72 ; Messenger v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 8 Vroom 
( N. J. ) 531, 18 Am. R. 754. 
§ 228. See the cases cited under 
Sec. 226 and Harrison v. Missouri 
Pacific Railway Co., 7 4 Mo. 364, 41 
Am. R. 318 ; Michigan Central R. R. 
Co. v. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6. 
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service at the expense of another shipper and another town.
The railroad is bound to serve all fairly and in turn, but if it
is unable within a reasonable time to provide the facilities
called for, it is liable to the shipper in damages if it fails to
notify him whether his cars can be furnished; and in any case
it will be liable if its failure is due to lack of facilities adequate
to do the business it had reason to anticipate. If the railroad
contracts to furnish cars it is bound to do so according to the
terms of the contract. A local freight agent has implied au-
thority to make such a contract.
§229. ——The Express Gases.—The State Courts in several
cases decided that to grant one express company exclusive ac-
commodations and privileges on its passenger trains for carry-
ing on an express business was an unlawful preference, and
that another company denied such privilege had an action for
damages against the railroad corporation.
But in The Express Cases the Supreme Court of the United
States decided that railroad companies were not common car-
riers of express companies. Their duty was to furnish the
public at large with express facilities adequate to insure rea-
sonable promptness and security, and they could not be com-
pelled to furnish to all independent express companies equal
facilities for doing business upon their passenger trains. This
is now the settled rule.
(4) Llabiltty for Loss.
§ 230. Common law rule.—The common carrier is with cer-
tain exceptions an insurer of the safe delivery of the goods en-
trusted to him.
The rule finds its reason in the opportunities for collusion
and fraud by which the owner may be deprived of his goods
§229. [—] The Express Cases,
117 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 542; and
compare New England Express Co.
v. Maine Central Railroad Co., 57
Me. 188, 2 Am. R. 31, and McDufi'ee
v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 430, 13 Am.
R. 72.
§230. [——] Hollister v. Nowlen,
19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. D.
455; [—] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga.
349, 46 Am. D. 393; [—] Railroad
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357;
[—] New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. (U.
S.) 344; Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug-
las (Mich.) 1, 40 Am. D. 33;
[—] Christenson v. American Ex-
press Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. R.
1.22; [—] Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88, 5
Am. R. 92; Willock v. Pennsylvania

















































































































































§ § 229-230 m' COMMON CARRIERS. 
service at the expense of another shipper and another town. 
The railroad is bound to serve all fairly and in turn, but if it 
is unable within a reasonable time to provide the facilities 
called for, it is liable to the shipper in damages if it fails to 
notify him whether his cars can be furnished ; and in any case 
it will be liable if its failure is due to lack of facilities adequate 
to do the business it had reason to anticipate. If the railroad 
contracts to furnish cars it is bound to do so according to the 
terms of the contract. A local freight agent has implied au­
thority to make such a contract. 
§ 229. --The Express Cases.-The State Courts. in several 
cases decided that to grant one express company exclusive ac­
commodations and privileges on its passenger trains for carry­
ing on an express business was an unlawful preference, and 
that another company denied such privilege had an action for 
damages against the railroad corporation. 
But in The Express Cases the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided that railroad companies were not common car­
riers of express companies. Their duty was to furnish the 
public at large with express facilities adequate to insure rea­
sonable promptness and security, and they could not be com­
pelled to furnish to all independent express companies equal 
facilities for doing business upon their passenger trains. This 
is now the settled rule. 
( 4) Liability for Loss. 
§ 230. Common law rule.-The common carrier is with cer­
tain exceptions an insurer of the safe delivery of the goods en­
trusted to him. 
The rule finds its reason in the opportunities for collusion 
and fraud by which the owner may be deprived of his goods 
§ 229. [-] The Express Cases, 
117 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 542 ; and 
compare New England Express Co. 
v Maine Central Railroad Co., 57 
Me. 188, 2 Am. R. 31, and McDuffee 
v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 430, 13 Am. 
R. 72. 
§ 230. [-] Hollister v. Nowlen, 
19 Wen<l. (N. Y. ) 234, 32 Am. D. 
455 ; [ -] Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 
349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; [-] Railroad 
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S. ) 357 ; 
[-] New Jersey Steam Navigation 
Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 6 How. (U. 
S. ) 344 ; Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug­
las (Mich. ) 1, 40 Am. D. 33 ; 
[ -] Christenson v. American Ex­
press Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. R. 
1.22 ; [-] Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 
Am. R. 92 ; Willock v. PenDBylvania 
Railroad Co., 166 Pa. St. 184, 30 
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DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. 231-232
while they are beyond his sight and control, and entrusted to
the sole keeping of the carrier. Though robber bands no longer
infest the highways, and the business of carrying goods is as
thoroughly systematized in its methods as it is vast in its pro-
portions, yet every relaxation of the rigor of the old common
law rule has been attended with such evils as abundantly to
justify its wisdom. And it is now well settled that only by
special contract can the carrier be relieved, and by statute in
some states even this means of restricting his liability is denied
him.
§231. Excepti0ns.—According to the early cases the com-
mon carrier is an insurer of the goods against all losses except
those arising from
(a) The act of God.
(b) The public enemy.
To these have been added
(c) The act of public authority.
(d) The act of the shipper.
(e) The inherent nature of the goods themselves.
Unless the loss be due to one of these exceptions the carrier
cannot excuse himself from liability by showing that the loss
was inevitable, that he was entirely free from negligence, or
that he had exercised the utmost possible human diligence and
foresight. He is absolutely liable.
§ 232. (a) Act of G0d.—The cases do not agree in defining
the act of God. By the better opinion it does not depend upon
the violence of the force, but it must be a force due to physical
Atl. R. 948, 45 Am. St. R. 674;
[—] Hale v. New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 539, 39
Am. D. 398; Rixford v. Smith, 52
N. H. 355, 13 Am. R. 42; [—] Hart
v. Chicago etc. Railway Co., 69 Ia.
485, 29 N. W. R. 597.
§231. See cases cited under Sec.
230, and Agnew v. Steamer Contra
Costa, 27 Cal. 426, 87 Am. D. 87.
§232. [—] Forward v. Pittard,
1 T. R. 27; [—] Railroad Co. v.
Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 176; Mer-
ritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115, 86 Am.
D. 292; McArthur v. Sears, 21
Wend. (N. Y.) 190; Fergusson v.
Brent, 12 Md. 9, 71 Am. D. 582;
Wolf v. American Express Co., 43
Mo. 421, 97 Am. D. 406; Colt v.
McMechen, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 160,
5 Am. D. 200; Transportation Co. v.
Tiers, 4 Zab. (N. J.) 697, 64 Am.
D. 394; Wald v. Pittsburg etc.
Railroad Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E.
R. 888, 53 Am. St. R. 332; Long v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 147 Pa.
St. 343, 23 Atl. R. 459, 30 Am. St.
R. 732; McGraw v. Baltimore 85
Ohio R. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 361, 41
Am. R. 696; Rixford v. Smith, 52
N. H. 355, 13 Am. R. 42. Compare

















































































































































DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 231-232 
while they are beyond his sight and control, and entrusted to 
the sole keeping of the carrier. Though robber bands no longer 
infest the highways, and the business of carrying goods is as 
thoroughly systematized in its methods as it is vast in its pro­
portions, yet every relaxation of the rigor of the old common 
law rule has been attended with such evils as abundantly to 
justify its wisdom. And it is now well settled that only by 
special contract can the carrier be relieved, and by statute in 
some states even this means of restricting his liability is denied 
him. 
§ 231. Exceptions.-According to the early cases the com­
mon carrier is an insurer of the goods against all losses except 
i hose arising from 
(a )  The act of  God. 
(b )  The public enemy. 
To these have been added 
( c )  The act o f  public authority . 
( d)  The act of  the shipper. 
( e )  The inherent nature o f  the goods themselves. 
Unless the loss be due to one of these exceptions the carrier 
cannot excuse himself fro:rn liability by showing that the loss 
was inevitable, that he was entirely free from negligence, or 
that he had exercised the utmost possible human diligence and 
foresight. He is absolutely liable. 
§ 232. (a) Act of God.-The cases do not agree in defining 
the act of God. By the better opinion it does not depend upon 
the violence of the force, but it must be a force due to physical 
Atl. R. 948, 45 Am. St. R. 674 ; 
[-] Hale v. New Jersey Steam 
Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 539, 39 
Am. D. 398 ; Rixford v. Smith, 52 
N. H. 355, 13 Am. R. 42 ; [-] Hart 
v. Chicago etc. Railway Co., 69 Ia. 
485, 29 N. W. R. 597. 
§ 231. See cases cited under Sec. 
230, and Agnew v. Steamer Contra 
Costa, 27 Cal. 426, 87 Am. D. 87. 
§ 232. [-] Forward v. Pittard, 
1 T. R. 2 7 ; [-] Railroad Co. v. 
Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S. ) 1 76 ;  Mer­
ritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115, 86 Am. 
D. 292 ; :McArthur v. Sears, 21  
Wend. ( N. Y. ) 190 ; Fergusson v. 
'j 
Brent, 12 Md. 9, 7 1  Am. D. 582 ; 
Wolf v. American Express Co., 43 
Mo. 421, 97 Am. D. 406 ; Colt v. 
McMechen, 6 Johns. ( N. Y. ) 160, 
5 Am. D. 200 i Transportation Co. v. 
Tiers, 4 Zab. (N. J. ) 697, 64 Am. 
D. 394 ; Wald v. Pittsburg etc. 
Railroad Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E. 
R. 888, 53 Am. St. R. 332 ; Long v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 147 Pa. 
St. 343, 23 Atl. R. 459, 30 Am. St. 
R. 732 ; McGraw v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 361, 41 
Am. R. 696 ; Rixford v. Smith, 52 
N. H. 355, 13 Am. R. 42. Co:npare 






3-235 OF COMMON CARRIERS.
causes, without the interposition of human agency. Examples
are, losses caused by lightning, freshets, earthquakes, frost, rain
and snow storms, unprecedented wind and other actions of the
elements.
§233. ilnevitable accident includes the act of God but
is not synonymous with it, for inevitable accident, vis major,
or irresistible force. may be due to human agency. Such are
losses by fire (not caused by lightning), by robbery and theft,
by decayed timbers in a bridge, by a strike, by a sunken mast,
by false lights or a drifted buoy. For loss by any of these
means, though no human force could have prevented it, the
carrier is liable.
§234. iProximate ca.use.—Not only must the loss be
caused by the act of God but that must have been the proximate
cause. If some human agency has intervened the carrier is
11ot excused unless the human agency was so connected with
the act of God that all amounted to one act.
§235. ——Diligence of ca.rrier.—Loss from disaster due to
the force of the elements which no human foresight could have
prevented it has been seen is not chargeable to the carrier. But
this implies not merely that the loss was caused by the act of
God but that it could not have
Overtaken by the act of God
road Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 86 Am. D.
415, and Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa.
St. 378, 80 Am. D. 627.
§233. Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y.
115, 86 Am. D. 292; Fergussou v.
Brent, 12 Md. 9, 71 Am. D. 58:3;
McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. (N.
Y.) 190. But compare Hays v.
Kennedy, 41 Pa. St. 378, 80 Am. D.
627, with [—] Fish v. Chapman, 2
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393.
§234. Merritt v. Earle, 29 N.
Y. 115, 86 Am. D. 292; Fergusson
v. Brent, 12 Md. 9, 71 Am. D. 582;
Blythe v. Railway Co., 15 Colo. 333,
25 Pac. R. 702, 22 Am. St. R. 403;
Wolf v. American Express Co., 43
Mo. 421, 97 Am. D. 406; Trans-
portation Co. v. Tiers, 4 Zab. (N.
J.) 697, 64 Am. D. 394; McGraw
been prevented by the carrier.
the carrier will still be liable
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
18 W. Va. 361, 41 Am. R. 696. Com-
pare Read v. Spalding, 30 N. Y. 630,
86 Am. D. 426, with Denny v. New
York Central Railroad Co., 13 Gray
(Mass.) 481, 74 Am. D. 645.
§235. [—] Railroad Co. v.
Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 176; Nu-
gent v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. Div.
423 ; Blythe v. Railway Co., 15 Colo.
333, 25 Pac. R. 702, 22 Am. St. R.
403; Smith v. Western Railway, 91
Ala. 455, 8 S. R. 754, 24 Am. St. R.
929; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. St.
378, 80 Am. D. 627; Wolf v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 43 Mo. 421, 97 Am.
D. 406; .McGraw v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co., 18 W. Va. 361,

















































































































































§ �  233-235 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
causes, without the interposition of human agency. Examples 
are, losses caused by lightning, freshets, earthquakes, frost, rain 
and snow storms, uPprecedented wind and other actions of the 
elements. 
§ 233. --Inevitable accident includes the act of God but 
is not synonymous with it, for inevitable accident, vis major, 
or irresistible force. may be due to human agency. Such are 
losses by fire (not caused by lightning) , by robbery and theft, 
by decayed timbers in a bridge, by a strike, by a sunken mast, 
by false lights or a drifted buoy. For loss by any of these 
means, though no human force could have prevented it, the 
carrier is liable. 
§ 234. --Proximate cause.-Not only must the loss be 
caused by the act of God but that must have been the proximate 
cause. If some human agency has intervened the carrier is 
not excused unless the human agency was so connected with 
the act of God that all amounted to one act. 
§ 235. --Diligence of carrier.-Loss from disaster due to 
the force of the elements which no human foresight could have 
prevented it has been seen is not chargeable to the carrier. But 
this implies not merely that the loss was caused by the act of 
God but that it could not have been prevented by the carrier. 
Overtaken by the act of God the carrier will still be liable 
road Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 86 Am. D. 
415, and Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. 
St. 378, 80 Am. D. 627. 
§ 233. Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 
1 1 5, 86 Am. D. 292 ; Fergusson v. 
Brent, 12 Md. 9, 71 Am. D. 582 ; 
McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. (N. 
Y. ) 190. But compare Hays v. 
Kennedy, 41 Pa. St. 378, 80 Am. D. 
627, with [-] Fish v. Chapman, 2 
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393. 
§ 234. Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. 
Y. 115, 86 Am. D. 292 ; Fergusson 
v. Brent, 12 Md. 9, 71 Am. D. 582 ; 
Blythe v. Railway Co., 15  Colo. 333, 
25 Pac. R. 702, 22 Am. St. R. 403 ; 
Wolf v. American Express Co., 43 
Mo. 421, 97 Am. D. 406 ; Trans­
portation Co. v. Tiers, 4 Zab. (N . 
.J. ) 697, 64 Am. D. 394 ; McGraw 
v. Bahimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 
IS W. Va. 361, 41 Am. R. 696. Com­
pare Read v. Spalding, 30 N. Y. 630, 
86 Am. D. 426, with Denny v. New 
York Central Railroad Co., 13 Gray 
(Mass.)  481, 74 Am. D. 645. 
§ 235. [-) Railroad Co. v. 
Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S. ) 176 ; Nu­
gent v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 
423 ; Blythe v. Railway Co., 15 Colo. 
333, 25 Pac. R. 702, 22 Am. St. R. 
403 ; Smith v. Western Railway, 91 
Ala. 455, 8 S. R. 754, 24 Am. St. R. 
929 ; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. St. 
378, 80 Am. D. 627 ; Wolf v. Ameri­
can Express Co., 43 Mo. 421, 97 Am. 
D. 406 ; . McGraw v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co., 18 W. Va. 361, 
41 Am. R. 696. 
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If
UNIV- M ares Law unease?
B‘
unless he uses all reasonable care in the sudden emergency to
save the goods. This care is not the utmost care which human
sagacity could suggest, but that of the ordinarily prudent man
confronted by such conditions.
§ 236. (b) The public enemy means an enemy of the coun-
try with whom the nation is at war, and pirates who are said
to be the enemies of all mankind.
It does not include mobs, rioters, robbers, strikers and in-
surgents. These, although common enemies of the country, are
not technically public enemies and loss by them will not excuse
the carrier. An insurrection however may ripen into a rebel-
lion or a revolution, so that a state of open war exists, and then
insurgents become public enemies.
§237. iNeg1igence of the carrier.—The carrier has al-
ways been exempt from liability for losses due to the public
enemy, but as in the case of the act of God, it must appear that
the public enemy was the proximate cause of the loss and that
it could not have been averted by ordinary care on the part of
the carrier.
§238. (0.) Public authority.—“If the carrier is excusable
for yielding to a public enemy he cannot be at fault for yield-
ing to actual authority what he may yield to usurped authority.
Whatever his duty to resist a forcible seizure without process
he carmot be compelled to assume that regular process is illegal, {{\‘l. g
and to accept all the consequences of resisting officers of the \umm
7 .
law. ’
He will be relieved of liability, therefore, if without his
fault the goods are destroyed by the police power of the
state, or if they are taken by legal process fair upon its face,
when issued against the owner of the goods. The shipper
should at once be notified of the seizure so that he may have
an opportunity to appear and defend. A seizure under void
process is no defence to the carrier.
§236. [—] Coggs v. Bernard,
2 Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. L. Cas. 199;
Southern Express Co. v. Womack, 1
Heisk. (Tenn.) 256; Clark v. Pacific
Railroad Co., 39 Mo. 184, 90 Am. D.
458; Lewis v. Ludwick, 6 Cold.
(Tenn.) 368, 98 Am. D. 454.
§237. Clark v. Pacific Railroad
Co., 39 Mo. 184, 90 Am. D. 458.
§238. [—] Pingree v. Railroad
Co., 66 Mich. 143, 33 N. W. R. 298,
11 Am. St. R. 479; [—] Stiles v.
Davies, 1 Black. (U. S.) 101;
[—] Bennett v. American Express
Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 Atl. R. 159, 23


































































































































































DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 236-238 
unless he uses all reasonable care in the sudden emergency to 
save the goods. This care is not the utmost care which hum.an 
sagacity could suggest, but that of the ordinarily prudent man 
confronted by such conditions. 
§ 236. (b) The public enemy means an enemy of the coun­
try with whom the nation is at war, and pirates who are said 
to be the enemies of all mankind. 
It does not include mobs, rioters, robbers, strikers and in­
surgents. These, although common enemies of the country, are 
not technically public enemies and loss by them will not excuse 
the carrier. An insurrection however may ripen into a rebel­
lion or a revolution, so that a state of open war exists, and then 
insurgents become public enemies. 
§ 237. --Negligence of the ca.rrier.-The carrier has al­
ways been exempt from liability for losses due to the public 
enemy, but as in the case of the act of God, it must appear that 
the public enemy was the proximate cause of the loss and that 
it could not have been averted by ordinary care on the part of 
the carrier. 
§ 238. (c. ) Public authority.-" If the carrier is excusable 
for yielding to a public enemy he cannot be at fault for yield­
ing to actual authority what he may yield to usurped authority. 
Whatever his duty to resist a forcible seizure without proc�ss 
he cannot be compelled to assume that regular process is illegal, '\):t· .
. 
and to accept all the consequences of resisting officers of the U/ll•�' .. 
law. " \ ��arr., _  
He will be relieved of liability, therefore, if without his 
· A 
fault the goods are destroyed by the police power of the 
state, or if they are taken by legal process fair upon its face, 
when issued against the owner of the goods. The shipper 
should at once be notified of the seizure so that he may have 
an opportunity to appear and defend. A seizure under void 
process is no defence to the carrier. 
§ 236. [ -] Coggs v. Bernard, 
� Ld. Ray. 909, 1 Sm. L. Cas. 19� ; 
Southern Express Co. v. Womack, 1 
Heisk. (Tenn. ) 256 ; Clark v. Pacific 
Railroad Co., 39 Mo. 184, 90 Am. D. 
458 ; Lewis v. Ludwick, 6 Cold. 
(Tenn. ) 368, 98 Am. D. 454. 
§ 237. Clark v. Pacific Railroad 
Co., 39 Mo. 184, 90 Am. D. 458. 
§ 238. [ -] Pingree v. Railroad 
Co., 66 Mich. 143, 33 N. W. R. 298, 
11 Am. St. R. 479 ; [-] Stiles v. 
Davies, 1 Black. (U. S.)  101 ; 
[ -] Bennett v. American Express 
Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 Atl. R. 159, 23 
A.m. St. R. 774 ; Hutchinson on Car-





39'242 Or COmmOn CARRIERS.
§239. (d.) Act of the shipper.—For his own fraud or
fault none may hold another liable. If the shipper improperly
pack or mark the goods in such manner that it is not ap-
parent to the carrier, or if he load them himself and assume
charge of them on the journey, or if he pack them so as to
conceal from the carrier their true value and character, he can-
not hold the carrier liable for loss due to his own act. To
excuse the carrier however it must appear that he was free
from negligence.
§ 240. ——Concealing va.lue.—The shipper is not in general
required to reveal the value of goods shipped. But if the
carrier asks the value and he fails to reveal it, he cannot hold
the carrier liable beyond the amount made known. And if the
shipper disguise the box or package, whether intentionally or
not, so as to conceal the true value of the goods, and the car-
rier is thereby led to use less care than goods of such value
demand, the shipper must bear the consequences. If he wishes
the carrier to assume full liability he should give notice so that
due care may be exercised, and proper compensation charged
for the added risk.
§241. (e.) Inherent nature of the goods.—Losses due to
the decay, defect, nature or infirmity of the goods themselves
have been placed with those caused by the act of God. The
same principle clearly applies, and where the carrier has
furnished proper accommodations and exercised ordinary care
upon the journey, and loss has occurred because of the in-
herent nature of the goods, no liability attaches.
§ 242. -iLive animals.—Since the common carrier has be-
come a carrier of animate things it has been recognized that
§239. Miltimore v. Chicago etc.
Railway Co., 37 Wis. 190; [—] Hart
v. Chicago etc. Railroad Co., 69 Iowa
485, 29 N. W. R. 597; Harvey v.
Rose, 26 Ark. 3, 7 Am. R. 595;
[—] Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9
Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 24 Am. D. 129;
McCarthy v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co., 102 Ala. 193, 14 S. R.
370, 48 Am. St. R. 29; Erie Railway
Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 239, 25 Am.
R. 451.
§240. [—] Hollister v. Now-
len, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am.
D. 455; [—] Orange County Bank
v. Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 24
Am. D. 129; [—] Bennett v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 23 Am.
St. R. 774.
§241. [—] Evans v. Fitchburg
Railway Co., 111 Mass. 142, 15 Am.
R. 19; McGraw v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railway Co., 18 W. Va. 361, 41 Am.
R. 696; Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H.
355, 13 Am. R. 42; [—] Moulton v.
St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 85,
16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781.

















































































































































§ �  239-242 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
§ 239. (d. ) Act of the shipper.-For his own fraud or 
fault none may hold another liable. If the shipper improperly 
pack or mark the goods in such manner that it is not ap­
parent to the carrier, or if he load them himself and assume 
charge of them on the journey, or if he pack them so as to 
conceal from the carrier their true value and character, he can­
not hold the carrier liable for loss due to his own act. To 
excuse the carrier however it must appear that he was free 
from negligence. 
§ 240. --Concealing value.-The shipper is not in general 
required to reveal the value of goods shipped. But if the 
carrier asks the value and he fails to reveal it, he cannot hold 
the carrier liable beyond the amount made known. And if the 
shipper disguise the box or package, whether intentionally or 
not, so as to conceal the true value of the goods, and the car­
rier is thereby led to use less care than goods of such value 
demand, the shipper must bear the consequences. If he wishes 
the carrier to assume full liability he should give notice so that 
due care may be exercised, and proper compensation charged 
for the added risk. 
§ 241. (e.) Inherent nature of the goodl.-Losses due to 
the decay, defect, nature or infirmity of the goods themselves 
have been placed with those caused by the act of God. The 
same principle clearly applies, and where the carrier has 
furnished proper accommodations and exercised ordinary care 
upon the journey, and loss has occurred because of the in­
herent nature of the goods, no liability attaches. 
§ 2'2. --Live &Dimals.-Since the common carrier has be­
come a carrier of animate things it has been recognized that 
§ 239. Miltimore v. Chicago etc. 
Railway Co., 37 Wis. 190 ; [-J Hart 
v. Chicago etc. Railroad Co., 69 Iowa 
485, 29 N. W. R. 597 ; Harvey v. 
Rose, 26 Ark. 3, 7 Am. R. 595 ; 
D. 455 ; [ -] Orange County Bank 
v. Brown, 9 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 85, 24 
Am. D. 129 ; [-] Bennett v. Ameri­
can Expre88 Co., 83 Me. 236, 23 Am. 
St. R. 774. 
[-] Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 § 241. [ -] Evans v. Fitchburg 
Wend. (N. Y. ) 85, 24 Am. D. 129 ; Railway Co., 111  Mase. 142, 15 Am. 
McCarthy v. Louisville & Nashville R. 19 ; McGraw v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co., 102 Ala. 193, 14 S. R. Railway Co., 18 W. Ya. 361, 41 Am. 
370, 48 Am. St. R. 29 ; Erie Railway R. 696 ; Rix.ford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 
Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 239, 25 Am. 355, 13 Am. R. 42 ; [-] Moulton v. 
R. 451. St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 85, 
§ 240. [-] Hollister v. Now· 16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781. 
len, 19 Wend. ( N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. § 242. [-] Evans v. Fitchburg 
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a different element has been introduced. “Living animals have
excitabilities and volitions of their own which greatly increase
the risks and difiiculties of management. They are carried in
a mode entirely opposed to their instincts and habits; they
may be made uncontrollable by fright, or, notwithstanding
every precaution, may destroy themselves in attempting to
break loose, or may kill each other.”
Michigan rule.-—The Michigan court has gone so far as to
hold that a railroad is not a common carrier of live stock, and
therefore is as to live stock an ordinary bailee for hire and
bound to use ordinary diligence. Other states have not fol-
lowed this rule.
§243. iLiabi1ity for live stock.—As a common carrier
of live stock the railroad ’s liability is that of an insurer as in
other cases, with the exception that it is excused if the loss
be due to the vice of the animal itself. But even then the rail-
road must have used ordinary diligence to prevent loss. It
is also required to supply suitable appliances such as stock-
cars and yards for loading, feeding and watering the stock at
proper intervals on the journey.
The shipper generally accompanies the stock, but if stock is
accepted for shipment without an attendant the carrier must
give the stock proper care. There are many state and some
federal statutes regulating the care of live stock shipped long
distances, both for the purpose of preventing cruelty to ani-
mals and danger to public health.
§ 244. Burden of proof.—The carrier is bound to carry safe-
ly, and if he fail to do so the burden is on him to furnish a
Railway Co., 111 Mass. 142, 15 Am.
R. 19; Clarke v. Rochester etc. Rail-
road Co., 14 N. Y. 570, 67 Am. D.
205. Compare [—] Michigan South-
em etc. Railway Co. v. McDonough,
21 Mich. 165, 4 Am. R. 466, and
[—-] Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v.
Nichols, 9 Kan. 235, 12 Am. R. 494;
[—] Ayres v. Chicago & N. W.
Railway Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W.
R. 432, 5 Am. St. R. 226.
§243. Agnew v. Steamer Contra
Costa, 27 Cal. 426, 87 Am. D. 87;
[—] Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. Rail-
way Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W. R.
432, 5 Am. St. R. 226; Norfolk &
Western Railroad Co. v. Harman, 91
Va. 601, 22 S. E. R. 490, 50 Am.
St. R. 855; [—] Evans v. Fitchburg
Railway Co., 111 Mass. 142, 15 Am.
R. 19; Liudsley v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Railway Co., 36 Minn. 539, 33
N. W. R. 7, 1 Am. St. R. 692;
[—] Moulton v. St. Paul etc. Ry.
Co., 31 Minn. 85, 16 N. W. R. 497,
47 Am. R. 781. See also 63 Am. St.
R. 548, note, and 5 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, 430. -
§ 244. [—] Bennett v. American

















































































































































DUTIES OF COMMON CARRIER. § §  243-244 
a different element has been introduced. ' ' Living animals have 
0xcitabilities and volitions of their own which greatly increase 
the risks and difficulties of management. They are carried in 
a mode entirely opposed to their instincts and habits ; they 
may be made uncontrollable by fright, or, notwithstanding 
every precaution, may destroy themselves in attempting to 
break loose, or may kill each other. " 
Michigan rule.-The Michigan court has gone so far as to 
hold that a railroad is not a common carrier of live stock, and 
therefore is as to iive stock an ordinary bailee for hire and 
bound to use ordinary diligence. Other states have not fol­
lowed this rule. 
§ 243. --Liability for live stock.-As a common carrier 
of live stock the railroad 's liability is that of an insurer as in 
other cases, with the exception that it is excused if the loss 
be due to the vice of the animal itself. But even then the rail­
road must have used ordinary diligence to prevent loss. It 
is also required to supply suitable appliances such as stock­
cars and yards for loading, feeding and watering the stock at 
proper intervals on the journey. 
The shipper generally accompanies the stock, but if stock is 
accepted for shipment without an attendant the carrier D!Ust 
give the stock proper care. There are many state and some 
federal statutes regulating the care of live stock shipped long 
distances, both for the purpose of preventing cruelty to ani­
mals and danger to public health. 
§ 244. Burden of proof .-The carrier is bound to carry safe­
ly, and if he fail to do so the burden is on him to furnish a 
I 
Railway Co., 111  Mase. 142, 15 Am. 432, 5 Am. St. R. 226 ; Norfolk & 
R. 19 ; Clarke v. Rochester etc. Rail- Western Railroad Co. v. Harman, 91 
road Co., 14 N. Y. 570, 67 Am. D. Va. 601, 22 S.  E. R. 490, 50 Am. 
205. Compare [-] Michigan South- St. R. 855 ; [-] Evans v. Fitchburg 
ern etc. Railway Co. v. McDonough, Railway Co., 111  Mase. 142, 15 Am. 
21 Mich. 165, 4 Am. R. 466, and R. 19 ; Lindsley v. Chicago, l\1. & St. 
[-] Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. P. Railway Co., 36 Minn. 539, 33 
Nichole, 9 Kan. 235, 12  Am. R. 494 ; N.  W. R. 7, 1 Am. St. R. 692 ; 
1-J Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. [-] Moulton v. St. Paul etc. Ry. 
Railway Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 N. W. Co., 31 Minn. 85, 16 N. W. R. 497, 
R. 432, 5 Am. St. R. 226. 47 Am. R. 781. See also 63 Am. St. 
§ 243. Agnew v. Steamer Contra R. 548, note, and 5 Am. & Eng. 
Costa, 27 Cal. 426, 87 Am. D. 87 ; Ency. of Law, 430. 
[-] Ayres v. Chicago & N. W. Rail- § 244. [-] Bennett v. American 






5-245 OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS.
valid excuse. If the shipper proves delivery of the goods to
the carrier and the delivery of them by the carrier in a dam-
aged condition, or an utter failure of the carrier to deliver, the
law raises the presumption that the carrier is liable. This
can be repelled only by proof by the carrier that the loss was
due to one of the excepted perils.
Some cases hold that he must. also prove that he was free
from negligence, but by the weight of authority if the shipper
asserts that notwithstanding the loss was caused by the act of
God or other excepted peril, still the carrier did not exercise
ordinary care to mitigate or prevent the loss, he and not the
carrier must assume the burden of proving such negligence.
(4.) Lilalnlity for Deviation and Delay.
§ 245. Deviation.—The carrier not only undertakes the
transportation, but he engages to carry by the usual route.
Any material deviation is an assertion of a right of control
in himself, and makes him liable for conversion. He becomes
an insurer of the goods even against the excepted perils, and it
affords him no excuse that they would have been subject to the
same perils on the usual route.
But a sudden emergency may justify a deviation. It must
appear however that the safety of the goods demanded it, and
that it was not practicable to consult the owner.
§246. Delay.—The first duty of the carrier is to carry
safely. His second is to deliver within a reasonable time. As
to the first he is an insurer, as to the second his responsibility
is that of an ordinary bailee for hire, he must use ordinary dili-
159, 23 Am. St. R. 774; [—] Rail- Am. St. R. 29; Hutchinson on Car-
road v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.)
176; [—] Hinkle v. Southern Rail-
way Co., 126 N. C. 932, 36 S. E. R.
348, 78 Am. St. R. 685; Lindsley v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co.,
36 Minn. 539, 33 N. W. R. 7, 1 Am.
St. R. 692; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa.
St. 378, 80 Am. D. 627; Tranporta-
tion Co. v. Tiers, 4 Zab. (N. J.)
697, 64 Am. D. 394; Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184,
14 Am. R. 57. Compare McCarthy
v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co., 102 Ala. 193, 14 S. R. 370, 48
riers, 766.
§245. [—] Davis v. Garrett, 6
Bing. 716, 19 E. C. L. 321; Crosby
v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. D.
745; Powers v. Davenport, 7 Black.
(Ind.) 497, 43 Am. D. 100;
[—] Bennett v. Byram, 38 Miss. 17,
75 Am. D. 90; Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. v. Odil, 96 Tenn. 61, 33
S. W. R. 611, 54 Am. St. R. 820.
§246. [—] Geismer v. Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railwa'y
Co., 102 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. R. 828,
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valid excuse . If the shipper proves delivery of the goods to 
the carrier and the delivery of them by the carrier in a dam­
aged condition, or an utter failure of the carrier to deliver, the 
law raises the presumption that the carrier is liable. This 
can be repelled only by proof by the carrier that the loss was 
due to one of the excepted perils. 
Some cases hold that he must also prove that he was free 
from negligence, but by the weight of authority if the shipper 
asserts that notwithstanding the loss was caused by the act of 
God or other excepted peril, still the carrier did not exercise 
ordinary care to mitigate or prevent the loss, he and not the 
carrier must assume the burden of proving such negligence. 
( 4. )  Liabi7,ity for Deviation and Delay. 
§ 245. Devie.tion.-The carrier not only undertakes the 
transportation, but he engages to carry by the usual route. 
Any material deviation is an assertion of a right of control 
in himself, and makes him liable for conversion. He becomes 
an insurer of the goods even against the excepted perils, and it 
affords him no excuse that they would have been subject to the 
same perils on the usual route. 
But a sudden emergency may justify a deviation. It must 
appear however that the safety of the goods demanded it, and 
that it was not practicable to consult the owner. 
§ 246. Delay.-The first duty of the carrier is to carry 
safely. His second is to deliver within a reasonable time. As 
to the first he is  an insurer, as to the second his responsibility 
is that of an ordinary bailee for hire, he must use ordinary dili-
159, 23 Am. St. R. 774 ; [-] Rail- Am. St. R. 29 ; Hutchinson on Car· 
road v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.) riers, 766. 
176 ; [-] Hinkle v. Southern Rail- § 245. [-] Davis v. Garrett, 6 
way Co., 126 N. C. 932, 36 S. E. R. Bing. 716, 19 E. C. L. 321 ; Crosby 
348, 78 Am. St. R. 685 ; Lindsley v. v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. D. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co., 745 ; Powers v. Davenport, 7 Black. 
36 Minn. 539, 33 N. W. R. 7, 1 Am . (Ind. ) 497, 43 Am. D. 100 ; 
St. R. 692 ; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. [-] Bennett v. Byram, 38 Miss. 17, 
St. 378, 80 Am. D. 627 ; Transporta- 75 Am. D. 90 ; Louisville & Nashville 
tion Co. v. Tiers, 4 Zab. (N . .T.) Railroad Co. v. Odil, 96 Tenn: 61, 33 
697, 64 Am. D. 394 ; Adams Ex- S. W. R. 611, 54 Am. St. R. 820. 
press Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184, § 246. [-] Geismer v. Lake 
14 Am. R. 57. Compare McCarthy Shore & Michigan Southern Railway 
v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 1 02 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. R. 828, 
Co., 102 Ala. 193, 14 S. R. 370, 48 5� Am. R. 837 ; [-] Bennett v ,  
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gence to effect the transportation with all convenient dispatch.
The only excuses for failure to carry safely are the excepted
perils; for delay not caused by the carrier’s negligence, any in-
evitable accident, or irresistible force such as fire, mobs, unex-
pected press of business, will furnish excuse.
Mere delay, even if it be unreasonable, does not amount to a
conversion of the goods; and the owner’s only remedy in such
a case is to accept the goods and look to the carrier for the
dalnage suffered. If danger threaten the goods delay may be-
come a duty, but in any case the carrier must exercise due
diligence in caring for the goods delayed, and when the reason
for the delay is removed, carry them forward promptly.
§247. ——Reasonable time is to be determined by all the
conditions, such as distance, the route, the season, the nature
of the goods, etc. Each case must be determined on its own
facts.
§ 248. ——Delay not sole cause of 1oss.—The authorities
are in conflict as to the liability of the carrier for loss by an act
of God which would not have overtaken the goods but for un-
necessary delay in transportation. The greater number of
cases hold the carrier excused on the ground that his negligent
delay was not the proximate cause of the loss. But many cases
refuse to separate the negligence of the carrier from the act of
God. To avail himself of exemption because of the act of God
or other excepted peril the carrier must, according to these
cases, show that he was free from fault.
Byram, 38 Miss. 17, 75 Am. D. 90;
Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N.
Y.) 215, 28 Am. D. 521; Crosby v.
Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. D. 745;
[—] Galena etc. Railroad Co. v.
Rae, 18 Ill. 488, e8 Am. D. 574;
Gulf etc. Railway Co. v. Levi, 76
Tex. 337, 13 S. VV. R. 191, 18 Am.
St. R. 45; Peet v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. C6., 20 Wis. 594, 91 Am. D. 4.46.
§247. [—] Bennett v. Byram,
38 Miss. 17, 75 Aln. D. 90; McGraw
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
18 w. Va. 361, 41 Am. R. 696; Peet
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 20 Wis.
594, 91 Am. D. 446.
§248. Denny v. New York Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 13 Gray (Mass)
481, 74 Am. D. 645; [—] Railroad
v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 176;
Michaels v. New York Central Rail-
road Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 86 Am. D.
415; Wald v. Pittsburg etc. Railroad
Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E. R. 888,
53 Am. St. R. 332; McGraw v. Bal-
timore & Ohio Railroad Co., 18 W.
Va. 361, 41 Am. R. 696. See also
11 Am. St. R. 363, note; Davis v.
Central Vermont Railroad Co., 66
Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313, 44 Am. St.
R. 852; Reid v. Evansville & Terre
Haute R. R. Co., 10 Ind. App. 385,

















































































































































DU'.tlES OF COMMON CARRIER. §§ 247-248 
gence to effect the transportation with all convenient dispatch. 
The only excuses for failure to carry safely are the excepted 
perils ; for delay not caused by the carrier 's negligence, any in­
evitable accident, or irresistible force such as fire, mobs, unex­
pected press of business, will furnish excuse. 
Mere delay, even if it be unreasonable, does not amount to a 
conversion of the goods ; and the owner 's only remedy in such 
a case is to accept the goods and look to the carrier for the 
damage suffered. If danger threaten the goods delay may be­
come a duty, but in any case the carrier must exercise due 
diligence in caring for the goods delayed, and when the reason 
for the delay is removed, carry them forward promptly. 
§ 247. --Reasonable time is to be determined by all the 
conditions, such as distance, the route, the season, the nature 
of the goods, etc. Each case must be determined on its own 
facts. 
§ 248. --Delay not sole ca.use of loss.-The authorities 
are in conflict as to the liability of the carrier for loss by an act 
of God which would not have overtaken the goods but for un­
necessary delay in transportation. The greater number of 
cases hold the carrier excused on the ground that his negligent 
delay was not the proximate cause of the loss. But many cases 
refuse to separate the negligence of the carrier from the act of 
God. To avail himself of exemption because of the act of God 
or other excepted peril the carrier must, according to these 
cases, show that he was free from fault. 
Byram, 38 Miss. 17, 75 Am. D. 90 ; 
Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N. 
Y. ) 215, 28 Am. D. 521 ; Crosby v. 
Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. D. 745 ; 
[ -] Galena etc. Railroad Co. v. 
Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. D. 574: ; 
Gulf etc. Railway Co. v. Levi, 76 
Tex. 337, 13 S. W. R. 191,  18 Am. 
St. R. 45 ; Peet v. Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 20 Wis. 594, 91 Am. D. 446. 
§ 24 7. [ -] Bennett v. Byra:n, 
38 Miss. 17, 75 Am. D. 90 ; McGraw 
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 
18 W. Va. 361, 41 Am. R. 696 ; Peet 
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 20 Wis. 
594, 91 Am. D. 446. 
I 248. Denny v. New Yor� Cen· 
tral Railroad Co., 13 Gray (Mass. ) 
481, 74 Am. D. 645 ; [-] Railroad 
v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S. ) 176 ; 
Michaels v. New York Central Rail­
road Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 86 Am. D. 
415 ; Wald v. Pittsburg etc. Railroad 
Co., 162 III. 545, 44 N. E. R. 888, 
53 Am. St. R. 332 ; McGraw v. Bal­
timore & Ohio Railroad Co., 18 W. 
Va. 361, 41 Am. R. 696. See also 
11 Arn. St. R. 363, note ; Davis v. 
Central Vermont Railroad Co., 66 
Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313, 44 Am. St. 
R. 852 ; Reid v. Evansville & Terre 
Haute R. R. Co., 10 Ind. App. 385, 
35 N. E. R. 703, 53 Arn. St. R. 391. 
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OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS.
CHAPTER XII.
B. LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRAC'l‘.
.
§249. Contracts enlarging liabil- §262 Bill of lading.
ity. 263. ‘Parol evidence.
250. Contracts limiting liability. 264 ‘Delivery of bill of lad-
251 iflistorical. ing.
252 '—'—'C°'1t1'9-ct must be ex‘ 265. Parol contracts.
Press. 266 Tickets, baggage cheeks, etc.
253. WNotices' (b) Extent of limitation.
(1) Limitation of nabmty "67 Limitations reasonable and
by public notice. “ .
254. (a) Public notice. .-l““'.. . -
255. -—Notice to reveal value (Z) L'mlmnom.a‘i to. file
of goods. nature of carrier s liabil-
256. Notice of rules and reg- 268 G ml‘ I 1
ulati0ns. . enera rue.
257. (b) Notice limiting liabil- 269. Special rules.
ity for 1088- (ii) Limitations as to
253- __Eng1i5h "119 amount of liability.
259‘ ——Am.el;?fn rule‘ . 270. Limitations as to amount.
(zionzisctf ml under spam! 271. Common law duty remains.
260. The earlier cases. 272- C°nsidemtion-
261. United States rule. 273. Parties to the contract.
(a) Form of special con- 274. iAgents of the carrier.
tracts. 275. Burden of proof.
§249. Contracts enlarging 1ia.bi1ity.—By special contract
the carrier may make himself liable to any extent, or in any
manner. He may insure against every risk, even acts of God
or the public enemy, against delay and the inherent defects of
the goods. He may undertake to ship at a certain time, by a
specified train, over a designated route, or to deliver at all
hazards by a definite hour. To such contracts fairly entered
into impossibility of performance is no defence. Having prom-
ised the carrier must perform at his peril.

















































































































































OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. 
CHAPTER XII. 
B. LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRAC'r. 
§ 249. Contracts enlarging liabil-
ity. 
250. Contracts limiting liability. 
251. --Historical. 
252. --Contract must be ex­
press. 
253. --Notices. 
( 1) Limitation of liability 
by public notice. 
254. (a) Public notice. 
255. --Notice to reveal value 
of goods. 
256. --Notice of rules and reg­
ulations. 
257. (b) Notice limiting liabil­
ity for loss. 
258. --English rule. 
259. --American rule. 
(�) Liability under special 
contract. 
260. The earlier caBes. 
261. United States rule. 
(a) Form of special con­
tracts. 
§ 262. Bill of lading. 
263. --Parol evidence. 
264. --Delivery of bill of lad­
ing. 
265. Parol contracts. 
266. Tickets, baggage checks, etc. 
(b) Eztent of limitation. 
267. Limitations reasonable and 
just. 
(i) Limitation& as to the 
11ature of carrier 's liabil­
ity. 
268. General rule. 
269. Special rules. 
(ii) Limitations as to 
amount of liability. 
270. Limitations as to amount. 
271. Common law duty remains. 
272. Consideration. 
273. Parties to the contract. 
274. --Agents of the carrier. 
275. Burden of proof. 
§ 249. Contracts enlarging liability.-By special contract 
the carrier may make himself liable to any extent, or in any 
manner. He may insure against every risk, even acts of God 
or the public enemy, against delay and the inherent defects of 
the goods. He may undertake to ship at a certain time, by a 
specified train, over. a designated route, or to deliver at all 
hazards by a definite hour. To such contracts fairly entered 
into impossibility of performance is no defence. Having prom­
ised the carrier must perform at his peril. 
§ 250. Contracts limiting liability.-It is equally well set-
104 
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tled that the responsibility of a common carrier may be limited
by an express contract assented to by the shipper at the time
the goods were accepted by the carrier, in so far as such re-
strictions are reasonable and not contrary to public policy.
Such in substance is the holding of the United States Supreme
Court, which has been followed by every state court, though
the conditions of liability at common law have, in some states,
been restored by provisions in the constitution or by statute.
§ 251. ——Historical.—The courts, with great unanimity
and much reiteration have insisted upon the wisdom of the
rule imposing upon the carrier extraordinary liability, and
have pointed out the disastrous results of any relaxation of the
rule, but with some exceptions they have failed to recognize
that they were in effect largely abandoning the rule, even while
they were insisting upon its great beneficence, by allowing the
carrier to escape its rigor by special contract with the shipper.
As Mr. Schouler has pointed out, “The reports bear ample
record of the unflagging perseverance with which the common
carrier seeks to make decreased responsibility to the public
the price of affording to the public increased facilities of trans-
portation; of his quick-wittedness in coaxing, entrapping, even
coercing his customers into accomplishing this furtherance of
his own ends.” '
The carrier, at the cost of some annoyance and a vast amount
of litigation, has through his use of the special contract wrested
from the public, by consent of the courts, almost the same ex-
emptions so strenuously denied him without a contract. So
hopeless has been the disadvantage of the shipper in the un-
equal contest that it was a foregone conclusion that he would
§250. [—] New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank,
6 How. (U. S.) 344; Southern Ex-
press Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 264;
[—] Railroad v. Lockwood, 17 Wall.
(U. S.) 357.
§251. Schouler on Bailments
and Carriers, Sec. 460, 88 Am. St.
R. 74, note; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill
(N. Y.) 623; [—] Fish v. Chapman,
2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393; [—] 1-101-
lister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.)
234, 32 Am. D. 455; Moses v. Boston
& Maine Railroad Co., 24 N. H. 71,
55 Am. D. 222; [—] Railroad v.
Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357;
Adams Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61
111. 134, 14 Am. R. 57; Gulf etc.
Railroad Co. v. Trawick, 68 Tex.
314, 4 s. W. R. 567, 2 Am. st. R.
494; Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
v. Vandeventer, 26 Neb. 222, 41 N.
W. R. 998; McDaniel v. Chicago
etc. Railway Co., 24 Iowa 412; Ohio
etc. Railway Co. v. Tabor, 98 Ky.
503, 32 s. W. R. 168; st. Louis etc.
Railway Co. v. Sherlock, 59 Kan.

















































































































































LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRAC'l\ § 251 
tled that the responsibility of a common carrier may be limited 
by an express contract assented to by the shipper at the time 
the goods were accepted by the carrie;r, in so far as such re­
strictions are reasonable and not contrary to public policy. 
Such in substance is the holding of the United States Supreme 
Court, which has been followed by every state court, though 
the conditions of liability at common law have, in some states, 
been restored by provisions in the constitution or by statute. 
§ 261. --Historical.-The courts, with great unanimity 
and much reiter�tion have insisted upon the wisdom of the 
rule imposing upon the carrier extraordinary liability, and 
have pointed out the disastrous results of any relaxation of the 
rule, but with some exceptions they have failed to recognize 
that they were in effect largely abandoning the rule, even while 
they were insisting upon its great beneficence, by allowing the 
carrier to escape its rigor by special contract with the shipper. 
As Mr. Schouler has pointed out, ' ' The reports bear ample 
record of the unflagging perseverance with which the common 
carrier seeks to make decreased responsibility to the public 
the price of affording to the public increased facilities of trans­
portation ; of his quick-wittedness in coaxing, entrapping, even 
coercing his customers into accomplishing this furtherance of 
his own ends. ' '  
· 
The carrier, at the cost of some annoyance and a vast amount 
of litigation, has through his use of the special contract wrested 
from the public, by consent of the courts, almost the same ex­
emptions so strenuously denied him without a contract. So 
hopeless has been the disadvantage of the shipper in the un­
equal contest that it was a foregone conclusion that he would 
§ 250. [ -] New Jersey Steam 5ii Am. D. 222 ; [-] Railroad v. 
Navigation Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357 ; 
6 How. (U. S. ) 344 ; Southern Ex- Adams Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61 
press Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 264 ; Ill. 184, 14 Am. R. 57 ; Gulf etc. 
[-] Railroad v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. Railroad Co. v. Trawick, 68 Tex. 
( U. S.)  357. 314, 4 S. W. R. 567, 2 Am. St. R. 
§ 251. Schouler on Bailments 494 ; Missouri Pacific Railway Co. 
and Carriers, Sec. 460, 88 Am. St. v. Vandeventer, 26 Neb. 222, 41 N. 
R 74, note ; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill W. R. 998 ; McDaniel v. Chicago 
( N. Y.) 623 ; [-) Fish v. Chapman, etc. Railway Co., 24 Iowa 412 ; Ohio 
2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; [-) Hol- etc. Railway Co. v. Tabor, 98 Ky. 
lister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y. ) 503, 32 S. W. R. 168 ; St. Louis etc. 
2341 32 Am. D. 455 ; Moses v. Boston Railway Co. v. Sherlock, 59 Kan. 
& Maine Railroad Co., 24 N. H. 71, 23, 51 Pac. R. 899. 
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be obliged to agree to any stipulations the court might allow
the carriers to impose; and “goods are in fact now but rarely
accepted by them without an agreement or contract for such
limitation. ”
One early case denying this right to the carrier stands alone,
although sympathy has been expressed with its rule in other
cases, and now in almost every state the validity of contracts
exempting the carrier from much of his common law liability
is firmly established, though in a few states provisions in the
constitutions or statutes forbid all such limitations, or in cer-
tain respects restrict them.
§252. ——Oontract must be express.—But the contract
must be express. A contract enlarging or restricting the car-
1-ier’s liability is in derogation of the common law, and so is
strictly construed against the party in whose favor the changes
are made. No exemptions are allowed the carrier except by
clear and explicit stipulations in the contract. If terms favor-
ing the carrier are susceptible of two meanings that will be
adopted which is the more favorable to the shipper. Exemp-
tion of liability for one cause will not by implication be ex-
tended to include others.
§253. ———Notices.-—Two means have been resorted to by
common carriers to evade and lessen liability.
(. 1) By public notice.
(2) By special contract.
Notices have been used for two purposes:
(a) To call attention to the rules and regulations of the
carrier.
(b) To limit his liability for loss.
(1) Limitation of Liability by Public Notice.
§254. (a) Public notices requiring the shipper to reveal
to the carrier what the latter has a right to demand, or pub-
§252. [—] Hinkle v. Southern
Railway Co., 126 N. C. 932, 36 S. E.
R. 348, 78 Am. St. R. 685; [—] New
Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.
Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. (U. S.)
344; [—] Hart v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331; Beck-
man v. Shouse, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 179,
28 Am. D. 653; [—] Bennett v.
American Express Co., 83 Me. 236,
22 Atl. R. 159, 23 Am. St. R. 774;
Southern Express O0. v. Caldwell, 88
U. S. 264.
§254. [—] Hollister v. Nowlen,
19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. D.

















































































































































§ § 252-254 OF COMMON OARRiERS. 
be obliged to agree to any stipulations the court might allow 
the carriers to impose ; and ' ' goods are in fact now but rarely 
accepted by them without an agreement or contract for such 
limitation. ' ' 
One early case denying this right to the carrier stands alone, 
although sympathy has been expressed with its rule in other 
cases, and now in almost every state the validity of contracts 
exempting the carrier from much of his common law liability 
is firmly established, though in a few states provisions in the 
constitutions or statutes forbid all such limitations, or in cer­
tain respects restrict them. 
§ 252. --Contract must be express .-But the contract 
must be express. A contract enlarging or restricting the car­
rier 's liability is in derogation of the common law, and so is 
strictly construed against the party in whose favor the changes 
are made. No exemptions are allowed the carrier except by 
clear and explicit stipulations in the contract. If terms favor­
ing the carrier are susceptible of two meanings that wil\ be 
adopted which is the more favorable to the shipper. Exemp­
tion of liability for one cause will not by implication be ex-
tended to include others. 
. 
§ 253. --Notices .-Two means have been resorted to by 
common carriers to evade and lessen liability. 
( 1 )  By public notice. 
(2 )  By special contract. 
Notices have been used for two purposes : 
(a )  To call attention to the rules and regulations of the 
carrier. 
(b)  To limit his liability for loss. 
( 1 )  Limitation of Liability by Public Notice. 
§ 254. (a.) Public notices requiring the shipper to reveal 
to the carrier what the latter has a right to demand, or pub-
§ 252. [-] Hinkle v. Southern 28 Am. D. 653 ; [-] Bennett v. 
Railway Co., 126 N. C. 932, 36 S. E. American Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 
R. 348, 78 Am. St. R. 685 ; [-] New 22 Atl. R. 159, 23 Am. St. R. 774 ; 
Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Southern Express Co. v. Caldwell, 88 
Merchants ' Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) U. S. 264. 
344 ; [-] Hart v. Pennsylvania § 254. [-] Hollister v. Nowlen, 
Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331 ;  Beck· 19 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 234, 32 Am. D. 
man v. Shouse, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 179, 4 :35 ; [-] New Jersey Steam Navi· 
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lishing the reasonable rules and regulations of the company
as to its manner of doing business, if brought home to the
knowledge of the shipper, are binding.
§255. ——Notice to reveal value of goods.—It has been
noted that the shipper is not bound to reveal the value of the
goods. The carrier however may by public notice brought to
the knowledge of the shipper protect itself from liability be-
yond a fixed amount, unless the shipper reveals the real value
so that the carrier may make reasonable charge for the addi-
tional risk, and take the necessary precautions to insure safety.
§256. ——-Notice of rules and regu1a.tions.—Again reason-
able rules as to the manner of delivery and entry of freight,
rates of freight, the disclosure of the nature of goods, perish-
able or dangerous, the time and manner of presenting claims
for losses and the like may be published by a general notice.
“These are but the reasonable regulations which every man
should be allowed to establish for his business to insure regu-
larity and promptness, and to properly inform him of the re-
sponsibility he assumes.’ ’
§257. (b) Notice limiting liability for 1oss.—A distinc-
tion is to be taken between notices designed to secure expedi-
tious service and fair dealing and those seeking to discharge
the carrier from duties imposed upon him by law. If the car-
rier seeks by public notice to escape duties and liabilities an-
nexed to his employment by law, it is not enough that such
notice be brought to the knowledge of the owner of the prop-
gation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6
How. (U. S.) 344; Southern Ex-
press Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635, 91
Am. D. 783.
§255. [—] Hollister v. Now-
len, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am.
D. 455; [—] Orange County Bank
v. Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 24
Am. D. 129; [—] Fish v. Chap-
man, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393;
[—] Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 112 U. S. 331; Willock v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co., 166 Pa. St.
184, 30 Atl. R. 948, 45 Am. St. R.
674.
§256. [—] McMillan v. Rail-
road Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. D.
208; Western Transportation Co. v.
Newhall, 24 Ill. 466, 76 Am. D. 760;
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36
Ga. 635, 91 Am. D. 783.
§257. Erie Railway Co. v. Wil-
cox, 84 Ill. 239, 25 Am. R. 451;
[—] New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. (U.
S.) 344; [—] Christenson v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am.
R. 122; [—] Bennett v. American
Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 Atl. R.

















































































































































LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. § §  255-257 
lishing the reasonable rules and regulations of the company 
as to its manner of doing business, if brought home to the 
knowledge of the shipper, are binding. 
§ 255. --Notice to revea.l value of goods.-It has been 
noted that the shipper is not bound to reveal the value of the 
goods. The carrier however may by public notice brought to 
the knowledge of the shipper protect itself from liability be­
yond a fixed amount, unless the shipper reveals the real value 
so that the carrier may make reasonable charge for the addi­
tional risk, and take the necessary precautions to insure safety. 
§ 2&6. --Notice of rules and regulations .-Again reason­
able rules as to the manner of delivery and entry of freight, 
rates of freight, the disclosure of the nature of goods, perish­
able or dangerous, the time and manner of presenting claims 
for losses and the like may be published by a general notice.  
' ' These are but the reasonable regulations which every man 
should be allowed to establish for his business to insure regu­
larity and promptness, and to properly inform him of the re­
sponsibility he assumes. ' '  
§ 267. (b) Notice limiting liability for loss.-A distinc­
tion is to be taken between notices designed to secure expedi­
tious service and fair dealing and those seeking to discharge 
the carrier from duties imposed upon him _by law. If the car­
rier seeks by public notice to escape duties and liabilities an­
nexed to his employment by law, it is not enough that such 
notice be brought to the knowledge of the owner of the prop-
gation Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 6 
How. (U. S.) 344 ; Southern Ex­
press Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635, 91 
Am. D. 783. 
§ 255. [-] Hollister v. Now­
len, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. 
D. 455 ; [ -] Orange County Bank 
v. Brown, 9 Wend. ( N. Y.) 85, 24 
Am. D. 129 ; [-] Fish v. Chap­
man, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; 
[-] Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad 
Co., 112 U. S. 331 ; Willock v. Penn­
sylvania Railroad Co., 166 Pa. St. 
184, 30 Atl. R. 948, 45 Am. St. R. 
674. 
§ 256. . [-] McMillan v. Rail­
road Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 
208 ; Western Transportation Co. v. 
Newhall, 24 Ill. 466, 76 Am. D. 760 ; 
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 
Ga. 635, 91 Am. D. 783. 
§ 257. Erie Railway Co. v. Wil­
cox, 84 Ill. 239, 25 Am. R. 451 ; 
[-] New Jersey Steam Navigation 
Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 6 How. (U. 
S.) 344 ; [ -] Christenson v. Ameri­
can Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. 
R. 122 ; [-] Bennett v. American 
Express Co., 83 Me. 236, 22 Atl. R. 
159, 23 Am. St. R. 774. 
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erty. To be efiectual the restriction must be actually assented
to by the owner.
§ 258. ——Eng1ish ru1e.—The attempt of the carrier by
posting public notice to limit his liability for loss was favored
by the English courts until it resulted in a situation so intoler-
able as to bring about the passage of the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act of 1854, which required that conditions must be
embodied in a special contract signed by the shipper, and that
they must be such as shall be adjudged by the court or judge,
before whom any question relating thereto shall be tried, to be
just and reasonable.
§259. ——American rule.—The American courts squarely
refused to follow the confessedly unsatisfactory rule reached
in England, but held that even though a notice were brought
to the shipper’s knowledge and he delivered goods thereafter
to the carrier, his consent to be bound by the notice was not
to be presumed. For “a notice can, at the most, only amount
to a proposal for a special contract which requires the assent
of the other party. The mere delivery of goods after receiv-
ing a notice cannot warrant a stronger presumption that the
owner intended to assent to a restricted liability on the part
of the carrier, than it does that he intended to insist on the
liabilities imposed by law,” as he had a right to do.
(2) Liability Under Special Contract.
§260. The earlier cases.—The case of Hollister v. Nowlen,
supra, was followed in a few years by Gould v. Hill, in which
a special contract was put in the same position as notices, the
court regarding the individual shipper as so hopelessly out-
matched in contracting with the great carrying corporations
§258. [—-] Hollister v. Now-
len, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am.
D. 455; [—] Railroad v. Lockwood,
17 Wall. (U. S.) 357; Moses v. Bos-
ton & Maine Railroad Co., 24 N. H.
71, 55 Am. D. 2'22; Southern Ex-
press Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 264.
§259. [—] Hollister v. Now-
len, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am.
D. 455; [—] New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank,
6 How. (U. S.) 344; [—] Railroad
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357;
Moses v. Boston & Maine Railroad
Co., 24 N. H. 71, 55 Am. D. 222;
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36
Ga. 635, 91 Am. D. 783.
§260. Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill (N.
Y.) 623; [—] Fish v. Chapman, 2
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393; [—] Rail-
road v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.)


















































































































































§ § 258-260 OF COMMON CAlrntERS. 
erty. To be effectual the restriction must be actually assented 
to by the owner. 
§ 258. --English rule.-The attempt of the carrier by 
posting public notice to limit his liability for loss was favorea 
by the English courts until it resulted in a situation so intoler­
able as to bring about the passage of the Railway and Canal 
Traffic Act of 1854, which required that conditions must be 
embodied in a special contract signed by the shipper, and that 
they must be such as shall be adjudged by the court or jud_ge, 
before whom any question relating thereto shall be tried, to be 
just and reasonable. 
§ 259. --American rule.-The American courts squarely 
refused to follow the confessedly unsatisfactory rule reached 
in England, but held that even though a notice were brought 
to the shipper 's knowledge and he delivered goods thereafter 
to the carrier, his consent to be bound by the notice was not 
to be presumed. For ' ' a  notice can, at the most, only amount 
to a proposal for a special contract which requires the assent 
of the other party. The mere delivery of goods after receiv­
ing a notice cannot warrant a stronger presumption that the 
owner intended to assent to a restricted liability on the part 
of the carrier, than it does that he intended to insist on the 
liabilities imposed by law, " as he had a right to do. 
( 2) Liabi1ity Under Special Contract. 
§ 260. The earlier cases.-The case of Hollister v. Nowlen, 
supra, was followed in a few years by Gould v. Hill, in which 
a special contract was put in the same position as notices, the 
court regarding the individual shipper as so hopelessly out­
matched in contracting with the great carrying corporations 
§ 258. [ -] Hollister v. Now­
len, 19 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 234, 32 Am. 
D. 455 ; [-] Railroad v. Lockwood, 
17 Wall. (U. S. ) 357 ; Moses v. Bos­
ton & Maine Railroad Co., 24 N. H. 
71, 55 Am. D. 222 ; Southern Ex­
press Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 264. 
§ 259. [-] Hollister v. Now­
len, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. 
D. 455 ; [-] New Jersey Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 
6 How. (U. S.) S« ; [-1 Railroad 
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S. ) 357 ; 
Moses v. Boston & Maine Railroad 
Co., 24 N. H. 71, 55 Am. D. 222 ; 
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 
Ga. 635, 91 Am. D. 783. 
§ 260. Gould v. Hill, 2 :ij:ill (N. 
Y.) 623 ; (-] Fish v. Chapman, 2 
Ga. 349, 46 Am. D. 393 ; [-] Rail· 
road v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S. ) 
357 ; Scbouler on Bailments and 
Carriers, 460-462. 
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that it made little difierence whether the carrier sought the
exemption by public notice or by special contract. It seemed
a travesty to speak of mutual assent between two parties on
such unequal footing.
§261. United States rule.—The Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of the New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, supra, disapproved the rule of Gould
v. Hill, and in this has been followed by all the state courts,
including New York; so that now, apart from statute, the car-
rier is everywhere permitted by contract assented to by the
shipper to secure release from his strict liability. It is now in
order to inquire
(a) How these restrictions may be made.
(b) How far they may extend.
(a) Form of Special Contracts.
§ 262. Bill of lading‘.—When the special contract is in writ-
ing its terms are usually incorporated in the bill of lading,
which, as already noticed in § 219, is both a receipt and a
contract. As a contract it requires mutual assent to its terms.
The carrier cannot by his ex parte action restrict his liability,
but express assent by the shipper is not essential. The courts,
with substantial unanimity, have held that when a shipper ac-
cepts a bill of lading at the time when he delivers his goods
to the carrier he is conclusively presumed, in the absence of
fraud and imposition, to have assented to all the terms and
conditions, written or printed, therein.
It matters not that he may not have understood them, or
even read them, nor that he took the bill but did not sign it.
He is conclusively presumed to know the general custom to
print such regulations in bills of lading, and if he chooses to
accept them without reading he is estopped from denying his
assent, so far as the regulations are reasonable and just.
§261. [—] New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank,
6 How. (U. S.) 344; Gould v. Hill,
2 Hill (N. Y.) 623.
§262. l"—-l lVlcMillan v. Rail-
road Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. D.
208; [—] Christenson v. American
Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am.
R 122; ‘Davis v. Central Vermont
Railroad Co., 66 Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R.
313, 44 Am. St. R. 852; Grace v.
Adams, 100 Mass. 505, 97 Am. D.
117; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y.
166, 10 Am. R. 575; Ballou v. Earle,
17 R. I. 441, 22 Atl. R. 1113, 33
Am. St. R. 881. Contra, Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184,

















































































































































LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. §§ 261-262 
that it made little difference whether the carrier sought the 
exemption by public notice or by special contract. It seemed 
a travesty to speak of mutual assent between two parties on 
such unequal footing. 
§ 261. United States rule.-The Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of the New Jersey Steam Navigation 
Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, . supra, disapproved the rule of Gould 
v. Hill, and in this has been followed by all the state courts, 
including New York ; so that now, apart from statute, the car­
rier is everywhere permitted by contract assented to by the 
shipper to secure release from his strict liability. It is now in 
order to inquire 
( a) How these restrictions may be made. 
(b ) How far they may extend. 
(a )  Form of Special Contracts. 
§ 262. Bill of lading.-When the special contract is in writ­
ing its terms are usually incorporated in the bill of lading, 
which, as already noticed in § 219, is both a receipt and a 
contract. As a contract it requires mutual assent to its terms. 
The carrier cannot by his ex parte action restrict his liability, 
but express assent by the shipper is not essential. The courts, 
with substantial unanimity, have held that when a shipper ac­
cepts a bill of lading at the time when he delivers his goods 
to the carrier he is conclusively presumed, in the absence of 
fraud and imposition, to have assented to all the terms and 
conditions, written or printed, therein. 
It matters not that he may not have understood them, or 
even read them, nor that he took the bill but did not sign it. 
He is conclusively presumed to know the general custom to 
print such regulations in bills of lading, and if he chooses to 
accept them without reading he is estopped from denying his 
assent, so far as the regulations are reasonable and just. 
§ 261. [-] New Jersey Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 
6 How. (U. S. ) 344 ; Gould v. Hill, 
2 Hill ( N. Y.)  623. 
§ 262. [-] McMillan v. Rail­
rcad Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 
208 ; [-] Christenson v. American 
Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. 
R 122 ; · Davis v. Central Vermont 
Railroad Co., 66 Vt. 290, 2'9 Atl. R. 
313, 44 Am. St. R. 852 ; Grace v. 
Adams, 100 Mass. 505, 97 Am. D. 
117 ; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 
166, 10 Am. R. 575 ; Ballou v. Earle, 
17 R. I. 441, 22 Atl. R. 1113, 33 
Am. St. R. 881. Contra, Adams Ex­
press Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184, 
1<4, Am. R. 57. 
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§263. ——Parol evidence.—Bills of lading, as contracts,
like other written contracts, cannot be varied or contradicted
by parol evidence. All previous oral agreements are pre-
sumed to be merged in a bill of lading, which is regarded as
the final repository of the terms and conditions of the contract
of carriage.
§264. ——Delivery of bill of lading.—To efiect a contract
by means of a bill of lading it is necessary to deliver the bill
of lading when the goods are accepted by the carrier. The
rule that prior negotiations are merged in the written agree-
ment has no application to a case where the written agree-
ment is imposed upon one party after the other party has
begun performance. If the carrier accepts the goods uncondi-
tionally, he cannot afterwards, without the consent of the
owner, limit his liability by imposing a bill of lading containing
restrictions. Of course, the shipper may expressly, or im-
pliedly, or by course of dealing, consent to a future delivery
of the contract.
§265. Parol contracts.—No particular form of contract is
necessary between the carrier and shipper. A parol statement
by the carrier assented to by the shipper will be as effectual as
a written contract, though evidence to prove it is more uncer-
tain. The contract may be partly in writing and partly oral,
but merely shipping goods after an oral statement of the con-
ditions of carriage is not conclusive of assent to those condi-
tions. The carrier assumes the burden of proving clearly the
mutual agreement.
§ 266. Tickets, baggage checks, etc., cannot be regarded like
bills of lading and exprgss receipts. These latter are taken
leisurely, are used in trade by way of pledge as security for
advances, or they are assigned to transfer title to the goods.
§263. See Sec. 221, ante; Davis
v. Central Vermont Railroad Co., 66
Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313, 44 Am. St.
R. 852; [—] Hansen v. Flint & Pere
Marquette Railroad Co., 73 Wis.
346, 9 Am. St. R. 791.
§264. [—] Bostwick v. Rail-
road Co., 45 N. Y. 712; Merchants’
Despatch Transportation Co. v.
Furthmann, 149 Ill. 66, so N. E. R.
624, 41 Am. st. R. 265; Gott v.
Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45; Hutchinson
on Carriers, 246-247.
§265. Gott v. Dinsmore, 111
Mass. 45; American Transportation
Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368; Black
v Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 319,
13 N. W. R. 244, 42 Am. R. 713.
§266. Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N.
Y. 264, 3 Am. R. 701; [—] Ran-
ehau v. Rutland Railroad Co., 71

















































































































































§ §  263-266 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
§ 263. --Parol evidence.-Bills of lading, as contracts, 
like other written contracts, cannot be varied or contradicted 
by parol evidence. All previous oral agreements are pre­
sumed to be merged in a bill of lading, which is regarded as 
the final repository of the terms and conditions of the contract 
of carriage. 
§ 264. --Delivery of bill of lading.-To effect a contract 
by means of a bill of lading it is �ecessary to deliver the bill 
of lading when the goods are accepted by the carrier. The 
rule that prior negotiations are merged in the written agree­
ment has no application to a case where the written agree­
ment is imposed upon one party after the other party has 
begun performance. If the carrier accepts the goods uncondi­
tionally, he cannot afterwards, without the consent of the 
owner, limit his liability by imposing a bill of lading containing 
restrictions. Of course, the shipper may expressly, or im­
pliedly, or by course of dealing, consent to a future delivery 
of the contract. 
§ 265. Parol contracts.-No particular form of contract is 
necessary between the carrier and shipper. A parol statement 
by the carrier assented to by the shipper will be as effectual as 
a written contract, though evidence to prove it is more uncer­
tain. The contract may be partly in writing and partly oral, 
but merely shipping goods after an oral statement of the con­
ditions of carriage is not conclusive of asgent to those condi­
tions. The carrier assumes the burden of proving clearly the 
mutual agreement. 
§ 266. Tickets, baggage/ checks, etc., cannot be regarded like 
bills of lading and express receipts. These latter are taken 
leisurely, are used in trade by way of pledge as security for 
advances, or they are assigned to transfer title to the goods. 
§ 263. See See. 221, ante ; Davis Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45 ; Hutchinson 
v. Central Vermont Railroad Co., 66 on Carriers, 246·247. 
Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313, 44 Am . St. § 265. Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 
R 852 ; [-] Hansen v. Flint & Pere Mass. 45 ; American Transportation 
Marquette Railroad Co., 73 Wis. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368 ; Black 
346, 9 Am. St. R. 791. v Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 319, 
§ 264. [-] Bostwick v. Rail· 13 N. W. R. 244, 42 Am. R. 713. 
re.ad Co., 45 N. Y. 712 ; Merchants ' § 266. Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. 
Despatch Transportation Co. v. Y. 264, 3 Am. R. 701 ; [-] Ran­
Furthmann, 149 Ill. 66, 36 N. E. R. chau v. Rutland Railroad Co., 71 
624, 41 Am. St. R. 265 ; Gott v. Vt. 142, 43 Atl. R. 11, 76 Am. St. R. 
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They are the representatives of the goods, and are of such im-
portance that a holder cannot be heard to claim ignorance of
their contents. Not so with tickets and checks; they are
usually taken in haste, represent no goods, and in general con-
tain no terms. They are understood to be mere receipts show-
ing that the holder has paid for a service. They are not in
general contracts, but mere evidence of a contract. If they
are to serve as contracts also the carrier must indicate that
fact, and in some way secure the assent of the owner.
(b) Extent of the Limitation.
§267. Limitations reasonable and just.—Though an almost
universal liberty is allowed the carrier to contract for exemp-
tions from his common law liability, the courts, with few ex-
ceptions, insist that the stipulations of the contract must be
reasonable and just. Even though a shipper may be ready to
assent to complete release of the carrier from liability, the
courts will not recognize such an agreement because of the
interest of the public in preventing the carrier from taking
advantage of the individual shipper.
It becomes important then at this point to mark out what is
reasonable and not contrary to public policy. For this purpose
restrictions may be regarded as intended to limit
(i) The nature of the liability.
(ii) The amount of the liability.
(i) Limitations as to the Nature of the C'arrier’s Liability.
§268. General rule.—It is
that common carriers may by
761; Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass.
505, 97 Am. D. 117; Kansas City
etc. Railroad Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38
Kan. 45, 15 Pac. R. 899, 5 Am. St.
R. 715; Rawson v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 48 N. Y. 212, 8 Am.
R. 543.
§268. [—] New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank,
6 How. (U. S.) 344; [—] Railroad
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357;
Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall.
(U. S.) 264; [—] Moulton v. St.
Paul etc. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 85,
the rule in most jurisdictions
special contract assented to by
16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781;
[—] Christenson v. American Ex-
press Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. R.
122; Davis v. Central Vermont Rail-
road Co., 66 Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313,
4-1 Am. St. R. 852; Ballou v. Earle,
17 R. I. 441, 22 Atl. R. 1113, 33
Am. St. R. 881; Reid v. Evansville
& Terre Haute Railroad Co., 10
Ind. App. 385, 35 N. E. R. 703, 53
Am. St. R. 391. See also the notes


















































































































































LIABII,l'fY U'NDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. § §  267-268 
'l'hey are the representatives of the goods, and are of such im­
portance that a holder cannot be heard to claim ignoranC'e of 
their contents. Not so with tickets and checks ; they are 
usually taken in haste, represent no goods� and in general con­
tain no terms, They are understood to be mere receipts show­
ing that the holder has paid for a service. They are not in 
general contracts, but mere evidence of a contract. If they 
are to serve as contracts also the carrier must indicate that 
fact, and in some way secure the assent of the owner. 
( b )  Extent of the Limitation. 
§ 267. Limitations reasonable and just.-Though an almost 
universal liberty is allowed the carrier to contract for exemp­
tions from his common law liability, the courts, with few ex­
ceptions, insist that the stipulations of the contract must be 
reasonable and just. Even though a shipper may be ready to 
assent to complete release of the carrier from liability, the 
courts will not recognize such an agreement because of the 
interest of the public in preventing the carrier from taking 
advantage of the individual shipper. 
It becomes important then at this point to mark out what is 
reasonable and not contrary to public policy. For this purpose 
restrietions may be regarded as intended to limit 
( i )  The nature of  the liability. 
( ii) The amolmt of the liability. 
( i) Limitations as to the Nature of the Carrier 's Liabi"lity. 
§ 268. General rule.-It is the rule in most jurisdictions 
that common carriers may by special contract assented to by 
761 ; Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 
505, 97 Am. D. 117 ; Kansas City 
etc. Railroad Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38 
Kan. 45, 15 Pac. R. 899, 5 Am. St. 
R. 715 ; Rawson v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co., 48 N. Y. 212, 8 Am. 
R. 543. 
§ 268. [ -] New Jersey Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Merchants ' Bank, 
6 How. (U. S. ) 344 ; [-] Railroad 
v. Lockwood, 1i Wall. (U. S. ) 357 ; 
Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 
(U. S. ) 264 ; [-] Moulton v. St. 
Paul etc. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 85, 
16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781 ; 
[ -] Christenson v. American Ex· 
press Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. R. 
122 ; Davis v. Central 'V ermont Rail­
road Co., 66 Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313, 
44 Am. St. R. 852 ; Ballou v. Earle, 
17 R. I. 441, 22 At!. R. 1 113, 33 
.Am. St. R. 881 ; Reid v. Evansville 
& Terre Haute Railroad Co., 10 
In d. App. 385, 35 N. E. R. 703, 53 
Am. St. R. 391. See also the notes 
to 32 Am. D. 498, and 88 Ard St. 
R. 95. 
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§§ 269-279 OF COMMON oxnmans.
the shipper be relieved from liability for loss to the goods from
any cause not due to the negligence of the carrier, or to his
agents or servants. Against negligence the carrier is not per-
mitted to contract.
§269. Special ru1es.—In New York a distinction is at-
tempted between the acts of the carrier, and the acts of its
agents or servants. Against its own negligence the carrier
may not contract, but against that of its agents and servants it
may. This distinction is not generally recognized, and in most
states is expressly denied; even in New York contracts for
such exemptions are construed with great strictness.
In Illinois, and perhaps a few other states, it has been held
that carriers are liable for “gross negligence or wilful mis-
feasance against which good morals and public policy forbid
they should be permitted to stipulate.” The Illinois courts,
however, seem to regard any negligence by the carrier as gross.
In Kentucky, Nebraska, Iowa and Texas the constitution or
statutes forbid common carriers to limit or restrict their lia-
bility as it exists at common law. In many other states some
bounds are set by statute to the carrier’s power to contract
against liability.
(ii) Limitations as to the Amount of the Liability.
§270. Limitations as to amount.—Despite some apparent
conflict in the cases the rule is now well settled that the car-
rier may by contract limit his liability in case of loss to a fixed
amount.
But it must appear that such amount was, for the purpose
§ 269. Magnin v. Dinsmore,. 56 N
Y. 168; [—] Mynard v. Syracuse,
etc., Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 180, 27
Am. R. 28; Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Smyser, 38 Ill. 354, 87
Am. D. 301; Chicago etc. Railway
Co. v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96, 24 N.
E. R. 417, 23 Am. St. R. 587; Black
v. Goodrich Transportation Co., 55
Wis. 319, 13 N. W. R. 244, 42 Am.
R. 713; Ohio, etc., Railway Co. v.
Tabor, 98 Ky. 503, 32 S. W. R. 168;
Missouri Pacific Railway C0. v.
Vandeventer, 26 Neb. 222, 41 N. W.
R. 998; McDaniel v. Chicago etc.
Railway Co., 24 Iowa, 412; Gulf etc.
Railroad Co. v. Trawick, 68 Tex.
314, 4 S. W. R. 567, 2 Am. St. R.
494; St. Louis etc. Railway Co. v.
Sherlock, 59 Kan. 23, 51 Pac. R.
S99. See the extended note in 88
Am. St. R. 74.
§270. [—] Hart v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5
Sup. Ct. 151; [—] Moulton v. St.
Paul etc. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 85,
16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781;
Alair v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Co., 53 Minn. 160, 54 N. W. R.

















































































































































§ §  269-270 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
the shipper be relieved from liability for loss to the goods from 
any cause not due to the negligence of the carrier, or to his 
agents or servants. Against negligence the carrier is not per­
mitted to contract. 
§ 269. Special rules.-In New York a distinction is at­
tempted between the acts of the carrier, and the acts of its 
agents or servants. Against its own negligence the carrier 
may not contract, but against that of its agents and servants it 
may. This distinction is not generally recognized, and in most 
states is expressly denied ; even in New York contracts for 
such exemptions are construed with great strictness. 
In Illinois, and perhaps a few other states, it has been held 
that carriers are liable for ' ' gross negligence or wilful mis­
feasance against which good morals and public policy forbid 
they should be permitted to stipulate. ' '  The Illinois courts, 
however, seem to regard any negligence by the carrier as gross. 
In Kentucky, Nebraska, Iowa and Texas the constitution or 
statutes forbid common carriers to limit or restrict their lia­
bility as it exists at common law. In many other states some 
bounds are set by statute to the carrier 's power to contract 
against liability. 
( ii) Limitations as to the Amount of the Liability. 
§ 270. Limitations as to amount.-Despite some apparent 
conflict in the cases the rule is now well settled that the car­
rier may by contract limit his liability in ease of loss to a fixed 
amount. 
But it must appear that such amount was, for the purpose 
§ 269. Magnin v. Dinsmore,, 56 N Railway Co., 24 Iowa, 412 ; Gulf etc. 
Y. 168 ; [-] Mynard v. Syracuse, Railroad Co. v. Trawick, 68 Tex. 
etc., Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 180, 27 314, 4 S. W. R. 567, 2 Am. St. R. 
Am. R. 28 ; Illinois Central Rail· 494 ; St. Louis etc. Railway Co. v. 
road Co. v. Smyser, 38 Ill. 354, 87 Sherlock, 59 Kan. 28, 151 Pac. R. 
Am. D. 301 ; Chicago etc. Railway Se9. See the extended note in 88 
Co. v .  Chapman, 133 Ill. 96, 24 N. Am. St. R. 74. 
E. R. 417, 23 Am. St. R. 587 ; Black § 270. [-] Hart v. Penneyl­
v. Goodrich Transportation Co., 55 vania Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 
Wis. 319, 18 N. W. R. 244, 42 Am. Sup. Ct. 151 ; [-] Moulton v. St. 
R. 713 ; Ohio, etc., Railway Co. v. Paul etc. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 85, 
Tabor, 98 Ky. 503, 32 S. W. R. 168 ; 16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781 ; 
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Alair v. Northern Pacific Railroad 
Vandeventer, 26 Neb. 222, 41 N. W. Co., 53 Minn. 160, 54 N. W. R. 
R. 998 ; McDaniel v. Chicago etc. 1072, 39 Am. St. R. 588 ; Belger v. 
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LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. 271-272
of transportation, the agreed value of the goods, fairly and
honestly fixed as the basis for the carricr’s charges and respon-
sibilities; and further, that the shipper was not denied the
right, by paying a reasonable compensation, to contract for a
greater value, not in excess of the real value of the goods. By
the weight of authority such a stipulation fixes the amount of
the recovery even when the loss is due to the carricr’s negli-
gence. The risk assumed accords with the charges paid and
there is no release from liability for negligence up to the value
which furnished the basis of the carrier ’s charges.
§271. Common law duty remains.—In any case the com-
mon law duty remains upon the carrier; he is not at liberty
to decline his duties and responsibilities as fixed by law; and
the shipper has a right to insist that the goods be carried for a
reasonable compensation, insured at their full value against
every loss except those from which the carrier was relieved at
common law. Any contract which denies, or by imposition,
coercion or undue advantage, wrests from the shipper this
right, is void. And when a special contract is assented to, the
carrier is still a common carrier in all respects except those
specifically named in the contract.
§272. Consideration.—Like other contracts the contract
limiting the liability of the carrier must be supported by con-
sideration. Mere acceptance and carriage of the goods is not
enough. The consideration usually consists in reduced rates
for carriage. When therefore the maximum rates allowed by
law are charged the contract limiting liability fails for lack of
Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166, 10 Am. R.
575; Ballou v. Earle, 17 R. I. 441,
22 Atl. R. 1113, 33 Am. St. R. 881;
Ullman v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co.,
112 Wis. 150, 88 N. W. R. 41, 88
Am. St. R. 949.
§271. [—] Railroad v. Lock-
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357; Moses
v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 24
N. H. 71, 55 Am. D. 222; [—] Mc-
Millan v. Michigan Southern, etc.,
Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am.
D. 208; Ballou v. Earle, 17 R. I.
441, 22 Atl. R. 1113, 33 Am. St. R.
S81; Railway Co. v. Cravens, 57
Ark. 1.12, 20 S. W. R. 803, 38 Am.
St. R. 230; [—] Hinkle v. Southern
Railway Co., 126 N. C. 932, 35 S.
E. R. 810, 78 Am. St. R. 685; Wit-
ting v. St. Louis etc. Railway Co.,
101 Mo. 631, 14 S. W. R. 743, 20
Am. St. R. 636.
§272. [-] McMillan v. Michi-
gan Southern, etc., Railroad Co., 16
Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 208; Belger v.
Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166, 10 Am. R.
575; McFadden v. Missouri Pacific
Railway Co., 92 Mo. 343, 4 S. W. R.
689, 1 Am. St. R. 721, and the note

















































































































































LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. §§ 271-272 
of transportation, the agreed value of the goods, fairly and 
honestly fixed as the basis for the carrier 's charges and respon­
sibilities ; and further, that the shipper was not denied the 
right, by paying a reasonable compensation� to contract for a 
greater value, not in excess of the real value of the goods. By 
the weight of authority such a stipulation fixes the amount of 
the recovery even when the loss is due to the carrier 's negli­
gence. The risk assumed accords with the charges paid and 
there is no release from liability for negligence up to the value 
which furnished the basis of the carrier 's charges. 
§ 271. Common law duty remains.-In any case the com­
mon law duty remains upon the carrier ; he is not at liberty 
to decline his duties and responsibilities as fixed by law ; and 
the shipper has a right to insist that the goods be carried for a 
reasonable compensation, insured at their full value against 
P.very loss except those from which the carrier was relieved at 
common law. Any contract which denies, or by imposition, 
<>oercion or undue advantage, wrests from the shipper this 
right, is void. And when a special contract is assented to, the 
carrier is still a common carrier in all respects except those 
specifically named in the contract. 
§ 272. Consideration.-Like other contracts the contract 
limiting the liability of the carrier must be supported by con­
sideration. Mere acceptance and carriage of the goods is not 
enough. The consideration usually consists in reduced rates 
for carriage. When therefore the maximum rates allowed by 
law are charged the contract limiting liability fails for lack of 
Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166, 10 Am. R. 
575 ; Ballou v. Earle, 1 7  R. I. 441, 
22 Atl. R. 1113, 33 Am. St. R. 881 ; 
Ullman v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 
112 Wis. 150, 88 N. W. R. 41, 88 
Am. St. R. 949. 
§ 271. [-] Railroad v. Lock· 
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S. ) 357 ; Moses 
v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 24 
N. H. 71, 55 Am. D. 222 ; [-] Mc· 
Millan v. Michigan Southern, etc., 
Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. 
D. 208 ; Ballou v. Earle, 17 R. I. 
441, 22 Atl. R. 1113, 33 Am. St. R. 
881 ; Railway Co. Y. Cravens, 57 
Ark. 1,12, 20 S. W. R. 803, 38 Am. 
St. R. 230 ; [-] Hinkle v. Southern 
Railway Co., 126 N. C. 932, 35 S. 
E. R. 810, 78 Am. St. R. 685 ; Wit­
ting v. St. Louis etc. Railway Co., 
101 Mo. 631, 14 8. W. R. 743, 20 
Am. St. R. 636. 
§ 272. [-] McMillan v. Michi­
gan Southern, etc., Railroad Co., 16 
l\Iich. 79, 93 Am. D. 208 ; Belger v. 
Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166, 10  Am. R. 
575 ; McFadden v. Missouri Pacific 
Railway Co., 92 Mo. 343, 4 S. W. R. 
689, 1 Am. St. R. 721, and the note 
to 88 Am. St. R. 88. 










consideration. In the absence of proof to thc contrary con-
sideration is presumed, the rate being based on the limited
liability incurred.
§2'73. Parties to the contract.—An agent entrusted by the
owner with goods for shipment has implied power to accept a
receipt containing reasonable limitations on the carrier’s lia-
bility. The consignor has usually such authority for a con-
signee, but a connecting carrier has no implied authority to
accept conditions other than those in its own contract of ship-
ment, or those that are by custom and usage known to the
shipper to be the conditions under which the connecting carrier
usually carries. But the agent directed to forward goods, in
the absence of contrary instructions, is bound to accept the
customary receipt, and if he refuse and the carrier in conse-
quence decline to accept the goods, the agent may become per-
sonally liable to the consignee for resulting loss.
§274. Agents of the carrier.—Railroads act only through
agents. No question of the authority of such agent can arise
where the company seeks to take advantage of the contract.
Acceptance of the contract is affirmance of the power of the
agent to make it. But when an agent accepts for the carrier
increased obligations, the question of his authority is vital. In
general the public have a right to assume that both the general
agent, and the local or station agent, have authority to bind the
company by reasonable contracts as to matters within the line
of their employment. The usage and custom of the carrier are
often important in determining whether the act of the agent
was within the real or apparent scope of his authority.
§275. Burden of proof.—The burden of proving that the
loss resulted from a cause included in the exemptions named
§273. Rawson v. Holland, 59 N.
Y. 611, 17 Am. R. 394; [—] Mc-
Millan v. Michigan Southern, etc.,
Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am.
D. 208; 88 Am. St. R. 87 and note.
§274. Deming v. Grand Trunk
Railway Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 Am. R.
267; Voorhees v. Chicago, Rock
Island 8a Pacific Railway Co., 71
Iowa, 735, 30 N. W. R. 29, 60 Am.
R. 823; VVood v. Chicago, Milwau-
kec & St. Paul Railway Co., 68
Iowa, 491, 27 N. W. R. 473, 56 Am.
R. 861; [—] Hansen v. Flint &
Pere Marquette Railroad Co., 73
Wis. 346, 41 N. W. R. 529, 9 Am.
St. R. 791. Compare Burroughs v.
Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 26, 1 Am. R.
78, and Grover & Baker Sewing Ma-
chine Co. v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
way Co., 70 Mo. 672, 35 Am. R. 444.
§275. Witting v. St. Louis, etc.,
Railway Co., 101 Mo. 631, 14 S. W.

















































































































































� §  2i3-275 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
consideration. In the absence of proof to the contrary con­
sideration is presumed, the rate being based on the limited 
liability incurred. 
§ 273. Parties to the contract.-An agent entrusted by the 
owner with goods for shipment has implied power to accept a 
receipt containing reasonable limitations on the carrier 's lia­
bility. The consignor has usually such authority for a con­
signee, but a connecting carrier has no implied authority to 
accept conditions other than those in its own contract of ship­
ment, or those that are by custom and usage known to the 
shipper to be the conditions under which the connecting carrier 
usually carries. But the agent directed to forward goods, in 
the absence of contrary instructions, is bound to accept the 
customary receipt, and if he refuse and the carrier in conse­
quence decline to accept the goods, the agent may become per­
sonally liable to the consignee for resulting loss . 
§ 274. Agents of the carrier.-Railroads act only through 
ag·ents . No question of the authority of '3uch agent can arise 
where the company seeks to take advantage of the contract. 
Acceptance of the cpntract is affirmance of the power of the 
agent to make it. But when an agent accepts for the carrier 
increased obligations, the question of his authority is vital. In 
general the public have a right to assume that both the general 
agent, and the local or station agent, have authority to bind the 
company by reasonable contracts as to matters within the line 
of their employment. The usage and custom of the carrier are 
often important in determining whether the act of the agent 
was within the real or apparent scope of his authority. 
§ 275. Burden of proof.-The burden of proving that the 
loss resulted from a cause included in the exemptions named 
§ 273. Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Iowa, 491, 27 N. W. R. 473, 56 Am. 
Y. 611, 17 Am. R. 394 ; [-] Me- R. 861 ; [-1 Hansen v. Flint & 
Millan v. Michigan Southern, etc., Pere Marquette Railroad Co., 73 
Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. Wis. 346, 41 N. W. R. 529, 9 Am. 
D. 208 ; 88 Am. St. R. 87 and note. St. R. 791. Compare Burroughs v. 
§ 274. Deming v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 26, 1 Am. R. 
Railway Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 Am. R. 78, and Grover & Baker Sewing Ma­
:!67 ; Voorhees v. Chicago, Rock chine Co. v. Missouri Pacific Rail­
Island & Pacific Railway Co., 7 1  way Co., 70 Mo. 672, 35  Am. R .  444. 
Iowa, 735, 30 N. W. R. 29, 60 Am. § 275. Witting v. St. Louis, etc., 
R. 823 ; Wood v. Chicago, Milwau- Railway Co., 101  Mo. 631, 14 S. W. 
kec & St. Paul Railway Co., 68 R. 7 43, 20 Am. St. R. 636 ; [ -1 Hin-
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LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. § 275
in the contract rests on the carrier. And even if that be shown
he will still be liable if the loss was caused by the negligence
of the carrier or his servants.
By the weight of authority the carrier makes out a prima
facie case by bringing the loss within the exemptions of the
contract, and the burden then rests on the owner to show that
the carrier was negligent. This rule is vigorously combatted
in many cases on the ground that the carrier alone is in posi-
tion to show how the goods have been treated during trans-
portation, and the burden of proving facts peculiarly within
the knowledge of a party should rest upon that party.
kle v. Southern Railway Co., 126 N.
(~. 932, 35 S. E. R. 810, 78 Am. St.
R. 685; Terre Haute etc. Railroad
C0. v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129, 31
N. E. R. 781, 32 Am. St. R. 239;
Reid v. Evansville & Terre Haute
Railroad Co., 10 Ind. App. 385, 35
N. E. R. 703, 53 Am. St. R. 391;
VVestern Transportation Co. v. New-
hall, 24 I1l. 466, 76 Am. D. 760;
Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36

















































































































































LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT. § 275 
in the contract rests on the carrier. And even if that be shown 
he will still be liable if the loss was caused by the negligence 
of the carrier or his servants. 
By the weight of authority the carrier makes out a prima 
f acie case by bringing the loss within the exemptions of the 
contract, and the burden then rests on the owner to show that 
the carrier was negligent . .  This rule is vigorously combatted 
in many cases on the ground that the carrier alone is in posi­
tion to show how the goods have been treated during trans­
portation, and the burden of proving facts peculiarly within 
the knowledge of a party should rest upon that party. 
kle v. Southern Railway Co., 126 N. Railroad Co., 10 Ind. App. 385, 35 
C. 932, 35 S. E. R. 810, 78 Am. St. N. E. R. 703, 53 Am. St. R. 3»! ; 
R. 685 ; Terre Haute etc. Railroad Western Transportation Co . v. New­
Co. v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129, 31 hall, 24 Ill. 466, 76 Am. D. 760 ; 
N. E. R. 781, 32 Am. St. R. 239 ; Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 






















OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS.
CHAPTER XIII.
3. TERMINATION OF THE RELATION.
Liability of common carrier
how ended.
(1 ) Delivery by the com-
mon carrier.
Essentials of delivery.
(a) Time of delivery.
Reasonable time.
(b) At the proper place.
General rule.
Delivery by carriers by
water.
Delivery by railroads.
Delivery by express com-
panies.
———Shipment C. O. D.
(c) In a proper manner.
Delivery safe and convenient.







Delivery to a connecting car-
rier.
Duty to carry beyond car-
rier’s route.
Partnership arrangement.
























Carriers agents of the con-
signor.
What amounts to delivery
to a connecting carrier.
Presumption as to carrier
liable.
Benefit to connecting carrier
of contract exemptions.








Delivery by carriers by
water.
——Manner of delivery.
Delivery to an elevator.






Improper exercise of right.
Inability to find consignee.
.
§ 276. Liability as common carrier how ended.—The duties
of the common carrier as such may be terminated
(1) By delivery.
(2) By excuse for non-delivery.
§276. Western Transportation Railroad Co. v. Day, 20 Ill. 375, 71
Co. v. Newhall, 24 Ill. 466, 76 Am. Am. D. 278; [—] Fisk v. Newton, 1

















































































































































OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS. 
CHAPTER XIII. 
3. TERMINA'l'ION OF THE RELATION. 
§ 276. Liability of common carrier 
how ended. 
( 1) Delivery by the com· 
1ncm carrier. 
277. Essentials of delivery. 
(a) Time of delivery. 
278. Reasonable time. 
(b) At the proper place. 
279. General rule. 
280. Delivery by carriers by 
water. 
281. Delivery by railroads. 
282. Delivery by express com­
panies. 
283. -Shipment C. 0. D. 
(c) In a proper manner. 
284. Delivery safe and convenient. 
( d) To the right person. 
285. Carrier absolutely liable. 
286. --Illustrations. 
287. Bill of lading. 
288. Delivery to consignee. 
289. --Interpleader. 
Connecting carriers. 
290. Delivery to a connecting car­
rier. 
291. Duty to carry beyond car­
rier 's route. 
292. Partnership arrangement. 
293. Goods directed beyond car· 
rier 's terminus. 
§ 294. --American rule. 
295. --Special contract. 
296. Carriers agents of the con· 
signor. 
297. What amounts to delivery 
to a connecting carrier. 
298. Presumption as to carrier 
liable. 
299. Benefit to connecting carrier 
of contract exemptions. 
300. Delivery to a warehouseman. 
301. --What constitutes such 
delivery. 





304. The Michigan rule. 
305. Delivery by carriers by 
water. 
306. --Manner of delivery. 
307. Delivery to an elevator. 
(t) Acts excusing non-de· 
livery. 
308. Excepted perils. 
309. Paramount owner. 
310. Stoppage in transitu. 
311. --Right how exercised. 
312. Improper exercise of right. 
313. Inability to find consignee. 
§ 276. Liability as common carrier how ended. -The duties 
of the common carrier as such may be terminated 
( 1 )  By delivery. 
( 2 ) By excuse for non-delivery. 
§ 276. Western Transportation Railroad Co. v. Day, 20 Ill. 375, 71 
Co. v. Newhall, 24 Ill. 466, 76 Am. Am. D. 278 ; [-] Fisk v. Newton, 1 
n. 760 ; Michigan Southern etc. Denio (N. Y. ) 45, 43 Am . J?. 649. 
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Delivery is the final duty of every carrier, as a carrier, and
his extraordinary liability can be ended only by proper de-
livery of the goods or by a valid excuse for non-delivery.
(1) Delivery by the Common Carrier.
§ 277. Essentials of de1ivery.—As proper delivery brings to
an end the extraordinary liability of the common carrier it be-
comes important to define legal delivery. The carrier fulfills
his duty only by a delivery .
(a) At a reasonable time.
(b) At the proper place.
(c) In a proper manner.
(d) To the right person.
(a) Time of Delivery.
§278. Reasonable time.—As already brought out (sections
246, 247), the carriage must be completed within a reasonable
time after the goods are accepted for transportation. It may
now be added that delivery must be made on a proper day and
at a reasonable time of the day. What is reasonable depends
upon circumstances and custom, but generally speaking the
consignee is not bound to receive goods out of business hours,
or on a stormy day that makes the removal of the goods dan-
gerous.
(b) At the Proper Place.
§279. General rule.—Formerly, in the absence of estab-
lished custom to the contrary, it was understood to be the duty
of all common carriers to deliver the goods to the consignee
§ 277. Hutchinson on Carriers, Andrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11
340; Eagle v. White, 6 Whar. (Pa.)
505, 37 Am. D. 434; Marshall v.
American Express Co., 7 Wis. 1, 73
Am. D. 381.
§278. Hill v. Humphreys, 5
Watts & S. (Pa.) 123, 39 Am. D.
117; Eagle v. White, 6 Whar. (Pa.)
505, 37 Am. D. 434; Morgan v. Dib-
ble, 29 Tex. 108, 94 Am. D. 264;
Marshall v. American Express Co., 7
Wis. 1, 73 Am. T\. 381; [-] Scheu
v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 22 N. E.
R. 1073, 15 Am. St. R. 426; Mc-
Am. R. 657; Richardson v. Goddard,
23 How. (U. S.) 28.
§279. [—] American Express
Co. v. Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 Am.
D. 691; Mcblasters v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 69 Pa. St. 3'74, 8 Am.
R. 264; Turner v. Hufi, 46 Ark.
222, 55 Am. R. 580; [—] Schen v.
Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 22 N. E.
R 1073, 15 Am. St. R. 426; Hayes
v. Wells-Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 185;
83 Am. D. 89; Houton etc. Rail-

















































































































































'f'ERMINATION OF TliE HELA'l'ION. § §  277-279 
Delivery is the final duty of every carrier, as a carrier, and 
his extraordinary liability can be ended only by proper de­
livery of the goods or by a valid excuse for non-delivery. 
( 1 ) Delivery by the Common Carrier. 
§ 277. Essentials of delivery.-As proper delivery brings to 
an end the extraordinary liability of the common carrier it be­
comes important to define legal delivery. The carrier fulfifo1 
his duty only by a delivery 
(a )  4.t a reasonable time. 
(b )  At the proper place. 
( c )  In  a proper mauner. 
( d )  To the right person. 
(a )  . Time i>f Delivery. 
§ !78. Reasonable time.-As already brought out (sections 
246, 247 ) ,  the carriage must be completed within a reasonable 
time after the goods are accepted for transportation. It may 
now be added that delivery must be made on a proper day and 
at a reasonable time of the day. What is reasonable depends 
upon circumstances and custom, but generally speaking the 
consignee is not bound to receive goods out of business hours, 
or on a stormy day that makes the removal of the goods dan­
gerous. 
( b ) At the Proper Place. 
§ 279. General rule.-Formerly, in the absence ·of estab­
lished custom to the contrary, it was understood to be the duty 
of all common carriers to deliver the goods to the consignee 
§ 277. Hutchinson on Carriers, 
340 ; Eagle v. White, 6 Whar. (Pa. ) 
505, 37 Am. D. 434 ; Marshall v. 
American Express Co., 7 Wis. 1, 73 
Am. D. 381. 
§ 278. Hill v. Humphreys, 5 
Watts & S. (Pa. ) 123, 39 Am. D. 
117 ; Eagle v. White, 6 Whar. (Pa. ) 
505, 37 Am. D. 434 ; Morgan v. Dib­
ble, 29 Tex. 108, 94 Am. D. 264 ; 
Marshall v. American Express Co., 7 
Wis. 1, 73 Am. I\ 381 ; [-] Scheu 
v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 22 N. E. 
R. 1073, 15 Am. St. R. 426 ; Mc· 
Andrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 
Am. R.  657 ; Richardson v. Goddard, 
23 How. (U. S. ) 28. 
§ 279. [ -] American Express 
Co. v. Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 A m .  
D. 691 ; McMasters v .  Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co., 69 Pa. St. 37 4, 8 Am. 
R. 264 ; Turner v. Huff, 46 Ark. 
222, 55 Am. R. 580 ; [-] Scheu v. 
Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 22 N. E. 
R 1073, 15 Am. St. R. 426 ; Hayes 
v. Wells-Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 185 ; 
83 Am. D. 89 ; Houston etc. Rail­
way Co. v. Adams, 49 Te:r::. 748, SO 
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§§ 280.281 OF COMMON oxaamas.
personally at his residence or place of business, or according
to the directions of the consignor. But any carrier was per-
mitted to show an established usage in his business to make
delivery in a different manner. Usage as to the manner of
delivery by the various classes of common carriers is now so
well established that doubt as to what is the proper manner of
delivery by a given carrier rarely arises.
Except where modified by usage personal delivery is still
the rule, and the common carrier who would excuse such de-
livery must establish a custom exempting from the rule the
class of carriers to which he belongs. Such usage may be relied
on because every person is supposed to contract with reference
to the known usages of a trade. Delivery at the usual place is
sufficient unless the place of delivery is specified in the contract.
§280. Delivery by carriers by water.—Carriers by water
have always been excused from personal delivery. A ship
trading from one port to another has not the means of carrying
the goods on land; and according to the established course of
trade a delivery on the usual wharf and notice to the consignor
of the arrival of the goods is such a delivery as will discharge
the carrier.
§281. Delivery by railroads.—Like carriers by water rail-
roads have fixed places for delivery. Transportation being
along a line of rails between definite stations the delivery of
goods conveyed by railroads is necessarily confined to certain
Am. R. 116; Gibson v. Culver, 17
Wend. (N. Y.) 305, 31 Am. D. 297;!
[—] Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio (N.
Y.) 45, 43 Am. D. 649; Sonia Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. Steamer Red River,
106 La. 42, 30 So. R. 303, 87 Am. St.
R. 293; Hutchinson on Carriers,
341-342.
§280. Hyde v. Trent & Mersey
Navigation Co., 5 T. R. 389;
[—] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y.
510, 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. St.
R. 426; Morgan v. Dibble, 29 Tex.
108, 94 Am. D. 264; [—] Zinn v.
New Jersey Steamboat Co., 49 N.
Y. 442, 10 Am. R. 402; [—] Fisk
v. Newton, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 45, 43
Am. D. 649; McAndrew v. Whit-
lock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. R. 657;
Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. (N.
Y.) 39, 8 Am. D. 211; Kohn v.
Packard, 3 La. 224, 23 Am. D. 453;
Shenk v. Philadelphia Steam Pro-
peller Co., 60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am.
D. 541; Richardson v. Goddard, 23
How. U. S. 28.
§281. [—] Moses v. Boston &
Maine Railroad Co., 32 N. H. 523, 64
Am. D. 381; [—] Norway Plains
Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co.,
1 Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Am. D. 423;
Bansemer v. Toledo & Wabash Rail-
way Co., 25 Ind. 434, 87 Am. D.
367; Thomas v. Boston 80 Provi-
dence Railroad Corp., 10 Metc.


















































































































































§ §  280-281 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
personally at his residence or place of business, or according 
to the directions of the consignor. But any carrier was per­
mitted to show an established usage in his business to make 
delivery in a different manner. Usage as to the manner of 
delivery by the various classes of common carriers is now so 
well established that doubt as to what is the proper manner of 
delivery by a given carrier rarely arises. 
Except where modified by usage personal delivery is still 
the rule, and the common carrier who would excuse such de­
livery must establish a custom exempting from the rule the 
cl ass of carriers to which he belongs. Such usage may be relied 
on because every person is supposed to contract with reference 
to the known usages of a trade. Delivery at the usual place is 
sufficient unless the place of delivery is specified in the contract. 
� 280. Delivery by carriers by water.-Carriers by water 
have always been excused from personal delivery. A ship 
trading from one port to another has not the means of carrying 
the goods on land ; and according to the established course of 
trade a delivery on the usual wharf and notice to the consignor 
of the arrival of the goods is such a delivery as will discharge 
the carrier. 
§ 2gi . Delivery by railroads.-Like carriers by water rail­
roads have fixed places for delivery. Transportation being 
along a line of rails between definite stations the delivery of 
goods conveyed by railroads is necessarily confined to certain 
Am. R. 116 ; Gibson v. Culver, 17  
Wend. (N. Y. ) 305, 31 Am. D. 297 ; ! 
[ -] Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio (N. 
Y. ) 45, 43 Am. D. 649 ; Sonia Cot­
ton Oil Co. v. Steamer Red River, 
106 La. 42, 30 So. R. 303, 87 Am. St. 
R. 293 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, 
341-342. 
§ 280. Hyde v. Trent & Mersey 
Navigation Co., 5 T. R. 389 ; 
[-] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. 
510, 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. St. 
R. 426 ; Morgan v. Dibble, 29 Tex. 
108, 94 Am. D. 264 ; [-] Zinn v. 
New Jersey Steamboat Co., 49 N. 
Y. 442, 10 Am. R. 402 ; [-] Fisk 
v. Newton, 1 Denio (N. Y. ) 45, 43 
Am. D. 649 ; MeAndrew v. Whit-
lock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. R. 657 ; 
Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. ( N. 
Y.) 39, 8 Am. D. 211 ; Kohn v. 
Packard, 3 La. 224, 23 Am. D. 453 ; 
Shenk v. Philadelphia Steam Pro­
peller Co., 60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. 
D. 541 ; Richardson v. Goddard, 23 
How. U. S. 28. 
§ 281. [ -] Moses v. Boston & 
Maine Railroad Co., 32 N. H. 523, 64 
Am. D. 381 ; [-] Norway Plains 
Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 
1 Gray (Mass. ) 263, 61 Am. D. 423 ; 
Bansemer v. Toledo & Wabash Rail-
way Co., 25 Ind. 434, 87 Am. D. 
367 ; Thomas v. Boston & Provi­
dence Railroad Corp., 10 Mete. 
(Mass. ) 472, 43 Am. D. 444. 
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TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. 282-284
points on the line of the railroad track. Railroad companies
cannot, without maintaining an additional wagon service, pass
from warehouse to warehouse to discharge their freight on the
premises of the various consignees. Accordingly they estab-
lish platforms and warehouses on their lines, and there dis-
charge their freight to await the removal by the consignee. The
precise moment at which delivery by a railroad to itself as
warehouseman terminates its liability as common carrier is
considered in sections 301-304, post.
§282. Delivery by express companies has always been per-
sonal except at stations too small to warrant keeping special
wagons for such delivery. The express companies owe their
origin largely to the necessity of personal care and delivery of
small packages of considerable value, and to this duty the law
holds them with strictness unless a clear and well-established
custom has modified their duty in a given instance.
§ 283. iShipment G. 0. D.—The law places on the carrier
no obligation to receive goods for carriage with the further
duty “to collect on delivery,” but frequently by contract or
custom, carriers, especially express companies, undertake such
services, and in such case they must perform the services and
deliver the goods according to instructions. The carrier is the
agent of the shipper to collect and return the money, and he
may allow the consignee to inspect the goods and even to carry
them away on condition that if they are not satisfactory they
may be returned and the money recovered. If the consignee
rejects the goods the shipper should be notified, and the carrier
holds the goods as warehouseman.
(0) In a Proper Manner.
§284. Delivery safe and c0nvenient.—In making delivery
the carrier is bound to consult the convenience of the consignee
§282. Baldwin v. American Exp.
Co., 23 Ill. 120, 74 Am. D. 190;
[—] Bullard v. American Express
Co., 107 Mich, 695, 65 N. W. R. 551,
61 Am. St. R. 358, and extended
note; [—] American Express Co. v.
Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 Am. D.
691; [—] Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. Y.
335; Witbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y.
13, 6 Am. R. 23; Hayes v. Wells,
Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 185, 83 Am. D.
89; Hutchinson on Carriers, 379-382.
§283. American Express Co. v.
Lesem, 39 Ill. 313'; [——] Hasse v.
American Express Co. 94 Mich. 133,
53 N. W. R. 918, 34 Am. St. R. 328;
Weed v. Barney, 45 N. Y. 344, 6 Am.
R. 96; Hutchinson on Carriers, 389-
393.

















































































































































TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. § §  282-284 
points on the line of the railroad track. Railroad companit'S 
cannot, without maintaining an additional wagon service, pass 
from warehouse to warehouse to discharge their freight on the 
premises of the various consignees. Accordingly tbey estab­
lish platforms and warehouses on their lines, and there di-.­
charge their freight to await the removal by the consignee. The 
precise moment at which delivery by a railroad to itself as 
warehouseman terminates its liability as common carrier is 
considered in sections 301-304, post. 
§ 282. Delivery by express companies has always been per­
sonal except at stations too small to warrant keeping special 
wagons for such delivery. The express companies owe their 
origin largely to the necessity of personal care and delivery of 
small packages of considerable value, and to this duty the law 
holds them with strictness unless a clear and well-established 
custom has modified their duty in a given instance. 
§ 283. -Shipment C. 0. D.-The law places on the carrier 
no obligation to receive goods for carriage with the further 
duty " to collect on delivery, " but frequently by contract or 
custom, carriers, especially express companies, undertake such 
services, and in such case they must perform the ·services and 
deliver the goods according to instructions. The carrier is the 
agent of the shipper to collect and return the money, and he 
may allow the consignee to inspect the goods and even to carry 
them away on condition that if they are not satisfactory they 
may be returned and the money recovered. If the consignee 
rejects the goods the shipper should be notified, and the carrier 
holds the goods as warehouseman . 
(c )  In a Proper Manner. 
§ 284. Delivery safe and convenient.-In making delivery 
the carrier is bound to consult the convenience of the consi�nee 
§ 282. Baldwin v. American Exp. 
Co., 23 Ill. 120, 7 4 Am. D. 190 ; 
[ -] Bullard v. American Express 
Co., 107 Mich, 695, 65 N. W. R. 551, 
61 Am. St. R. 358, and extended 
note ; [-] American Express Co. v. 
Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 Am. D. 
691 ; [-] Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. Y. 
335 ; Witbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y. 
IS, 6 Am. R. 23 ; Hayes v, Wells, 
Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 185, 83 Am. D. 
89 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, 379-382. 
§ 283. American Express Co. v. 
Lesem, 39 Ill. 313 ; [ -] Hasse v. 
American Express Co. 94 Mich. 133, 
53 N. W. R. 918, 34 Am. St. R. 328 ; 
Weed v. Barney, 45 N. Y. 344, 6 Am. 
R. 96 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, 389-
393. 
§ 284, Morgan "°· Dibble, 29 Tex, 
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§§-235-236 OF cOmmOn CARRIERS.
and the safety of the goods. They must be so placed as to be
convenient of access, under such circumstances that the con-
signee may receive and take them away with reasonable dis-
patch and safety. Until he has had an opportunity to do so the
carrier is bound to properly protect them from untoward
weather and other injurious conditions. Whether the delivery
has been made under proper circumstances is a question of
fact to be determined from all the evidence in each case.
(d) To the Right Person.
§285. Carrier absolutely lia.ble.—Finally delivery must be
made to the right person. “No circumstances of fraud, imposi-
tion, or mistake will excuse the common carrier from responsi-
bility for delivery to the wrong person.” Delivery to one not
entitled to receive them is conversion by the carrier, and so is
refusal to deliver to the right person when he has properly
established his identity and his right to the goods.
§ 286. ——Il1ustrations.—Thus the carrier is liable if he de-
livers the goods to the wrong party by mistake, or to an agent
not authorized to receive them, or to one who has secured
goods to be sent by the consignor on a forged order. If an
order is sent in the name of a fictitious firm, the carrier is
liable by the weight of authority even though the delivery is
made to the one who sent the order. On this however the
J08, 94 Am. D. 264; McAndrew v.
Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. R.
657; Sonia Cotton Oil Co. v.
Steamer Red River, 106 La. 42, 30
So. R. 303, 87 Am. St. R. 293;
[—] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y.
510,. 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. St.
R. 426.
§285. [—] Pacific Express Co.
v. Shearer, 160 Ill. 215, 43 N. E. R.
816, 52 Am. st. R. 324; Price v.
Oswego and Syracuse Railway Co.,
50 N. Y. 213, 10 Am. R. 475; Shenk
v. Philadelphia Steam Propeller Co.,
60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. D. 541;
Weyand v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Co., 75 Iowa 573,
39 N. W. R. 899, 9 Am. St. R. 504;
Houston etc. Railway Co. v. Adams,
49 Tex. 748, 30 Am. R. 116;
[—] Hawkins v. Hofiman, 6 Hill
(N. Y.) 586, 41 Am. D. 767;
[—] McEntee v. New Jersey Steam-
boat Co., 45 N. Y. 34, 6 Am. R. 28;
Hutchinson on Carriers, 344.
§286. Price v. Railroad Co., 50
N. Y. 213, 10 Am. R. 475; [—] Mc-
Entee v. New Jersey Steamboat Co.,
45 N. Y. 34, 6 Am. R. 28; Samuel
v. Cheney, 135 Mass. 278, 46 Am. R.
467; Adams v. Blankenstein, 2 Cal.
413, 56 Am. D. 350. But compare
Dunbar v. Boston & Providence
Railroad Corp., 110 Mass. 26, 14
Am. R. 576, and Winslow v. Rail-

















































































































































§ § ·285-286 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
and the safety of the goods. They must be so placed as to be 
convenient of access, under such circumstances that the con­
signee may receive and take them away with reasonable dis­
patch and safety. Until he has had an opportunity to do so the 
carrier is bound to properly protect them from untoward 
weather and other injurious conditions. Whether the delivery 
has been made under proper circumstances is a question of 
fact to be determined from all the evidence in each case. 
(d) To the Right Person. 
§ 285. Canier absolutely liable.-Finally delivery must be 
made to the right person. ' ' No circumstances of fraud, imposi­
tion, or mistake will excuse the common carrier from responsi­
bility for delivery to the wrong person. ' '  Delivery to one not 
entitled to receive them is conversion by the carrier, and so is 
refusal to deliver to the right person when he has properly 
established his identity and his right to the goods. 
§ 286. --IDustra.tions.-Thus the carrier is liable if he de­
livers the goods to the wrpng party by mistake, or to an agent 
not authorized to receive them, or to one who has secure<l 
goods to be sent by the consignor on a forged order. If an 
order is sent in the name of a fictitious firm, the carrier is 
liable by the weight of authority even though the delivery is 
made to the one who sent the order. On this however the 
1 08, 94 Am. D. 264 ; MeAndrew v. Houston etc. Railway Co. v. Adams, 
Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. R. 49 Tex. 748, 30 Am. R. 116 ; 
657 ; Sonia Cotton Oil Co. v. [-] Haw kine v. Hoffman, 6 Hill 
Steamer Red River, 106 La. 42, 30 (N. Y. ) 586, 41 Am. D. 767 ; 
So. R. 303, 87 Am. St. R. 293 ; [-] MeEntee v. New Jersey Steam­
[ -] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. boat Co., 45 N. Y. 3-4:, 6 Am. R. 28 ; 
510, 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. St. Hutchinson on Carriere, 344. 
R. 426. § 286. Price v. Railroad Co., 50 
§ 285. [-] Pacific Expreee Co. N. Y. 213, 10 Am. R. 475 ; [-] Me-
v. Shearer, 160 Ill. 215, 43 N. E. R. Entee v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 
816, 52 Am. St. R. 324 ; Price '" 45 N. Y. 34, 6 Am. R. 28 ; Samuel · 
Oswego and Syracuse Railway Co., v. Cheney, 135 Mase. 278, 46 Am. R. 
50 N. Y. 2131 10 Am. R. 475 ; Shenk 467 ; Adame v. Blankenetein, 2 Cal. 
v. Philadelphia Steam Propeller Co., 413, 56 Am. D. 350. But compare 
60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. D. 541 ; Dunbar v. Boston & Providence 
Weyand v. Atchison, Topeka & Railroad Corp., 110  Mase. 26, 14 
Santa Fe Railway Co., 75 Iowa 573, Am. R. 576, and Winslow v. Rail-
39 N. W. R. 899, 9 Am. St. R. 504 ; road Co., 42 Vt. 700, 1 Am. R. 365. 
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TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. §§ 287-289
cases do not seem to be entirely harmonious. But if the goods
were misdirected, or directed to a swindler, the carrier will
be justified by delivery according to directions. And so he
will if the consignor induces or ratifies the delivery.
§287. Bill of lading.—The bill of lading is the representa-
tive of the goods. To insure safety in delivering the goods the
carrier should insist on the presentation of the proper bill of
lading by one known to the carrier to be the consignee, or his
transferee or authorized agent.
§ 288. Delivery to consignee.—Presumptively, the consignee
is the owner of the goods and therefore ordinarily delivery
should be made to him or to his transferee. If delivery is made
to any one else the carrier is liable to an action of trover by any
rightful holder of the bill of lading. It will however always be
suflicient excuse that delivery has been made to the true owner
or according to his directions, though contrary to the direc-
tions of the bill of lading. But in such case the carrier assumes
the burden of proving that he delivered to one having para-
mount rights.
§289. Interpleader.—So long as the carrier has reasonable
ground for uncertainty as to the proper person to whom deliv-
ery should be made he is justified in delaying for proper iden-
tification. “Reasonable hesitation in a doubtful matter is not
evidence of conversion.” If need be resort may be had to the
courts to determine by interpleader or otherwise between rival
claimants.
§287. See Sec. 224, ante and the
cases there cited, and Weyand v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
way Co., 75 Iowa 573, 39 N. W. R.
899, 9 Am. St. R. 504 ; [—] Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co. v. Stern, 119
Pa. St. 24, 12 Atl. R. 756, 4 Am.
St. R. 626; [—] Shaw v. Railway
Co., 101 U. S. 557.
§288. [—] Dyer v. Great
Northern Railway Co., 51 Minn. 345,
53 N. W. R. 714, 38 Am. St. R.
506; [—] Sweet v. Barney, 23 N.
Y. 335; Wolfe v. Missouri Pacific
Railway Co., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W.
R. 49, 10 Am. St. R. 331; [—] Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co. v. Stern, 119
Pa. St. 24, 12 Atl. R. 756, 4 Am. St.
R. 626.
§ 289. Wells v. American Express
Co., 55 Wis. 23, 11 N. W. R. 537, 42
Am. R. 695; Shellenberg v. Fremont
etc. Railroad Co., 45 Neb. 487, 63
N. W. R. 859, 50 Am. St. R. 561;
[—] McEntee v. New Jersey Steam-
boat Co., 45 N. Y. 34, 6 Am. R. 28;
The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575; Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 7 N. H. 452, 28 Am. D,
359; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend.
(N. Y.) 168, 35 Am. D. 607. Ex-


















































































































































T:mRMINAtION OF TH:m R:mLATION. § §  287-289 
cases do not seem to be entirely harmonious. But if the goods 
were misdirected, or directed to a swindler, the carrier will 
be justified by delivery according to directions. And so he 
will if the consignor induces or ratifies the delivery. 
§ 287. Bill of lading.-The bill of lading is the representa­
tive of the goods. To insure safety in delivering the goods the 
carrier should insist on the presentation of the proper bill of 
lading by one known to the carrier to be the consignee, or his 
transferee or authorized agent. 
§ 288. Delivery to consignee.-Presumptively, the consignee 
is the owner of the goods and therefore ordinarily delivery 
should be made to him or to his transferee. If delivery is made 
to any one else the carrier is liable to an action of trover by anr 
rightful holder of the bill of lading. It will however always be 
sufficient excuse that delivery has been made to the true owner 
or according to his directions, though contrary to the direc­
tions of the bill of lading. But in such case the carrier assumes 
the burden of proving that he delivered to one having para­
mount rights. 
§ 289. Interpleader.-So long as the carrier has reasonable 
ground for uncertainty as to the proper person to whom deliv­
ery should be made he is justified in delaying for proper iden­
tification. " Reasonable hesitation in a doubtful matter is not 
evidence of conversion. ' '  If need be resort may be had to the 
courts to determine by interpleader or otherwise between rival 
claimants. 
I 287. See Sec. 224, ante and the sylvania Railroad Co. v. Stern, 119 
cases there cited, and Weyand v. Pa. St. 24, 1 2  Atl. R. 756, 4 Am. St. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail- R. 626. 
way Co., 75 Iowa 573, 39 N. W. R. § 289. Wells v. American Express 
899, 9 Am. St. R. 504 ; [-] Penn- Co., 55 Wis. 23, 11 N. W. R. 537, 42 
sylvania Railroad Co. v. Stern, 119 Am. R. 695 ; Shellenberg v. Fremont 
Pa. St. 24, 12 Atl. R. 756, 4 Am. etc. Railroad Co., 45 Neb. 487, 63 
St. R. 626 ; (-] Shaw v. Railway N. W. R. 859, 50 Am. St. R. 561 ; 
Co., 101 U. S. 557. [-] McEntee v. New Jersey Steam-
§ 288. [-] Dyer v. Great boat Co., 45 N. Y. 34, 6 Am. R. 28 ; 
Northern Railway Co., 51 Minn. 345, The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575 ; Fletcher v. 
53 N. W. R. 714, 38 Am. St. R. Fletcher, 7 N. H. 452, 28 Am. D� 
506 ; [ -] Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. 359 ; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. 
Y. 335 ; Wolfe v. Missouri Pacific ( N. Y. ) 168, 35 Am. D. 607. Ex­
Railway Co., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. tended note to 91 Am. St. R. 593, 
R. 491 10 Am. St. R. 331 ; [-] Penn- post sec. 309. 
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§§ 290-292 0F COMMON CARRIERS.
Connecting Carriers.
§290. Delivery to a connecting carrier.—When goods are
received to be carried beyond the terminus of the carrier ’s line
the liability of such carrier is terminated by delivering the
goods to the proper connecting carrier. If the shipping receipt
names the connecting lines the shipper ’s directions must be fol-
lowed. Delivery to a different connecting carrier amounts to
a conversion of the goods. If no directions are given, then the
customary or most convenient and direct route should be fol-
lowed. Each carrier beyond its own line is a mere forwarder
and is bound to use ordinary care.
§ 291. Duty to carry beyond carrier's route.—No carrier is
by law compelled to carry goods to points not on its own line.
But any carrier may by contract undertake responsibility for
the whole transit, including other lines as well as its own.
Such undertaking not being imposed by law, must rest upon a
contract, express or implied; and if a carrier by custom or traf-
fic arrangements with other lines, or by specific stipulations in
its bills of lading, holds itself out to carry beyond its own line
it will be liable for a refusal to perform such service.
§292. Partnership arrangements.—Thus several carriers
frequently make joint or partnership arrangements, the effect
of which is to create a mutual agency and to make each liable
§ 290. [—] Briggs v. Boston etc.
Railroad Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 246,
83 Am. D. 626; Robinson v. Baker,
5 Cush. (Mass.) 137, 51 Am. D. 54;
Johnson v. Transportation Co., 33
N. Y. 610, 88 Am. D. 416; Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co. v.
Thomas, 89 Ala. 294, 7 S. R. 762, 18
Am. St.‘ R. 119; Knight v. Provi-
denee & Worcester Railroad Co., 13
R. I. 572, 43 Am. R. 46; Hadd v.
Express Co., 52 Vt. 335, 36 Am. R.
757; Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Y.
611, 17 Am. R. 394.
§291. Myrick v. Michigan Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102, 1
Sup. Ct. 425; Hill Manufacturing
Co. v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Co.,
104 Mass. 122, 6 Am. R. 202; Bird
v. Railroads, 99 Tenn. 719, 42 S.
W. R. 451, 63 Am. St. R. 856; Per-
kins v. Portland etc. Railroad Co., 47
Me. 573, 74 Am. D. 507; Grover &
Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Mis-
souri Pacific Railway Co., 70 Mo.
672, 35 Am. R. 444; [—] Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Franken-
berg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 Am. R. 92;
[—] Bullard v. American Express
Co., 107 Mich. 695, 65 N. W. R. 551,
61 Am. St. R. 358, 371, note.
§292. [—] Champion v. Bost-
wick, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 175, 31 Am.
D. 376; Fitchburg etc. Railroad Co.
v. Hanna, 6 Gray (Mass.) 539, 66
Am. D. 427; [—] Nashua Lock Co.
v. Worcester & Nashua Railroad Co.,



















































































































































§§ 290-292 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
Connecting Carriers. 
§ 290. Delivery to a. connecting carrier.-When goods are 
received to be carried beyond the terminus of the carrier 's line 
the liability of such carrier is terminated by delivering the 
goods to the proper connecting carrier. If the shipping receipt 
names the connecting lines the shipper 's directions must be fol­
lowed. Delivery to a different connecting carrier amounts to 
a conversion of the goods. If no directions are given, then the 
customary or most convenient and direct route should be fol­
lowed. Each carrier beyond its own line is a mere forwarder 
and is bound to use ordinary care. 
§ 291. Duty to carry beyond carrier 's route.-No carrier is 
by law compelled to carry goods to points not on its own line. 
But any carrier may by contract undertake responsibility for 
the whole transit, including other lines as well as its own. 
Such undertaking not being imposed by law, must rest upon a 
contract, express or implied ; and if a carrier by custom or traf­
fic arrangements with other lines, or by specific stipulations in 
its bills of lading, holds itself out to carry beyond its own line 
it will be liable for a refusal to perform such service. 
§ 292. Partnership arrangements.-Thus several carriers 
frequently make joint or partnership arrangements, the effect 
of which is to create a mutual agency and to make each liable 
§ 290. [-] Briggs v. Boston etc. 
Railroad Co., 6 Allen ( Mass. ) 246, 
83 Am. D. 626 ; Robinson v. Baker, 
r. Cush. (Mass. ) 137, 51 Am. D. 54 ; 
Johnson v. Transportation Co., 33 
N. Y. 610, 88 Am. D. 416 ; Alabama 
Great Southern Railroad Co. v. 
'l'homas, 89 Ala. 294, 7 S. R. 762, 18 
Am. St., R. 119 ; Knight v. Provi­
dence & Worcester Railroad Co., 13  
R .  I.  572, 43  Am. R .  46 ; Hadd v. 
Express Co., 52 Vt. 335, 36 Am. R. 
757 ; Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Y. 
611, 17 Am. R. 394. 
§ 291. Myrick v. Michigan Cen· 
tral Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102, 1 
Sup. Ct. 425 ; Hill Manufacturing 
Co. v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Co., 
l 04 Mass. 122, 6 Am. R. 202 ; Bird 
v. Railroads, 99 Tenn. 719, 42 S. 
W. R. 451, 63 Am. St. R. 856 ; Per· 
kins v. Portland etc. Railroad Co., 47 
Me. 573, 7 4 Am. D. 507 ; Grover & 
Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Mis· 
souri Pacific Railway Co., 70 Mo. 
672, 35 Am. R. 444 ; [ -] Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Franken· 
berg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 Am. R. 92 ; 
[-] Bullard v. American Express 
Co., 107 Mich. 695, 65 N. W. R. 551, 
61 Am. St. R. 358, 371, note. 
§ 292. [-] Champion v. Bost­
wick, 18 Wend. (N. Y. ) 175, 31 Am. 
D. 376 ; Fitchburg etc. Railroad Co. 
v. Hanna, 6 Gray (Mass. ) 539, 66 
Am. D. 427 ; [-] Nashua Lock Co. 
v. Worcester & Nashua Railroad Co., 
48 . N. H. 3391 2 Am. R. 242 ; Rocky 
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TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. 293'294,
for the acts and contracts of all. Such are agreements to divide
expenses and profits pro rota, to jointly employ common agents,
to receive and carry goods and cars on through arrangements.
Whether agreements create joint liability is to be determined
from the facts of each case. Giving through rates, shipping in
a through car, receiving prepayment of freight for the whole
route, and receiving goods “to forward” are evidences of such
joint arrangements which have been considered sufficient to
justify a jury in finding the contract to be one for through
transportation. . .
§293. Goods directed beyond carrier’s terminus.—In Eng-
land and several of the American states the rule of Muschamp’s
case is followed, according to which the acceptance of goods
directed to a point beyond the carrier’s line is prima facie evi-
dence of a contract for through transit. In the absence of a
contract to the contrary or of facts that deny the presumption,
the initial carrier so receiving the goods assumes liability for
through transportation. This rule finds its justification in the
hardship of compelling the shipper to locate the particular car-
rier on whose road the loss occurred.
§294. American rule.—By the great weight of authority in
the United States a carrier by the mere acceptance of goods
Mount Mills v. Wilmington etc.
Railroad Co., 119 N. C. 693, 25 S. E.
R. 854, 56 Am. St. R. 682; Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35
Neb. 267, 53 N. W. R. 76, 37 Am.
St. R. 437; Bradford v. South Caro-
lina Railroad Co., 7 Rich. L. (S. C.)
201, 62 Am. D. 411. See also the
note to 72 Am. D. 238, and com-
pare Irvin v. Nashville etc. Railroad
C0., 92 Ill. 103, 34 Am. R. 116, with
Hot Springs Railroad Co. v. Trippe,
42 Ark. 465, 48 Am. R. 65.
§293. Muschamp v. Lancaster
etc. Railway Co., 8 Mees. & W. 421;
Erie Railway Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill.
239, 25 Am. R. 451; [—] Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Franken-
berg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 Am. R. 92. See
also [—] Nashua Lock Co. v. Wor-
cester & Nashua Railroad Co., 48 N.
H. 339, 2 Am. R. 242; [—] Quimby
v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am.
D. 469.
§294. [—] McMillan v. Michi-
gan Southern etc. Railroad Co., 16
Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 208;
[—] Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.
Y. 306, 72 Am. D. 469; Myrick v.
Michigan Central Railroad Co., 107
U. s. 102, 1 Sup. ct. 425;
[—] Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester
& Nashua Railroad Co., 48 N. H.
339, 2 Am. R. 242; Alabama
Great Southern Railway Co. v.
Thomas, 89 Ala. 294, 7 S. R. 762,
18 Am. St. R. 119; Knight v. Provi-
dence & Worcester Railroad Co., 13
R. I. 572, 43 Am. R. 46; Burroughs
v. Norwich & Worcester Railroad
Co., 100 Mass. 26, 1 Am. R. 78;
Hadd v. Express Co., 52 Vt. 335, 36
Am. R. 757. See also Gray v. Jack-

















































































































































TERMINATION OF T:ElE RELATION. § §  293-294 
for the acts and contracts of all. Such are agreements to divide 
expenses and profits pro rata, to jointly employ common agents, 
to receive and carry goods and cars on through arrangements. 
Whether agreements create joint liability is to be determined 
from the facts of each case. Giving through rates, shipping in 
a through car, receiving prepayment of freight for the whole 
route, and receiving goods ' ' to forward ' '  are evidences of such 
joint arrangements which have been considered sufficient to 
justify a jury in finding the contract to be one for through 
transportation. 
§ 293. Goods directed beyond carrier 's terminus.-In Eng­
land and several of the American states the rule of Muschamp 's 
case is followed, according to which the acceptance of goods 
directed to a point beyond the carrier 's line is prima facie evi­
dence of a contract for through transit. In the absence of a 
contract to the contrary or of facts that deny the presumption, 
the initial carrier so receiving the goods assumes liability for 
through transportation. This rule finds its justification in the 
hai;dship of compelling the shipper to locate the particular car­
rier on whose road the loss occurred. 
§ 294. American rule.-By the great weight of authority in 
the United States a carrier by the mere acceptance of goods 
Mount Mills v. Wilmington etc. 
Railroad Co., 119 N. C. 693, 25 S. E. 
R. 854, 56 Am. St. R. 682 ; Missouri 
Pacific Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35 
Neb. 267, 53 N. W. R. 76, 37 Am. 
St. R. 437 ; Bradford v. South Caro­
lina Railroad Co., 7 Rich. L. (S. C. ) 
201, 62 Am. D. 411. See also the 
note to 72 Am. D. 238, and com­
pare Irvin v. Nashville etc. Railroad 
Co., 92 III. 103, 34 Am. R. 1 16, with 
Hot Springs Railroad Co. v. Trippe, 
42 Ark. 465, 48 Am. R. 65. 
§ 293. Muschamp v. Lancaster 
etc. Railway Co., 8 Mees. & W. 421 ; 
Erie Railway Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 
239, 25 Am. R. 451 ; [-] Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Franken­
berg, 54 Ill. 88, 5 Am. R. 92. See 
also [-] Nashua Lock Co. v. Wor­
cester & Nashua Railroad Co., 48 N. 
H. 3397 2 Am. R. 242 ; [-] Quimby 
v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am. 
D. 469. 
§ 294. [-] McMillan v. Michi­
gan Southern etc. Railroad Co., 16  
Mich. 79, 93  Am. D.  208 ; 
L-] Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 1 7  N. 
Y. 306, 72 Am. D. 469 ; Myrick v. 
Michigan Central Railroad Co., 107 
U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. 425 ; 
[-] Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester 
& Nashua Railroad Co., 4.8 N. H. 
339, 2 Am. R. 242 ; Alabama 
Great Southern Railway Co. v. 
Thomas, 89 Ala. 294, 7 S. R. 762, 
18 Am. St. R. 119 ; Knight v. Provi­
dence & Worcester Railroad Co., l 3 
R. I. 572, 43 Am. R. 46 ; Burroughs 
v. Norwich & Worcester Railroad 
Co., 100 Mass. 26, 1 Am. R. 78 ; 
Hadd v. Express Co., 52 Vt. 335, 36 
Am. R. 757. See also Gray v. Jack­
son, 51 N. H. 9, 1 2  Am. R. I. 
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directed to a point not on its own line undertakes to perform
its part of the carriage and to deliver the goods to the next
connecting carrier for further transportation. Prima facie the
responsibility of each carrier is limited to its own line, and
delivery to the next connecting line. ‘
§295. Special contract.—But whatever the rule as to what
facts are sufficient to show a through contract, it is settled not
only that a carrier may by special contract assume liability for
through shipment, but that he may also relieve himself of all
liability beyond his own line. Such limitations are inserted in
most modern shipping contracts.
Under the American rule the local freight agent has no im-
plied power to make through contracts contrary to the custom
and instructions of his principal. Only the general agent has
such power. ~
§296. Carriers agents of the consignor.—It has been seen
that when several carriers form a line under joint arrangements
each is the agent of the others for transportation. But when
the liability of each carrier is limited to his own line the con-
signor constitutes each carrier his forwarding agent for whose
acts he is liable, and who in turn is liable to him as principal
for any failure to follow instructions in forwarding the goods.
§ 297. What amounts to delivery to a. connecting carrier.-
The shipper has a right to understand that the liability as a
common carrier is upon some one during the whole period of
the transportation. The liability of one carrier is not dis-
§ 295. [—] Nashua Lock Co. v.
Worcester & Nashua Railroad Co.,
cific Railway Co., 70 Mo. 672, 35
Am. R. 444.
48 N. H. 339, 2 Am. R. 242;
[—] Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.
Y. 306, 72 Am. D. 469; Perkins v.
Portland etc. Railroad Co., 47 Me.
573, 74 Am. D. 507; [—] Hansen
v. Flint & P. M. Railroad Co., 73
Wis. 346, 41 N. W. R. 529, 9 Am.
St. R. 791; Wheeler v. San Fran-
cisco etc. Railroad Co., 31 Cal. 46,
89 Am. D. 147; Cincinnati etc.
Railroad Co. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio St.
221, 2 Am. R. 391; Burroughs v.
Norwich etc. Railroad Co., 100 Mass.
26, 1 Am. R. 78; Grover & Baker
Sewing Machine Co. v. Missouri P8.-
§296. [—] Briggs v. Boston &
Lowell Railroad Co., 6 Allen
(Mass.) 246, 83 Am. D. 626; John-
son v. Transportation Co., 33 N. Y.
610, 88 Am. D. 416; Missouri Pa-
cific Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35 Neb.
267, 53 N. W. R. 76, 37 Am. St. R.
437; Halliday v. St. Louis etc. Rail-
way Co., 74 Mo. 159, 41 Am. R. 309.
§297. [—] Condon v. Mar-
quette etc. R. R. Co., 55 Mich.
218, 21 N. W. R. 321, 54 Am. R.
367 ; Irish v. Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway Co., 19 Minn. 376. 18

















































































































































§ § 295-297 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
directed to a point not on its own line undertakes to perform 
its part of the carriage and to deliver the goods to the next 
connecting carrier for further transportation. Prima facie the 
responsibility of each carrier is limited to its own line, and 
delivery to the next connecting line, 
§ 295. Special contract.-But whatever the rule as to what 
facts are sufficient to show a through contract, it is settled not 
only that a carrier may by special contract assume liability for 
through shipment, but that he may also relieve himself of all 
liability beyond his own line. Such limitations are inserted in 
most modern shipping contracts. 
Under the American rule the local freight agent has no im­
plied power to make through contracts contrary to the custom 
and instructions of his principal. Only the general agent has 
such power. 
§ 296. Oaniers agents of the consignor.-It has been seen 
that when several carriers form a line under joint arrangements 
each is the agent of the others for transportation. But when 
the liability of each carrier is limited to his own line the con­
signor constitutes each carrier his forwarding agent for whose 
acts he is liable, and who in turn is liable to him as principal 
for any failure to follow instructions in forwarding the goods. 
§ 297. What amounts to delivery to a connecting canier.­
The shipper has a right to understand that the liability as a 
common carrier is upon some one during the whole period of 
the transportation. The liability of one carrier is not dis-
§ 295. [-] Nashua Lock Co. v. cific Railway Co., 70 Mo. 672, 35 
Worcester & Nashua Railroad Co., Am. R. 444. 
48 N. H. 339, 2 Am. R. 242 ; § 296. [-J Briggs v. Boston & 
[-] Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Lowell Railroad Co., 6 Allen 
Y. 306, 72 Am. D. 469 ; Perkins v. (Mass. ) 246, 83 Am. D. 626 ; John­
Portland etc. Railroad Co., 47 Me. son v. Transportation Co., 33 N. Y. 
573, 74 Am. D. 507 ; [-] Hansen 610, 88 Am. D. 416 ; Missouri Pa· 
v. Flint & P. M. Railroad Co., 73 cific Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35 Neb. 
Wis. 346, 41 N. W. R. 529, 9 Am. 267, 53 N. W. R. 76, 37 Am. St. R. 
St. R. 791 ; Wheeler v. San Fran- 437 ; Halliday v. St. Louis etc. Rail­
cisco etc. Railroad Co., 31 Cal. 46, way Co., 74 Mo. 159, 41 Am. R. 309. 
89 Am. D. 147 ; Cincinnati etc. § 297. [-) Condon v. Mar· 
Railroad Co. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio St. quette etc. R. It. Co., 55 Mich. 
221, 2 Am. R. 391 ; Burroughs v. 218, 21 N. W. R. 321, 54 Am. R. 
Norwich etc. Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 367 ; Irish v. Milwaukee & St. 
26, 1 Am. R. 78 ; Grover & Baker Paul Railway Co., 19 Minn. 376. 18  
Sewing Machine Co, v. Missouri Pa- Am. R. 840 ; Rawson v. Holland, 5A 
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TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. § 298
charged until that of the next connecting carrier has been as-
sumed; and this does not take place until there is a delivery of
the goods to the succeeding carrier, or such a notification as
according to the course of business is equivalent to a tender of
delivery.
A carrier does not by storing the goods at the end of his own
line become a warehouseman, but remains a common carrier of
the goods until he has made a proper tender thereof to the suc-
ceeding carrier, or has performed such acts as are tantamount
to a delivery. Thus he may notify the next carrier that the
goods have been placed where such carrier usually receives
them, or if such be the custom between the carriers he may
leave them without notice. If the connecting carrier refuses
to receive them, the first carrier must properly store them and
notify the consignor or the consignee.
§298. Presumption as to carrier liable.—Conditions once
proved to have existed are presumed to continue until the con-
trary is shown is the principle applied in fastening responsibil-
ity for loss when it does not appear on which of several con-
necting lines the damage was done. Prima facie that carrier is
liable in whose possession the goods are found in a damaged
condition, but in the United States an action can be maintained
N. Y. 611, 17 Am. R. 394; [—] Jud-
son v. Western Railroad Corp., 4
Allen (Mass.) 520, 81 Am. D. 718;
Lewis v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rail-
way Co., 47 W. Va. 656, 35 S. E. R.
908, 81 Am. St. R. 816; Gass v.
New York etc. Railroad Co., 99
Mass. 220, 96 Am. D. 742; Ladue
v. Grifiith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82 Am. D.
360; Conkey v. Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway Co., 31 Wis. 619, 11
Am. R. 630; Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Co., 33 N. Y. 610, 88 Am. D.
416; Grand Rapids & Indiana Rail-
road Co. v. Diether, 10 Ind. App.
206, 37 N. E. R. 39, 53 Am. St. R.
385; Goold v. Chapin, 20 N. Y. 259,
75 Am. D. 398.
§298. Laughlin v. Chicago &
North Western Railway Co., 28 Wis.
204, 9 Am. R. 493; [—] Moore v.
New York etc. Railroad Co., 173
Mass. 335, 53 N. E. R. 816, 73 Am.
St. R. 298; Shriver v. Sioux City
etc. Railroad Co., 24 Minn. 506, 31
Am. R. 353; Cooper v. Georgia Pa-
cific Railway Co., 92 Ala. 329, 9 S.
R. 159, 25 Am. St. R. 59; Savannah
etc. Railroad Co. Iv. Harris, 26 Fla.
148, 7 S. R. 544, 23 Am. St. R. 551;
[—] Hinkle v. Southern Railway
Co., 126 N. C. 932, 35 S. E. R. 810,
78 Am. St. R. 685; [—] Morganton
Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River etc. Railway
Co., 121 N. C. 514, 28 S. E. R. 474,
61 Am. St. R. 679; Beard v. Illinois
Central Railway Co., 79 Iowa, 518,
44 N. W. R. 800, 18 Am. St. R. 381;
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Adams, 78 Tex. 372, 14 S. W. R.
666, 22 Am. St. R. 56; Missouri Pa-
cific Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35 Neb.


















































































































































TERMINATION 0}� THE RELATION. § 298 
charged until that of the next connecting carrier has been as­
sumed ; and this does not take place until there is a delivery of 
the goods to the succeeding carrier, or such a notification as 
according to the course of business is equivalent to a tender of 
delivery. 
A carrier does not by storing the goods at the end of his own 
line become a warehouseman, but remains a common carrier of 
the goods until he has made a proper tender thereof to the suc­
ceeding carrier, or has performed such acts as are tantamount 
to a delivery. Thus he may notify the next carrier that the 
good15 have been placed where such carrier usually receives 
them, or if such be the custom between the carriers he may 
leave them without notice. If the connecting carrier refuses 
to receive them, the first carrier must properly store them and 
notify the consignor or the consignee. 
§ 298. Presumption as to carrier li&ble.-Conditions once 
proved to have existed are presumed to continue until the con­
trary is shown is the principle applied in fastening responsibil­
ity for loss when it does not appear on which of several con­
necting lines the damage was done. Prima f acie that carrier is 
liable in whose possession the goods are found in a damaged 
condition, but in the United States an action can be maintained 
N. Y. 611, 17 Am. R. 394 ; [-] Jud· Mass. 335, 53 N. E. R. 816, 73 Am. 
son v. Western Railroad Corp., 4 St. R. 298 ; Shriver v. Sioux City 
Allen (Mass.) 520, 81 Am. D. 718 ; etc. Railroad Co., 24 Minn. 506, 31 
Lewis v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rail· Am. R. 353 ; Cooper v. Georgia Pa­
way Co., 47 W. Va. 656, 35 S. E. R. cific Railway Co., 92 Ala. 329, 9 S. 
908, 81 Am. St. R. 816 ; Gass v. R. 159, 25 Am. St. R. 59 ; Savannah 
New York etc. Railroad Co., 99 etc. Railroad Co. ·v. Harris, 26 Fla. 
Mass. 220, 96 Am. D. 742 ; Ladue ' 148, 7 S. R. 544, 23 Am. St. R. 551 ; 
v. Griffith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82 Am. D. [-] Hinkle v. Southern Railway 
360 ; Conkey v. Milwaukee & St. Co., 126 N. C. 932, 35 S. E. R. 810, 
Paul Railway Co., 31 Wis. 619, 11 78 Am. St. R. 685 ; [-] Morganton 
Am. R. 630 ; Johnson v. Transporta- Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River etc. Railway 
tion Co., 33 N. Y. 610, 88 Am. D. Co., 121 N. C. 514, 28 S. E. R. 474, 
416 ; Grand Rapids & Indiana Rail- 61 Am. St. R. 679 ; Beard v. Illinois 
road Co. v. Diether, 10 Ind. App. Central Railway Co., 79 Iowa, 518, 
206, 37 N. E. R. 39, 53 Am. St. R. 44 N. W. R. 800, 18 Am. St. R. 381 ; 
385 ; Goold v. Chapin, 20 N. Y. 259, Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. 
75 Am. D. 398. Adams, 78 Tex. 372, 14 S. W. R. 
§ 298. Laughlin v. Chicago & 666, 22 Am. St. R. 56 ; Missouri Pa­
North Western Railway Co., 28 Wis. cific Railway Co. v. Twiss, 35 Neb. 
204, 9 Am. R. 493 ; [-] Moore v. 267, 53 N. W. R. 76, 37 Am. St. R. 
New York etc. Railroad Co., 173 437. 
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against any previous carrier to whose default the loss is due.
Under the English rule only the initial carrier can be sued. In
any case, if there has been a recovery against one carrier he
has an action over against the carrier whose fault caused the
injury.
§ 299. Benefit to connecting carrier of contract exemptions.
—A connecting carrier is entitled to the benefit of limitations
of liability in the shipping contract only when the initial car-
rier contracted for through transportation, or stipulated that
the exemptions in the bill of lading should inure to the benefit
of all the carriers engaging in the transportation of the goods.
As such contracts are strictly construed no exemptions granted
to the initial carrier who undertakes only to receive the goods
and deliver them to the next connecting carrier will, by mere
implication, be extended to later carriers on the route.
§ 300. Delivery to a. wa.rehouseman.—Except in cases where
the carrier is bound to make personal delivery it is usually
proper to make delivery to a warehouseman. As has already
been explained, carriers by boat and by rail have always been
allowed to make such delivery, and delivery by a railroad
from itself as a common carrier to itself as a warehouseman at
the destination of the goods terminates its liability as a com-
mon carrier, and substitutes the liability of a warehouseman.
§301. ——What constitutes delivery to a warehouse so as
to terminate liability as a carrier is a question upon which
three rules may be noticed, resulting from three views as to the
moment when the carrier has performed his full duty as car-
rier. All agree that when such duty has been fully performed
liability as carrier immediately changes to that as warehouse-
man. These three rules have been ably set forth by the courts
of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Michigan respectively,
§299. [—] McMillan v. Michi- v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 1
gan Southern etc. Railroad Co., 16
Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 208; Bird v.
Railroads, 99 Tenn. 719, 42 S. W.
R. 451, 63 Am. St. R. 856; Maghee
v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Co., 45
N. Y. 514, 6 Am. R. 124; Halliday
v. St. Louis etc. Railway Co., 74 Mo.
159, 41 Am. R. 309; Faulkner v.
Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 37 Am. R. 574.
§300. [—] Norway Plains Co.
Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Am. D. 423;
[—] Moses v. Boston & Maine Rail-
road C0., 32 N. H. 523, 64 Am. D.
381; Thomas v. Boston & Provi-
dence Railroad Corp., 10 Metc.
(Mass.) 472, 43 Am. D. 444; Tar-
bell v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co.,
110 N. Y. 170, 17 N. E. R. 721, 6
Am. St. R. 350.
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§ §  299-301 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
against any previous carrier to whose default the loss is due. 
Under the English rule only the initial carrier can be sued. In 
any case, if there has been a recovery against one carrier he 
has an action over against the carrier whose fault caused the 
injury. 
§ 299. Benefit to connecting carrier of contract exemptions. 
-A connecting carrier is entitled to the benefit of limitations 
of liability in the shipping contract only when the initial car­
rier contracted for through transportation, or stipulated that 
the exemptions in the bill of lading should inure to the benefit 
of all the carriers engaging in the transportation of the goods. 
As such contracts are strictly construed no exemptions granted 
to the initial carrier who undertakes only to receive the goods 
and deliver them to the next connecting carrier will, by mere 
implication, be extended to later carriers on the route. 
§ 300. Delivery to a warehousem.a.n.-Except in cases where 
the carrier is bound to make personal delivery it is usually 
proper to make delivery to a warehouseman. As has already 
been explained, carriers by boat and by rail have always been 
al lowed to make such delivery, and delivery by a railroad 
from itself as a common carrier to itself as a warehouseman at 
the destination of the goods terminates its liability as a com­
mon carrier, and substitutes the liability of a warehouseman. 
§ 301. --What constitutes delivery to a warehouse so as 
to terminate liability as a carrier is a question upon which 
three rules may be noticed, resulting from three views as to the 
moment when the carrier has performed his full duty as car­
rier. All agree that when such duty has been fully performed 
liability as carrier immediately changes to that as warehouse­
man. These three rules have been ably set forth by the courts 
of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Michigan respectively, 
§ 299. [-] McMillan v. Michi­
gan Southern etc. Railroad Co., 16  
Mich. 79, 93 Am .  D .  208 ; Bird v. 
Railroads, 99 Tenn. 719, 42 S. W. 
R. 451, 63 Am. St. R. 856 ; l\faghee 
v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Co., 45 
N .  Y. 514, 6 Am. R. 124 ; Hallid>iy 
v. St. Louis etc. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 
1 59, 41 Am. R. 309 ; Faulkner v. 
Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 37 Am. R. 574. 
§ 300, [-] Norway Plains Co. 
v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 1 
Gray (Mass. ) 263, 61 Am. D. 423 ; 
[-] Moses v. Boston & Maine Rail­
road Co., 32 N. H. 523, 64 Am. D. 
S81 ; Thomas v. Boston & Provi­
dence Railroad Corp., 10 Mete. 
(Mass. ) 472, 43 Am. D. 444 ; Tar­
bell v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co., 
110 N. Y. 170, 17 N. E. R. 721, 6 
Am. St. R. 350, 
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and for convenience will be called the Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Michigan rules.
§302. ——The Massachusetts rule is that the duty assumed
by the railroad, to which shippers are presumed from their
knowledge of that custom to assent, is to carry the goods safely
to their destination and there discharge them at their ware-
house ready to be taken by the consignee. As soon as the
goods are so stored the railroad becomes a warehouseman. If
the railroad is not to unload the goods then its duty as carrier
ends when the car has been delivered in a convenient position
for unloading. This rule has the advantage of being “plain,
precise, practical and of easy application.” That it is also
“well adapted to the security of all persons interested” has
been often denied.
§303. ——The New Hampshire rule is that the liability of
the railroad as carrier continues until the owner or consignee
has actually received the goods, or until he has had a reason-
able opportunity after their arrival to inspect and remove them
in the common course of business.
The extent of this reasonable opportunity, however, is not
to be measured by any peculiar circumstance in the condition
and situation of the consignee requiring longer time or better
opportunity than if he lived in the vicinity of the warehouse
and had adequate facilities for taking the goods away.
§304. ——'I'he Michigan rule declares that “the liability
of the carrier continues until the consignee has been notified
of the receipt of the goods and has had reasonable time in the
§302. [—] Norway Plains Co.
v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 1
Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Am. D. 423;
Rice v. Hart, 118 Mass. 201, 19 Am.
R. 433; Chicago 80 North Western
Railway Co. v. Sawyer, 69 Ill. 285,
18 Am. R. 613; Bansemer v. Toledo
& Wabash Railway Co., 25 Ind. 434,
87 Am. D. 367 ; Gregg v. Illinois
Central Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 550,
35 N. E. R. 343, 37 Am. St. R. 238;
Gashweiler v. Wabash etc. Railway
Co., 83 Mo. 112, 53 Am. R. 558; In-
dependence Mills Co. v. Burlington
etc. Railway Co., 72 Iowa 535, 34 N.
W. R. 320, 2 Am. St. R. 258.
§303. [—] Moses v. Boston &
Maine Railroad Co., 32 N. H. 523,
64 Am. D. 381; Blumenthal v.
Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402, 91 Am. D.
349; Winslow v. Vermont 85 Massa-
chusetts Railroad Co., 42 Vt. 7 00, 1
Am. R. 365; Wood v. Crocker, 18
Wis. 363, 86 Am. D. 773.
§304. [—] McMillan v. Michi-
gan Southern etc. Railroad Co., 16
Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 208; Faulkner
v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 37 Am. R.
574; [—] Zinn v. New Jersey
Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442, 10 Am.


















































































































































TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. § §  302-304 
and for convenience will be called the Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire and Michigan rules. 
§ 302. --The Massachusetts rule is that the duty assumed 
by the railroad, to which shippers are presumed from their 
knowledge of that custom to assent, is to carry the goods safely 
to their destination and there discharge them at their ware­
house ready to be taken by the consignee. As soon as the 
goods are so stored the railroad becomes a warehouseman. If 
the railroad is not to unload the goods then its duty as carrier 
ends when the car has been delivered in a convenient position 
for unloading. This rule has the advantage of being ' ' plain, 
precise, practical and of easy application . "  That it is also 
' ' well adapted to the security of all persons interested ' '  has 
been often denied. 
§ 303. --The New Hampshire rule is that the liability of 
the railroad as carrier continues until the owner or consignee 
has actually received the goods, or until he has had a reason­
able opportunity after their arrival to inspect and remove them 
in the common course of business. 
The extent of this reasonable opportunity, however, is not 
to be measured by any peculiar circumstance in the condition 
and situation of the consignee requiring longer time or better 
opportunity than if he lived in the vicinity of the warehouse 
and had adequate facilities for taking the goods away. 
§ 304. --The Michigan rule declares that " the liability 
of the carrier continues until the consignee has been notified 
of the receipt of the goods and has had reasonable time in the 
§ 302. [-] Norway Plains Co. 
v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 1 
Gray (Mass. ) 263, 61 Am. D. 423 ; 
nice v. Hart, 118 Mass. 201, 19 Am. 
R. 433 ; Chicago & North Western 
Railway Co. v. Sawyer, 69 Ill. 285, 
18 Am. R. 613 ; Bansemer v. Toledo 
& Wabash Railway Co., 25 Ind. 434, 
87 Am. D. 367 ; Gregg v. Illinois 
Central Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 550, 
35 N. E. R. 343, 37 Am. St. R. 238 ; 
Gashweiler v. Wabash etc. Railway 
Co., 83 Mo. 112, 53 Am. R. 558 ; In­
dependence Mills Co. v. Burlington 
etc. Railway Co., 72 Iowa 535, 34 N. 
W. R. 320, 2 Am. St. R. 258, 
§ 303. [-] Moses v. Boston & 
Maine Railroad Co., 32 N. H. 523, 
64 Am. D. 381 ; Blumenthal v. 
Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402, 91 Am. D. 
349 ; Winslow v. Vermont & Massa­
chusetts Railroad Co., 42 Vt. 700, 1 
Am. R. 365 ; Wood v. Crocker, 18  
Wis. 363, 86 Am. D. 773. 
I 304. [ - l McMillan v. Michi­
gan Southern etc. Railroad Co., 16 
Mich. 79, 93 Am. D. 208 ; Faulkner 
v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 37 Am. R. 
574 ; [-] Zinn v. New Jersey 
Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442, 10 Am. 
R. 402 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, 
§§ 373-374. 
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common course of business to take them away after such noti-
fication.”
This modification grows out of the uncertainty of the arrival
of shipments by freight, and the impracticability of requiring
the consignee, who is unwilling to entrust the goods to the rail-
road as warehouseman, to watch from day to day the arrival
of trains. It is more reasonable to require the carrier to give
notice to the consignee, and to the carrier himself this is less
burdensome than to be subjected to numberless inquiries.
In some of the states some cases are to be found using the
language of the Michigan rule and others using that of the
New Hampshire rule, and failing to notice any distinction
between the two.
§305. Delivery by carriers by water.—Carriers by water
have never been required to make personal delivery. If the
consignee is not present to receive the goods they may be
landed on a proper wharf and notice of their arrival must be
sent to the consignee. It is difficult to find any substantial
reason for a different rule in case of railroads, and to preserve
consistency some courts that excuse the railroad company
from giving notice have held that ships running on a regular
schedule and having regular warehouses for the delivery of
goods are not required to give notice. It is always competent
to show usage to make delivery without notice.
§306. ———Manner of delivery.—A carrier by water does
not perform its duty as a carrier by a mere discharge of the
goods upon the wharf. The consignee must have a reasonable
time after notice of their arrival in which to remove the goods,
\
In Shenk v. Steam Propeller Co.,
60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. D. 541, lan-
guage is used that seems to recog-
nise each of the three rules.
§305. Richardson v. Goddard, 23
How. (U. S.) 28; [—] Zinn v. New
Jersey Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442,
10 Am. R. 402; [—] Scheu v.
Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 22 N. E.
R. 1073, 15 Am. St. R. 426; Tarbell
v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co., 110
N. Y. 170, 17 N. E. R. 721, 6 Am.
St. R. 350; Gibson v. Culver, 17
Wend. (N. Y.) 305, 31 Am. D. 297;
Turner v. Huff, 46 Ark. 222, 55 Am.
R. 580; Farmers & Mechanics’ Bank
v. Chaplain Transportation Co., 16
Vt. 52, 42 Am. D. 491, 18 Vt. 131,
23 Vt. 186, 56 Am. D. 68.
§ 306. Tarbell v. Royal Exchange
Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170, 17 N.
E. R. 721, 6 Am. St. R. 350;
[—] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y.
510, 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. St.
R. 426; Shenk v. Steam Propeller
Co., 60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. D. 541;


















































































































































§ §  305-306 OF COMMON CARRIERS. 
common course of business to take them away after such noti­
fication. ' '  
This modification grows out of the uncertainty of the arrival 
of shipments by freight, and the impracticability of requiring 
the consignee, who is unwilling to entrust the goods to the rail­
road as warehouseman, to watch from day to day the arrival 
of trains. It is more reasonable to require the carrier to give 
notice to the consignee, and to the carrier himself this is less 
burdensome than to be subjected to numberless i_nquiries. 
In some of the states some cases are to be found using the 
language of the Michigan rule and others using that of the 
New Hampshire rule, and failing to notice any distinction 
between the two. 
§ 305. Delivery by carriers by water.-Carriers by water 
have never been required to make personal delivery. If the 
consignee is not present to receive the goods they may be 
landed on a proper wharf and notice of their arrival must be 
sent to the consignee. It is difficult to find any substantial 
reason for a different rule in case of railroads, and to preserve 
consistency some courts that excuse the railroad company 
from givin g notice have held that ships running on a regular 
schedule and having regular warehouses for the delivery of 
goods are not required to give notice.  It is always competent 
to show usage to make delivery without notice. 
§ 306. --Manner of delivery.-A carrier by water does 
not perform its duty as a carrier by a mere discharge of the 
goods upon the wharf. The consignee must have a reasonable 
time after notice of their arrival in which to remove the goods, 
In Shenk v. Steam Propeller Co., Turner v. Huft', 46 Ark. 222, 55 Am. 
60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. D. 541, lan- R. 580 ; Farmers & Mechanics ' Bank 
guage is used that seems to recog· v. Chaplain Transportation Co., 16 
nise each of the three rules. Vt. 52, 42 Am. D. 491, 18 Vt. 131, 
§ 305. Richardson v .  Goddard, 23 23 Vt. 186, 56 Am. D. 68. 
How. (U. S. ) 28 ; [-] Zinn v. New § 306. Tarbell v. Royal Exchange 
Jersey Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442, Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 1 70, 17 N. 
10 Am. R. 402 ; [ -] Scheu v. E. R. 721, 6 Am. St. R. 350 ; 
Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 22 N. E. f-] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. 
R. 1073, 15 Am. St. R. 426 ; Tarbell 5101 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. St. 
v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co., 110 R. 426 ; Shenk v.  Steam Propeller 
N. Y. 170, 1 7  N. E. R. 721, 6 Am. Co., 60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. D. 541 ; 
St. R. 350 ; Gibson v. Culver, 17 Richmond v. Steamboat Co., 87 N. 
Wend. (N. Y.) 305, 31 Am. D. 297 ; Y. 240. 
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and in the meantime they must not be left by the carrier un-
protected in an exposed condition. If the carrier does not re-
move them within a reasonable time they must be properly
stored and not until then is the carrier divested of his respon-
sibility.
The consignee cannot prolong liability by delaying to receive
the goods, but neither can he be required to take them on Sun-
day or a legal holiday or in weather that threatens injury to
them. The carrier must deliver them at the usual wharf, or if
there be no regular wharf then at a suitable wharf designated
by the shipper, or by a majority of several shippers.
§307. Delivery to an elevator.—Some peculiar questions
have arisen as to the delivery of grain by a carrier. If there
is no designated elevator, and the grain is not at once removed
by the consignee, the carrier may leave it in the cars, or store
it in a suitable elevator at the risk and expense of the owner.
But if the grain is consigned to a particular elevator the car-
rier must deliver it at that elevator unless it is situated off the
line of that carrier. Mandamus will lie against the carrier
to compel the performance of this duty, but no carrier can be
compelled to carry over lines not owned or controlled by it.
In Illinois there are statutes regulating delivery to public
elevators.
(2) Acts Ezccusing Non-Delwery.
§ 308. Excepted perils.—Failure to deliver the goods to the
consignee will of course be excused if occasioned by any of
the excepted perils (sec. 231), or by a cause against which the
carrier has contracted in the bill of lading. But even in these
cases, as has been seen, the carrier is afforded no excuse if his
negligence proximately contributed to the loss (secs. 235 and
237). '
§309. Paramount 0Wner.—The carrier cannot avail himself
of the title of a third person, even the true owner, to keep the
§307. Gregg v. Illinois Central §309. The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575;
Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. King v. Richards, 6 Whart. (Pa.)
R. 343, 37 Am. St. R. 238; [—] Chi- 418, 37 Am. D. 420; Wells v. Amer-
cago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. ican Express Co., 55 Wis. 23, 11 N.
People, 56 Ill. 365, 8 Am. R. 690; W. R. 537, 42 Am. R. 695; Wolfe v.
People v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 97 Mo.

















































































































































TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. § §  307-309 
and in the meantime they must not be left by the carrier un­
protected in an exposed condition. If the carrier does not re­
move them within a reasonable time they must be properly 
stored and not until then is the carrier divested of his respon­
sibility. 
The consignee cannot prolong liability by delaying to receive 
the goods, but neither can he be required to take them on Sun­
day or a legal holiday or in weather that threatens injury to 
them. The carrier must deliver them at the usual wharf, or if 
there be no regular wharf then at a suitable wharf designated 
by the shipper, or by a majority of several shippers. 
§ 307. Delivery to an eleva.tor.-Some peculiar questions 
have arisen as to the delivery of grain by a carrier. If there 
is no designated elevator, and the grain is not at once removed 
by the consignee, the carrier may leave it in the cars, or store 
it. in a suitable elevator at the risk and expense of the owner. 
But if the grain is consigned to a particular elevator the car­
rier must deliver it at that elevator unless it is situated off the 
J ine of that carrier. Mandamus will lie against the carrier 
to compel the performance of this duty, but no carrier can be 
compelled to carry over lines not owned or controlled by it. 
In Illinois there are statutes regulating delivery to public 
elevators. 
(2)  Acts Excusing Non-Delivery. 
§ 308. Excepted perils.-Failure to deliver the goods to the 
consignee will of course be excused if occasioned by any of 
the excepted perils ( sec. 231) ,  or by a cause against which the 
carrier has contracted in the bill of lading. But even in these 
cases, as has been seen, the carrier is afforded no excuse if his 
negligence proximately contributed to the loss (secs. 235 and 
237) . 
§ 309. Paramount owner.-The carrier cannot avail himself 
of the title of a third person, even the true owner, to keep the 
§ 307. Gregg v. Illinois Central 
Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. 
R. 343, 37 Am. St. R. 238 ; [-] Chi­
cago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. 
People, 56 Ill. 365, 8 Am. R. 690 ; 
People v. Chicago & Alton Railroad 
Co., 55 Ill. 95, 8 Am. R. 631. 
9 
§ 309. The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575 ; 
K ing v. Richards, 6 Whart. (Pa. ) 
418, 37 Am. D. 420 ; Wells v. Amer­
ican Express Co., 55 Wis. 23, 11 N. 
W. R. 537, 42 Am. R. 695 ; Wolfe v. 
:\fissouri Pacific Railway Co., 97 Mo. 
473, 1 1  S. W. R. 49, 10 Am. St. R .  
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property for himself as against the shipper or his consignee or
assignee; neither can he of his own motion set up against the
bailor such claims of third persons; but when the true owner
has demanded his property the carrier is bound to deliver to
him, and such delivery to the paramount owner is a complete
defense against the claim of the bailor. The carrier however
assumes the burden of proving the ownership and right to im-
mediate possession of the third person at the time of the de-
livery.
The safe course for the carrier who finds himself embar-
rassed by such conflicting claims is to hold the goods a suffi-
cient time to satisfy his reasonable doubts as to the party to
whom delivery should be made. This he has a right to do.
The carrier may then deliver the goods to one of the claim-
ants, taking from him a bond of indemnity against loss if the
other claim should prove paramount. Or the parties may be
compelled to settle their claims by interpleader in court where
there are such relations between them as to permit that pro-
ceeding. The tendency of modern cases and statutes is to
ignore the early requirement of privity between the parties as
an essential requisite to the right to a bill of interpleader.
§310. Stoppage in transitu of the goods may excuse the
carrier for non-delivery to the consignee. If a vendor sells
goods on credit to a vendee whom he afterwards discovers to
be insolvent, he has a right to stop the goods in the hands of
the carrier at any time during the transit. For this purpose
transit continues until the carrier has surrendered control of
the goods to the vendee, or to his bona fide transferee of the bill
of lading. It is enough if the carrier has consented to keep the
goods as bailee of the vendee, but so long as the carrier holds
331; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend.
(N. Y.) 168, 35 Am.D. 607; Hutch-
inson on Carriers, 404-408, 34 Am.
St. R. 731, Note, rmte, § 289. As to
interpleader generally see 91 Am. St.
R. 593 and extended note.
§ 310. Branan v. Atlanta etc.
Railroad Co., 108 Ga. 70, 33 S. E. R.
8ac, 75 Am. st. R. 26; [—] Potts
v. New York & New England Rail-
road Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. R.
247; Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 243, 35
Am. R. 17; [—] Rucker v. Dono-
van, 13 Kan. 251, 19 Am. R. 84;
Farrell v. Richmond & Danville Rail-
road Co., 102 N. C. 390, 9 S. E. R.
302, 11 Am. St. R. 760; Langstaif
v. Stix, 64 Miss. 171, 1 S. R. 97, 60
Am. R. 49; Brewer v. Boston &
Albany Railroad Co., 179 Mass. 228,
60 N. E. R. 548, 88 Am. St. R. 375;
Jefifris v. Fitchburg Railroad Co.,
93 Wis. 250, 67 N. W. R. 424, 57
Am. St. R. 919; Ocean Steamship
Co. v. Ehrlich, 88 Ga. 502, 14 S. E.

















































































































































� 310 OF COMMON CARRI ERS. 
property for himself as against the shippPr or his cons ignee or 
assignee ; neither can he of his own motion set up aga inst the 
bailor such claims of third persons ; but when the true owner 
has demanded his property the carrier is bound to deliver to 
him, and such delivery to the paramount owner is a complete 
defense against the claim of the bailor. The carrier however 
assumes the burden of proving the ownership and right to im­
mediate possession of the third person at the time of the de­
livery. 
The safe course for the carrier who finds himself embar­
rassed by such conflicting claims is to hold the goods a suffi­
cient time to satisfy his reasonable doubts as to the party to 
whom delivery should be made. This he has a right to do. 
The carrier may then deliver the goods to one of the claim­
ants, taking from him a bond of indemnity against loss if the 
other claim should prove paramount. Or the parties may be 
compelled to settle their claims by interpleader in court where 
there are such relations between them as to permit that pro­
ceeding. The tendency of modern cases and statutes is to 
ignore the early requirement of privity between the parties as 
an essential requisite to the right to a bill of interpleader. 
§ 310. Stoppage in transitu of the goods may excuse the 
carrier for non-delivery to the consignee. If a vendor sells 
goods on credit to a vendee whom he afterwards discovers to 
be insolvent, he has a right to stop the goods in the hands of 
the carrier at any time during the transit. For this purpose 
. transit continues until the carrier has surrendered control of 
the goods to the vendee, or to his bona fide transferee of the bill 
of lading. It is enough if the carrier has consented to keep the 
goods as bailee of the vendee, but so long as the carrier holds 
331 ; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. T" van, 13 Kan. 251, 19 Am. R. 84 ; 
( N. Y. ) 168, 35 Am. D. 607 ; Hutch- Farrell v. Richmond & Danville Rail· 
inson on Carriers, 404-408, 34 Am. road Co., 102 N. C. 390, 9 S. E. R. 
St. R. 731, Note, ante, § 289. As to 302, 11 Am. St. R. 760 ; Langstaff 
interpleader genera1ly see 91 Am. St. v. Stix, 64 Miss. 171, 1 S. R. 97, 60 
R. 593 and extended note. Am. R. 49 ; Brewer v. Boston & 
§ 310. Branan v. Atlanta etc. Albany Railroad Co., 179 Mass. 228, 
Railroad Co., 108 Ga. 70, 33 S. E. R. 60 N. E. R. 548, 88 Am. St. R. 375 ; 
836, 75 Am. St. R. 26 ; [-] Potts .Jeffris v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 
v. New York & New England Rail- 93 Wis. 250, 67 N. W. R. 424, 57 
road Co., 131 Mass. 455, 41 Am. R. Am. St. R. 919 ; Ocean Steamship 
247 ; Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 243, 35 Co. v. Ehrlich, 88 Ga. 502, 14 S. E. 
Am . R. 17 ; [-] Rucker v. Dono- R. 707, 30 Am. St. R. 164. 
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the goods to maintain his special lien for the carrying charges,
prima facie the transit has not ended. The goods are still sub-
ject to stoppage.
§311. ——Rig'ht how exercised.—Only the vendor or his
agent can exercise this right, and it must be exercised against
one actually insolvent at the time, though his insolvency may
not have been declared. Simple notice to the carrier to hold
the goods subject to the vendor’s orders is suflicient to bring
about the stoppage of the goods. This notice may be to the
agent or servant of the carrier in actual possession of the goods,
or to any authorized agent of the carrier under such circum-
stances as to make it reasonably possible to give the necessary
orders to the agent in actual possession. The vendor must pay
the carrier all charges on the goods, but the carrier cannot
hold the goods as security for other unpaid charges of the
vendee.
§312. ——Improper exercise of the right.—If the vendee
is not really insolvent the vendor is liable in damages for the
stoppage, but it is believed the carrier incurs no risk by heed-
ing a notice to hold the goods for the vendor, unless he holds
them with knowledge of the solvency of the vendee. As against
the vendor the carrier may insist upon reasonable evidence of
the validity of his claim.
§ 313. Inability to find the consignee may furnish an excuse
for non-delivery. He may be dead, absent, or unknown, and
§311. [—] Rucker v. Donovan, Am. R. 475; [—] Zinn v. New
13 Kan. 251, 19 Am. R. 84; [—] Al-
len v. Maine Central Railroad Co.,
79 Me. 327, 9 Atl. R. 895, 1 Am. St.
R. 310; Farrell v. Richmond &
Danville Railroad Co, 102 N. C. 390,
9 S. E. R. 302, 11 Am. St. R. 760;
Langstaif v. Stix, 64 Miss. 171, 60
Am. R. 49; Wheeling 80 Lake Erie
Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 61 Ohio St.
551, 56 N. E. R. 471, 76 Am. St. R.
435. E
§ 312. [—] Allen v. Maine Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 79 Me. 327, 9 Atl.
R. 895, 1 Am. St. R. 310, The Vi-
dette, 34 Fed. B. 396.
§313. Price v. Oswego & Syra-
cuse Railway Co., 50 N. Y. 213, 10
Jersey Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442,
10 Am. R. 402, The Thames, 14
Wall. (U. S.) 98; Witbeck v. H01-
land, 45 N. Y. 13, 6 Am. R. 23;
Adams Express Co. v. Darnell, 31
Ind. 20, 99 Am. D. 582 ; Bansemer
v. Toledo & Wabash Railway Co.,
25 Ind. 434, 87 Am. D. 367;
l—-] Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio (N.
Y.) 45, 43 Am. D. 649; [—] Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Hockett, 30
Ind. 250, 95 Am. D. 691; Mor-
gan v. Dibble, 29 Tex. 108, 94 Am.
D. 264; [—] Scheu v. Benedict, 116


















































































































































TERMINATION OF THE RELATION. §§  311-313 
the goods to maintain his special lien for the carrying charges, 
prima f acie the transit has not ended. The goods are still sub­
ject to stoppage. 
§ 311. --Right how exercised.-Only the vendor or his 
agent can exercise this right, and it must be exercised against 
one actually insolvent at the time, though his insolvency may 
not have been declared. Simple notice to the carrier to hold 
the goods subject to the vendor 's orders is sufficient to bring 
about the stoppage of the goods. This notice may be to the 
agent or servant of the carrier in actual possession of the goods, 
or to any authorized agent of the carrier under such circum­
stances as to make it reasonably possible to give the necessary 
orders to the agent in actual possession. The vendor must pay 
the carrier all charges on the goods, but the carrier cannot 
hold the goods as security for other unpaid charges of the 
vendee. 
§ 312. --Improper exercise of the right.-If the vendee 
is not really insolvent the vendor is liable in damages for the 
stoppage, but it is believed the carrier incurs no risk by heed­
ing a notice to hold the goods for the vendor, unless he holds 
them with knowledge of the solvency of the vendee. As against 
the vendor the carrier may insist upon reasonable evidence of 
the validity of his claim. 
§ 313. Inability to find the consignee may furnish an excuse 
for non-delivery. He may be dead, absent, or unknown, and 
§ 311.  [ -] Rucker v. Donovan, 
1 3  Kan. 251, 19 Am. R. 84 ; [-] Al­
len v. Maine Central Railroad Co., 
79 Me. 327, 9 Atl. R. 895, 1 Am. St. 
R. 310 ; Farrell v. Richmond & 
Danvple Railroad Co, 1.02 N. C. 390, 
9 S. E. R. 302, 11 Am. St. R. 760 ; 
Langstaff v. Stix, 64 Mias. 171, 60 
Am. R. 49 ; Wheeling & Lake Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 61 Ohio St. 
551, 56 N. E. R. 471, 76 Am. St. R. 
435. 
§ 312. [-] Allen v. Maine Cen­
tral Railroad Co., 79 Me. 327, 9 Atl. 
R. 895, 1 Am. St. R. 310, The Vi­
dette, 34 Fed. R. 396. 
§ 313. Price v. Oswego & Syra­
cuse Railway Co., 50 N. Y. 213, 1 0  
Am. R .  475 ; [-) Zinn v .  New 
J ersey Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442, 
10 Am. R. 402, The Thames, 14 
Wall. (U. S.) 98 ; Witbeck v. Hol­
land, 45 N. Y. 13, 6 Am. R. 23 ; 
Adams Express Co. v. Damell, 31 
Ind. 20, 99 Am. D. 582 ; Bansemer 
v. Toledo & Wabash Railway Co., 
25 Ind. 434, 87 Am. D. 367 ; 
l-1 Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio (N. 
Y.) 45, 43 Am. D. 649 ; [-J Ameri-
1•an Express Co. v. Hockett, 30 
Ind. 250, 95 Am. D. 691 ; Mor­
gan v. Dibble, 29 Tex. 108, 94 Am. 
D. 264 ; [-] Scheu v. Benedict, 116 
N. Y. 510, 22 N. E. R. 1073, 15 Am. 
St. R. 426. 
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§ 313 OF COMMON CARRIERS. '
the carrier after due efforts may be unable to find him. The
carrier may then discharge himself from further responsibility
by placing the goods in store with a responsible party to hold
as warehouseman for the owner. But the law requires that
diligent and careful inquiry be made for the consignee, and if
the carrier fails to "do this he remains liable as a common car-
rier. In jurisdictions where railroads are not bound to give
notice to the consignee they are of course excused from this
duty.
The carrier ’s duty to deliver and the consignee ’s duty to re-
ceive are reciprocal. The consignee cannot by his act prolong
the period of the carricr’s liability as a common carrier. If
therefore the consignee refuses or fails to accept the goods the
carricr’s extraordinary liability ceases. However, he is not
justified in abandoning the goods or in negligently exposing
them to injury, but he becomes charged with the duty of prop-

















































































































































OF' COMMON <JA.R:RIERS. 
the carrier after due efforts may be unable to find him. The 
carrier may then discharge himself from further responsibility 
by placing the goods in store with a responsible party to hold 
as warehouseman for the owner. But the law requires that 
diligent and careful inquiry be made for the consignee, and if 
the carrier fails to ·do this he remains liable as a common car­
rier. In jurisdictions where railroads are not bound to give 
notice to the consignee they are of course excused from this 
duty. 
The carrier 's duty to deliver and the consignee 's duty to re­
ceive are reciprocal. The consignee cannot by his act prolong 
the period of the carrier 's liability as a common carrier. If 
therefore the consignee refuses or fails to accept the goods the 
carrier 's extraordinary liability ceases. However, he is not 
justified in abandoning the goods or in negligently exposing 
them to injury, but he becomes charged with the duty of prop­



























OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.
Who are quasi-bailees. §
Carriers of passengers.
1. Nature of the relation.
The parties.















2. Rights and duties result-
ing from the relation.
Classification.
A. By operation of law.














































(3) Duty to accept all.
Common carriers of pas-
sengers.
Carrier may refuse to ac-
cept.































































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. 
§ 314. Who are quasi-bailees. 
315. Carriers of passengers. 
1. Nature of the relation. 
316. The parties. 




320. - ( 1 )  The ofter to be-
come a passenger. 
321. Special callings. 
322. Employees. • 
323. Payment of fare 
not necessary. 
324. Trespassen. 




326. What . amounts to 
acceptance. 
t. Bights and duties result­
ing from the relation. 
327. Classification. 
A. By operation of law. 
(1) Bight to compensation. 
§ 335. ---Tickets ambiguous 
on face. 
336. B11Bis of carrier 's 
liability. 
337. Conditions printed 
on ticket. 
338. Stop-overs, coupon 
tickets. 
339. Limited tickets. 
(t) Bight to make regula-
ti011s. 
340. Basis of right. 
341. Must be reasonable. 
342. --What regulations rea· 
sonable. 
343. --Ejection of passengers 
for breach. 
(S) Duty to accept all. 
344. Common carriers of pas­
sengers. 
345. Carrier may refuse to ac­
cept. 








Fare. 346. Equal accommodations. 
Means of conveyance. 
Roadbeds, bridges, etc. 
Latest improvements. 
Agents and servants. 
Stational facilities. 
334. 




Sale of tickets. 349. 
---Nature of ticket. 350. 
---Ticket as a con- 351. 
tract. 
---Ticket as between 
paaeenger and conductor. 352. 
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( 5) Liability for injuries 
lo pasaengers. 
Meaaure of diligence. 
§§ 314-315 OF QUASI-BAILEES.
.
§353. ——As far as human care §36T. Custody of passenger.
and foresight will go. 368. Passenger supposed to ac-
354. Gratuitous passenger. company baggage.
355. Contributory negligence. 369 Delivery of baggage.
356, ——What amounts 130 c0n- B. Limitation Of liability
tributary negligence, of carriers of passengers
351. ——Illustrations. by @0"W@*-
358. Proximate cause. 370- A8 to baggage-
Sleem-ng cm. c0,mpaMe8. 371 As to ‘the passenger.
359‘ Not common can.iers. 372 Gratuitous ‘passengers.
360. Nature of their undertaking. (3) ljermmatwn of the
361. Their liability. _ "”“"""'.
Owners of passenger eleva- 3'3 How termmated‘
tm_8. (1 ) Contract to carry fully
. executed.
362. Are ca¥n?r.s of passengers‘ 374. When carrier ’s relation
(6) Lrabrlity for delay. ends.
363. Reasonable diligence. (2) Comg»,-act to cawy left
(7) Liability for P11-9se"‘ incomplete.
-96"-9 b“99a9e- 375. (a) The passenger may
364. Insurers of baggage. leave.
365. What is baggage. 376. (b) Carrier may eject pas-
366. Value of baggage. senger.
§314. Who are quasi-bai1ees.—There are several classes of
carriers whose callings are public or nearly so, but who are
not carriers of goods. Such are carriers of passengers, includ-
ing sleeping car companies and owners of passenger elevators,
carriers of news, such as telegraph and telephone companies,
and carriers of mail. The Post Oflice Department carries goods
as well as news, but as it is a department of the government
and therefore cannot be sued it is scarcely to be regarded as a
real bailee for hire.
The undertakings of all these carriers, however, are in their
nature so like those of bailees for hire that a consideration of
their legal status is most naturally found in connection with
the work on Bailments and Carriers. With no other branch of
commercial law have they any close relations, but they may
very properly be called quasi-bailees. The passenger carrier
as to the baggage of the passenger is of course a bailee, a com-
mon carrier of goods.
§315. Carriers of passengers are either private or common
carriers. As the undertaking involves the safety of human life
they are required to exercise a degree of care commensurate

















































































































































§ §  314-315 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
§ 353. --AB far as human care 
and foresight will go. 
354. -Gratuitous passenger. 
355. Contributory negligence. 
356. --What amounts to con­
tributory �egligence. 
357. --Illustrations. 
358. --Proximate cause. 
Sleeping car companies. 
359. Not common carriers. 
360. Nature of their undertaking. 
361. Their liability. 
Owners of passenger eleva­
tors. 
362. Are carriers of passengers. 
(6) Liability for delay. 
363. Reasonable diligence. 
(7) Liability for passen-
ger 's baggage. 
364. Insurers of baggage. 
365. What is baggage. 
366. Value of baggage. 
§ 367. Custody of passenger. 
368. Passenger supposed to ac­
company baggage. 
369. Delivery of baggage. 
B. Limitation of liability 
of carriers of passengers 
by contract. 
370. As to baggage. 
371. As to the passenger. 
372. Gratuitous passengers. 
(3) TerminatiQn of the 
relation. 
373. How terminated. 
(1 ) Contract to carry fully 
executed. 
374. When carrier 's relation 
ends. 
(�) Contract to carry left 
incomplete. 
375. (a)  The passenger may 
leave. 
376. (b)  Carri€r may eject pas­
senger. 
§ 314. Who are quasi-ba.ilees.-There are several classes of 
carriers whose callings are public or nearly so, but who are 
not carriers of goods. Such are carriers of passengers, includ­
ing sleeping car companies and owners of passenger elevators, 
carriers of news, such as telegraph and telephone companies, 
and carriers of mail. 'l'he Post Office Department carries goods 
as well as news, but as it is a department of the government 
and therefore cannot be sued it is scarcely to be regarded as a 
real bailee for hire. 
The undertakings of all these carriers, however, are in their 
nature so like those of bailees for hire that a consideration of 
their legal status is most naturally found in connection with 
the work on Bailments and Carriers. With no other branch of 
commercial law have they any close relations, but they may 
very properly be called quasi-bailees. The passenger carrier 
as to the baggage of the passenger is of course a bailee, a com­
mon carrier of goods. 
§ 315. Carriers of passengers are either private or common 
carriers. As the undertaking involves the safety of human life 
they are required to exercise a degree of care commensurate 
with such a responsibility. Except for this a private carrier 
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Or CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§ 316-319
of passengers is subject to no liabilities that call for special
mention here, and the present chapter will be devoted to com-
mon carriers of passengers, taking up 1. the nature of the rela-
tion; 2. its rights and duties; and 3. its termination.
1. THE NATURE or THE RELATION.
§ 316. The parties.—It is first necessary in questions arising
over the carrying of human beings to know who are common
carriers of passengers and who are passengers. The relations
of passengers and non-passengers to carriers rest on very dif-
ferent principlcs of law, and give rise to widely different liabil-
ities.
§317. Common carriers of passengers are such as hold
themselves out for hire to carry all persons indifferently who
apply for passage.
The distinction here, as in the case of carriers of goods, be-
tween private and public carriers, lies in the public profession,
the undertaking to carry all indifierently who apply.
§318. ‘Illustrations. Contractors running construction
trains, lumbermen operating logging trains, railroads as to
freight trains, owners of conveyances occasionally loaned or
hired to carry persons, and sleeping car companies, are not
common carriers of passengers. They may, of course, by offier-
ing as a business to carry indiscriminately any who apply, be-
come common carriers. They are such if they habitually keep
coaches to carry by highway or rail, or boats to carry by water,
such persons as present themselves for carriage.
.
§319. Passeng'erS.—Passengers are persons who present
themselves for the purpose of being carried and who are ac-
cepted by the carrier.
§317. Shoemaker v. Kingsbury,
12 Wall. (U. S.) 369; [—] Thomp-
son-Houston Electric Co. v. Simon,
20 Ore. 60, 25 Pac. R. 147, 23 Am.
St. R. 86.
§318. [—] Thompson-Houston
Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60,
25 Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86;
Houston & Texas Central Railway
Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am.
R. 98; [—] Blum v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500; Gard-
ner v. New Haven etc. Co., 51 Conn.
143, 50 Am. R. 12; [—] Hoar v.
Maine Central Railroad Co., 70 Me.
65, 35 Am. R. 299; Murch v. Con-
cord Railroad Corp., 29 N. H. 9,
61 Am. D. 631; Siegrist v. Arnot,
86 Mo. 200, 56 Am. R. 425. Com-
pare Dunn v. Grand Trunk Railway
C0., 58 Me. 187, 4 Am. R. 267, and
Eaton v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western Railroad Co., 57 N. Y. 382,

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSF.:NGERS. § §  316-319 
of passengers is subject to no liabilities that call for special 
mention here, and the present chapter will be devoted to com­
mon carriers of passengers, taking up 1.  the nature of the rela­
tion ; 2. its rights and duties ; and 3. its termination. 
1. THE NATURE OF THE RELATION. 
§ 316. The p&rties.-It is first necessary in questions arising 
over the carrying of human beings to know who are common 
carriers of passenger.'$ and who are passengers. The relations 
of passengers and non-passengers to carriers rest on very dif­
ferent principles of law, and give rise to widely different liabil­
ities. 
§ 317. Common carriers of passengers are such as hold 
themselves out for hire to carry all persons indifferently who 
apply for passage. 
The distinction here, as in the case of carriers of goods, be­
tween private and public carriers, lies in the public profession, 
the undertaking to carry all indifferently who apply. 
§ 318. --mustrations.-Contractors running construction 
trains, lumbermen operating logging trains, railroads as to 
freight trains, owners of conveyances occasionally loaned or 
hired to carry persons, and sleeping car companies, are not 
common carriers of passengers. 'l'hey may, of course, by offer­
ing as a business to carry indiscriminately any who apply, be­
come common carriers. They are such if they habitually keep 
coaches to carry by highway or rail, or boats to carry by water, 
such persons as present themselves for carriage. 
§ 319. Passengers.-Passengers are persons who present 
themselves for the purpose of being carried and who are ac­
cepted by the carrier. 
§ 317. Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, ner v. New Haven etc. Co., 51 Conn. 
12 Wall. (U. 8. ) 369 ; [-] Thomp· 143, 50 Am. R. 12 ; [-] Hoar v. 
eon-Houston Electric Co. v. Simon, Maine Central Railroad Co., 70 :Mc. 
20 Ore. 60, 25 Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. 65, 35 Am. R. 299 ; Murch v. Con-
st. R. 86. cord Railroad Corp., 29 N. H. 9, 
§ 318. (-] Thompson-Houston 61 Am. D. 631 ; Siegrist v. Arnot, 
Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 86 Mo. 200, 56 Am. R. 425. Com-
25 Pac. R. 147, 23 Am. St. R. 86 ; pare Dunn v. Grand Trunk Railway 
Houston & Texas Central Railway Co., 58 Me. 187, 4 Am. R. 267, and 
Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am. Eaton �· Delaware, Lackawanna & 
R. 98 ; (-] Blum v. Pullman Palace Western Railroad Co., 57 N. Y. 3821 
Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 500 ; Gard· 15 Am. R. 513. 
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§§ 320-321 Or QUASI-BAILEES.
The relation of passenger and carrier rests upon a contract,
express or implied; Therefore two essentials are to be noted;
(1). There must on one side be an offer to become a pas-
senger.
(2). There must on the other be an acceptance of the ofier
by the carrier, either expressly or impliedly.
§ 320. ——(1) The offer to become a. passenger is usually
to be implied from the circumstances. The traveler must" put
himself under the control of the carrier for the purpose of
being carried. This he does if he enters the carrier’s prem-
ises, waiting room, or vehicle, with the intention in good faith,
and within a reasonable time, of becoming a passenger; or if
the carrier sends a vehicle to bring passengers to its station and
he is riding in such a vehicle for the purpose of becoming a
passenger he is ordinarily regarded as a passenger. As soon
as he has put himself in control of the carrier in the usual way
provided by the carrier, he has so far offered himself as a
passenger as to become such, unless there is some act of refusal
on the part of the carrier.
§321. iSpecia1 callings.—Many persons, not employees
of the carrier, ride for the purpose of performing some service
or carrying on some business upon the boat or train. Such are
mail clerks, express and news agents, and the like, who per-
44 Am. St. R. 474; Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. O’Keefe, 168 Ill.
115, 48 N. E. R. 294, 61 Am. st. R.
§319. Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont.
90, 35 Am. R. 450; [—] Bricker v.
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad
Co., 132 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. R. 983,
19 Am. St. R. 585; Chicago & Erie
Railroad Co. v. Field, 7 Ind. App.
172, 34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R.
444; Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. O’Keefe, 168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. R.
294, 61 Am. St. R. 68, and extended
note.
§ 320. [—] Warren v. Fitchburg
Railroad Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 227,
85 Am. D. 700; Webster v. Fitch-
burg Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 298, 37
N. E. R. 165; Chicago & Erie Rail-
road Co. v.‘ Field, 7 Ind. App. 172,
34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. 444;
Hansley v. Jamesville etc. Railroad
Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. R. 528,
68, and extended note; Gardner v.
New Haven etc. Co., 51 Conn. 143,
50 Am. R. 12.
§321. Union Pacific Railway Co.
v. Nichols, 8 Kan. 505, 12 Am. R.
475; Gulf etc. Railway Co. v. Wil-
son, 79 Tex. 371, 15 S. W. R. 280,
23 Am. St. R. 345; [—] Magofiin
v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 102
Mo. 540, 15 s. W. R. 76, 22 Am.
St. R. 798; Brewer v. New York etc.
Railroad Co., 124 N. Y. 59, 26 N. E.
R. 324, 21 Am. St. R. 647; Cleveland
etc. Railway Co. v. Ketcham, 133
Ind. 346, 33 N. E. R. 116, 36 Am.
St. R. 550; Commonwealth v. Ver-

















































































































































§§  320-321 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
The relation of passenger and carrier rests upon a contract, 
express or implied; Therefore two essentials are to be noted : 
( 1 ) . There must on one side be an offer to become a pas­
senger. 
(2 ) . There must on the other be an acceptance of the offer 
by the carrier, either expressly or impliedly. 
§ 320. -- (1) The o:ffer to become a passenger is usually 
to be implied from the circumstances. The traveler must put 
himself under the control of the carrier for the purpose of 
being carried. 1,his he does if he enters the carrier 's prem­
ises, waiting room, or vehicle, with the intention in good faith, 
and within a reasonable time, of becoming a passenger ; or if 
the carrier sends a vehicle to bring passengers to its station and 
he is riding in such a vehicle for the purpose of becoming a 
passenger he is ordinarily regarded as a passenger. As soon 
as he has put himself in control of the carrier in the usual way 
provided by the carrier, he has so far offered himself as a 
passenger as to become such, unless there is some act of refusal 
on the part of the carrier. 
§ 321. --Special callings.-Many persons, not employees 
of the carrier, ride for the purpose of performing some service 
or carrying on some business upon the boat or train. Such are 
mail clerks, express and news agents, and the like, who per-
§ 319. Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 44 Am. St. R. 474 ; Illinois Central 
90, 35 Am. R. 450 ; [-] Bricker v. Railroad Co. v. 0 'Keefe, 168 Ill. 
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad 115, 48 N. E. R. 294, 61 Am. St. R. 
Co., 132 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. R. 983, 68, and extended note ; Gardner v. 
19 Arn. St. R. 585 ; Chicago & Erie New Haven etc. Co., 51 Conn. 143, 
Railroad Co. v. Field, 7 Ind. App. 50 Am. R. 12. 
1 72, 34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. § 321. Union Pacific Railway Co. 
444 ; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Nichols, 8 Kan. 505, 12 Arn. R. 
v. 0 'Keefe, 168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. R. 475 ; Gulf etc. Railway Co. v. Wil-
294, 61 Am. St. R. 68, and extended son, 79 Tex. 371, 15 S. W. R. 280, 
note. 23 Am. St. R. 345 ; [ -] Magoffin 
§ 320. [-] Warren v. Fitchburg v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 102 
Railroad Co., 8 Allen (Mass. ) 227, Mo. 540, 15 S. W. R. 76, 22 Arn. 
85 Am. D. 700 ; Webster v. Fitch- St. R. 798 ; Brewer v. New York etc. 
burg Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 298, 37 Railroad Co., 124 N. Y. 59, 26 N. E. 
N. E. R. 165 ; Chicago & Erie Rail- R. 324, 21 Am. St. R. 647 ; Cleveland 
road Co. v.' Field, 7 Ind. App. 172, etc. Railway Co. v. Ketcham, 133 
34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. 444 ; Ind. 346, 33 N. E. R. 1 16, 36 Arn. 
Hansley v. Jamesrille etc. Railroad St. R. 550 ; Commonwealth v. Ver­
Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. R. 528, mont & Massachusetts Railroad Co., 
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form a service for an employer who pays the carrier for per-
mission to carry on a business and to have his clerks or agents
transported on the train or boat to take charge thereof. It
is generally held that persons performing such services and
traveling with the consent of the carrier are not employees
of the carrier, but are passengers, or as some cases put it. are
to be treated with the same care as passengers. It is of no
consequence that their fare is paid by-a third person, or that
it is part of the charge paid the carrier- for permission to
carry on the business, or that no compensation is paid for the
carriage of such persons. If they are lawfully on the train
and entitled to ride, they are passengers.
§322. --—Emp1oyees of the carrier are not passengers if
they are riding while engaged in the service for which they
were employed, or are traveling free of charge to and from
their work. But an employee may be a passenger, and he is
generally regarded as such, if he travels when not about his
duties to the carrier, or if before and after his hours of em-
ployment for his own private interest or pleasure he rides
to and from his work on a ticket that forms part of the con-
sideration by which he was induced to enter the employment
of the carrier. To its servants the carrier owes the duty to
use due diligence in selecting fellow servants, but does not
guarantee against the negligence of such fellow servants when
properly selected.
§ 323. ——Pa.yment of fare is not necessary to make one a
108 Mass. 7, 11 Am. R. 301; Sey-
bolt v. New York etc. Railroad Co.,
95 N. Y. 562, 47 Am. R, 75.
Contra as to express messengers:
Baltimore & Ohio etc. Railway Co.
v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498; Peterson
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway
Co., — Wis. —, 96 N. W. R. 532.
§322. Vick v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 267, 47 Am.
R. 36; [—] Doyle v. Fitchburg Rail-
road Co., 162 Mass. 66, 37 N. E. R.
770, 44 Am. St. R. 335, 166 Mass.
492, 55 Am. St. R. 417; Dickinson
v. West End Street Railway Co., 177
Mass. 365, 59 N. E. R. 60, 83 Am.
St. R. 284; O’Donnell v. Allegheny
Valley Railroad Co., 59 Pa. St. 239,
98 Am. D. 336; [—] Williams v.
Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 18
Utah, 210, 54 Pac. R. 991, 72 Am.
St. R. 777; Ionnone v. New York
etc. Railroad Co., 21 R. I. 452, 44
Atl. R. 592, 79 Am. St. R. 812;"
[—] Steamboat New World v. King,
16 How. (U. S.) 469; McNulty v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 182 Pa.
St. 479, 38 Atl. R. 524, 61 Am. St.
R. 721; [—] Hoar v. Maine Central
Railroad Co., 70 Me. 65, 35 Am. R.
299.
§ 323. [—] Philadelphia & Read-
ing Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How.

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF 1> ASSENGERS. §§ 322-323 
form a service for an employer who pays the carrier for per­
mission to carry on a business and to have his clerks or agents 
transported on the train or boat to take charge thereof. It 
is generally held that persons performing such services and 
traveling with the consent of the carrier are not employees 
of the carrier, but are passengers, or as some cases put it. are 
to be treated with the same care as passengers. It is of no 
consequence that their fare is paid by · a  third person, or that 
it is part of the charge paid the carrier for permission to 
carry on the business, or that no compensation is paid for the 
carriage of such persons. If they are lawfully on the train 
and entitled to ride, they are passengers. 
§ 322. --Employees of the carrier are not passengers if 
they are riding while engaged in the service for which they 
were employed, or are traveling free of (•harge to and from 
their work. But an employee may be a passenger, and he is 
generally regarded as such, if he travels when not about his 
duties to the carrier, or if before and after his hours of em­
ployment for his own private interest or pleasure he rides 
to and from his work on a ticket that forms part of the con­
sideration by which he was induced to enter the employment 
of the carrier. To its servants the carrier owes the duty to 
use due diligence in selecting fellow servants, but does not 




-Payment of fa.re is not necessary to make one a 
108 Mass. 7, 1 1  Am. R. 301 ; Sey- Valley Railroad Co., 59 Pa. St. 239, 
bolt v. New York etc. Railroad Co., 98 Am . D. 336 ; [-] Williams v. 
95 N. Y. 562, 47 Am. R, 75. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 18 
Contra as to express messengers : Utah, 210, 54 Pac. R. 991, 72 Am. 
Baltimore & Ohio etc. Railway Co. St. R. 777 ; Ionnone v. New York 
v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498 ; Peterson etc. Railroad Co., 21 R. I. 452, 44 
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Atl. R. 592, 79 Am. St. R. 812 ;· 
Co., - Wis. -, 96 N. W. R. 532. [-] Steamboat New World v. King, 
§ 322. Vick v. New York Central 16 How. (U. S.) 469 ; McNulty v. 
Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 267, 47 Am. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 182 Pa. 
R. 36 ; [-] Doyle v. Fitchburg Rail- St. 479, 38 Atl. R. 524, 61 Am. St. 
road Co., 162 Mass. 66, 37 N. E. R. R. 721 ; [-] Hoar v. Maine Central 
770, 44 Am. St. R. 335, 166 Mass. Railroad Co., 70 Me. 65, . 35 Am. R. 
492, 55 Am. St. R. 417 ; Dickinson 299. 
v. West End Street Railway Co., 177 § 323. [-] Philadelphia & Read­
Mass. 365, 59 N. E. R. 60, 83 Am. ing Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 
St. R. 284 ; O 'Donnell v. Allegheny (U. S.) 468 ; [-] Railroad v. Lock-
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passenger. The carrier may refuse to carry without compen-
sation, but if that right be waived the only inquiry is whether
the person was lawfully on the train. If the carrier accepts
the duty of carrying a human being that duty can not be
affected by the payment or non-payment of fare. Though the
relation of carrier and passenger rests upon contract, the duty
of the carrier toward human life does not rest upon contract,
but is imposed by law.
§324. l'I'respassers.—But toward a mere trespasser the
carrier owes no duty except to refrain from any wilful injury.
One who boards a train without the knowledge or consent of
the carrier, intending to steal a ride or in any manner to de-
fraud the carrier of full compensation, is not a passenger, but
a trespasser. And if by collusion with trainmen, or even with
the conductor, he secures permission to ride free, or for less
than the full fare, he is no passenger. Wrongful collusion
with an agent can give no right against his principal.
§325. (2) Acceptance by the carrier.—As the relation of
carrier and passenger can arise only from a contract, it fol-
lows that one can not become a passenger until he is accepted
by the carrier. Acceptance is usually implied from the act
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357, 10 Am.
R. 366; Ohio & Mississippi Railroad
Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9, 81 Am. D.
336; [—] Williams v. Oregon Short
Line Railroad Co., 18 Utah 210, 54
Pac. R. 991, 72 Am. St. R. 777; Illi-
nois Central Railroad Co. v. Beebe,
174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. R. 1019, 66
Am. St. R. 253; [—] Hoar v. Maine
Central Railroad Co., 70 Me. 65, 35
Am. R. 299 ; Russell v. Pittsburg etc.
Railway Co., 157 Ind. 305, 61 N. E.
R. 678, 87 Am. St. R. 214; Union
Pacific Railway Co. v. Nichols, 8
Kan. 505, 12 Am. R. 475; Lemon
v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340, 30 Am. R.
799. Compare Higley v. Gilmer, 3
Mont. 90, 35 Am. R. 450.
§324. [—] Brieker v. Philadel-
phia & Reading Railroad Co., 132
Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. R. 983, 19 Am.
St. R. 585; McVeety v. St. Paul etc.
Railway Co., 45 Minn. 268, 47 N.
W. R. 809, 22 Am. St. R. 728; Hig-
ley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 90, 35 Am. R.
450; Toledo etc. Railway Co. v.
Beggs, 85 Ill. 80, 28 Am. R. 613;
Louisville etc. Railway Co. v. Thomp-
son, 107 Ind. 442, 8 N. E. R. 18,
57 Am. R. 120; Way v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,
64 Iowa 48, 19 N. W. R. 828, 52 Am.
R. 431; Padgitt v. Moll, 159 Mo.
143, 60 S. W. R. 121, 81 Am. St. R.
347; Chicago & Erie Railroad Co.
v. Field, 7 Ind. App. 172, 34 N. E.
R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. 444; Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. O’Keefe,
168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. R. 294, 61
Am. St. R. 68, note.
§325. [—] Bricker v. Philadel-
phia & Reading Railroad Co., 132
Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. R. 983, 19 Am.
St. R. 585 ; Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont.
90, 35 Am. R. 450; Chicago & Erie
















































































































































s §  324-325 OE' QUASI-BAILEES. 
passenger. The carrier may refuse to carry without compen­
sation, but if that right be waived the only inquiry is whether 
the person was lawfully on the train. If the carrier accepts 
the duty of carrying a human being that duty can not be 
affected by the payment or non-payment of fare. Though the 
relation of carrier and passenger rests upon contract, the duty 
of the carrier toward human life does not rest upon contract, 
but is imposed by law. 
§ 324. --Trespassers.-But toward a mere trespasser the 
carrier owes no duty except to refrain from any wilful injury. 
One who boards a train without the knowledge or consent of 
the carrier, intending to steal a ride or in any manner to de­
fraud the carrier of full compensation, is not a passenger, but 
a trespasser. And if by collusion with trainmen, or even with 
the conductor, he secures permission to ride free, or for less 
than the full fare, he is no passenger. Wrongful collusion 
with an agent can give no right against his principal. 
§ 325. (2) Acceptance by the carrier.-As the relation of 
carrier and passenger can arise only from a contract, it fol­
lows that one can not become a passenger until he is accepted 
by the carrier. Acceptance is usually implied from the act 
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.)  357, 10 Am. W. R. 809, 22 Am. St. R. 728 ; Hig­
R. 366 ; Ohio & Mississippi Railroad ley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 90, 35 Am. R. 
Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9, 81 Am. D. 450 ; Toledo etc. Railway Co. v. 
336 ; [-] Williams v. Oregon Short Beggs, 85 Ill. 80, 28 Am. R. 613 ; 
Line Railroad Co., 18 Utah 210, 54 Louisville etc. Railway Co. v. Thomp­
Pac. R. 991, 72 Am. St. R. 777 ; Illi- son, 107 Ind. 442, 8 N. E. R. 18, 
nois Central Railroad Co. v. Beebe, 57 Am. R. 120 ; Way v. Chicago, 
174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. R. 1019, 66' Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 
Am. St. R. 253 ; [ -] Hoar v. Maine 64 Iowa 48, 19 N. W. R. 828, 52 Am. 
Central Railroad Co., 70 Me. 65, 35 R. 431 ; Padgitt v. Moll, 159 Mo. 
J>.m. R. 299 ; Russell v. Pittsburg etc. 143, 60 S. W. R. 121, 81 Am. St. R. 
Railway Co., 157 Ind. 305, 61 N. E. 347 ; Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. 
R. 678, 87 Am. St. R. 214 ; Union v. Field, 7 Ind. App. 172, 34 N. E. 
Pacific Railway Co. T. Nichols, 8 R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. 444 ; Illinois 
Kan. 505, 12 Am. R. 475 ;  Lemon Central Railroad Co. v. O 'Keefe, 
v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 340, 30 Am. R. 168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. R. 294, 61 
799. Compare Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Am. St. R. 68, note. 
)font. 90, 35 Am. R. 450. § 325. [-] Bricker v. Philadel-
§ 324. [-] Bricker v. Philadel- phia & Reading Railroad Co., 132 
phia & Reading Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. R. 983, 19 Am. 
Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. R. 983, 19 Am. St. R. 585 ; Higley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 
St. R. 585 ; Mc Veety v. St. Paul etc. 90, 35 Am. R. 450 ; Chicago & Erie 
Railway Co., 45 Minn. 268, 47 N. Railroad Co. v. Field, 7 Ind. App. 
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OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§ 326'327
of the passenger in putting himself in the control of the car-
rier in the manner usually provided by the carrier for its pas-
sengers. The carrier rarely expressly accepts the passenger
as such until after the carriage has begun, but the relation
dates from the implied acceptance when the passenger prop-
erly presents himself for carriage.
§326. _wha1= amounts to accepta.nce.—The carrier is in
general presumed to have accepted as passengers all who offer
themselves in the usual way for carriage, whether the carrier
has knowledge of such offer or not. Entering a station with
the intention of purchasing a ticket for immediate transporta-
tion, or boarding a train with or without a ticket with the in-
tention of paying for the ride when called upon, ordinarily
makes one a passenger, and so does signaling a bus to stop for
a pedestrian if the driver heeds the signal and stops the bus.
But running to catch a train, boarding a train not used for
carrying passengers, or a passenger train in a part of the train
not used for passengers, or riding in the cab of the engine
with the consent of the engineer, are not acts from which the
carrier ’s acceptance of the person as a passenger will be pre-
sumed.
2. RIGHTS AND DUTrEs RESULTING FROM THE RELATION.
§327. Classiflcationr—The rights and liabilities of the pas-
senger carrier are fixed.
A. By operation of law; or
B. By contract.
172, 34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R.
444; [—] Hoar v. Maine Central
Railroad Co., 70 Me. 65, 35 Am. R.
299; Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. O’Keefe, 168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E.
R. 294, 61 Am. st. R. e8.
§326. [—] Brien v. Bennett, 8
Car. & P. 724, 34 E. C. L. 984 ;. Car-
penter v. Boston 8a Albany Railroad
Co., 97 N. Y. 494, 49 Am. R. 540;
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Nichols,
8 Kan. 505, 12 Am. R. 475;
[—] Warren v. Fitchburg Railway
Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 227, 85 Am. D.
700; Hansley v. J amesville etc. Rail-
road Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E.
R. 528, 44 Am. St. R. 474; Merrill
v. Eastern Railroad Co., 139 Mass.
238, 1 N .E. R. 548, 52 Am. R. 705;
[—] Bricker v. Philadelphia & Read-
ing Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 1, 18
Atl. R. 983, 19 Am. St. R. 585; Illi-
nois Central Railroad Co. v. O ’Keefe,
168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. R. 294, 61 Am.
St. R. 68; Gardner v. New Haven
etc. Co., 51 Conn. 143, 50 Am. R. 12;
Eaton v. Delaware, Lackawanna 80
Western Railroad Co., 57 N. Y. 382,
15 Am. R. 513; Udell v. Citizens’
Street Railroad Co., 152 Ind. 507,

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF P .ASS:eNGERS. §§  326-327 
of the passenger in putting himself in the control of the car­
rier in the manner usually provided by the carrier for its pas­
sengers. The carrier rarely expressly accepts the passenger 
as such until after the carriage has begun, but the relation 
dates from the implied acceptance when the passenger prop­
erly presents himself for carriage. 
§ 326. --What amounts to accepta.nce.-The carrier is in 
general presumed to have accepted as passengers all who offer 
themselves in the usual way for carriage, whether the carrier 
has knowledge of such offer or not. Entering a station with 
the intention of purchasing a ticket for immediate transporta­
tion, or boarding a train with or without a ticket with the in­
tention of paying for the ride when called upon, ordinarily 
makes one a passenger, and so does signaling a bus to stop for 
a pedestrian if the driver heeds the signal and stops the bus. 
But running to catch a train, boarding a train not used for 
carrying passengers, or a passenger train in a part of the train 
not used for passengers, or riding in the cab of the engine 
with the consent of the engineer, are not acts from which the 
carrier 's acceptance of the person as a passenger will be pre­
sumed. 
2. RIGHTS AND DUTIES RESULTING FROM THE RELATION. 
§ 327. Classiflcation.-The rights and liabilities of the pas­
senger carrier are fixed. 
A. By operation of law ; or 
B. By contract. 
172, 34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. 
444 ; [-] Hoar v. Maine Central 
Railroad Co., 70 Me. 65, 35 Am. R. 
299 ; Illinois Central Railroad Co. 
v. O 'Keefe, 168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. 
R. 294, 61 Am. St. R. 68. 
§ 326. [-] Brien v. Bennett, 8 
Car. & P. 724, 34 E. C. L. 984 ;, Car· 
penter v. Boston & Albany Railroad 
Co., 97 N. Y. 494, 49 Am. R. 540 ; 
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Nichols, 
8 Kan. 505, 12 Am. R. 475 ; 
[-] Warren v. Fitchburg Railway 
Co., 8 Allen (Mass. ) 227, 85 Am. D. 
700 ; Hansley v. Jamesville etc. Rail· 
road Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. 
R. 528, 44 Am. St. R. 474 ; Merrill 
v. Eastern Railroad Co., 139 Mass. 
238, 1 N .E. R. 548, 52 Am. R. 705 ; 
[-] Bricker v. Philadelphia & Read­
ing Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 1, 18  
Atl. R .  983, 19 Am. St. R .  585 ; Illi­
nois Central Railroad Co. v. 0 'Keefe, 
168 Ill. 115, 48 N. E. R. 294, 61 Am. 
St. R. 68 ; Gardner v. New Haven 
etc. Co., 51 Conn. 143, 50 Am. R. 12 ; 
Eaton v. Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western Railroad Co., 57 N. Y. 382, 
15 Am. R. 513 ; Udell v. Citizens ' 
Street Railroad Co., 152 Ind, 507, 
52 N. E. R. 799, 71 Am. St. R. 336. 
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§§ 323-330 OF QUASI-BAILEES.
A. By operation of law the carrier of passengers has the
following rights and duties:
(1)
Right to compensation.
(2. Right to make reasonable regulations.
(3) Duty to accept all as passengers.
(4) Duty to furnish accommodations.
(5) Liability for injury to the passenger.
(6) Liability for delay in transportation.
(7) Liability for passenger’s baggage.
(1) Right to Compensation.
§328. Fa.re.—Like every carrier the common carrier of
passengers has a right to compensation for his services, and
may demand his payment in advance. It is usual to do this
by requiring the purchase of a ticket before entering the oars
or other vehicle. The rules already stated as to compensa-
tion of the common carrier of goods apply to the compensation
of the common carrier of passengers, except that the latter
is equally a carrier of passengers who pay and of those who
ride gratuitously with the carrier ’s consent.
§329. ——Amount of fa.re.-—In the case of the great cor-
porations engaged in carrying passengers by land, the fare is
often fixed by charter or statute. When not so regulated the
customary rate, or in the absence of usage, a reasonable
amount may be charged. The charge must be uniform to all
persons of the same class riding under the same conditions.
§ 330. ——Tickets purchased by the passenger showing the
route and train for which passage has been paid are in uni-
versal use. Such tickets are evidence of the passenger’s right
to ride, and they are often used as a contract containing
printed stipulations as to the special terms under which the
carriage is undertaken, both of the passenger and of his bag-
gage. (See Sec. 333.)
§328. See the cases under sec.
323; Hutchinson on Carriers, sec.
565; Barrett v. Market Street Rail-
way Co., 81 Cal. 296, 22 Pac. R. 859,
15 Am. st. R. 61; [—] Standish
v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 111
Mass. 512, 15 Am. R. 66;
[—] O’Brien v. Boston etc. Rail-
road, 15 Gray (Mass.) 20, 77 Am.
D. 347; Lynch v. Metropolitan Ele-
vated Railway Co., 90 N. Y. 77, 43
Am. R. 141; Pullman Palace Car Co.
v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125, 20 Am. R. 232.
§329. Ante, sec. 202-203; Spot'-
ford y. Railroad Co., 128 Mass. 326;
Wellinan v. Railway Co., 83 Mich.
592, 47 N. W. R. 489; Hutchinson

















































































































































§ §  328-330 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
A. By operation of law the carrier of passengers has the 
following rights and duties : 
( 1 )  Right to compensation. 
( 2 .  Right to make reasonable regulations. 
( 3 )  Duty to accept all as  passengers. 
( 4)  Duty to furnish accommodations. 
( 5 ) Liability for inj ury to the passenger. 
( 6 )  Liability for delay i n  transportation. 
( 7 )  Liability for passenger 's baggage. 
( 1 ) Right to Compensation. 
§ 328. Fare.-Like every carrier the common carrier of 
passengers has a right to compensation for his services, and 
may demand his payment in advance. It is usual to do this 
by requiring the purchase of a ticket before entering the cars 
01· other vehicle . The rules already stated as to compensa­
tion of the common carrier of goods apply to the compensation 
of the common carrier of passengers, except that the latter 
is equally a carrier of passengers who pay and of those who 
ride gratuitously with the carrier 's consent. 
§ 329. --Amount of fa.re.-In the case of the great cor­
porations engaged in carrying passengers by land, the fare is 
often fixed by charter or statute. When not so regulated the 
customary rate, or in the absence of usage, a reasonable 
amount may be charged. The charge must be uniform to all 
persons of the same class riding under the same conditions. 
§ 330. --Tickets purchased by the passenger showing the 
route and train for which passage has been paid are in uni­
versal use. Such tickets are evidence of the passenger 's right 
to ride, and they are often used as a contract containing 
printed stipulations as to the special terms under which the 
carriage is undertaken, both of the passenger and of his bag­
gage. ( See Sec. 333 . )  
§ 328. See the eases under see. D .  347 ; Lynch v. Metropolitan Ele-
323 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, see. vated Railway Co., 90 N. Y. 77, 43 
565 ; Barrett v. Market Street Rail- Am. R. 141 ; Pullman Palace Car Co. 
way Co., 81 Cal. 296, 22 Pac. R. 859, v. Reed, 75 Ill. 1 25, 20 Am. R. 232. 
15 Am. St. R. 61 ; [-] Standish § 329. Ante, see. 202-203 ; Spof­
v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 111 ford y.  Railroad Co., 128 Mass. 326 ; 
Mass. 512, 15 Am. R. 66 ; WelhD.an v. Railway Co., 83 Mich. 
[-] 0 'Brien v. Boston etc. Rail- 592, 47 N. W. R. 489 ; Hutchinson 
road, 15 Gray (Mass.) 201 77 Am. on Carriers, sec. 567a. 
1•0 
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OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. 331-332
§331. ——Sa1e of tickets.—As already stated, the carrier
may require the purchase of a ticket as a prerequisite to the
right to ride. Passengers who fail to comply may be ejected
from the train, or required to pay a higher fare on the train,
provided this higher fare be not in excess of the amount the
carrier is permitted to charge.
But the carrier must afford passengers reasonable oppor-
tunities to procure tickets. The ticket office must be open for
a reasonable time before the train starts, or at lea_st before
the schedule time for its departure, and tickets must be sold
indiffierently to all who apply. If the fault of the carrier
prevents the passenger from procuring a ticket he is entitled
to ride by paying the lower fare on the train, and if he is
ejected for a refusal to pay the higher charge the carrier is
liable for the damages caused thereby.
§332. ——Nature of ticket.—The ticket is evidence that
the passenger has paid his fare, and must therefore be pro-
duced whenever called for by the conductor. One who re-
fuses to produce his ticket, or
§331. McGowen v. Morgan ’s
Railroad & Steamship Co., 41 La.
732, 6 S. R. 606, 17 Am. St. R.
415; [—] Zagelmeyer v. Cincinnati,
Saginaw & Mackinaw Railroad
Co., 102 Mich. 214, 60 N. W. R. 436,
47 Am. St. R. 514; [—] O’Rourke
v. Citizens’ Street Railway Co., 103
Tenn. 124, 52 S. W. R. 872, 76 Am.
St. R. 639; Poole v. Northern Pacific
Railroad Co., 16 Ore. 261, 19 Pac.
R. 107, 8 Am. St. R. 289; Reese v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 131 Pa.
St. 422, 19 Atl. R. 72, 17 Am. St.
R. 818; Du Laurans v. St. Paul &
Pacific Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49,
2 Am. R. 102; Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Co. v. Parks, 18
Ill. 460, 68 Am. D. 562; [—] Forsee
v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad
Co., 63 Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801;
Everett v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad Co., 69 Iowa 15,
28 N. W. R. 410, 58 Am. R. 207;
St. Louis etc. Railroad Co. v. South,
43 Ill. 176, 92 Am. D. 103; Jefier-
who has lost or mislaid it, can
sonville Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28
Ind. 1, 92 Am. D. 276; Swan v.
Manchester etc. Railroad Co., 132
Mass. 116, 42 Am. R. 432.
§332. [—] Ranchau v. Rutland
Railroad Co., 71 Vt. 142, 76 Am. St.
R. 761; Mahoney v. Detroit Street
Railway Co., 93 Mich. 612, 53 N. W.
R. 793, 32 Am. St. R. 528; Jerome v.
Smith, 48 Vt. 230, 21 Am. R. 125;
Townsend v. New York Central Rail-
road Co., 56 N. Y. 295, 15 Am. R.
419; [—] Standish v. Narragansett
Steamship Co., 111 Mass. 512, 15
Am. R. 66; Pullman Palace Car Co.
v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125, 20 Am. R. 232;
Van Kirk v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 76 Pa. St. 66, 18 Am. R. 404.
But see also Maples v. New York
& New Haven Railroad Co., 38 Conn.
557, 9 Am. R. 434; Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill.
421, 92 Am. D. 138; Jeifersonville
Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116,

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§ 331-332 
§ 331. Sale of tickets.-As already stated, the carrier 
may require the purchase of a ticket as a prerequisite to the 
right to ride. Passengers who fail to comply may be ejected 
from the train, or required to pay a higher fare on the train, 
provided this higher fare be not in excess of the amount the 
carrier is permitted to charge. 
But the carrier must afford passengers reasonable oppor­
tunities to procure tickets. The ticket office must be open for 
a reasonable time before the train starts, or at le8:_st before 
the schedule time for its departure, and tickets must be sold 
indifferently to all who apply. If the fault of the carrier 
prevents the passenger from procuring a ticket he is entitled 
to ride by paying the lower fare on the train, and if he is 
ejected for a refusal to pay the higher charge the carrier is 
liable for the damages caused thereby. 
§ 332. --Nature of ticket.-The ticket is evidence that 
the passenger bas paid his fare, and must therefore be pro­
duced whenever called for by the conductor. One who re­
fuses to produce his ticket, or who bas lost or mislaid it, can 
I 331. McGowen v. Morgan 's -
Railroad & Steamship Co., 41 La. 
732, 6 8. R. 606, 11 Am. St. R. 
415 ; [-] Zagelmeyer v. Cincinnati, 
Saginaw & Mackinaw Railroad 
Co., 102 Mich. 214, 60 N. W. R. 436, 
47 Am. St. R. 514 ; [-] O 'Rourke 
v. 
_
Citizens ' Street Railway Co., 103 
Tenn. 124, 52 8. W. R. 872, 76 Am. 
St. R. 639 ; Poole v. Northern Pacific 
Railroad Co., 16 Ore. 261, 19 Pae. 
R. 107, 8 Am. St. R. 289 ; Reese v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 131 Pa. 
St. 422, 19 Atl. R. 72, 17 Am. St. 
R. 818 ; Du Laurans v. St. Paul & 
Pacific Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49, 
2 Am. R. 102 ; Chicago, Burlington 
& Quincy Bailr6ad Co. v. Parks, 18 
Ill. 460, 68 Am. D. 562 ; [-] Forsee 
v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad 
Co., 63 Miss. 661 56 Am. R. 801 ; 
Everett v. Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific Railroad Co., 69 Iowa 15, 
28 N. W. R. 410, 58 Am. B. 207 ; 
St. Louis etc. Railroad Co. v. South, 
43 Ill. 176, 92 Am. D. 103 ; J effer-
sonville Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 
Ind. I, 92 Am. D. 276 ;  Swan v. 
Manchester etc. Railroad Co.. 132 
Mass. 116, 42 Am. R. 432. 
§ 332. [ -] Ranchau v. Butland 
Railroad Co., 71 Vt. 142, 76 Am. St. 
R. 761 ; Mahoney v. Detroit Street 
Railway Co., 93 Mich. 612, 53 N. W. 
R. 793, 32 Am. St. R. 528 ; Jerome v. 
Smith, 48 Vt. 230, 21 Am. B. 125 ; 
Townsend v. New York Central Rail­
road Co., 56 N. Y. 295, 15 Am. R. 
419 ; [-] Standish v. Narragansett 
Steamship Co., 111 Mase. 512, 15 
Am. R. 66 ; Pullman Palace Car Co. 
v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125, 20 Am. R. 232 ; 
Van Kirk v. Pennsylvania Railroad 
\Jo., 76 Pa. St. 66, 18 Am. B. 404. 
But see also Maples v. New York 
& New Haven Railroad Co., 38 Conn. 
557, 9 Am. R. 434 ; Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 
421, 92 Am. D. 138 ; Jeffersonville 
Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116, 
10 Am. R. 103. 
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§§ 333-334 OF‘ QUASI-BAILEES.
be required to pay full fare on the train on penalty of ejection
for refusal so to do. The conductor may require the passenger
to surrender his ticket, but not without giving him instead a
check or other evidence of his right to ride.
§333. i'I'icket as a contract.—The ordinary passenger
ticket is not a contract, but mere evidence of a contract, a
receipt or token given by the carrier to show its trainmen for
what right the passenger has paid. In this it differs from a
bill of lading which is ordinarily both a receipt and a contract.
If therefore the carrier embodies in the ticket elements of the
contract of carriage the purchaser does not by mere accept-
ance of the ticket assent to terms printed thereon, in the
absence of actual knowledge of them.
His acquiescence may be assumed when he knows he is
buying a ticket at reduced rates and the terms are plainly
printed on the ticket, or when he signs stipulations so printed
without taking the trouble to read them, but in any case the
conditions will not be binding unless they are reasonable.
It is the contract, not the ticket, that governs the right to
transportation, and it is seldom, if ever, that the ticket em-
bodies all the elements of the contract. But when the cir-
cumstances are such that the passenger must be understood
to have assented to conditions on the ticket they become part
of the contract of carriage. If the ticket does not express
the full contract, parol evidence is admissible to supply missing
terms.
§ 334. ——As between the passenger and the conductor the
§333. [—] Ranchau v. Rutland E. R. 424, 51 Am. St. R. 206;
Railroad Co., 71 Vt. 142, 43 Atl. R.
1], 76 Am. St. R. 761; [—] Quirnby
v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am.
1). 469; Fonseca v. Cunard Steam-
ship Co., 153 Mass. 553, 27 N. E. R.
665, 25 Am. St. R. 660; Boyd v.
Spencer, 103 Ga. 828, 30 S. E. R.
841, 68 Am. St. R. 146; [—] Kent
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
45 Ohio St. 284, 12 N. E. R. 798,
4 Am. St. R. 539; Kansas City etc.
Railroad Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38 Kan.
45, 15 Pac. R. 899, 5 Am. St. R.
715; Louisville etc. Railway Co. v.
Nicholai, 4 Ind. App. 119, 30 N.
[—] Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551, 27 Atl. R.
914, 39 Am. St. R. 654; Walker v.
Price, 62 Kan. 327, 62 Pac. 1001,
84 Am. St. R. 392; Burnham v.
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 63 Me.
298, 18 Am. R. 220; Callaway v.
Mellett, 15 Ind. App. 366, 44 N. E.
R. 198, 57 Am. St. R. 238;
[—] O’Rourke v. Citizens’ Street
Railway Co., 103 Tenn. 124, 52 S.
W. R. 872, 76 Am. St. R. 639.
§334. [—] Frederick v. Mar-
quette etc. Railroad Co., 37 Mich.

















































































































































§ §  333-334 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
be required to pay full fare on the train on penalty of ejection 
for refusal so to do. The conductor may require the passenger 
to surrender his ticket, but not without giving him instead a 
check or other evidence of his right to ride. 
§ 333. --Ticket as a contract.-The ordinary passenger 
ticket is not a contract, but mere evidence of a contract, a 
receipt or token given by the carrier to show its trainmen fo!-' 
what right the passenger has paid. In this it differs from a 
bill of lading which is ordinarily both a receipt and a contract. 
If therefore the carrier embodies in the ticket elements of the 
contract of carriage the purchaser does not by mere accept­
ance of the ticket assent to terms printed thereon, in the 
absence of actual knowledge of them. 
His acquiescence may be assumed when he knows he is 
buying a ticket at reduced rates and the terms are plainly 
printed on the ticket, or when he signs stipulations so printed 
without taking the trouble to read them, but in any case the 
conditions will not be binding unless they are reasonable. 
It is the contract, not the ticket, that governs the right to 
transportation, and it is seldom, if ever, that the ticket em­
bodies all the elements of the contract. But when the cir­
cumstances are such that the passenger must be understood 
to have assented to conditions on the ticket they become part 
of the contract of carriage. If the ticket does not express 
the full contract, parol evidence is admissible to supply missing 
terms. 
§ 334. --As between the passenger and the conductor the 
§ 333. [-] Ranehau v. Rutland E. R. 424, 51 Am. St. R. 206 ; 
Railroad Co., 71 Vt. 142, 43 Atl. R. [-] Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. 
11 ,  76 Am. St. R. 761 ; [-] Quimby Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551, 27 Atl. R. 
'"· Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am. 914, 39 Am. St. R. 654 ; Walker v. 
D. 469 ; Fonseca v. Cunard Steam- Price, 62 Kan. 327, 62 Pac. 1001, 
ship Co., 153 Mase. 553, 27 N. E. R. 84 Am. St. R. 392 ; Burnham v. 
665, 25 Am. St. R. 660 ; Boyd v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 63 Me. 
Spencer, 103 Ga. 828, 30 S. E. R. 298, 18 Am. R. 220 ; Callaway v. 
Ml, 68 Am. St. R. 146 ; [-] Kent Mellett, 15 Ind. App. 366, 44 N. E. 
''· Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., R. 198, 57 Am. St. R. 238 ; 
45 Ohio St. 284, 12 N. E. R. 798, [-] 0 'Rourke v. Citizens ' Street 
4 Am. St. R. 539 ; Kansas City etc. Railway Co., 103 Tenn. 124, 52 S. 
Railroad Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38 Kan. W. R. 872, 76 Am. St. R. 639. 
45, 15 Pac. R. 899, 5 Am. St. R. § 334. [ -] Frederick v. Mar-
715 ; Louisville etc. Railway Co. v. quette etc. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. 
Nicholai, 4 Ind. App. 119, 30 N. 342, 26 Am. R. 531 ; Bradshaw v. 
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ticket is conclusive of the passenger’s right to ride. On a
ticket reading from A to VB one may not ride from B to A,
nor from A to C beyond B. As to that conductor it does not
matter that the mistake in the ticket was the fault of the
ticket agent who sold it. The conductor must be guided by
the ticket or the carrier would be at the mercy of every fraud-
ulent representation of a passenger. The passenger with a
wrong ticket should pay his fare again, taking a receipt. He
may then recover from the carrier all the damage proximately
caused by the fault of the ticket agent.
§335. ——Tickets ambiguous on their face have led the
courts in some cases to relax the above rule, with a resulting
uncertainty that seems unfortunate and not always in accord
with reason and the conditions under which a conductor acts
in taking tickets. Thus, where a pasenger through the fault
of the agent or carrier is unable to procure a proper ticket,
or has been given a ticket which does not show upon its face
that it is defective, it has been held that the conductor must
accept the passenger ’s statement until he knows the contrary
to be true. Under such a rule it is difficult to see how the
carrier can be protected against fraudulent representations.
The cases on this question are in conflict.
§336. i~Basis of carrier’s 1ia.bi1ity.—It is possible that
the conflicting rules result from a failure to distinguish be-
tween the right of the conductor and the liability of the car-
rier. By the weight of reason,
South Boston Railroad Co., 135
Mass. 407, 46 Am. R. 481; McKay
v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 34 W.
Va. 65, 11 S. E. R. 737, 26 Am. St.
R. 913; Kiley v. Chicago City Rail-
way Co., 189 Ill. 384, 59 N. E. R.
794, 82 Am. St. R. 460; Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Gaines,
99 Ky. 411, 36 s. W. R. 174, 59 Am.
St. R. 465; Callaway v. Mellett, 15
Ind. App. 366, 44 N. E. R. 198, 57
Am. St. R. 238; Keeley v. Boston &
Maine Railroad Co., 67 Me. 163, 24
Am. R. 19; Hot Springs Railroad
Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177, 45 S.
W. R. 351, 67 Am. St. R. 913.
§335. [—] Hnfford v. Grand
Rapids & Indiana Railroad Co., 64
and it is believed of authority
Mich. 631, 31 N. W. R. 544, 8 Am.
St. R. 859. (Compare id. 53 Mich.
118, 18 N. W. R. 580.) [—] O’~
Rourke v. Citizens’ Street Railway
Co., 103 Tenn. 124, 52 S. W. R. 872,
76 Am. St. R. 639; Kansas City etc.
Railroad Co. v. Riley, 68 Miss. 765,
9 S. R. 443, 24 Am. St. R. 309;
Head v. Georgia Pacific Railway
Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. E. R. 217, 11
Am. St. R. 434; Murdock v. Boston
& Albany Railroad Co., 137 Mass.
293, 50 Am. R. 307.
§336. Appleby v. St. Paul City
Railway Co., 54 Minn. 169, 55 N.
W. R. 1117, 40 Am. St. R. 308;
Louisville 85 Nashville, Railroad Co.
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ticket is conclusive of the passenger 's right to ride. On a 
ticket reading from A to B one may not ride from B to A, 
nor from A to C beyond B. As to that conductor it does not 
matter that the mistake in the ticket was the fault of the 
ticket agent who sold it. The conductor must be guided by 
the ticket or the carrier would be at the mercy of every fraud­
ulent representation of a passenger. The passenger with a 
wrong ticket should pay his fare again, taking a receipt. He 
may then recover from the carrier all the damage proximately 
caused by the fault of the ticket agent. 
§ 335. --Tickets ambiguous on their face have led the 
courts in some cases to relax the above rule, with a resulting 
uncertainty that seems unfortunate and not always in accord 
with reason and the conditions under which a conductor acts 
in taking tickets. Thus, where a pasenger through the fault 
of the agent or carrier is unable to procure a proper ticket, 
or has been given a ticket which does not show upon its face 
that it is defective, it has been held that the conductor must 
accept the passenger 's statement until he knows the contrary 
to be true. Under such a rule it is difficult to see how the 
carrier can be protected against fraudulent representations. 
'fhe cases on this question are in conflict. 
§ 336. ---Basis of carrier 's liability.-It is possible that 
the conflicting rules result from a failure to distinguish be­
tween the right of the conductor and the liability of the car­
rier. By the weight of reason, and it is believed of authority 
South Boston Railroad Co., 135 Mieh. 631, 31 N. W. R. 544, 8 Am. 
Mass. 407, 46 Am. R. 481 ; MeKay St. R. 859. (Compare id. 53 Mich. 
v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 34 W. 118, 18 N. W. R. 580. ) [-] 0 '· 
Va. 65, 11 S. E. R. 737, 26 Am . St. Rourke v. Citizens ' Street Railway 
R. 913 ; Kiley v. Chicago City Rail- Co., 103 Tenn. 124, 52 S. W. R. 872, 
way Co., 189 Ill. 384, 59 N. E. R. 16 Am. St. R. 639 ; Kansas City etc. 
794, 82 Am. St. R. 460 ; Louisville Railroad Co. v. Riley, 68 Miss. 765, 
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Gaines, 9 S. R. 443, 24 Am. St. R. 309 ; 
99 Ky. 411, 36 S. W. R. 174, 59 Am. Head v. Georgia Pacific Railway 
St. R. 465 ; Callaway v. Mellett, 15 Co., 79 Ga. 358, 1 S.  E.  R.  217, 1 1  
Ind. App. 366, 44 N .  E .  R .  198, 57 Am. St. R. 434 ; Murdock v. Boston · 
Am. St. R. 238 ; Keeley v. Boston & & Albany Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 
Maine Railroad Co., 67 Me. 163, 24 293, 50 Am. R. 307. 
Am. R. 19 ; Hot Springs Railroad § 336. Appleby v. St. Paul City 
Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177, 45 S. Railway Co., 54 Minn. 169, 55 N. 
W. R. 351, 67 Am. St. R. 913. W. R. 1117, 40 Am. St. R. 308 ; 
§ 335. [-] Hufford v. Grand Louisville & Nashville, Railroad Co. 
Rapids & Indiana Railroad Co., 64 v. Gaines, 99 Ky. 411, 36 S. W. R. 
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also, the conductor must be guided by the ticket, and is guilty
of no wrong in ejecting a passenger for failure to present a
proper ticket and refusal to pay full fare.
But the carrier is equally liable for the acts of the conductor
and of the ticket agent. If, therefore, through the negligence
or wrong of such agent the passenger is not furnished with
a proper ticket the carrier is liable for the natural and proxi-
mate consequences. The passenger may pay his fare again
and recover back the extra amount so paid; but he is not
bound to do so, and if he refuses and is ejected from the train
the carrier is liable not only for the amount of the fare, but
for other losses proximately caused by the negligence of the
agent, but not, it is believed, for injuries caused by resisting
ejection from the train, unless the passenger was wantonly and
maliciously injured by the trainmen. The passenger recovers,
but his recovery is based on the wrong of the ticket agent
and not on that of the conductor. This distinction in some
cases has an important bearing on the form of the action and
the amount of the damages.
§337. ——Conditions printed on the ticket bind the pas-
senger if they are reasonable and not contrary to public policy.
But the ticket is a mere token that the fare is paid and that
the passenger has a right to be carried to the destination indi-
cated in the ticket according to the reasonable regulations
of the company. Both the regulations on the ticket and other
regulations of the carrier, at least so far as they are presumed
to be known, are part of the contract of carriage, and the
passenger must conform to them.
§338. ——Stop-overs, coupon tickets.—Presumptively a
ticket is evidence of a right to a continuous passage to the
174, 59 Am. St. R. 465; Kiley v.
Chicago City Railway Co., 189 Ill.
384, 59 N. E. R. 794, 82 Am. St. R.
460; [—] O’Rourke v. Citizens’
Street Railway Co., 103 Tenn. 124,
52 S. W. R. 872, 76 Am. St. R. 639;
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
road Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 17
Pac. R. 54, 5 Am. St. R. 780.
§337. [—] Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co. v. Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551,
C7 Atl. R. 914, 39 Am. St. R. 654;
McClure v. Philadelphia etc. Rail-
road Co., 34 Md. 532, 6 Am. R. 345.
§338. [—] Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co. v. Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551,
27 Atl. R. 914, 39. Am. St. R. 654;
Cheney v. Boston & Maine Railroad
Co., 11 Metc. (Mass.) 121, 45 Am.
D. 190; Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga.
657, 23 S. E. R. 836, 51 Am. St. R.
152; [—] Auerbach v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281,
42 Am. R. 290; McClure v. Philadel-
phia etc. Railroad Co., 34 Md. 532,

















































































































































§ §  337-338 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
also, the conductor must be guided by the ticket, and is guilty 
of no wrong in eject}ng a passenger for failure to present a 
proper ticket and refusal to pay full fare. 
But the carrier is equally liable for the acts of the conductor 
and of the ticket agent. If, therefore, through the negligence 
or wrong of such agent the passenger is not furnished with 
a proper ticket the carrier is liable for the natural and proxi­
mate consequences. The passenger may pay his fare again 
and recover back the extra amount so pnid ; but he is not 
bound to do so, and if he refuses and is ejected from the train 
the carrier is liable not only for the amount of the fare, but 
for other losses proximately caused by the negligence of the 
agent, but not, it is believed, for injuries caused by resisting 
ejection from the train, unless the passenger was wantonly and 
maliciously injured by the trainmen. The passenger recovers, 
but his recovery is based on the wrong of the ticket agent 
and not on that of the conductor. This distinction in some 
cases has an important bearing on the form of the action and 
the amount of the damages. 
§ 337. --Conditions printed on the ticket bind the pas­
senger if they are reasonable and not contrary to public polic�. 
But the ticket is a mere token that the fare is paid and that 
the passenger has a right to be carried to the destination indi­
cated in the ticket according to the reasonable regulations 
of the company. Both the regulations on the ticket and 0th.er 
regulations of the carrier, at least so far as they are presumed 
to be known, are part of the contract of carriage, and the 
passenger must conform to them. 
§ 338. -Stop-overs, coupon tickets.-Presumptively a 
ticket is evidence of a right to a continuous passage to the 
174, 59 Am. St. R. 465 ; Kiley v. 
Chicago City Railway Co., 189 Ill. 
384, 59 N. E. R. 794, 82 Am. St. R. 
460 ; [ -] 0 'Rourke v. Citizens ' 
Street Railway Co., 103 Tenn. 124, 
52 S. W. R. 872, 76 Am. St. R. 639 ; 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail­
road Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 17  
Pac. R.  54, 5 Am. St. R.  780. 
§ 337. [-] Pennsylvania Rail· 
road Co. v. Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551, 
�7 Atl. R. 914, 39 Am. St. R. 654 ; 
McClure v. Philadelphia etc. Rail· 
road Co., 34 Md. 532, 6 Am. R. 345. 
§ 338. [-] Pennsylvania Rail­
road Co. v. Parry, 55 N. J. L. 551, 
27 Atl. R. 914, 39. Am. St. R. 654 ; 
Cheney v. Boston & Maine Railroad 
Co., 1 1  Mete. (Mass. ) 121, 45 Am. 
D. 190 ; Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga. 
657, 23 S. E. R. 836, 51 Am. St. R. 
152 ; [-] Auerbach v. New York 
Central Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281, 
4� Am. R. 290 ; McClure v. Philadel­
phia etc. Railroad Co., 34 Md. 532, 
6 Am. R. 345 ; State v. Overton, 4 
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destination therein named, and the passenger has no right to
break the journey by stopping off unless the carrier specially
grants stop-over privileges. The contract is entire, and neither
party can be required to perform it in fragments. Where,
however, the passage is over several lines, or several branches
of the same line, and a coupon ticket is given, each coupon is a
sort of separate contract over that division of the route, and
the passenger may leave the train at junction points and re-
sume his journey by a later train.
§339. ——Limited tickets.—There is nothing unreasonable
in limiting a ticket to be “good only on date of sale,” “good
only two days from date stamped on back,” “not good on
limited trains.” If one asks for an inferior ticket at a reduced
rate he is presumed to accept the conditions printed thereon
as part of the contract of carriage. If, however, a first class
unlimited ticket is paid for the passenger is bound only by
conditions of which he had notice, and if a second class ticket
is issued to him the carrier is liable if he is denied the full
advantages of a first class ticket. It has been held that a time
limitation is not matter of contract, but is a mere regulation
of which the passenger must take notice.
Tickets limited as to time of use are not good after the
expiration of such time. The journey must be begun,-though
not necessarily completed, before the expiration of such time
limit. In the case of coupon tickets the journey over the por-
tion of the route covered by the last coupon must have been
entered upon, but not necessarily completed, within the limit.
Zab. (N. J.) 435, 61 Am.‘ D. 671; Railway Co., 63 Me. 298, 18 Am. R.
Stone v. Chicago & Northwestern 220; Louisville & Nashville Rail-
Railway Co., 47 Iowa 82, 29 Am. R.
4458.
§339. [—] Boston & Lowell
Railroad Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen
(Mass.) 267, 79 Am. D. 729; Hef-
fron v. Detroit City Railway Co., 92
Mich. 406, 52 N. W. R. 802, 31 Am.
St. R. 601; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N.
Y. 512, 13 Am. R. 617; McClure v.
Philadelphia etc. Railroad Co., 34
Md. 532, 6 Am. R. 345; Keeley v.
Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 67
Me. 163, 24 Am. R. 19; Walker v.
Price, 62 Kan. 327, 62 Pac. R. 1001,
84 Am. St. R. 392, and extended
note; Burnham v. Grand Trimk
road Co. v. Gaines, 99 Ky. 411, 36
s. W. R. 174, 59 Am. st. R. 465;
{—] Ranchau v. Rutland Railroad
Co., 71 Vt. 142, 43 Atl. R. 11, 76
Am. St. R. 761. Compare Coburn v.
Morgan’s Railroad Co., 105 La.
398, 29 S. R. 882. 83 Am. St. R.
242, with Boyd v. Spencer, 103 Ga.
828, 30 s. E. R. 841, e8 Am. st. R.
146; [—] Auerbach v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281,
42 Am. R. 290; Cleveland etc. Rail-
way Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind. App.


















































































































































OF CARRIERS OP PASSENGERS. § 339 
destination therein named, and the passenger has no right to 
break the journey by stopping off unless the carrier specially 
grants stop-over privileges. The contract is entire, and neither 
party can be required to perform it in fragments. Where, 
however, the passage is over several lines, or several branches 
of the same line, and a coupon ticket is given, each coupon is a 
sort of separate contract over that division of the route, and 
the passenger may leave the train at junction points and re­
sume his journey by a later train. 
§ 339. --Limited tickets.-There is nothing unreasonable 
in limiting a ticket to be ' ' good only on date of sale, ' '  ' ' good 
only two days from date stamped on back, ' '  ' ' not good on 
limited trains. " If one asks for an inferior ticket at a reduced 
rate he is presumed to accept the conditions printed thereon 
as part of the contract of carriage. If, however, a first class 
unlimited ticket is paid for the passenger is bound only by 
conditions of which he had notice, and if a second class ticket 
is issued to him the carrier is liable if he is denied the full 
advantages of a first class ticket. It has been held that a time 
limitation is not matter of contract, but is a mere regulation 
of which the passenger must take notice. 
Tickets limited as to time of use are not good after the 
expiration of such time. The journey must be begun, . though 
not necessarily completed, before the expiration of such time 
l imit. In the case of coupon tickets the journey over the por­
tion of the route covered by the last coupon must have been 
entered upon, but not necessarily completed, within the limit. 
Zab. ( N. J. ) 435, 61 Am: D. 671 ; Railway Co., 63 Me. 298, 18 Am. R. 
Stone v. Chicago & Northwestern 220 ; Louisville & Nashville Rail· 
Railway Co., 47 Iowa 82, 29 Am. R. road Co. v. Gaines, 99 Ky. 411, 36 
458. S. W. R. 174, 59 Am. St. R. 465 ; 
§ 339. [-] Boston & Lowell [-] Ranchau v. Rutland Railroad 
Railroad Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen Co., 71 Vt. 142, 43 Atl. R. 11, 76 
(Mass. ) 267, 79 Am. D. 729 ; Ref· Am. St. R. 761. Compare Coburn v. 
fron v. Detroit City Railway Co., 92 Morgan 's Railroad Co., 105 La. 
Mich. 406, 52 N. W. R. 802, 31 Am. 398, 29 S. R. 882. 83 Am. St. R. 
St. R. 601 ; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. 242, with Boyd v. Spencer, 103 Ga. 
Y. 512, 13 Am. R. 617 ; McClure v. 828, 30 S. E. R. 841, 68 Am. St. R. 
Philadelphia etc. Railroad Co., 34 146 ;  [-] Auerbach v. New York 
Md. 532, 6 Am. R. 345 ; Keeley v. Central Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 281, 
Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 67 42 Am. R. 290 ; Cleveland etc. Rail­
Me. 163, 24 Am. R. 19 ; Walker v. way Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind. App. 
Price, 62 Kan. 327, 62 Pae. R. 1001, 1 35, 60 N. E. R. 169, 87 Am. St. R. 
84 Am. St. R. 392, and extended S45. 
riote ; Burnham v. Grand Trunk 
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(2) Right to Make Regulations.
§ 340. Basis of the right.—It is not only the right, but also
the duty, of passenger carriers to make and enforce reasonable
rules and regulations for the safety and comfort of their pas-
scngers. Particularly in the case of carriers using steam as
a motive power, public convenience and safety require such
rules as to the manner of doing their business as carriers and
as to the conduct of their passengers as shall ensure a service
that is swift, regular and safe.
For the enforcement of such rules and regulations the law
gives the carrier ample authority. Derangement in the run-
ning of trains is hazardous to property and life, and a pas-
senger whose conduct causes such derangement forfeits his
right to ride. Every passenger therefore impliedly agrees
to be bound by the reasonable regulations of the carrier.
§341. Must be rea.sona.b1e.—While these reasonable regu-
lations are part of the contract, expressed or implied, for the
carriage, and while the carrier may, if necessary, resort to
force to compel obedience to them, yet he assumes the risk of
being liable in damages to the passenger if he resorts to ex-
treme measures to enforce regulations that are unreasonable
and unnecessary. The reasonable regulations may apply to the
station or to any part of the journey, to the passenger on or
off the train. But it must be
service and to secure the just
§340. Hibbard v. Erie Railroad
Co., 15 N. Y. 455; [—] O’Brien v.
Boston etc. Railroad Co., 15 Gray
(Mass.) 20, 77 Am. D. 347;
[—] Chicago & North-Western
Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185,
8 Am. R. 641 ; [—] Standish v. Nar-
ragansett Steamship Co., 111 Mass.
512, 15 Am. R. 66; Johnson v. Con-
cord Railroad Corporation, 46 N. H.
‘.213, 88 Am. D. 199; Chicago & Erie
Railroad Co. v. Field, 7 Ind. App.
172, 34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R.
444; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Vlfliittemore, 43 Tll. 420, 92 Am. D.
1.38; Commonwealth v. Power, 7
Metc. (Mass.) 596, 41 Am. D, 465,
their purpose to facilitate the
rights of the parties, and not
and extended note; Day v. Owen, 5
Mich. 520, 72 Am. D. 62.
§341. [—] Forsee v. Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co., 63
Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801; Common-
wealth v. Power, 7 Metc. (Mass.)
596, 41 Am. D. 465; [—] Chicago
& North-Western Railway Co. v. Wil-
liams, 55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641;
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
road Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 17
Pac. R. 54, 5 Am. St. R. 780; Maples
v. New York & New Haven Railroad
Co., 38 Conn. 557, 9 Am. R. 434;
Lynch v. Metropolitan Elevated



















































































































































§ §  340-341 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
(2 ) R'ight to Make Regulations. 
§ 340. Basis of the right.-It is not only the right, but also 
the duty, of passenger carriers to make and enforce reasonable 
rules and regulations for the safety and comfort of their pas­
sengers. Particularly in the case of carriers using steam as 
a motive power, public convenience and safety require such 
rules as to the manner of doing their business as carriers and 
as to the conduct of their passengers as shall ensure a service 
that is swift, regular and safe. 
For the enforcement of such rules and regulations the law 
gives the carrier ample authority. Derangement in the run­
ning of trains is hazardous to property and life, and a pas­
senger whose conduct causes such derangement forfeits his 
right to ride. Every passenger therefore impliedly agrees 
to be bound by the reasonable regulations of the carrier. 
§ 341. Must be reasonable.-While these reasonable regu­
lations are part of the contract, expressed or implied, for the 
carriage, and while the carrier may, if necessary, resort to 
force to compel obedience to them, yet he assumes the risk of 
being liable in dal'.llages to the passenger if he resorts to ex­
treme measures to enforce regulations that are unreasonable 
and unnecessary. The reasonable regulations may apply to the 
station or to any part of the journey, to the passenger on or 
off the train. But it must be their purpose to facilitate the 
service and to secure the just rights of the parties, and not 
§ 340. Hibbard v. Erie Railroad and extended note ; Day v. Owen, 5 
Co., 15 N. Y. 455 ; [-] 0 'Brien v. Mich. 520, 72 Am. D. 62. 
Boston etc. Railroad Co., 15 Gray § 341. [-] Forsee v. Alabama 
(Mass. ) 20, 77 Am. D. 347 ; Great Southern Railroad Co., 63 
[-] Chicago & North-Western Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801 ; Common­
Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, wealth v. Power, 7 Mete. ( Mass. ) 
8 Am. R. 641 ; [-] Standish v. Nar- 596, 41 Am. D. 465 ; [-] Chicago 
ragansett Steamship Co., 111 MaBB. & North-Western Railway Co. v. Wil-
512, 15 Am. R. 66 ; Johnson v. Con- Iiams, 55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641 ; 
cord Railroad Corporation, 46 N. H. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail­
'.!13, 88 Am. D. 199 ; Chicago & Erie road Co. v. Gan ts, 38 Kan. 608, 17 
Railroad Co. v. Field, 7 Ind. App. Pac. R. 54, 5 Am. St. R. 780 ; Maples 
172, 34 N. E. R. 406, 52 Am. St. R. v .  New York & New Haven Railroad 
444 ; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Co., 38 Conn. 557, 9 Am. R. 434 ; 
Whittemore, 43 Tll. 420, 92 Am. D. Lynch v. Metropolitan Elevated 
138 ; Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Railway Co., 90 N. Y. 77, 43 Am. R. 
Mete. (Mass. ) 596, 41 Am. D. 465, 141. 
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to unnecessarily subject the passenger to inconvenience and
annoyance. "
§ 342. ——Regulations are reasonable which require that a
ticket shall be purchased and presented before passing the
gates to the train, which direct when and where a train may
be boarded, which require passengers to ride on passenger
trains only and in certain cars on such trains, which limit the
time within which a ticket may be used, which provide that
certain trains shall not stop at designated places, which com-
pel orderly conduct and presentable condition on the part of
passengers. But such rules must be uniform in their applica-
tion to persons. Discriminations must not be capricious, but
must be based upon some principle that the law recognizes as
just.
And the trainmen need not wait till a rule is broken, but
may anticipate ‘and prevent unseemly and disorderly conduct
by expelling an ofiender before the overt act is committed.
Whether a regulation is reasonable depends upon the facts of
each case. If the facts are undisputed it becomes a question
of law.
§343. ——Ejecti0n of passengers for breach of reasonable
regulations may be made at any place unless, as is the case in
many states, statutes forbid the ejection of any person from a
train except at a regular station or near a dwelling house.
But while the carrier need not consult the convenience of a
§342. [—] Forsee v. Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co., 63
Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801; State v.
Overton, 4 Zab. (N. J.) 435, 61 Am.
D. 671; [—] Chicago & North-
Western Railway Co. v. Williams, 55
Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641; Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v.
Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 17 Pac. R. 54, 5
Am. St. R. 780; Johnson v. Concord
Railroad Corporation, 46 N. H. 213,
88 Am. D. 199; Houston & Texas
Central Railway Co. v. Moore, 49
Tex. 31, 30 Am. R. 98; [—] Stan-
dish v. Narragansett Steamship Co.,
111 Mass. 512, 15 Am. R. 66; Lynch
v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway
Co., 90 N. Y. 77, 43 Am. R. 141;
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75
Ill. 125, 20 Am. R. 232; Common-
wealth v. Power, 7 Metc. (Mass.)
596, 41 Am. D. 465; Pittsburg etc.
Railway Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. St.
140, 16 Atl. R. 607, 10 Am. St.
R. 517; Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520,
72 Am. D. 62; Pittsburg etc. Rail-
way Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576,
26 Am. R. 68.
§343. Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420, 92
Am. D. 138; Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Gants, 38
Kan. 608, 17 Pac. R. 54, 5 Am. St.
R. 780; McClure v. Philadelphia etc.
Railroad Co., 34 Md. 532, 6 Am. R.
345; [—] O’Brien v. Boston etc.
Railroad Co., 15 Gray (Mass.) 20.

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§  342-343 
to unnecessarily subject the passenger to inconvenience and 
annoyance. 
§ 342. --Regula.tions are reasonable which require that a 
ticket shall be purchased and presented before passing the 
gates to the train, which direct when and where a train may 
be boarded, which require passengers to ride on passenger 
trains only and in certain cars on such trains, which limit the 
time within which a ticket may be used, which provide that 
certain trains shall not stop at designated places, which com­
pel orderly conduct and presentable condition on the part of 
passengers. But such rules must be uniform in their applica­
tion to persons. Discriminations must not be capricious, but 
must be based upon some principle that the law recognizes as 
just. 
And the trainmen need not wait till a rule is broken, but 
may anticipate 
·
and prevent unseemly and disorderly conduct 
by expelling an off ender before the overt act is committed. 
Whether a regulation is reasonable depends upon the facts of 
each case. If the facts are undisputed it becomes a question 
of law. 
§ 343. --Ejection of passengen for breach of reasonable 
regulations may be made at any place unless, as is the case in 
many states, statutes forbid the ejection of any person from a 
train except at a regular station or near a dwelling house. 
But while the carrier need not consult the convenience of a 
§ 342. [-] Forsee v. Alabama 
Great Southam Railroad Co., 68 
Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801 ; State v. 
Overton, 4 Zab. (N. J.) 435, 61 Am. 
D. 671 ; (-] Chicago & North­
Western Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 
Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641 ; Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. 
Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 17 Pac. R. 54, 5 
Am. St. R. 780 ; Johnson v. Concord 
Railroad Corporation, 46 N. H. 213, 
88 Am. D. 199 ; Houston & Texas 
Central Railway Co. v. Moore, 49 
Tex. 31, 30 Am. R. 98 ; [-] Stan· 
dish v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 
111 Mass. 512, 15 Am. R. 66 ; Lynch 
v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway 
Co., 90 N. Y. 77, 43 Am. R. 141 ; 
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 
Ill 125, 20 Am. R. 232 ; Common­
wealth v. Power, 7 Mete. (M888. )  
596, 41  .Am.  D .  465 ; Pittsburg etc. 
Railway Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. St. 
140, 16 Atl. R. 607, 10 Am. St. 
R. 517 ; Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 
72 Am. D. 62 ; Pittsburg ete. Rail­
way Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576, 
26 Am. R. 68. 
§ 343. Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420, 92 
Am. D. 138 ; Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Gants, 38 
Kan. 608, 17 Pac. R. 54, 5 Am. St. 
R. 780 ; McClure v. Philadelphia etc. 
Railroad Co., 34 Md. 532, 6 Am. R. 
345 ; [-] 0 'Brien v. Boston etc. 
Railroad Co., 15 Gray (Mass. ) 20, 
77 Am. D. 347 ; Manning v. Louis-
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§ 3-14 OF QUASI-BAILEES. '
passenger who has forfeited his right to ride, yet he must not
needlessly expose such passenger to peril. He may use as
much force as is necessary to accomplish the ejection but
will be liable if he uses more and injury results.
Offer to pay, or to conform to reasonable requirements,
comes too late after the train has been stopped to put the
passenger ofi:'. The passenger has a right to resist wrongful
ejection, but he need not do so to preserve~his rights. Paying
a fare under protest as fully protects all his rights as resist-
ance, and the courts are loath to encourage resistance, which
may or may not be rightful, by increasing the damages for
injury received because of such resistance, even though the
passenger may be within his rights.
(3) Duty to Accept All.
§344. Common carriers of passengers rest under the same
duty to serve all as do common carriers of goods. It is the
rule therefore that all persons who present themselves in
proper condition, ready, able and willing to pay their fare,
at a proper time and place, are entitled to be carried by the
carrier, provided he has room in his vehicle. It is equally
ville & Nashville Railroad Co., 95
Ala. 392, 11 S. R. 8, 36 Am. St. R.
225; Hoflbauer v. Delhi etc. Rail-
road Co., 52 Iowa 342, 35 Am. R.
278; Jefiersonville Railroad Co. v.
Rogers, 38 Ind. 116, 10 Am. R. 103;
[—] Forsee v. Alabama & Great
Southern Railroad Co., 63 Miss. 66,
56 Am. R. 801; Philadelphia etc.
Railroad Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155,
28 Am. R. 442; Memphis & Charles-
ton Railroad Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn.
627, 4 S. W. R. 5, 4 Am. St. R. 776;
Alabama Great Southern Railroad
Co. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45, 9 S. R.
303, 30 Am. St. R. 28; Hang v.
Great Northern Railway Co., 8 N.
D. 23, 77 N. W. R. 97, 73 Am. St.
R. 727; Hibbard v. Erie Railroad
Co., 15 N. Y. 455; Van Dusan v.
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 97 Mich.
439, 56 N. W. R. 848, 37 Am. St. R.
354; Kiley v. Chicago City Railway
Co., 189 Ill. 384, 59 N. E. R. 794,
82 Am. St. R. 460. Compare Yorton
v. Milwaukee etc. Railway Co., 54
Wis. 234, 11 N. W. R. 482, 41 Am.
R. 23, with Lake Erie & Western
Railway Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381, 45
Am. R. 464, and [—] O’Rourke v.
Citizens’ Street Railway Co., 103
Tenn. 124, 52 S. W. R. 872, 76 Am.
St. R. 639.
§344. [—] Zachery v. Mobile
& Ohio Railroad Co., 74 Miss. 520,
21 S. R. 246, 60 Am. St. R. 529;
Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 72 Am.
D. 62; Beekman v. Saratoga etc.
Railroad Co., 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.)
45, 22 Am. D. 679; [—] Chicago &
North-Western Railway Co. v. Wil-
liams, 55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641;
Railroad Commissioners v. Portland
etc. Railroad Co., 63 Me. 269, 18
Am. R. 208; McDuflee v. Portland




















































































































































pa�senger who has forfeited his right to ride, yet he must no t 
needlessly expose such passenger to peril. He may use as 
much force as is necessary to accomplish the ej ection but 
will be liable if he uses more and injury results. 
Offer to pay, or to conform to reasonable requirements, 
comes too late after the train has been stopped to put the 
passenger off. The passenger has a right to resist wrongful 
ejection, but he need not do so to preserve -his rights. Paying 
a fare under protest as fully protects all his rights as resist­
ance, and the courts are loath to encourage resistance, which 
may or may not be rightful, by increasing the damages for 
injury received because of such resistance, even though the 
passenger may be within his rights. 
( 3) Duty to Accept AU. 
§ 344. Comm.on carriers of passengers rest under the same 
duty to serve all as do common carriers of goods. It is the 
rule therefore that all persons who present themselves in 
proper condition, ready, able and willing to pay their fare, 
at a proper time and place, are entitled to be carried by the 
carrier, provided he has room in his vehicle. It is equally 
ville & Nashville Railroad Co., 95 
Ala. 392, 11 S. R. 8, 36 Am. St. R. 
225 ; Hoffbauer v. Delhi etc. Rail­
road Co., 52 Iowa 342, 35 Am. R. 
278 ; Je:tfersonville Railroad Co. v. 
Rogers, 38 Ind. 116, 10 Am. R. 103 ; 
f-] Forsee v. Alabama & Great 
Southern Railroad Co., 63 MiBB. 66, 
56 Am. R. 801 ; Philadelphia etc. 
Railroad Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155, 
�8 Am. R. 442 ; Memphis & Charles­
ton Railroad Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 
627, 4 S. W. R. 5, 4 Am. St. R. 776 ; 
Alabama Great Southern Railroad 
Co. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45, 9 S. R. 
303, 30 Am. St. R. 28 ; Haug v. 
Great Northern Railway Co., 8 N. 
D. 23, 77 N. W. R. 97, 73 Am. St. 
R. 727 ; Hibbard v. Erie Railroad 
Co., 15 N. Y. 455 ; Van Dusan v. 
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 97 Mich. 
439, 56 N. W. R. 848, 37 Am. St. R. 
�54 ; Kiley v. Chicago City Railway 
f 'o., 189 Ill. 384, 59 N. E. R. 794, 
82 Am. St. R. 460. Compare Yorton 
v. Milwaukee etc. Railway Co., 54 
Wis. 234, 11 N. W. R. 482, 41 Am. 
R. 23, with Lake Erie & Western 
Railway Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381, 45 
Am. R. 464, and [-] O 'Rourke v. 
Citizens ' Street Railway Co., 103 
Tenn. 124, 52 S. W. R. 872, 76 Am. 
St. R. 639. 
§ 344. [-] Zachery v. Mobile 
& Ohio Railroad Co., 7 4 MiBB. 520, 
21 S. R. 246, 60 Am. St. R. 529 ; 
Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 72 Am. 
D. 62 ; Beekman v. Saratoga etc. 
Railroad Co., 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y. ) 
45, 22 Am. D. 679 ; [ -] Chicago & 
North-Western Railway Co. v. Wil­
li ams, 55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641 ; 
Railroad Commissioners v. Portland 
etc. Railroad Co., 63 Me. 269, 18 
Am. R. 208 ; McDuffee v. Portland 
etc. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 430, 13 
.f\ m. R. 72. 
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OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. 345-347
true that only those who so present themselves have any claim
to be carried.
§ 345. The carrier may refuse to accept those who are unfit
to travel, who refuse to obey reasonable regulations, who
wish to travel for illegal or immoral purposes, or whose pres-
ence is olfensive or dangerous to the comfort or health of
passengers, or might cause disorder and violence on the way
or at the end of the journey. And no one has a right to insist
on being carried on Sunday, or for the purpose of engaging in
traflic on the route. Such business the carrier has a right to
control for its own benefit.
(4) Duty to Furmlsh Accommodations.
§346. Equal accommodations must be provided for all
passengers of a certain class. But separate cars may be pro-
vided for persons of different color, or sex, provided they are
substantially equal, and more elaborate accommodations may
be provided for holders of first class tickets, or for through
passengers, than for others.
§347. Means of conveyance.—The carrier is bound to use
all reasonable efforts to provide adequate accommodations for
its passengers. It undertakes to furnish them not only trans-
portation but a seat, and a passenger need not surrender his
§345. [—] Zachery v. Mobile
& Ohio Railroad Co., 74 Miss. 520,
21 S. R. 246, 60 Am. St. R. 529;
Sevier v. Vicksburg & Meridian
Railroad Co., 61 Miss. 8, 48 Am. R.
74; Lemont v. Washington &
Georgetown Railroad Co., 1 Mack.
(D. C.) 180, 47 Am. R. 238; Pear-
son v. Duane, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 605;
Walsh v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23, 24
Am. R. 376; Pittsburg etc. Railway
Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576, 26 Am.
R. 68.
§346. [—] Chicago & North-
Western Railway Co. v. Williams,
55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641; West
Chester & Philadelphia Railroad Co.
v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209, 93 Am. D.
744; Bowie v. Birmingham Railway
& Electric Co., 125 Ala. 397, 27 S.
R. 1016, 82 Am. St. R. 247;
[—] Memphis & Charleston Railroad
Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 4 S. W.
R. 5, 4 Am. St. R. 776.
§347. St. Louis etc. Railway Co.
\". Leigh, 45 Ark. 368, 55 Am. R.
558; [—] Memphis & Charleston
Railroad Co. v. Benson, 85'Tenn.
627, 4 S. W. R. 5, 4 Am. St. R. 776;
[--] Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc.
(Mass.) 1, 43 Am. D. 346; Hege-
man v. Western Railroad Corp., 16
Barb. (N. Y.) 353, 13 N. Y. 9, 64
Am. D. 517; [—] Meier v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. St.
225, 3 Am. R. 581; Treadwell v.
Whittier, 8o Cal. 574, 22 Pac. R. 266,
13 Am. St. R. 175; Spellman v. Lin-
coln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890,

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASS.BNGERS. § §  345-347 
true that only those who so present themselves have any claim 
to be carried. 
§ 345. The carrier ma.y refuse to a.ccept those who are unfit 
to travel, who refuse to obey reasonable regulations, who 
wish to travel for illegal or immoral purposes, or whose pres­
ence is offensive or dangerous to the comfort or health of 
passengers, or might cause disorder and violence on the way 
or at the end of the journey. And no one has a right to insist 
on being carried on Sunday, or for the purpose of engaging in 
traffic on the route. Such business the carrier has a right to 
control for its own benefit. 
( 4) Duty to Furnish Accommodations. 
§ 346. Equal accommodations must be provided for all 
passengers of a certain class. But separate cars may be pro­
vided for persons of different color, or sex, provided they are 
substantially equal, and more elaborate accommodations may 
be provided for holders of first class tickets, or for through 
passengers, than for others. 
§ 347. Means of conveyance.-The carrier is bound to use 
all reasonable efforts to provide adequate accommodations for 
its passengers. It undertakes to furnish them not only trans­
portation but a seat, and a passenger need not surrender his 
§ 345. [-] Zachery v. Mobile 
& Ohio Railroad Co., 7 4 MiBll. 520, 
21 S. R. 246, 60 Am. St. R. 529 ; 
Sevier v. Vicksburg & Meridian 
Railroad Co., 61 Miss. 8, 48 Am. R. 
74 ; Lemont v. Washington & 
Georgetown Railroad Co., 1 Mack. 
< D. C.)  180, 47 Am. R. 238 ; Pear­
llon v. Duane, 4 Wall. (U. S. ) 605 ; 
Walsh v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. 
Paul Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23, 24 
Am. R. 376 ; Pittsburg etc. Railway 
Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576, 26 Am. 
R. 68. 
§ 346. [-] Chicago & North­
Western Railway Co. v. Williams, 
55 Ill. 185, 8 Am. R. 641 ; West 
Chester & Philadelphia Railroad Co. 
v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209, 93 Am. D. 
7 44 ; Bowie v. Birmingham Railway 
& Electric Co., 125 Ala. 397, 27 S. 
R. 1016, 82 Am. St. R. �4i ; 
l -] Memphis & Charleston Railroad 
Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 4 8. W. 
R. 5, 4 Am. St. R. 776. 
§ 347. St. Louis etc. Railway Co. 
v. Leigh, 45 Ark. 368, 55 Am. R. 
558 ; [ - ] Memphis & Charleston 
Railroad Co. v. Benson, 85 · Tenn. 
627, 4 S. W. R. 5, 4 Am. St. R. 776 ; 
[-] Ingalls ,.. Bills, 9 Mete. 
( Mass. ) 1, 43 Am. D. 346 ; Hege­
man v. Western Railroad Corp ., 16 
Barb. ( N. Y. ) 353, 13  N. Y. 9, 64 
A m .  D. 517 ;  [-] Meier v. Penn­
l!lylvania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. St. 
225, 3 Am. R. 581 ; Treadwell v. 
Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. R. 266, 
13 Am. St. R. 1 75 ;  Spellman v. Lin­
coln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890, 
55 N. W. R. 270, 38 Am. St. R. 753. 
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§§ 348-350 OF QUASI-BAILEES. '
ticket until he is furnished a seat. But he cannot insist upon
being carried free, and if he chooses to ride without a seat
he must pay. If he is unwilling to do so he must leave the
train at the first reasonable opportunity and sue the carrier
for the damages proximately resulting from its breach of
contract.
For the slightest negligence on the part of the carrier of
passengers in providing safe means of conveyance it is liable,
if injury to the passenger results. The carrier must use the
utmost diligence to provide such vehicles as shall insure the
safety of the passengers, but for latent defects which no known
and practicable test would discover it is not responsible. By
the weight of authority the carrier is as to the passenger
also liable for the failure on the part of the manufacturer to
discover defects in the vehicle which known tests would have
revealed. There is no relation between the manufactur and
the passenger, but the carrier makes the manufacturer his
agent or servant by employing him to make the vehicle.
§348. Roadbeds, bridges, etc., must be kept in safe and
usable condition, and for failure so to do the carrier incurs the
same liability as for using a defective vehicle.
§349. ——Latest improvements.—In the construction and
equipment of their vehicles and road carriers of passengers
must keep pace with the march of progress. The law does
not require the adoption of every new device no matter how
novel or expensive, but it does demand that the carrier shall
employ the latest and best devices in general use by carriers
of that class.
§350. Agents and servants of the carrier must be com-
petent, careful and courteous. For any injury resulting from
§348. O’Donnell v. Allegheny 3 Am. R. 581; Le Barron v. East
Valley Railroad Co., 59 Pa. St. 239,
98 Am. D. 336; Ohio Valley Rail-
way Co. v. Watson, 93 Ky. 654, 21
S. W. R. 244, 40 Am. St. R. 211;
[—] Commonwealth v. Boston &
Maine Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 500,
37 Am. R. 382; Louisville, New Al-
bany 8v Chicago Railway Co. v. Sny-
der, 117 Ind. 435, 20 N. E. R. 284,
10 Am. St. R. 60.
§349. [—] Meier v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. St. 225,
Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen (Mass.)
312, 87 Am. D. 717; Hegeman v.
Western Railroad Corp., 13 N. Y.
9, 64 Am. D. 517; Treadwell v. Whit-
tier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. R. 266, 13
Am. St. R. 175.
§350. Goddard v. Grand Trunk
Railway Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. R.
39; Birmingham Railway & Electric
Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 30 S.
R. 456, 89 Am. St. R. 43; Haver

















































































































































§ §  348-350 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
ticket until he is furnished a seat. But he cannot insist upon 
being carried free, and if he chooses to ride without a seat 
he must pay. If he is unwilling to do so he must leave the 
train at the first reasonable opportunity and sue the carrier 
for the damages proximately resulting from its breach of 
contract. 
For the slightest negligence on the part of the carrier of 
passengers in providing safe means of conveyance it is liable, 
if injury to the passenger results. The carrier must use the 
utmost diligence to provide such vehicles as shall in.�ure the 
safety of the passengers, but for latent defects which no known 
and practicable test would discover it is not responsible. By 
the weight of authority the carrier is as to the passenger 
also liable for the failure on the part of the manufacturer to 
discover defects in the vehjcle which known tests would have 
revealed. There is no relation between the manufactur and 
the passenger, but the carrier makes the manufacturer his 
agent or servant by employing him to make the vehicle. 
§ 348. Roadbeds, bridges, etc., must be kept in safe and 
usable condition, and for failure so to do the carrier incurs the 
same liability as for using a defective vehicle . 
§ 349. --Latest improvements.-In the construction and 
equipment of their vehicles and road carriers of passengers 
must keep pace with the march of progress. The law does 
not require the adoption of every new device no matter how 
novel or expensive, but it does demand that the carrier shall 
employ the latest and best devices in general use by carriers 
of that class. 
§ 350. Agents and servants of the carrier must be com­
petent, careful and courteous. For any injury resulting from 
§ 348. 0 'Donnell v. Allegheny 
Valley Railroad Co., 59 Pa. St. 239, 
98 Am. D. 336 ; Ohio Valley Rail­
way Co. v. Watson, 93 Ky. 654, 21 
8. W. R. 244, 40 Am. St. R. 211 ; 
f-] Commonwealth v. Boston & 
Maine Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 500, 
37 Am. R. 382 ; Louisville, New Al­
bany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Sny­
der, 117 Ind. 435, 20 N. E. R. 284, 
10 Am. St. R. 60. 
§ 349. [-] Meier v. Pennsyl­
vania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. St. 225, 
3 Am. R. 581 ; Le Barron v. East 
Boston Ferry Co., 1 1  Allen (Mass. ) 
312, 87 Am. D. 717 ; Hegeman v. 
Western Railroad Corp., 13 N. Y. 
9, 64 Am. D. 517 ; Treadwell v. Whit­
tier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. R. 266, 13  
Am. St. R.  175. 
§ 350. Goddard v. Grand Trunk 
Railway Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. R. 
39 ; Birmingham Railway & Electric 
Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 30 S. 
R. 456, 89 Am. St. R. 43 ; Haver 
v. Central Railroad Co., 62 N. J, 
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the incompetence, carelessness or misconduct of its servants
thecarrier is liable, whether it knew of such unfitness or not.
The liability arises not out of the responsibility of the master
for the acts of his servants, but out of the obligation which
the law imposes upon the carrier to protect the passenger from
ill treatment by its servants, fellow passengers or strangers.
The severest rule of damages is applied if a company retains
in its employ one known to be of intemperate habits, or in any
way unfit.
§351. Stational facilities.—A railroad is required to main-
tain a station, means of access to and from the same, and
facilities for getting to and from trains, that are reasonably
safe. There is not the same reason for the utmost care about
the station that exists as to the roadway and cars, but for the
slightest negligence in providing and maintaining reasonably
safe stational facilities the carrier is liable if injury results.
As to persons not passengers who have business at the station
only ordinary care is required.
(5) Liability for Injuries to the Passenger.
§352. Measure of di1ig'ence.——The common carrier of pas-
sengers is bound to use for the safety of his passengers all
precautions as far as human care and foresight will go. For
L. 282, 41 Atl. R. 916, 72 Am. St. R.
647; Savannah etc. Railway Co. v.
Quo, 103 Ga. 125, 29 S. E. R. 607,
68 Am. St. R. 85; [—] Common-
wealth v. Boston & Maine Railroad
Co., 129 Mass. 500, 37 Am. R. 382;
Gillingham v. Ohio River Railroad
C0., as W. Va. s88, 14 s. E. R. 243,
29 Am. St. R. 827.
§351. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western Railroad Co. v. Trautwein,
52 N. J. L. 169, 19 Atl. R. 178, 19
Am. St. R. 442; Barker v. Ohio
River Railroad Co., 51 W. Va. 423,
41 S. E. R. 148, 90 Am. St. R. 808;
[—] Warren v. Fitchburg Railroad
Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 227, 85 Am.
D. 700; Little Rock etc. Railway Co.
v. Lawton, 55 Ark. 428, 18 S. W. R.
543, 29 Am. St. R. 48, and note;
Gillis v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,
59 Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. D. 317; Cross
v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
Railway Co., 69 Mich. 363, 37 N. W.
R. 361, 13 Am. St. R. 399; McKone
v. Michigan Central Railroad Co.,
51 Mich. 601, 17 N. W. R. 74, 47
Am. R. 596; Tubbs v. Michigan
Central Railroad Co., 107 Mich. 108,
64 N. W. R. 1061, 61 Am. St. R.
320;-McDonald v. Chicago & North-
western Railway Co., 26 Ia. 124, 96
Am. D. 114; Atlantic City Rail-
road Co. v. Goodin, 62 N. J. L. 394,
42 Atl. R. 333, 72 Am. St. R. 652.
§352. [—] Christie v. Griggs,
2 Camp. 79; [—] Philadelphia &
Reading Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14
How. (U. S.) 468; [—] Steamboat
New World v. King, 16 How. (U.
S.) 469; [—] Ingalls v. Bills, 9

















































































































































OF CARRIE!?S OF l>ASSENGERS. §§ 351-352 
the incompetence, carelessness or misconduct of its servants 
the . carrier is liable, whether it knew of such unfitness or not. 
The liability arises not out of the responsibility of the master 
for the acts of his servants, but out of the obligation which 
the law imposes upon the carrier to protect the passenger from 
ill treatment by its servants, fellow passengers or strangers. 
The severest rule of damages is applied if a company retains 
in its employ one known to be of intemperate habits, or in any 
way unfit. 
§ 351. Stational facilities.-A railroad is required to main­
tain a station, means of access to and from the same, and 
facilities for getting to and from trains, that are reasonably 
safe. There is not the same reason for the utmost care about 
the station that exists as to the roadway and cars, but for the 
slightest negligence in providing and maintaining reasonably 
safe stational facilities the carrier is liable if injury results. 
As to persons not passengers who have business at the station 
only ordinary care is required. 
( 5 ) Liability for Injuries to the Passenger . .  
§ 352. Measure of diligence.-The common carrier of pas­
sengers is bound to use for the safety of his passengers all 
precautions as far as human care and foresight will go. For 
L. 282, 41 Atl. R. 916, 72 Am. St. R. 59 Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. D. 317 ; Cross 
647 ; Savannah etc. Railway Co. v. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern 
Quo, 103 Ga. 125, 29 S. E. R. 607, Railway Co., 69 Mich. 363, 37 N. W. 
68 Am. St. R. 85 ; [-] Common- R. 361, 13 Am. St. R. 399 ; McKone 
wealth v. Boston & Maine Railroad v. Michigan Central Railroad Co., 
Co., 129 Mass. 500, 37 Am. R. 382 :  5 1  Mich. 601, 1 7  N. W. R. 74, 47 
Gillingham v. Ohio River Railroad Am. R. 596 ; Tubbs v. Michigan 
Co., 35 W. Va. 588, i4 S. E. R. 243, Central Railroad Co., 107 Mich. 108, 
29 Am. St. R. 827. 64 N. W. R. 1061, 61  Am. St. R. 
§ 351. Delaware, Lackawanna & 320 ; · McDonald v. Chicago & North­
Western Railroad Co. v. Trautwein, western Railway Co., 26 Ia. 124, 96 
5z N. J. L. 169, 19 Atl. R. 178, 19 Am. D. 114 ; Atlantic City Rail ­
Am. St. R. 442 ; Barker v. Ohio road Co. v. Goodin, 62 N. J. L. 394, 
River Railroad Co., 51 W. Va. 423, 42 Atl. R. 333, 72 Am. St. R. 652. 
41 S. E. R. 148, 90 Am. St. R. sqs ; § 352. [-] Christie v. Griggs, 
r-] Warren v. Fitchburg Railroad 2 Camp. 79 ; [-] Philadelphia & 
Co., 8 Allen ( Mass. ) 227, 85 Am. Reading Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 
D. 700 ; Little Rock etc. Railway Co. How. (U. S. ) 468 ; [-] Steamboat 
v. Lawton, 55 Ark. 428, 18 S. W. R. New World v. King, 16 How. (U. 
E43, 29 Am. St. R. 48, and note ; S. ) 469 ; [-] Ingalls v. Bills, 9 
Gillis v, Pennt11lvania Railroad Co., Mete. (MaBB.) 11 43 Am. D. 346 i 
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injuries to the passenger proximately caused by any, even the
slightest, negligence of the carrier, the latter is liable. If
however the contributory negligence of the passenger is the
proximate cause of the injury the carrier is of course not
liable.
The carrier of passengers then is not, like the common car-
rier of goods, an insurer against loss, “but as there are com-
mitted to his charge for the time the lives and safety of persons
of all ages and of all degrees of ability for self-protection, and
as the slightest failure in watchfulness may be destructive of
life or limb, it is reasonable to require of him the most perfect
care of prudent and cautious men; and his undertaking as to
his passengers goes to this extent, that as far as human fore-
sight and care can reasonably go he will transport them
safely.” '
§353. iAs far as human care and foresight will go is
a phrase that has come to have a technical meaning in this
connection. On the one hand it does not mean all the care
conceivable regardless of expense, mode of conveyance or
extent of the carrier’s business. On the other, it does mean
Farish v. Reigle, 11 Grat. (Va.) 697,
62 Am. D. 666; [—] Hollister v.
Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32
Am. D. 455; Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt.
586, 80 Am. D. 699; [—-] Meier v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 64 Pa.
St. 225, 3 Am. R. 581; [—] Jam-
mison v. Chesapeake 80 Ohio Railway
Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. R. 758, 53
Am. St. R. 813; Bonce v. Dubuque
Street Railway Co., 53 Iowa 278, 5
N. W. R. 177, 36 Am. R. 221;
Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574,
22 Pac. R. 266, 13 Am. st. R. 175;
Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit
Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N. W. R. 270,
38 Am. St. R. 753; Hegeman v.
Western Railroad Corp., 13 N. Y.
9, 64 Am. D. 517; McKeon v. Chi-
cago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway
Co., 94 Wis. 477, 69 N. W. R. 175,
59 Am. St. R. 910; Connell v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Railway Co., 93 Va.
44, 24 S. E. R. 467, 57 Am. St. R.
786; Cooley on Torts, 642.
§353. In addition to the cases
cited in sec. 352, see [—] Dodge
v. Boston & Bangor Steamship Co.,
148 Mass. 207, 19 N. E. R. 373, 12
Am. St. R. 541; [—] Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St.
147, 62 Am. D. 323; Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md.
378, 90 Am. D. 49; [—] Warren v.
Fitchburg Railroad Co., 8 Allen
(Mass.) 227, 85 Am. D. 700;
[—] Railroad v. Lockwood, 17 Wall.
(U. S.) 357; Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Worthington, 21
Md. 275, 83 Am. D. 578; Dela-
ware, Laekawanna & Western Rail-
road O0. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L.
169, 19 Atl. R. 178, 19 Am. St. R.
442; Barker v. Ohio River Railroad
Co., 51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. R. 148,
90 Am. St. R. 808; Weightman v.
Louisville etc. Railway Co., 70 Miss.



















































































































































§ 353 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
injuries to the passenger proximately caused by any, even the 
slightest, negligence of the carrier, the latter is liable. If 
however the contributory negligence of the passenger is the 
proximate cause of the injury the carrier is of course not 
liable. 
The carrier of passengers then is not, like the common car­
rier of goods, an insurer against loss, " but as there are com­
mitted to his charge for the time the lives and safety of persons 
of all ages and of all degrees of ability for self-protection, and 
as the slightest failure in watchfulness may be destructive of 
life or limb, it is reasonable to require of him the most perfect 
care of prudent and cautious men ; and his undertaking as to 
his passengers goes to this extent, that as far as human fore­
sight and care can reasonably go he will transport them 
safely. ' '  
§ 353. --As far as human care and foresight will go is 
a phrase that has come to have a technical meaning in this 
connection. On the one hand it does not mean all the care 
conceivable regardless of expense, mode of conveyance or 
extent of the carrier 's business. On the other, it does mean 
Farish v. Reigle, 11 Grat. (Va. ) 697, 
62 Am. D. 666 ; f-] Hollister v. 
Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 
Am. D. 455 ; Hadley v. Cross, 34 Vt. 
586, 80 Am. D. 699 ; [ -] Meier v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. 
St. 225, 3 Am. R. 581 ; [-] Jam­
mison v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. R. 758, 53 
Am. St. R. 813 ; Bonce v. Dubuque 
Street Railway Co., 53 Iowa 278, 5 
N .  W. R. 1 77, 36 Am. R. 221 ; 
Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 
22 Pac. R. 266, 13 Am. St. R. 175 ; 
Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit 
Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N. W. R. 270, 
38 Am. St. R. 753 ; Hegeman v. 
Western Railroad Corp., 13 N. Y. 
9, 64 Am. D. 51 7 ;  McKeon v. Chi­
cago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway 
Co., 94 Wis. 477, 69 N. W. R. 1 75, 
59 Am. St. R. 910 ; Connell v. Chesa­
peake & Ohio Railway Co., 93 Va. 
44, 24 S. E. R. 467, 57 Am. St. R. 
786 ; Cooley on Torts, 642. 
§ 353. In addition to the cases 
cited in sec. 352, see [ -] Dodge 
v. Boston & Bangor Steamship Co., 
148 Mass. 207, 19 N. E. R. 373, 12 
Am. St. R. 541 ; [ -1 Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 
147, 62 Am. D. 323 ; Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 
378, 90 Am. D. 49 ; [-] Warren v. 
Fitchburg Railroad Co., 8 Allen 
( Mass. ) 227, 85 Am. D. 700 ; 
[-] Railroad v. Lockwood, 17  Wall. 
(U. S. ) 357 ; Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co. v. Worthington, 21  
Md. 275, 83 Am. D. 578 ; Dela­
ware, Lackawanna & Western Rail­
road Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L. 
169, 19 Atl. R. 178, 19 Am. St. R. 
442 ; Barker v. Ohio River Railroad 
Co., 51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. R. 148, 
90 Am. St. R. 808 ; Weightman v. 
Louisville etc. Railway Co., 70 Miss. 
563, 12 So. R. 586, 35 Am. St. R. 
660. 
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the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons, a rigor-
ous insistence upon all the diligence consistent with the nature
of the carrier’s undertaking and the requirements of the
business.
As already noted (§§ 346-351), this diligence extends to
careful provision as to the means of conveyance, roadbed,
bridges, improved appliances, proper stational facilities and
careful and considerate agents and servants. The care must
be proportioned to the character of the transportation em-
ployed by the carrier and to all the circumstances of the
journey. Sick or infirm passengers must be treated with hu-
manity and consideration. If there is an accident the pre-
sumption arises that the carrier has failed to exercise this
extraordinary care and the burden rests upon the carrier to
repel such presumption.
§354. ——Gratuitous passengers.—This care is exacted as
to all passengers alike. Public policy demands that human
life be protected, and the fact that a passenger is riding
gratuitously furnishes no excuse for the carrier’s negligence.
The liability does not grow out of a contract, expressed or
implied, but the “law raises the duty out of regard for human
life and for the purpose of securing the utmost diligence by
carriers in protecting those who have committed themselves to
their hands.” This protection does not extend to one not
lawfully a passenger.
§355. Contributory neg'lig'ence.—Men are in general re-
sponsible for the consequences reasonably to be anticipated
from their own acts. A passenger therefore can not hold a
carrier liable for an injury from any cause if his own negli-
gence was a natural and proximate cause contributing to the
injurious result. In a word the passenger can not hold the
§354. Ante, sec. 323 and cases
cited. [—] Philadelphia & Reading
Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. (U.
S.) 468; [—] Railroad v. Lock-
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357; Car-
roll v. Staten Island Railroad Co.,
58 N. Y. 126, 17 Am. R. 221.
§355. [—] Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co. v. Aspell. 23 Pa. St. 147,
62 Am. D. 323; Graham v. McNeill,
20 Wash. 466, 55 Pac. R. 631, 72 Am.
St. R. 121; Walker v. Vicksburg
etc. Railroad Co., 41 La. Ann. 795,
6 So. R. 916, 17 Am. St. R. 417, and
note; [—] Jammison v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway Co., 92 Va. 327, 23
S. E. R. 758, 53 Am. St. R. 813;
Florida Southern Railway Co. v.
Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. R. 506, 32

















































































































































OF CAnRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§ 354-355 
the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons, a rigor­
ous insistence upon all the diligence consistent with the nature 
of the carrier 's undertaking and the requirements of the 
business. 
As already noted ( § §  346-351 ) , this diligence extends to 
careful provision as to the means of conveyance, roadbed, 
bridges, improved appliances, proper stational facilities and 
careful and considerate agents and servants. The care must 
be proportioned to the character of the transportation em­
ployed by the carrier and to all the circumstances of the 
journey. Sick or infirm passengers must be treated with hu­
manity and consideration. If there is an accident the pre­
sumption arises that the carrier has failed to exercise this 
extraordinary care and the burden rests upon the carrier to 
repel such presumption. 
§ 354. --Gratuitous paasengers.-This care is exacted as 
to all passengers alike. Public policy demands that human 
life be protected, and the fact that a passenger is riding 
gratuitously furnishes no excuse for the carrier 's negligence. 
The liability does not grow out of a contract, expressed or 
implied, but the " law raises the duty out of regard for human 
life and for the purpose of securing the utmost diligence by 
carriers in protecting those who have committed themselves to 
their hands. ' '  This protection does not extend to one not 
lawfully a passenger. 
§ 355. Contributory negligence.-Men are in general re­
sponsible for the consequences reasonably to be anticipated 
from their own acts. A passenger therefore can not hold a 
carrier liable for an injury from any cause if his own negli­
gence was a natural and proximate cause contributing to the 
injurious result. In a word the passenger can not hold the 
§ 354. Ante, sec. 323 and cases 20 Wash. 466, 55 Pac. R. 631, 72 Am. 
cited. [-] Philadelphia & Reading St. R. 121 ; Walker v. Vicksburg 
Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. (U. etc. Railroad Co., 41 La. Ann. 795, 
S. ) 468 ; [-] Railroad v. Lock- 6 So. R. 916, 17 Am. St. R. 417, and 
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.)  357 ; Car- note ; [-] .Jammison v. Chesapeake 
roll v. Staten Island Railroad Co., & Ohio Railway Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 
58 N. Y. 126, 17 Am. R. 221. S. E. R. 758, 53 Am. St. R. 813 ; 
§ 355. [-] Pennsylvania Rail- Fiorida Southern Railway Co. v. 
road Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. R. 506, 32 
62 Am. D. 323 ; Graham v. McNeill, Am. St. R. 17. 
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carrier liable for an injury if he himself has been guilty of
contributory negligence.
§356. ——What amounts to contributory negligence is
usually a question for the jury to determine from all the facts
and circumstances of the case. Even where the facts are
undisputed it is still ordinarily a question for the jury whether
the conduct of the passenger was that to be expected of a
reasonably prudent man under like circumstances. If it was
not there was negligence. The facts in some cases make the
negligence or prudence of a passenger so clear that but one
inference can be drawn therefrom. In such cases contributory
negligence is a question of law for the court.
§357. iIllustrations.—The following are facts from
which a jury may properly determine according to the sur-
rounding circumstances of each case that the passenger has
or has not been guilty of contributory negligence: entering
or leaving a moving train, riding on the platform or on a
part of the train not intended for passengers when seats are
provided by the carrier in the passenger cars, alighting at a
place other than the regular stopping place, riding with the
arms or other part of the body projecting beyond the out-
§356, [—] Filer v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 47,
10 Am. R. 327; Lambeth v. North
Carolina Railroad Co., 66 N. O. 494,
8 Am. R. 508; Graham v. MeNeill,
20 Wash. 466, 55 Pac. R. 631, 72
Am. St. R. 121; Atlantic City Rail-
road Co. v. Goodin, 62 N. J. L. 394,
42 Atl. R. 333, 72 Am. St. R. 652;
Wade v. Columbia Railway etc. Co.,‘
51 S. C. 296, 29 S. E. R. 233, 64 Am.
St. R. 676; Tubbs v. Michigan Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 107 Mich. 108, 64
N. W. R. 1061, 61 Am. St. R. 320;
Terre Haute etc. Railroad Co. v.
Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. R. 168;
Weber v. Kansas City Cable Rail-
way Co., 100 Mo. 194, 12 S. W. R.
804, 13 S. W. R. 587, 18 Am. St. R.
541; Piper v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 156 N. Y. 224, 50 N.
E. R. 851, 66 Am. St. R. 560; Schif-
fler v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
~i*
way Co., 96 Wis. 141, 71 N. W.
R. 97, 65 Am. St. R. 35.
§357. [—] Filer v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 47,
10 Am. R. 327; [—] Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St.
147, 62 Am. D. 323; Buel v. New
York Central Railroad Co., 31 N.
Y. 314, 88 Am. D. 271; Weber v.
Kansas City Cable Railway Co., 100
Mo. 194, 12 S. W. R. 804,
13 S. W. R. 587, 18 Am. St.
R. 541; Nefl’ v. Harrisburg Trac-
tion A Co., 192 Pa. St. 501, 43
Atl. R. 1020, 73 Am. St. R. 825;
New York, Lake Erie & Western
Railroad Co. v. Enches, 127 Pa. St.
316, 17 Atl. R. 991, 14 Am. St. R.
848; Lambeth v. North Carolina
Railroad Co., 66 N. C. 494, 8 Am.
R. 508; Memphis & Charleston Rail-
road Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466,

















































































































































§ §  356-357 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
carrier liable for an injury if he himself has been guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
§ 356. --What amount.a to contributory negligence is 
usually a question for the jury to determine from all the facts 
and circumstances of the case. Even where the facts are 
undisputed it is still ordinarily a question for the jury whether 
the conduct of the passenger was that to be expected of a 
reasonably prudent man under like circumstances. If it was 
not there was negligence. The facts in some cases make the 
negligence or prudence of a passenger so clear that but O il f'  
inference can be  drawn therefrom. In  such cases contributory 
negligence is a question of law for the court. 
§ 357. --IDustra.tions.-The following are facts from 
which a jury may properly determine according to the sur­
rounding circumstances of each case that the passenger has 
or has not been guilty of contributory negligence : entering 
or leaving a moving train, riding on the platform or on a 
part of the train not intended for passengers when seats are 
provided by the carrier in the passenger cars, alighting at a 
place other than the regular stopping place, riding with the 
arms or other part of the body proj ecting beyond the out-
§ 356. [-] Filer v. New York way Co., 96 Wis. 141, 71 N. W. 
Central Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 47, R. 97, 65 Am. St. R. 35. 
10 Am. R. 327 ; Lambeth v. North § 357. [-] Filer v. New York 
Carolina Railroad Co., 66 N. C. 494, Central Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 47, 
8 Am. R. 508 ; Graham v. McNeill, 10 Am. R. 327 ; [-] Pennsylvania 
20 Wash. 466, 55 Pac. R. 631, 72 Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 
Am. St. R. 121 ; Atlantic City Rail- 147, 62 Am. D. 323 ; Buel v. New 
road Co. v. Goodin, 62 N. J. L. 394, York Central Railroad Co., 31 N. 
42 Atl. R. 333, 72 Am. St. R. 652 ; Y. 314, 88 Am. D. 271 ; Weber v. 
Wade v. Columbia Railway etc. Co.; Kansas City Cable Railway Co., 100 
51 S. C. 296, 29 S. E. R. 233, 64 Am. Mo. 194, 12 S. W. R. 804, 
St. R. 676 ; Tubbs v. Michigan Cen- 13 S. W. R. 587, 18 Am. St. 
tral Railroad Co., 107 Mich. 108, 64 R. 541 ; Neff v. Harrisburg Trac­
N. W. R. 1061, 61 Am. St. R. 320 ; tion · Co., 192 Pa. St. 501, 43 
Terre Haute etc. Railroad Co. v. Atl. R. 1020, 73 Am. St. R. 825 ; 
Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. R. 168 ; New York, Lake Erie & Western 
Weber v. Kansas City Cable Rail- Railroad Co. v. Enches, 127 Pa. St. 
way Co., 100 Mo. 194, 12 S. W. R. 316, 17 Atl. R. 991, 14 Am. St. R. 
804, 13 S. W. R. 587, 18 Am. St. R. 848 ; Lambeth v. North Carolina 
541 ; Piper v. New York Central Railroad Co., 66 N. C. 494, 8 Am. 
Railroad Co., 156 N. Y. 224, 50 N. R. 508 ; Memphis & Charleston Rail­
E. R. 851, 66 Am. St. R. 560 ; Sehif- road Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466, 
fler v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail- 7 Am. R. 699 ; St. Louis etc. Rail· 
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side of the car, alighting from a car in front of a train moving
on another track.
If a trainman invites or directs a passenger to get on or off
a moving train the presumption arises that such trainman
knew his business and that it is safe to do so. And even if
some danger is apparent to the passenger he will be justified
in acting as a reasonably prudent man would be supposed to
act under similar circumstances. If the carrier by its fault
puts the passenger to a choice between jumping from a
moving train and being carried by his station, it is responsible
for results, unless the passenger acts rashly and exposes him-
self to danger that a prudent man would not incur. And the
carrier is liable if its trains are so carelessly operated as to
lead passengers in the exercise of reasonable prudence to
apprehend danger, and in trying to escape it they are injured.
This is true though it may turn out that they would have
received no harm but for their attempt to escape.
§358. ——Proximate cause.—'l‘he contributory negligence
of the passenger must have been a proximate cause of the
injury. Even when negligent the carrierwill not be liable
road Co. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, 40
Am. R. 105; Florida Southern Rail-
way Co. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So.
R. 506, 32 Am. St. R. 17; Illinois
Central Railroad C0. v. Green, 81 Ill.
19, 25 Am. R. 255; Walker v. Vicks-
burg etc. Railroad Co., 41 La. Ann.
795, 6 So. R. 916, 17 Am. St. R.
417, and note; Evansville etc. Rail-
road Co. v. Athon, 6 Ind. App. 295,
33 N. E. R. 469, 51 Am. St. R. 303;
Graham v. McNeill, 20 Wash. 466,
55 Pac. R. 631, 72 Am. St. R. 121;
Benedict v. Minneapolis & St. Louis
Railroad Co., 86 Minn. 224, 90 N.
W. R. 360, 91 Am. St. R. 345; Clerc
v. Morgan ’s etc. Railroad & Steam-
ship Co., 107 La. 370, 31 So.
R. 886, 90 Am. St. R. 319; Creamer
v. West End Street Railway Co., 156
Mass. 320, 31 N. E. R. 391, 32 Am.
St. R. 456; Cartwright v. Chicago &
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 52 Mich.
606, 18 N. W. R. 380, 50 Am. R.
274; Terre Haute etc. Railroad Co.
v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. R.
168; Irish v. Northern Pacific Rail-
road Co., 4 Wash. 48, 29 Pac. R. 845,
31 Am. St. R. 899; St. Louis etc.
Railway Co. v. Murray, 55 Ark. 248,
18 S. W. R. 50, 29 Am. St. R. 32.
§358. [—] Jammison v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Railway Co., 92 Va.
327, 23 S. E. R. 758, 53 Am. St. R.
813; Schifller v. Chicago & North-
western Railway Co., 96 Wis. 141,
71 N. W. R. 97, 65 Am. St. R. 35;
Weber v. Kansas City Cable Railway
Co., 100 Mo. 194, 12 S. W. R. 804,
13 S. W. 587, 18 Am. St. R. 541;
Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43
Mo. 380, 97 Am. D. 402; Zemp v.
Wilmington etc. Railroad Co., 9
Rich. L. (S. C.) 84, 64 Am. D. 763;
McDonald v. International etc. Rail-
way Co., 86 Tex. 1, 22 S. W. R. 939,


















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF 1> ASSENGERS. § 358 
side of the car, alighting from a car in front of a train moving 
on another track. 
If a trainman invites or directs a passenger to get on or off 
a moving train the presumption arises that such trRinman 
knew his business and that it is safe to do so. And even if 
some danger is apparent to the passenger he will be justified 
in acting as a reasonably prudent man would be supposed to 
act under similar circumstances. If the carrier by its fault 
puts the passenger to a choice between jumping from a 
moving train and being carried by his station, it is responsible 
for results, unless the passenger acts rashly and exposes him­
self to danger that a prudent man would not incur. And the 
carrier is liable if its trains are so carelessly operated as to 
lead passengers in the exercise of reasonable prudence to 
apprehend danger, and in trying to escape it they are injured. 
This is true though it may turn out that they would have 
received no harm but for their attempt to escape. 
§ 358. --Proximate cause.-'l'he contributory negligence 
of the passenger must have been a proximate cause of the 
injury. Even when negligent the carrier will not be liable 
road Co. v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 519, 40 274 ; Terre Haute etc. Railroad Co. 
Am. R. 105 ; Florida Southern Rail- v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. R. 
way Co. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 168 ; Irish v. Northern Pacific Rail· 
R. 506, 32 Am. St. R. 17 ; Illinois road Co., 4 Wash. 48, 29 Pac. R. 845, 
Central Railroad Co. v. Green, 81 Ill. 31 Am. St. R. 899 ; St. Louis etc. 
19, 25 Am. R. 255 ; Walker v. Vicks- Railway Co. v. Murray, 55 Ark. 248, 
burg etc. Railroad Co., 41 La. Ann. 18 S. W. R. 50, 29 Am. St. R. 32. 
795, 6 So. R. 916, 17 Am. St. R. § 358. [-] Jammison v. Chesa-
417, and note ; Evansville etc. Rail- peake & Ohio Railway Co., 92 Va. 
road Co. v. Athon, 6 Ind. App. 295, 327, 23 S. E. R. 758, 53 Am. St. R. 
33 N. E. R. 469, 51 Am. St. R. 303 ; 813 ; Schifller v. Chicago & North­
Graham v. McNeill, 20 Wash. 466, western Railway Co., 96 Wis. 141, 
55 Pac. R. 631, 72 Am. St. R. 121 ; 71 N. W. R. 97, 65 Am. St. R. 35 ; 
Benedict v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Weber v. Kansas City Cable Railway 
Railroad Co., 86 Minn. 224, 90 N. Co., 100 Mo. 194, 12 S. W. R. 804, 
W. R. 360, 91 Am. St. R. 345 ; Clerc 13 S. W. 587, 18 Am. St. R. 541 ; 
v. Morgan 's etc. Railroad & Steam- Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 
ship Co., 107 La. 370, 31 So. Mo. 380, 97 Am. D. 402 ; Zemp v. 
R. 886, 90 Am. St. R. 319 ; Creamer Wilmington etc. Railroad Co., 9 
v. West End Street Railway Co., 156 Rich. L. (S. C.) 84, 64 Am. D. 763 ; 
Mase. 320, 31 N. E. R. 391, 32 Am. McDonald v. International etc. Rail­
St. R. 456 ; Cartwright v. Chicago & way Co., 86 Tex. 1, 22 S. W. R. 939, 
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 52 Mich. 40 Am. St. R. 803, and note. See 
606, 18 N. W, R. 380, 50 Am. R. vost, sec. 416. 
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if its negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury,
or if the passenger’s negligence and that of the carrier both
directly contributed to the result. But on the other hand, the
negligence of the passenger is no defence to the carrier unless
such negligence so far contributed to the result as to be in
some degree a proximate cause of the injury complained of.
If in spite of the negligence of the passenger the carrier might
have averted the injury, this last negligence will be the proxi-
mate cause and the carrier will still be liable.
Sleeping Car Companies.
§359. Not common can‘iers.—Sleeping car companies, it
has been seen (§ 166), are not innkeepers. Neither are they,
as to the baggage and valuables of the passenger, common
carriers. The railroad company is the carrier, and the sleep-
ing car company merely furnishes the car and reserves to itself
the right to provide a conductor and a porter, and to charge
for the use of its berths any person who has become a pas-
senger of the railroad, and yet in many respects the duties of
sleeping car companies are similar to those of common carriers
of passengers and their liabilities are most naturally treated
of in this connection. .
§360. Nature of their undertaking.—“A sleeping car com-
pany holds itself out to the world as furnishing safe and com-
fortable cars, and when it sells a ticket it impliedly stipulates
to do so. It invites passengers to pay for and make use of its
cars for sleeping, all parties knowing that during the greater
part of the night the passenger will be asleep powerless to
protect himself or to guard his property.” The company is
therefore bound to furnish reasonable protection, to have an
employee to watch the berths while the passengers are sleep-
§359. [—] Blum v. Pullman
Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500;
[——] Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. R. 258;
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gavin,
93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. R. 70, 42 Am.
St. R. 902; Pullman Palace Car Co.
v. Matthews, 74 Tex. 654, 12 S. W.
R. 744, 15 Am. St. R. 873; Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala.
581, 24 So. R. 921, 74 Am. st. R.
53. See extended note to Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Lowe, 26 Am. St.
R. 331, and Pullman Palace Car Co.
v. Pollock, 69 Tex. 120, 5 S. W. R.
814, 5 Am. St. R. 31.
§360. [—] Blum v. Pullman
Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500;
Lewis v. New York Central Sleep-
ing Car Co., 143 Mass. 267, 9 N.
E. R. 615, 56 Am. R. 852; Carpenter
v. New York etc. Railroad Co., 124
N. Y. 53, 26 N. E. R. 277, 21 Am.

















































































































































§ §  359-360 OF QtlASI-BAILEES. 
if its negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury, 
or if the passenger 's negligence and that of the carrier both 
directly contributed to the result. But on the other hand , the 
negligence of the passenger is no defence to the carrier unless 
such negligence so far contributed to the result as to be in 
some degree a proximate cause of the injury complained of. 
If in spite of the negligence of the passenger the carrier might 
have averted the injury, this last ne@ligence will be the proxi­
mate cause and the carrier will still be liable. 
Sleeping Car Companies. 
§ 859. Not common carriers.-Sleeping car companies, it 
has been seen ( §  166 ) , are not innkeepers. Neither are they, 
as to the baggage and valuables of the passenger, common 
carriers. The railroad company is the carrier, and the sleep­
ing car company merely furnishes the car &nd reserves to itself 
the right to provide a conductor and a porter, and to charge 
for the use of its berths any person who has become a pas­
senger of the railroad, and yet in many respects the duties of 
sleeping car companies are similar to those of common carriers 
of passengers and their liabilities are most naturally treated 
of in this connection. 
§ 360. Nature of their undertaking.-' ' A sleeping car com­
pany holds itself out to the world as furnishing safe and com­
fortable cars, and when it sells a ticket it impliedly stipulates 
to do so. It invites passengers to pay for and make use of its 
cars for sleeping, all parties knowing that during the greater 
part of the night the passenger will be asleep powerless to 
protect himself or to guard his property. " The company is 
therefore bound to furnish reasonable protection, to have an 
employee to watch the berths while the passengers are sleep-
§ 359. [ -] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lowe, 26 Am. St. 
Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 500 ; R. 331, and Pullman Palace Car Co. 
[-] Pullman Palace Car Co. v. v. Pollock, 69 Tex. 120, 5 S. W. R. 
Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. R. 258 ; 814, 5 Am. St. R. 31. 
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gavin, § 360. [-) Blum v. Pullman 
93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. R. 70, 42 Am. Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 500 ; 
St. R. 902 ; Pullman Palace Car Co. Lewis v. New York Central Sleep­
v. Matthews, 74 Tex. 654, 12 S. W. ing Car Co., 143 Mass. 267, 9 N. 
R. 744, 15 Am. St. R. 873 ; Pullman E. R. 615, 56 Am. R. 852 ; Carpenter 
Palace Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. v. New York etc. Railroad Co., 124 
581, 24 So, R. 921, 74 Am. St. R. N. Y. 53, 26 N. E. R. 277, 21 Am. 
53. See extended note to Pullman St, R. 644 ; Pullman Palace Car Co, 
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ing, to defend their property from thieves and their persons
from insult, and in general, to exercise a degree of care com-
mensurate with the danger to which passengers are exposed.
If there is a vacant berth in the car the company is bound
to furnish this accommodation and protection to any proper
person who offers at the proper time and place to pay the
fare fixed therefor; in other words, the calling is a public one.
§361. Liability of the sleeping car company.—If through
lack of commensurate care or through failure to suitably guard
and protect the passenger and his effects, injury is suffered,
the company is liable. The liability is a question of negli-
gence. It must further appear that the loss was not due to the
negligence of the passenger, and that the goods or valuables
lost were such as may properly be carried for the use or
convenience of the passenger upon the journey.
Owners of Passenger Elevators.
§362. Are carriers of passengers.—In accordance with the
general rule that the utmost care and diligence must be exer-
cised in all cases where human life is involved, it is held
that those who operate passenger elevators in public or semi-
public buildings are carriers of passengers undertaking to
carry safely passengers who use the elevator, so far as the
utmost human care and foresight will go. For the slightest
neglect in the construction, repair or operation of the elevator
resulting in injury to persons riding therein the owners or
operators are liable.
v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. R.
921, 74 Am. St. R. 53; Connell v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 93
Va. 44, 24 S. E. R. 467, 57 Am.
St. R. 786; Nevin v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 106 Ill. 222, 46 Am. R. 688.
§361. Lewis v. New York Cen-
tral Sleeping Car Co., 143 Mass. 267,
9 N. E. R. 615, 56 Am. R. 852;
[—] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car
Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500; Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Handy, 63
Miss. 609, 56 Am. R. 846; Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala.
581, 24 So. R. 921, 74 Am. St. R. 53;
Woodruif etc. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind.
474, 43 Am. R. 102.
§362. Treadwell v. Whittier, 80
Cal. 574, 22 Pac. R. 266, 13 Am.
St. R. 175 ; Southern Building &
Loan Association v. Lawson, 97
Tenn. 367, 37 S. W. R. 86, 56 Am.
St. R. 804; Goodsell v. Taylor, 41
Minn. 207, 42 N. W. R. 873, 16 Am.
st. R. 700; Hartford Deposit Co.
v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222, 50 N. E. R.
178, 64 Am. St. R. 35; [—] Springer
v. Ford, 1.89 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. R.
953, 82 Am. St. R. 464. See also
the extended note to 77 Am. St. R.
26, contra Griifen v. Manice, 166
N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. R. 925, 82 Am.
St. R. 630 ; Burgess v. Stowe, —-



















































































































































OF CARRIERS 01" PASSENGERS. § §  361-362 
in g, to defend their property from thieves and their persons 
from insult, and in general, to exercise a degree of care com­
mensurate with the danger to which passengers are exposed. 
If there is a vacant berth in the car the company is bound 
to furnish this accommodation and protection to any proper 
person who offers �t the proper time and place to pay the 
fare fixed thereforJ ju other words, the calling is a public one. 
§361. Liability of the sleeping car compa.ny.-lf through 
lack of commemmrate care or through failure to suitably guard 
and protect the passenger and his effects, injury is suffered, 
the company is liable. r he liability is a question of negli­
gence. It must further appear that the loss was not due to the 
negligence of the passenger, and that the goods or valuables 
lost were sueh as may properly be carried for the use or 
convenience of the passenger upon the journey. 
Owners of Passenger Elevators. 
§ 362. Are carriers of pasaengers.-In accordance with the 
general rule that the utmost care and diligence must be exer­
cised in all cases where human life is involved, it is he]d 
that those who operate passenger elevators in public or semi­
public buildings are carriers of passengers undertaking to 
carry safely passengers who use the elevator, so far as the 
utmost human care and foresight will go . For the slightest 
neglect in the construction, repair or operation of the elevator 
resulting in injury to persons riding therein the owners or 
operators are liable. 
v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. R. 
921, 74 Am. St. R. 53 ; Connell v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 93 
Va. 44, 24 S. E. R. 467, 57 Am. 
St. R. 786 ; Nevin v. Pullman Palace 
Car Co., 106 Ill. 222, •6 Am. R. 688. 
§ 361. Lewis v. New York Cen­
tral Sleeping Car Co., 143 Mass. 267, 
9 N. E. R. 615, 56 Am. R. 852 ; 
[ -] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car 
Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 500 ; Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Handy, 63 
Miss. 609, 56 Am. R. 846 ; Pullman 
Palace Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 
581, 24 So. R. 921, 7 4 Am. St. R. 53 ; 
Woodruff etc. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 
474, 43 Am. R. 102, 
§ 362. Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 
Cal. 574, 22 Pac. R. 266, 13 Am. 
St. R. 175 i Southern Building & 
Loan Association v. Lawson, 97 
Tenn. 367, 37 S. W. R. 86, 56 Am. 
St. R. 804 ; Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 
Minn. 207, 42 N. W. R. 873, 16 Am. 
St. R. 700 ; Hartford Deposit Co. 
v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222, 50 N. E. R. 
1 78, 64 Am. St. R. 35 ; [ -] Springer 
v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N. E. R. 
953, 82 Am. St. R. 464. See also 
the extended note to 77 Am. St. R. 
26, contra Griffen v. Maniee, 166 
N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. R. 925, 82 Am. 
St. R. 630 ; Burgess v. Stowe, 





(6) Liability for Delay.
§363. Reasonable diligence in beginning, continuing and
ending the transportation is the undertaking of the passenger
carrier. No liability is incurred by delays for which there is
reasonable excuse; carriers are not warrantors of speed.
Published time-tables are public professions, and carriers
must make all reasonable effort to carry according to their
schedules. For wilful or needless departures therefrom the
carrier is liable to one who incurs loss as a proximate result
of such fault of the carrier. The test of liability is negli-
gence, failing to use due care and skill to run in conformity
to the time-table. Changes in the time-table must be given
the same notice as the publication of the table itself.
(7) Liability for Passengei"’s Baggage.
§ 364. Insurers of baggage.—As to the passenger’s baggage
the carrier is a common carrier of goods, and an insurer
against all losses but those due to the excepted perils. The
payment of fare covers payment for carrying a reasonable
amount of baggage. The liability arises when the baggage
has been delivered to the agent of the carrier, or if there be
a custom to receive baggage left in a certain place, depositing
it there at any reasonable time before the departure of the
train is enough. The liability of the carrier does not depend
§ 363. Gordon v. The Railroad, 52
N. H. 596, 13 Am. R. 97; Weed v.
Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32
Am. D. 455; [—] Hawkins v. Hofl’-
Panama Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362,
72 Am. D. 474; [—] Sears v. East-
ern Railroad Co., 14 Allen (Mass.)
433, 92 Am. D. 780; Hurst v. Great
Western Railway Co., 19 C. B. (N.
S.) 310, 115 E. C. L. 310; Heirn
v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17, 66 Am.
D. 588, and note; Georgia Railroad
Co. v. Hayden, 71 Ga. 518, 51 Am.
R. 274; Walsh v. Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23,
24 Am. R. 376; Carter v. Peck, 4
Sneed (Tenn.) 203, 67 Am. D. 604.
§364. Isaaeson v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 94 N. Y. 278,
46 Am. R. 143; [—] Hollister v.
man, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 586, 41 Am. D.
767; Wilson v. Grand Trunk Rail-
way Co., 56 Me. 60, 96 Am. D. 435;
Hickox v. Naugatuck Railroad Co.,
31 Conn. 281, 83 Am. D. 143;
[—] Goldberg v. Ahnapee & West-
ern Railway Co., 105 Wis. 1, 80 N.
W. R. 920, 76 Am. St. R. 899;
Wright v. Caldwell, 3 Mich. 51;
Green v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail-
way Co., 38 Iowa 100, 41 Iowa 410;
Murray v. International Steamship
Co., 170 Mass. 166, 48 N. E. R. 1093,
64 Am. St. R. 290; Moore v. N. Y.
etc. Railroad Co., 173 Mas. 335, 53


















































































































































§ §  363-364 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
( 6 )  Liability for Delay. 
§ 363. Reasonable diligence in beginning, continuing and 
ending the transportation is the undertaking of the passenger 
carrier. No liability is incurred by delays for which there is 
reasonable excuse ; carriers are not warrantors of speed. 
Published time-tables are public professions, and carriers 
must make all reasonable effort to carry according to their 
schedules. For wilful or needless departures therefrom the 
carrier is liable to one who incurs loss as a proximate result 
of such fault of the carrier. The test of liability is negli­
gence, failing to use due care and skill to run in conformity 
to the time-table. Changes in the time-table must be given 
the same notice as the publication of the table itself. 
( 7 ) Liability for Passenger 's Baggage. 
§ 364. Insurers of baggage.-As to the passenger 's baggage 
the carrier is a common carrier of goods, and an insurer 
against all losses but those due to the excepted perils. The 
payment of fare covers payment for carrying a reasonable 
amount of baggage. The liability arises when the baggage 
has been delivered to the agent of the carrier, or if there be 
a custom to receive baggage left in a certain place, depositing 
it there at any reasonable time before the departure of the 
train is enough. The liability of the carrier does not depend 
§ 363. Gordon v. The Railroad, 52 Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 
N. H. 596, 13 Am. R. 97 ; Weed v. Am. D. 455 ; [-] Hawkins v. Hoff­
Panama Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, man, 6 Hill ( N. Y. ) 5861 41 Am. D. 
72 Am. D. 4 7 4 ;  [-] Sears v. East- 767 ; Wilson v. Grand Trunk Rail­
ern Railroad Co., 14 Allen (Ma88. ) way Co., 56 Me. 60, 96 Am. D. 435 ; 
433, 92 Am. D. 780 ; Hurst v. Great Hickox v. Naugatuck Railroad Co., 
Western Railway Co., 19 C. B. (N. 31 Conn. 281, 83 Am. D. 143 ; 
S.)  310, 115 E. C. L. 310 ; Heirn [-] Goldberg v. Ahnapee & West­
v. Mccaughan, 32 Miss. 1 7, 66 Am. ern Railway Co., 105 Wis. 1, 80 N. 
D. 588, antl note ; Georgia Railroad W. R. 920, 76 Am. St. R. 899 ; 
Co. v. Hayden, 71 Ga. 518; 51 Am. Wright v. Caldwell, 3 Mich. 51 ; 
R. 274 ; Walsh v. Chicago, Milwaukee Green v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail­
& St. Paul Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23, way Co., 38 Iowa 100, 41 Iowa 410 ; 
24 Am. R. 376 ; Carter v. Peck, 4 Murray v. International Steamship 
Sneed ( Tenn.) 203, 67 Am. D. 604. Co., 170 Mass. 166, 48 N. E. R. 1093, 
§ 364. Isaacson v. New York 64 Am. St. R. 290 ; Moore v. N. Y. 
Central Railroad Co., 94 N. Y. 278, etc. Railroad Co., 173 Mass. 335, 53 
46 Am. R. 143 ; [-] Hollister v. N. E. R. 816, 73 Am. St. R. 298. 
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upon the delivery or non-delivery of the baggage check.
Among several connecting carriers on the route the same rules
and presumptions prevail as to liability for baggage as have
been already explained in the case of connecting carriers of
goods (§§ 290-299).
§ 365. What is baggage depends on the person and the con-
ditions of the journey. Whatever one carries for his per-
sonal use, convenience or amusement, according to the habits
or wants of the class to which he belongs, for his use on the
way or for the ultimate purpose of the journey, is baggage.
The use must be personal to the traveler, and not merchan-
dise or samples for business, nor articles for permanent use
after he ceases to be a traveler. If however the carrier know-
ingly chooses to treat other goods as baggage, and to carry
them as such, he will be responsible therefor. The question is
often one of fact for the jury, to be determined from all the
circumstances of the case.
§366. Value of baggage.—The carrier is not an insurer of
goods and money carried by the traveler beyond what is rea-
sonably necessary for the convenience and comfort of the
traveler as such, according to
§365. [—] New York Central
Railroad Co. v. Fralolf, 100 U. S.
24; Hannibal etc. Railroad Co. v.
Swift, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 262; May-
crow v. Great Western Railway Co.,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 612; [—] Orange
County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. (N.
Y.) 85, 24 Am. D. 129; ['——] Haw-
kins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill. (N. Y.)
586, 41 Am. D. 767; Oakes v. North-
ern Pacific Railroad Co., 20 Ore. 392,
26 Pac. R. 230, 23 Am. St. R. 126;
Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605, 84
Am. D. 646. (Compare Connolly v.
Warren, 106 Mass. 146, 8 Am. R.
300.) Coward v. East Tennessee &
Georgia Railroad Co., 16 Lea
(Tenn.) 225, 57 Am. R. 226; Dibble
v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217, 56 Am. D.
460; Michigan Central Railroad Co.
v. Carrow, 73 Ill. 348, 24 Am. R.
248; Toledo & Ohio Central Railway
Co. v. Bowler & Burdick Co., 57
his station in life. It can not
Ohio st. a8, 47 N. E. R. 1039, es
Am. St. R. 702; Kansas City etc.
Railway Co. v. McGahey, 63 Ark.
344, 38 S. W. R. 659, 18 Am. St.
R. 111; Bomar v. Maxwell, 9
Humph. (Tenn.) 620, 51 Am. D.
682 ; Runyan v. Central Railroad
Co., 61 N. J. L. 537, 41 Atl. R. 367,
68 Am. St. R. 711. Compare Blu-
mantle v. Fitcliburg Railroad Co.,
127 Mass. 322, 34 Am. R. 376, with
Minter v. Pacific Railroad Co., 41
M0. 503, 97 Am. D. 288.
§366. [—] Orange County
Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.)
85, 24 Am. D. 129; [—] New York
Central Railroad Co. v. Fralofl’, 100
U. S. 24; [—] Blum v. Pullman
Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500;
Pfister v. Central Pacific Railroad
Co., 70 Cal. 169, 11 Pac. R. 686, 59
Am. R. 404; Michigan Central Rail-

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§  365-366 
upon the delivery or non-delivery of the baggage check. 
Among several connecting carriers on the route the same rules 
and presumptions prevail as to liability for baggage as have 
been already explained in the case of connecting carriers of 
goods ( § § 290-299 ) . 
§ 365. What is baggage depends on the person and the con­
ditions of the journey. Whatever one carries for his per­
sonal use, convenience or amusement, according to the habits 
or wants of the class to which he belongs, for his use on the 
way or for the ultimate purpose of the journey, is baggage. 
The use must be personal to the traveler, and not merchan­
dise or samples for business, nor articles for permanent use 
after he ceases to be a traveler. If however the carrier know­
ingly chooses to treat other goods as· baggage, and to carry 
them as such, he will be responsible therefor. The question is 
often one of fact for the jury, to be determined from all the 
circumstances of the case. 
§ 366. Value of baggage.-The carrier is not an insurer of 
goods and money carried by the traveler beyond what is rea­
sonably necessary for the conveni�nce and comfort of the 
traveler as such, according to his station in life. It can not 
§ 365. [-] New York Central Ohio St. 38, 47 N. E. R. 1039, 63 
Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. Am. St. R. 702 ; Kansas City etc. 
24 ; Hannibal etc. Railroad Co. v. Railway Co. v. McGahey, 63 Ark. 
Swift, 12 Wall. (U. S. ) 262 ; May- 344, 38 S. W. R. 659, 18 Am. St. 
crow v. Great Western Railway Co., R. 111 ; Bomar v. Maxwell, 9 
L. R. 6 Q. B. 612 ; [-] Orange Humph. (Tenn. ) 620, 51 Am. D. 
County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. ( N. 682 ; Runyan v. Central Railroad 
Y.) 85, 24 Am. D. 1 29 ; [-] Haw· Co., 61 N. J. L. 537, 41 Atl. R. 367, 
kins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill. ( N. Y. ) 68 Am. St. R. 711. Compare Blu· 
586, 41 Am. D. 767 ; Oakes v. Norlh· mantle v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 
ern Pacific Railroad Co., 20 Ore. 392, 127 Mass. 322, 34 Am. R. 376, with 
26 Pac. R. 230, 23 Am. St. R. 126 ; Minter v. Pacific Railroad Co., 41 
Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605, 84 Mo. 503, 97 Am. D. 288. 
Am. D. 646. (Compare Connolly v. § 366. [-] Orange County 
Warren, 106 Mass. 146, 8 Am. R. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 
300. ) Coward v. East Tennessee & 85, 24 Am. D. 129 ; [-] New York 
Georgia Railroad Co., 16 Lea Central Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 
(Tenn. ) 225, 57 Am. R. 226 ; Dibble U. S. 24 ; [-] Blum v. Pullman 
v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217, 56 Am. D. Palace Car Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 500 ; 
460 ; Michigan Central Railroad Co. Pfister v. Central Pacific Railroad 
v. Carrow, 73 Ill. 348, 24 Am. R. Co., 70 Cal. 169, 11 Pac. R. 686, 59 
248 ; Toledo & Ohio Central Railway Am. R. 404 ; Michigan Central Rail­
Co. v. Bowler & Burdick Co., 57 road Co. v. Carrow, 73 Ill. 348, 24 
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be required to carry as luggage such property, but may compel
the owner to send it by express or freight. If the traveler
wishes the carrier to assume further liability he must reveal
the true value, so that the carrier may charge according to
the risk. The carrier of baggage unlike the carrier of goods
owes no duty to inquire as to the contents of trunks.
§367. Custody of passenger.—The carrier assumes no re-
sponsibility for money and valuables, not properly baggage,
carried by the passenger upon his person. And for goods or
packages carried as hand baggage the carrier incurs no lia-
oility except for negligence. Some cases hold the carrier to
the full common law liability as insurers of articles retained by
the passenger for his personal use upon the journey and lost
without negligence on his part. But the weight of authority
seems to hold the carrier to the exercise of proper watchful-
ness only, and this is especially required in the case of articles
of personal apparel carried in a berth in a sleeping car lost
while the passenger is enjoying the sleep to which the carrier
has invited him.
As to ordinary baggage the custody must be surrendered to
the carrier or he is not responsible for its loss. It would be
unreasonable to hold the carrier responsible for property never
entrusted to his custody at all.
§368. Passenger supposed
Am. R. 248; Weeks v. New York
etc. Railroad Co., 72 N. Y. 50, 28
Am. R. 104; Runyan v. Central Rail-
road Co., 61 N. J. L. 537, 41 Atl.
R. 367, 68 Am. St. R. 711; Toledo
& Ohio Central Railway Co. v. Bow-
ler & Burdick Co., 57 Ohio St. 38,
47 N. E. R. 1039, 63 Am. St. R.
702. -
§367. [—] Kinsley v. Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad
Co., 125 Mass. 54, 28 Am. R. 200;
[—] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car
Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 500; Weeks v.
New York etc. Railroad Co., 72 N.
Y. 50, 28 Am. R. 104; First Na-
tional Bank v. Marietta & Cincinnati
Railroad Co., 20 Ohio St. 259, 5
Am. R. 655; Pfister v. Central Pa-
to accompany baggage.—It is
cific Railroad Co., 70 Cal. 169, 11
Pac. R. 686, 59 Am. R. 404; Tower
v. Utica etc. Railroad Co., 7 Hill
(N. Y.) 47, 42 Am. D. 36; Lewis
v. New York Central Sleeping Car
Co., 143 Mass. 267, 9 N. E. R. 615,
58 Am. R. 135; [——-] Pullman Pal-
ace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360,
24 Am. R. 258; Gleason v. Goodrich
Transportation Co., 32 Wis. 85, 14
Am. R. 716; Pullman Palace Car Co.
‘v. Pollock, 69 Tex. 120,-5 s. W. R.
814, 5 Am. St. R. 31; Whicher v.
Boston & Albany Railroad Co., 176
Mass. 275, 57 N. E. R. 601, 79
Am. St. R. 314; Woodrufi Sleeping
etc. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43
Am. R. 102.

















































































































































§ §  367-368 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
be required to carry as luggage such property, but may compel 
the owner to send it by express or freight. If the traveler 
wishes the carrier to assume further liabi1ity he must reveal 
the true value, so that the carrier may charge according to 
the risk. The carrier of baggage unlike the carrier of goods 
owes no duty to inquire as to the contents of trunks. 
§ 367. Custody of passenger.-The carrier assumes no re­
sponsibility for money and valuables, not properly baggage, 
carried by the passenger upon his person. And for goods or 
oackages carried as hand baggage the carrier incurs no lia-
01lity except for negligence. Some cases hold the carrier to 
.he full common law liability as insurers of articles retained by 
the passenger for his personal use upon the journey and lost 
without negligence on his part. But the weight of authority 
seems to hold the carrier to the exercise of proper watchful­
ness only, and this is especially required in the case of articles 
of personal apparel carried in a berth in a sleeping car lost 
while the passenger is enjoying the sleep to which the carrier 
has invited him. 
As to ordinary baggage the custody must be surrendered to 
the carrier or he is not responsible for its loss. It would be 
unreasonable to hold the carrier responsible for property never 
entrusted to his custody at all. 
§ 368. Passenger supposed to accompany baggage.-It is 
Am. R. 248 ; Weeks v. New York 
etc. Railroad Co., 72 N. Y. 50, 28 
Am. R. 104 ; Runyan v. Central Rail­
road Co., 61 N. J. L. 537, 41 Atl. 
R. 367, 68 Am. St. R. 711 ; Toledo 
& Ohio Central Railway Co. v. Bow­
ler & Burdick Co., 57 Ohio St. 38, 
. 47 N. E. R. 1039, 63 Am. St. R. 
702. . 
§ 367. t:__] Kinsley v. Lake 
Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad 
Co., 125 Mass. 54, 28 Am. R. ZOO ; 
[ - ] Blum v. Pullman Palace Car 
Co., 1 Flip. (U. S. ) 500 ; Weeks v. 
New York etc. Railroad Co., 72 N. 
Y. 50, 28 Am. R. 104 ; First Na­
tional Bank v. Marietta & Cincinnati 
Railroad Co., 20 Ohio St. 259, 5 
Am. R. 655 ; Pfister v, Central Pa-
cific Railroad Co., 70 Cal. 169, 11 
Pac. R.  686, 59 Am. R. 404 ; Tower 
v. Utica etc. Railroad Co., 7 HiJJ 
(N. Y.) 47, 42 Am. D. 36 ; Lewis 
v. New York Central Sleeping Car 
Co., 143 Mass. 267, 9 N. E. R. 615, 
58 Am. R. 135 ; [-] Pullman Pal­
ace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 
24 Am. R. 258 ; Gleason v. Goodrich 
Transportation Co., 32 Wis. 85, 14 
Am. R. 716 ; Pullman Palace Car Co. 
v. Pollock, 69 Tex. 120, · 5 S. W. R. 
814, 5 Am. St. R. 31 ; Whicher -v. 
Boston & Albany Railroad Co., 176 
Mass. 275, 57 N. E. R. 601, 79 
Am. St. R. 314 ; Woodruff Sleeping 
etc. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 
Am. R. 102. 
§ 368. Wilson v .  Grand Trunk 
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implied in the ordinary contract of carriage that the baggage
and the passenger go together. The carriage of the baggage
is an incident to the principal contract to carry the passenger.
If therefore the baggage is sent on another train through the
carrier’s fault the carrier bears the risk,.but if the passenger
chooses to go by another train, or carries luggage neither
belonging to him nor for his personal use upon the journey,
the carrier becomes a mere gratuitous bailee as to such bag-
gage. As a matter of course if the carrier consents to carry
the baggage by another route or train, his liability remains,
and on the other hand if baggage is sent without the carrier’s
consent by one not buying a ticket or paying for the carriage
the carrier can become liable only for wilful or wanton injury.
§369. Delivery of baggag'e.—The carrier’s liability for the
baggage of the passenger continues until it is ready to be
delivered to the passenger at his destination, and until he has
had a reasonable opportunity to call for it and take it away.
What is such reasonable time depends upon circumstances, but
usually it is immediately. The passenger can not for his own
convenience prolong the period of the extraordinary lia-
bility of the carrier. If the baggage is not called for within
a reasonable time the carrier may store it and his liability
changes to that of a warehouseman.
B. Of the Limitation of the Liability of the Carrier of Pas-
sengers by Contract.
§370. As to the baggage of the passenger the carrier may
by contract make limitations of liability subject to the same
Railway Co., 56 Me. 60, 96 Am. D. P. Railroad Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill. 510,
435 ; Wald v. Pittsburg etc. Rail- 24 Am. R. 268.
road Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E. R. §369. Roth v. Bufialo etc. Rail-
888, 53 Am. St. R. 332; Beers v. road Co., 34 N. Y. 548, 90 Am. D.
Boston etc. Railroad Co., 67 Conn.
417, 34 Atl. R. 541, 52 Am. St. R.
293; Isaacson v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 94 N. Y. 278, 46 Am.
R. 142; Curtis v. Delaware, Laeka-
wanna & Western Railroad Co., 74
N. Y. 116, 30 Am. R. 271; Coward
v. East Tennessee & Georgia Rail-
road Co., 16 Lea (Tenn.) 225, 57
Am. R. 226; [—] Chicago, R. I. &
736; [—] Chicago, Rock Island 80
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill.
510, 24 Am. R. 268; Kansas City
etc. Railway Co. v. McGahey, 63
Ark. 344, 38 S. W. R. 659, 58 Am.
St. R. 111; Ditman Boot & Shoe Co.
v. Keokuk & Western Railroad Co.,
91 Iowa 416, 59 N. W. R. 257, 51
Am. St. R. 352; Ouimit v. Hen-

















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§ 369-370 
implied in the ordinary contract of carriage that the baggage 
and the passenger go together. The carriage of the baggage 
is an incident to the principal contract to carry the passenger. 
If therefore the baggage is sent on another train through the 
carrier 's fault the carrier bears the risk, . but if the passenger 
chooses to go by another train, or carrie� luggage neither 
belonging to him nor for his personal use upon the journey, 
the carrier becomes a mere gratuitous bailee as to such bag­
gage. As a matter of course if the carrier consents to carry 
the baggage by another route or train, his liability remains, 
and on the other hand if baggage is sent without the carrier 's 
consent by one not buying a ticket or paying for the carriage 
the carrier can become liable only for wilful or wanton injury. 
§ 369. Delivery of baggage.-The carrier 's liability for the 
baggage of the passenger continues until it is ready to be 
delivered to the passenger at his destination, and until he has 
had a reasonable opportunity to call for it and take it away. 
What is such reasonable time depends upon circumstances, but 
usually it is immediately. The passenger can not for his own 
convenience prolong the period of the extraordinary lia­
bility of the carrier. If the baggage is not called for within 
a reasonable time the carrier may store it and his liability 
changes to that of a warehouseman. 
B.  Of the Limitatwn of the Liability of the Carrier of Pas­
sengers by Contract. 
§ 370. As to the baggage of the passenger the carrier may 
by contract make limitations of liability subject to the same 
Railway Co., 56 Me. 60, 96 Am. D. P. Railroad Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill. 510, 
435 ; Wald v. Pittsburg etc. Rail- 24 Am. R. 268. 
road Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E. R. § 369. Roth v, Buffalo etc. Rail-
888, 53 Am. St. R. 332 ; Beers v. road Co., 34 N. Y. 548, 90 Am. D. 
Boston etc. Railroad Co., 67 Conn. 736 ; [ -] Chicago, Rock Island & 
417, 34 Atl. R. 541, 52 Am. St. R. Pacific Railroad Co. v. Boyce, 73 Ill. 
293 ; Isaacson v. New York Central 510, 24 Am. R. 268 ; Kansas City 
Railroad Co., 94 N. Y. 278, 46 Am. etc. Railway Co. v. McGahey, 63 
R. 142 ; Curtis v. Delaware, Lacka· Ark. 344, 38 S. W. R. 659, 58 Am. 
wanna & Western Railroad Co., 74 St. R. 111 ; Ditman Boot & Shoe Co. 
N. Y. 116, 30 Am. R. 271 ; Coward , .. Keokuk & Western Railroad Co., 
Y. East Tennessee & Georgia Rail· !H Iowa 416, 59 N. W. R. 257, 51 
road Co., 16 Lea ( Tenn . ) 225, 57 Am. St. R. 352 ; Ouimit v, Hen· 
Am. R. 226 ; [-] Chicago, R. I. & shaw, 35 Vt. 6051 84 Am, D. 646 ;  
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rules as carriers of goods generally (see chapter 12). But
conditions limiting the liability for baggage which are printed
on the passenger ’s ticket are of no force unless brought to the
notice of the passenger and expressly or impliedly assented to
by him.
§371. As to the passenger, it is doubtful if the carrier in
most states can by contract secure exemption from the full
care demanded by law. It is public policy and not contract
that requires the security of the passenger “as far as human
care and foresight will go,” and no individual can excuse the
carrier. The states that allow the carrier of goods to con-
tract within certain limits against liability for negligence
apply the same rules to passenger carriers but with perhaps
greater caution and stricter construction.
§372. Gratuitous passengers.—A number of states uphold
contracts exempting carriers from liability for injuries to
passengers traveling on a pass but the weight of authority is
that no distinction is to be taken betwen such passengers, pas-
Fairfax v. New York Central Rail-
road Co., 73 N. Y. 167, 29 Am. R.
1]9.
§370. Coward v. East Tennessee
& Georgia Railroad Co., 16 Lea
(Tenn.) 225, 57 Am. R. 226; Cam-
den & Amboy Railroad Co. v. Bal-
dauf, 16 Pa. St. 67, 55 Am. D. 481;
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago
Railway Co. v. Nicholai, 4 Ind. App.
119, 30 N. E. R. 424, 51 Am. St. R.
206; [—] Ranchau v. Rutland Rail-
road Co., 71 Vt. 142, 43 Atl. R. 11,
76 Am. St. R. 761; Kansas City
etc. Railroad Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38
Kan. 45, 15 Pac. R. 899, 5 Am. St.
R. 715, and note, ante, sec. 266.
§371. [—] Railroad v. Lock-
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357;
[——~l Williams v. Oregon Short Line
Railroad Co., 18 Utah 210, 54 Pac.
R. 991, 72 Am. st. R. 777;
[—] Doyle v. Fitchburg etc. Rail-
road Co., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E.
R. 611, 55 Am. St. R. 417; Russell
v. Pittsburg etc. Railway Co., 157
Ind. 305, 61 N. E. R. 678, 87 Am.
St. R. 214; Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E.
R-. 1019, 66 Am. St. R. 253; Sey-
bolt v. New York, Lake Erie & West-
ern Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 562, 47
Am. R. 75; Bissel v. New York Cen-
tral Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 442, 82
Am. D. 369.
§372. Griswold v. New York &
New England Railroad Co., 53
Conn. 371, 4 Atl. R. 261, 55 Am. R.
115; Ulrich v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 108 N. Y. 80, 15 N.
E. R. 60, 2 Am. St. R. 369; Bissel
v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
25 N. Y. 442, 82 Am. D. 369;
[—] Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad
Co., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. R.
611, 55 Am. St. R. 417; Russell v.
Pittsburg etc. Railroad Co., 157 Ind.
305, 61 N. E. R. 678, 87 Am. St.
R. 214; [—] Williams v. Oregon
Short Line Railroad Co., 18 Utah
210, 54 Pac. R. 991, 72 Am. St. R.

















































































































































§ §  371-372 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
I 
rules as carriers of goods generally ( see chapter 12) . But 
conditions limiting the liability for baggage which are printed 
on the passenger 's ticket are of no force unless brought to the 
notice of the passenger and expressly or impliedly assented to 
by him. 
§ 371. As to the passenger, it is doubtful if the carrier in 
most states can by contract secure exemption from the full 
care demanded by law. It is public policy and not contract 
that requires the security of the passenger ' ' as far as human 
care and foresight will go, ' '  and no individual can excuse the 
carrier. The states that allow the carrier of goods to con­
tract within certain limits against liability for negligence 
apply the same rules to passenger carriers but with perhaps 
greater caution and stricter construction. 
§ 372. Gratuitous passengers.-A number of states uphold 
contracts exempting carriers from liability for injuries to 
passengers traveling on a pass but the weight of authority is 
that no distinction is to be taken betwen such passengers, pas-
Fail'fax v. New York Central Rail- Ind. 305, 61 N. E. R. 678, 87 Am. 
road Co., 73 N. Y. 167, 29 Am. R. St. R. 214 ; Illinois Central Railroad 
1J 9. Co. v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. 
§ 370. Coward v. East TenneBSee R. 1019, 66 Am. St. R. 253 ; Sey­
& Georgia Railroad Co., 16 Lea bolt v. New York, Lake Erie & West­
( Tenn. ) 225, 57 Am. R. 226 ; Cam· ern Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 562, 47 
den & Amboy Railroad Co. v. Bal- Am. R. 75 ; Bissel v. New York Cen­
dauf, 16 Pa. St. 67, 55 Am. D. 481 ; tral Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 442, 82 
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Am. D. 369. 
Railway Co. v. Nieholai, 4 Ind. App. § 372. Griswold v. New York & 
1 19, 30 N. E. R. 424, 51 Am. St. R. New Englau.d Railroad Co., 53 
206 ; [-] Ranchau v. Rutland Rail· Conn. 371, 4 Atl. R. 261, 55 Am. R. 
road Co., 71 Yt. 142, 43 Atl. R. 11, ll !J ;  Ulrich v. New York Central 
76 Am. St. R. 761 ; Kansas City Railroad Co., 108 N. Y. 80, 15 N. 
etc. Railroad Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38 E. R. 60, 2 Am. St. R. 369 ; BiBSel 
Kan. 45, 15 Pac. R. 899, 5 Am. St. v. New York Central Railroad Co., 
R. 715, and note, ante, sec. 266. 25 N. Y. 442, 82 Am. D. 369 ; 
§ 371. [-] Railroad v. Lock· [ -] Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad 
wood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357 ; Co., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. R. 
[ -] Williams v. Oregon Short Line 611, 55 Am. St. R. 417 ; Russell v. 
Railroad Co., 18 Utah 210, 54 Pac. Pittsburg etc. Railroad Co., 157 Ind. 
R. 991, 72 Am. St. R. 777 ; 305, 61 N. E. R. 678, 87 Am. St. 
[-] Doyle v. Fitchburg etc. Rail- R. 214 ; [-] Williams v. Oregon 
road Co., 166 Mass. 492, 44 N. E. Short Line Railroad Co., 18 Utah 
R. 6 1 1 ,  55 Am. St. R. 417 ; Russell 2 10, 54 Pae. R. 991, 72 Am. St. R. 
v. Pittsburg etc. Railway Co., 157 777 ; Baltimore & Ohio ete. Railway 
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sengers riding on reduced rates and passengers paying full
fare. The law imposes the same duty to protect life and limb
in all cases.
An exception is to be noticed in the case of persons whom
the railway company is under no obligation to carry, such
as express messengers, mail clerks and parlor car porters. As
no duty to carry such persons exists, the carrier may refuse
to undertake the carriage except upon its own terms. Persons
accompanying stock and riding on a drover’s pass are not
gratuitous passengers, but passengers for hire.
(3) Termination of the Relation.
§373. How terminated.—A contract of carriage may be
(1) Fully executed, or
(2) Left incomplete, because
a. The passenger has abandoned the journey, or
b. The carrier has ejected the passenger from his
vehicle.
(1) Contract to Carry Fully Executed.
3
§374. When carrier s relation ends.—“The carrier is
bound to exercise the strictest vigilance not only in carrying
passengers to their destination but in setting them down safely
Co. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498; Peter-
son v. Chicago & Northwestern Rail-
way Co., — Wis. —, 96 N. W. R.
532; [—] Railroad v. Lockwood, 17
Wall. (U. S.) 357; Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13,
50 N. E. R. 1019, as Am. st. R.
253, note to 61 Am. St. R. 89.
§374. [—] Commonwealth v.
Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 129
Mass. 500, 37 Am. R. 382; Hansley
v. Jamesville etc. Railroad Co.,
115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. R. 528, 44
Am. St. R. 474; Terre Haute &
Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Buck,
96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. R. 168;
[—] Dodge v. Boston & Bangor
Steamship Co., 148 Mass. 207, 19
N. E. R. 373, 12 Am. St. R. 541;
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & South-
ern Railroad Co. v. Cantrell, 37
Ark. 519, 40 Am. R. 105; Lambeth
v. North Carolina Railroad Co., 66
N. C. 494, 8 Am. R. 508; Memphis
& Charleston Railroad Co. v. Whit-
field, 44 Miss. 466, 7 Am. R. 699;
[—] Filer v. New York Central Rail-
road Co., 49 N. Y. 47, 10 Am. R.
327 ; Harris v. Howe, 74 Tex. 534,
12 S. W. R. 224, 15 Am. St. R.
862; [—] Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17
N. Y. 306, 72 Am. D. 469; Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Green, 81 Ill.
19, 25 Am. R. 255; Mitchell v.
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 51 Mich.
236, 16 N. W. R. 388, 47 Am. R.
566; Cartwright v. Chicago & Grand
Trunk Railway Co., 52 Mich. 606,
18 N. W. R. 380, 50 Am. R. 274;
[—] Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, 62 Am. D.


















































































































































OF CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. §§ 373-374: 
sengers riding on reduced rates and passengers paying full 
fare. The law imposes the same duty to protect life and limb 
· in all cases. 
An exception is to be noticed in the case of persons whom 1 
the railway company is under no obligation to carry, such t t '  < 1.., : , - :· 
as express messengers, mail clerks and parlor car porters. As 
· 1 
no duty to carry such persons exists, the carrier may refuse 
to undertake the carriage except upoµ its own terms. Persons 
accompanying stock and riding on a drover 's pass are not 
gratuitous passengers, but passengers for hire. 
§ 373. 
( 1 )  
( 2)  
( 3 ) Termination of the Relation. 
How termina.ted.-A contract of carriage may be 
Fully executed, or 
Left incomplete, because 
a. The passenger has abandoned the journey, or 
b. The carrier has ejected the passenger from his 
vehicle. 
( 1 )  Contract to Carry Fully Executed. 
§ 374. When carrier 's relation ends.-" The carrier is 
bound to exercise the strictest vigilance not only in carrying 
passengers to their destination but in setting them down safely 
Co. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498 ; Peter- Ark. 519, 40 Am. R. 105 ; Lambeth 
son v. Chicago & Northwestern Bail- v. North Carolina Railroad Co., 66 
way Co., - Wis. -, 96 N. W. R. N. C. 494, 8 Am. R. 508 ; Memphis 
532 ; [-] Railroad v. Lockwood, 17 & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Whit· 
Wall. (U. S.) 357 ; Illinois Central field, 44 Miss. 466, 7 Am. R. 699 ; 
Railroad Co. v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, [-] Filer v. New York Central Rail-
50 N. E. R. 1019, 66 Am. St. R. road Co., 49 N. Y. 471 10 Am. R. 
253, note to 61 Am. St. R. 89. 327 ; Harris v. Howe, 74 Tex. 534, 
§ 374. [-] Commonwealth v. 12 S. W. R. 224, 15 Am. St. R. 
Boston & Maine Railroad Co., 129 862 ; [-] Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 
Mass. 500, 37 Am. R. 382 ; Hansley N. Y. 306, 72 Am. D. 469 ; Illinois 
v. Jamesville etc. Railroad Co., Central Railroad Co. v. Green, 81 Ill. 
115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. R. 528, 44 19, 25 Am. R. 255 ; Mitchell v. 
Am. St. R. 474 ; Terre Haute & Grand Trunk Railway Co., 51 Mich. 
Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Buck, 236, 16 N. W. R. 388, 47 Am. R. 
96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. R. 168 ; 566 ; Cartwright v. Chicago & Grand 
[-] Dodge v. Boston & Bangor Trunk Railway Co., 52 Mich. 606, 
Steamship Co., 148 Mass. 207, 19 18 N. W. R. 380, 50 Am. R. 274 ; 
N. E. R. 373, 12 Am. St. R. 541 ; [ -] Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. 
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & South- Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, 62 Am. D. 











at the end.” The carrier performs his full duty therefore by
carrying a passenger to his destination as indicated by his
ticket and giving him suitable opportunity to alight in a proper
place. An invitation by the carrier to the passenger to alight
without allowing a reasonable time, or afiording a safe place
subjects the carrier to liability for injurious consequences;
but the passenger alone is responsible for the results of his
contributory negligence. Harm which one brings upon him-
self is treated so far as others are concerned as though not
received at all.
If the carrier contracts for only a portion of the route his
duty is completed by carrying the passenger to the point on
his line where the transfer is to be made to a connecting car-
rier’s line. '
(2) Contract to Carry left Incomplete.
§375. (a) The passenger may leave the conveyance, with
intent to abandon the journey, at any time. If he does he
ceases to be a passenger though he may intend to resume the
journey by a later train. Leaving for a temporary purpose
however does not affect the relation, nor does one cease to be
a passenger while traveling from one train to another in the
prosecution of the journey. But one stepping from a street
car to the public highway ordinarily ceases to be a passenger
even while traveling to another car. The highway is not a
passenger station.
§ 376. (b) The carrier may eject the passenger before the
journey’s end, as already noted, for failure to pay fare, or
for breach of the carrier’s reasonable regulations, and the
carrier is not again obliged to receive the passenger.
§375. [—] Dodge v. Boston &
Bangor Steamship Co., 148 Mass.
207, 19 N. E. R. 373, 12 Am. St. R.
541; Parsons v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 113 N. Y. 355, 21 N.
E. R. 145, 10 Am. St. R. 450;
Northrup v. Railway Passenger As-
surance Co., 43 N. Y. 516, 3 Am. R.
724; [—] Commonwealth v. Boston
& Maine Railroad Co., 129 Mass.
500, 37 Am. R. 383; Stone v. Chi-
cago & Northwestern Railway Co., 47
Iowa 82, 29 Am. R. 458; Creamer
v. West End Street Railway Co.,
156 Mass. 320, 31 N. E. R. 391, 32
Am. St. R. 456. But compare
Keator v. Traction Co., 191 Pa. St.
102, 43 Atl. R. 86, 71 Am. St. 758.

















































































































































§ §  375-376 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
at the end. " 'l'he carrier performs his full duty therefore by 
carrying a passenger to his destination as indicated by his 
ticket and giving him suitable opportunity to alight in a proper 
place. An invitation by the carrier to the passenger to alight 
without allowing a reasonable time, or affording a safe place 
subjects the carrier to liability for injurious consequences ; 
but the passenger alone is responsible for the results of bis 
contributory negligence. Harm which one brings upQn him­
self is treated so far as others are concerned as though not 
received at all. 
If the carrier contracts for only a portion of the route his 
duty is completed by carrying the passenger to the point on 
his line where the trans£ er is to be made to a connecting car­
rier 's line. 
(2 ) Contract to Ca·rry left Incomplete. 
§ 375. (a )  The passenger may leave the conveyance, with 
intent to abandon the journey, at any time. If he does he 
ceases to be a passenger though he may intend to resume the 
journey by a later train. Leaving for a temporary purpose 
however does not affect the relation, nor does one cease to be 
a passenger while traveling from one train to another in the 
prosecution of the journey. But one stepping from a street 
car to the public highway ordinarily ceases to be a passenger 
even while traveling to another car. The highway is not a 
passenger station. 
§ 376. (b)  The carrier may eject the passenger before the 
journey 's end, as already noted, for failure to pay fare, or 
for breach of the carrier 's reasonable regulations, and the 
carrier is not again obliged to receive the passenger. 
§ 375. [-] Dodge v. Boston & 
Bangor Steamship Co., 148 MaBS. 
207, 19 N. E. R. 373, 12 Am. St. R. 
541 ; Parsons v. New York Central 
Railroad Co., 113 N. Y. 355, 21 N. 
E. R. 145, 10 Am. St. R. 450 ; 
Northrup v. Railway Passenger As­
surance Co., 43 N. Y. 516, 3 Am. R. 
724 ; [ -] Commonwealth v. Boston 
& Maine Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 
500, 37 Am. R. 383 ; Stone v. Chi­
cago & Northwestern Railway Co., 47 
Iowa 82, 29 Am. R. 458 ; Creamer 
v. West End Street Railway Co., 
156 Mass. 320, 31 N. E. R. 391, 32 
Am. St. R. 456. But compare 
Keator v. Traction Co., 191 Pa. St. 
102, 43 Atl. R. 86, 71 Am. St. 758. 



















Carriers of mail and intelli- §391.
gence.
Post Ofiice Department.




Telegraph companies as car-
riers of intelligence.
Definition.




2. Rights and duties of tel-
egraph companies as ear-
rien.
Classification.
(1.) Right to compensa-
tion.
Discrimination.
(2.) Right to make rules
and regulations.
iNotice of rules.















(3.) Duty to serve all im-
partially.
(4.) Duty to provide ade-
quate facilities.




(6.) Liability for delay or
failure to deliver.











Duty to serve all impar-
tially.
Patent subject to public
control.
Right to regulate charges.
§377. Carriers of 4mail and of intel1igence.—In addition to
the carriers of passengers, considered in the last chapter, there
remain for notice the post office as a carrier of mail and
7
telegraph and telephone companies as carriers of intelligence.
Such companies, by the clear weight of authority, are not
common carriers, nor even bailees for hire, and yet they exer-
cise a public calling and perform duties nearly resembling





















































































































































§ 377. Carriers of mail and intelli­
gence. 
Post Office Department. 
378. Not properly a bailee. 
379. Contractors for carrying 
mail. 
380. Postmasters. 
.Telegraph companies as car­
riers of intelligence. 
381. Definition. 
1. Nature of the relation. 
382. Public calling. 
383. Not common carriers. 
384. Are quasi-bailees. 
�. Bight• and duties of tel­
egraph companies as ear­
ner•. 
385. Classification. 
386. (1 . )  Right to compensa-
ti on. 
387. --Discrimination. 
388. (2 .)  Right to make rules 
and regulations. 
389. --Notice of rules. 
390. --What rules are reason­
able. 
§ 391. (3.) Dut1 to serve all im­
partially. 
392. (4. ) Duty to provide ade­
quate facilities. 
393. ( 5 . )  Liability for mistakes 
in transmission. 
394. --Limiting liability for 
negligence by contract. 
395. (6.)  Liability for delay or 
failure to deliver. 
3. Termination of the re-
lation. 
396. Delivery where. 
397. Delivery to whom. 
398. Delivery to connecting lines. 
Telephone companies. 
399. Telegraph and telephone 
companies alike quasi­
public. 
400. Not common carriers. 
401. Duty to serve all impar­
tially. 
402. Patent subject to public 
control. 
403. Right to regulate charges. 
§ 377. Carriers of 
.
mail and of intelligence.-In addition to 
the carriers of passengers, considered in the last chapter, there 
remain for notice the post office as a carrier of mail, and 
telegraph and telephone companies as carriers of intelligence. 
Such companies, by the clear weight of authority, are not 
common carriers, nor even bailees for hire, and yet they exer­
cise a public calling and perform duties ne_arly resembling 
those of common carriers. They are in short quasi-bailees . 
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§§ 378-381 OF QUASI-BAILEES.
Post Oflice Department.
§378. Not properly a bailee.—The government as a carrier
of the mails has been said to be a bailee for hire, and is cer-
tainly a public, or common, rather than a private carrier.
But while its undertakings are in their nature like those of
common carriers yet the government incurs no liability, since
it can not be sued except by its own consent and consequently
the courts can have no occasion to lay down any rules of
liability. It seems more in accord with the facts therefore
to consider the post office department and its employees and
officers as quasi-bailees. -
§379. Contractors for carrying mail are employees of the
government, and between them and those sending matter by
mail there is no privity, no relation of bailor and bailee. The
contractor for the performance of his duty as carrier is respon-
sible to the government alone.
§380. Postmasters also are government employees, and in
general are responsible to the Post Ofliee Department alone.
For personal negligence resulting in loss to a private person
they may be liable to such person.
All deputies and employees appointed by postmasters by
authority of law are government employees. The postmaster
is not liable for their misfeasance unless he was negligent in
selecting them. For the acts of persons privately employed
bv him to do his work he is of course liable as for his own
v .
negligence.
Telegraph Companies as Carriers of Intelligence.
§381. Definiti0n.-—Telegraph and telephone companies or-
§378. But compare Schouler on
Bailments and Carriers, 265-272.
§379. Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat.
(Va.) 230, 94 Am. D. 445; Hutch-
ins v. Brackett, 22 N. H. 252, 53
Am. D. 248; [—] Foster v. Metts,
55 Miss. 77, 30 Am. R. 504; Central
Railroad & Banking Co. v. Lampley,
76 Ala. 357, 52 Am. R. 334.
§380. Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld.
Ray. 646; Sawyer v. Corse, 17
Grat. (Va.) 230, 94 Am. D. 445;
Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. L. (S.
C.) 146, 53 Am. D. 727; [—] Fos-
ter v. Metts, 55 Miss. 77, 30 Am. R.
504; Keenan v. Southworth, 110
Mass. 474, 14 Am. R. 613; Raisler
v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710, 12 So. R.
238, a8 Am. st. R. 213.
§381. [—] Mentzer v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 93 Iowa


















































































































































§ §  378-381 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
Post Office Department. 
§ 378. Not properly a. bailee.-The government as a carrier 
of the mails has been said to be a bailee for hire, and is cer­
tainly a public, or common, rather than a private carrier. 
But while its undertakings are in their nature like those of 
common carriers yet the government incurs no liability, since 
it can not be sued except by its own consent and consequently 
the courts can have no occasion to lay down any rules of 
liability. It seems more in accord with the facts therefore 
to consider the post office department and its employees and 
officers as quasi-bailees. 
§ 379. Contra.ctors for carrying mail are employees of the 
government, and between them and those sending matter by 
mail there is no privity, no relation of bailor and bailee. The 
contractor for the performance of his duty as carrier is respon­
sible to the government alone. 
§ 380. Postmasters also are government employees, and in 
general are responsible to the Post Office Department alone. 
For personal negligence resulting in loss to a private person 
they may be liable to such person. 
All deputies and employees appointed by postmasters by 
authority of law are government employees. The postmaster 
is not liable for their misfeasance unless he was negligent in 
selecting them. For the acts of persons privately employed 
by him to do his work he is of course liable as for his own 
negligence. 
Telegraph Companies as Carriers of Intelligence. 
§ 381. Deftnition.-Telegraph and telephone companies or-
§ 378. But compare Schouler on 
Bailments and Carriers, 265·272. 
§ 379. Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 
(Va. ) 230, 94 Am. D. 445 ; Hutch­
ins v. Brackett, 22 N. H. 252, 53 
Am. D. 248 ; [-] Foster v. Metts, 
55 Miss. 77, 30 Am. R. 504 ; Central 
Railroad & Banking Co. v. Lampley, 
76 Ala. 357, 52 Am. R. 334. 
§ 380. Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. 
Ray. 646 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 
Grat. (Va. ) 230, 94 Am. D. 445 ; 
Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rieb. L. (S. 
C. ) 146, 53 Am. D. 727 ; [-] Fos­
ter v. Metts, 55 Miss. 77, 30 Am. R. 
504 ; Keenan v.  Southworth, 110 
Mass. 474, 14 Am. R. 613 ;  Raisler 
v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710, 12 So. R. 
238, 38 Am. St. R. 213. 
§ 381. [-] Mentzer v. West­
ern Union Telegraph Co., 93 Iowa 
752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 
294. 
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ganized to serve the public by furnishing an apparatus for
conveying intelligence to a distance by means of electricity
stand in practically the same relation to the public and are
subject to almost the same regulations in performing their
quasi-public functions. However the manner of conveying
intelligence by telephone differs from that by telegraph so
far that in many respects their liabilities differ in kind
though not in amount. It serves the present purpose there-
fore to first consider the telegraph company, and then give
attention to telephone companies in so far as they call for
separate mention.
1. Nature of the Relation.
§382. Public cal1ing.—Te1egraph companies exercise a
public employment; they are chartered for a public purpose,
are granted extraordinary powers including that of eminent
domain; they offer their skill and peculiar facilities to all who
have occasion to use them; in consequence of these extraor-
dinary privileges and this public holding out they owe the
public and those who employ them important services which
can not be ignored or avoided. They stand in the position
of those engaged in public callings.
§383. Not common carriers.—In some early cases they
were called common carriers of news, and in several states
they are now by statute declared to be common carriers. But
apart from statute they are at present nowhere regarded as
§382. Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 7
Sup. Ct. 1126; [—] Telegraph
Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301,
41 Am. R. 500; [—] True v. In-
ternational Telegraph Co., 60 Me.
9, 11 Am. R. 156; Gray v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 87 Ga. 350,
13 S. E. R. 562, 27 Am. St. R. 259;
Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph
C0., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am. R. 38; Smith
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 83
Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 126;
[—] Ayer v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. R.
495, 1 Am. St. R. 353; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Neill, 57
Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589;
[—] Webbe v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R.
670, 61 Am. St. R. 207.
§383. Parks v. Alta California
Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 423, 73 Am.
D. 589. (Compare Hart v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 66 Cal.
579, 6 Pac. R. 637, 56 Am. R. 119.)
Kirby v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 4 S. Dak. 105, 55 N. W. R. 759,
46 Am. St. R. 765; Pacific Tele-
graph Co. v. Underwood, 37 Neb.
315, 55 N. VV. R. 1057, 40 Am. St. R.
490; State v. Citizens’ Telephone
Co., 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. R. 257,

















































































































































OF 'tELEGnAPlt COMPANIES. § §  382-383 
ganized to serve the public by furnishing an apparatus for 
conveying intelligence to a distance by means of electricity 
stand in practically the same relation to the public and are 
imbject to almost the same regulations in performing their 
quasi-public functions. However the manner of conveying 
intelligence by telephone differs from that by telegraph so 
far that in many respects their liabilities differ in kind 
though not in amount. It serves the present purpose there­
fore to first consider the telegraph company, and then give 
attention to telephone companies in so far as they call for 
separate mention. 
1. Nature of the Relation. 
§ 382. Public calling.-Telegraph companies exercise a 
public employment ; they are chartered for a public purpose, 
are granted extraordinary powers including that of eminent 
domain ; they offer theiw skill and peculiar facilities to all who 
have occasion to use them ; in consequence of these extraor­
dinary privileges and this public holding out they owe the 
public and those who employ them important services which 
can not be ignored or avoided. They stand in the position 
of those engaged in public callings. 
§ 383. Not common ca.rriers.-In some early cases they 
were called common carriers of news, and in several states 
they are now by statute declared to be common carriers. But 
apart from statute they are at present nowhere regarded as 
§ 382. Western Union Telegraph Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589 ; 
Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 7 [-] Wehbe v. Western Union Tele­
Sup. Ct. 1126 ; (-1 Telegraph graph Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 
Co. v .  Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301, 670, 61 Am. St. R.  207. 
41 Am. R. 500 ; [-] True v. In- § 383. Parks v. Alta California 
ternational Telegraph Co., 60 Me. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 423, 73 Am . 
9, 11 Am. R. 156 ; Gray v. Western D. 589. ( Compare Hart v. West­
Union Telegraph Co., 87 Ga. 350, ern Union Telegraph Co., 66 Cal. 
13 S. E. R. 562, 27 Am. St. R. 259 ; 579, 6 Pac. R. 637, 56 Am. R. 119. ) 
Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph Kirby v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am . R. 38 ; Smith Co., 4 S. Dak. 105, 55 N. W. R. 759, 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 83 46 Am. St. R. 765 ; Pacific Tele­
Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 126 ; graph Co. v. Underwood, 37 Neb. 
[-] Ayer v. Western Union Tele- 315, 55 N. W. R. 1057, 40 Am. St. R. 
graph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. R. 490 ; State v. Citizens ' Telephone 
495, 1 Am. St. R. 353 ; Western Co., 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. R. 257, 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Neill, 57 85 Am. St. R. 870 ; Leonard v, New 
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common carriers to the extent that they are insurers against
mistakes in transmitting messages. The instrumentalities by
which they perform their service are subject to danger from
accident, atmospheric conditions and the malice of strangers;
and they have no such immediate custody- of the message as the
common carrier has of the goods he carries.
They have in other cases been spoken of as bailees for hire
bound to exercise ordinary care. But they receive nothing
tangible to carry, and as will appear are held to more than
ordinary care.
§384. Are quasi-ba.i1ees.—But the nature of their under-
taking is closely analogous to that of common carriers. The
one transports to a distance the contents of a letter, the other
transports a package, and both perform the service in the
exercise of a public calling. Though their duties difier yet
their profession, liability and legal status are practically the
same as those of carriers of passengers.
It is natural therefore that most of the rules of law gov-
erning telegraph companies should be adaptations of the law
of carriers already noticed. But the law of electricity is of
such recent growth and the likenesses and difierences of com-
mon carriers and telegraph companies have been so variously
emphasized in different jurisdictions, that on many points
York etc. Telegraph Co. 41 N. Y.
544, 1 Am. R. 446; [—] Grinnell v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 113
Mass. 299, 18 Am. R. 485; [—] Ment-
zer v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am.
St. R. 294; Smith v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am.
St. R. 126; Birney v. New York
etc. Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 341, 81
Am. D. 607; [—] True v. Interna-
tional Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11
Am. R. 156; Tyler v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am.
R. 38; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 46 Am. R.
715; Reed v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R.
904, 58 Am. St. R. 609; [—] Tele-
graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St.
301, 41 Am. R. 500.
- §384. Gillis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 461, 17 Atl.
R. 736, 15 Am. St. R. 917; [—] Tel-
egraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio
St. 301, 41 Am. R. 500; Express Co.
v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 264;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 46 Am. R.
715; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Call Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62 N. W.
R. 506, 48 Am. St. R. 729;
[—] True v. International Tele-
graph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. R. 156;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589;
Smith v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 126;
[—] Mentzer v. Western Union Tel-
egraph Co., 93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. R.

















































































































































§ 384 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
common carriers to the extent that they are insurers against 
mistakes in transmitting messages. The instrumentalities by 
which they perform their service are subj ect to danger from 
accident, atmospheric conditions and the malice of strangers ; 
and they have no such immediate custody of the message as the 
common carrier has of the goods he carries. 
They have in other cases been spoken of as bailees for hire 
bound to exercise ordinary care. But they receive nothing 
tangible to carry, and as will appear are held to more than 
ordinary care. 
§ 384. Are qua.si-bailees.-But the nature of their nnder­
taking is closely analogous to that of common carriers. The 
one transports to a distance the contents 'Jf a letter, the other 
transports a package, and both perform the service in the 
exercise of a public calling. Though their duties differ yet 
their profession, liability and legal status are practically the 
same as those of carriers of passengers. 
It is natural therefore that most of the rules of law gov­
erning telegraph companies should be adaptations of the law 
of carriers already noticed. But the law of electricity is of 
such recent growth and the likenesses and differences of com­
mon carriers and telegraph companies havt:> been so variously 
emphasized in different jurisdictions, that on many points 
York etc. Telegraph Co. 41 N. Y. 
544, 1 Am. R. 446 ; [ -] Grinnell v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 
Mass. 299, 18 Am. R. 485 ; [-] Ment­
zer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am . 
St. R. 294 ; Smith v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. 
St. R. 126 ; Birney v. New York 
etc. Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 341, 81 
Am. D.  607 ; [ -] True v .  Interna­
tional Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 
Am . R. 156 ; Tyler v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am. 
R. 38 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 46 Am. R. 
715 ; Reed v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R. 
904, 58 Am. St. R. 609 ; [ -] Tele­
graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 
301, 41 Am. B. 500. 
§ 384. Gillis v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 461, 17 Atl. 
R. 736, 15 Am. St. R. 917 ; {-] Tel­
egraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio 
St. 301, 41 Am. R. 500 ; Express Co. 
v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. (U. S. ) 264 ; 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Reynolds, 77 Va. 1 73, 46 Am. R. 
715 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Call Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62 N. W. 
R. 506, 48 Am. St. R. 729 ; 
[-] True v. International Tele­
graph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. R. 156 ; 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589 ; 
Smith v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 126 ; 
[-] Mentzer v. Western Union Tel­
egraph Co., 93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. R. 
1, 57 Am. St. R. 294. 
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decisions are in conflict, on others confusion reigns, and the
law of electricity as a whole may well be regarded as still in
process of formation.
2. The Rights and Duties of Telegraph. Companies as Carriers.
§385. The rights and duties of telegraph companies as
carriers may be conveniently considered under the following
heads :
(1) Right to compensation.
(2) Right to make reasonable rules and regulations.
(3) Duty to serve all indiscriminately.
(4) Duty to furnish facilities.
(5) Liability for mistakes in transmission.
(6) Liability for delay or failure to deliver.
§386. (1) Right to compensation.—As a matter of
course the telegraph company can not be compelled to per-
form its service without reasonable compensation and it may
demand payment before it undertakes the service, or by un-
dertaking without prepayment it may waive that right, and
then it cannot collect until the service has been performed.
The compensation may be graduated l§O.tll€ service rendered,
the rates having relation to the length of the message and the
distance it is carried, and more may be charged for day than
for night messages, for messages that are repeated to insure
correct transmission than for unrepeated messages.
§387. iDiscrimination.—But having devoted its prop-
erty to a public use the telgraph company must serve the
public impartially. It must, unless there be a reasonable
ground of discrimination, serve all persons alike upon their
§-386. Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Call Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62
N. W. R. 506, 48 Am. St. R. 729;
[—] Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, 54
S. W. R. 827, 92 Am. St. R. 366;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E.
R. 874, 54 Am. St. R. 515; Kirby
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
4 S. Dak. 105, 55 N. W. R. 759,
46 Am. St. R. 765; [—] Ayer v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 79
Me. 493, 10 Atl. R. 495, 1 Am. St.
R. 353.
§387. Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Call Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62 N.
W. R. 506, 48 Am. St. R. 729; Inter-
Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated
Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. R.
822, 75 Am. St. R. 184; Commercial
Union Telegraph Co. v. New Eng-
land Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61
Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 1071, 15 Am.
St. R. 893; [—] Leavell v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 116 N. C. 211,

















































































































































OF TELEGRAPlI COMPANIES. § §  385-387 
decisions are in conflict, on others confusion reigns, and the 
law of electricity as a whole may well be regarded as still in 
process of formation. 
2. The Rights and Duties of Telegraph Companies as Carriers. 
§ 385. The rights and duties of telegraph companies as 
carriers may be conveniently considered under the following 
heads : 
( 1 )  Right to compensation. 
(2 )  Right to  make reasonable rules and regulations. 
(3 ) Duty to serve all indiscriminately. 
( 4) Duty to furnish facilities. 
( 5 ) Liability for mistakes in transmission. 
( 6 )  Liability for delay o r  failure t o  deliver. 
§ 386. ( 1 )  Right to compensation.-As a matter of 
course the telegraph company can not be compelled to per­
form its service without reasonable compensation and it may 
demand payment before it undertakes the service, or by un­
dertaking without prepayment it may waive that right, and 
then it cannot collect until the service has been performed. 
The compensation may be graduated to
' 
the service rendered, 
the rates having relation to the length of the message and the 
distance it is carried, and more may be charged for day than 
for night messages, for messages that are repeated to insure 
correct tra;nsmission than for unrepeated messages. 
§ 387. --Discrimination.-But having devoted its prop­
erty to a public use the telgraph company must serve the 
public impartially. It must, unless there be a reasonable 
ground of discrimination, serve all persons alike upon their 
§ 386. Western Union Telegraph - Me. 493, 10 Atl. R. 495, 1 Am. St. 
Co. v. Call Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62 · R. 353. 
N. W. R. 506, 48 Am. St. R. 729 ; § 387. Western Union Telegraph 
[-] Western Union Telegraph Co. Co. v. Call Co., 44 Neb. 326, 62 N. 
v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, 54 W. R. 506, 48 Am. St. R. 729 ; Inter­
s. W. R. 827, 92 Am. St. R. 366 ; Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. R. 
Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E. 822, 75 Am. St. R. 184 ; Commercial 
R. 874, 54 Am. St. R. 515 ; Kirby Union Telegraph Co. v. New Eng­
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., land Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61 
4 S. Dak. 105, 55 N. W. R. 759, Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 1071, 15 Am. 
46 Am. St. R. 765 ; [-] Ayer v. St. R. 893 ; [ -] Leavell v. Western 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 79 Union Telegraph Co., 116 N. C. 211,  
2 1  S. E. R. 391, 47 Am. St. R. 798. 
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tender of equal pay for equal services and must not render to
one service at a less rate than to another where such dis-
crimination operates to the disadvantage of the other. By
the better opinion a discrimination based merely on the quan-
tity of business offered is unjust, tends to create a monopoly
and destroy competition, and is therefore contrary to public
policy. But it is not unjust discrimination to make a dif-
ference in rates based on the expense and difficulty of per-
forming the service.
§388. (2) Right to make rules and regulations.—“That
telegraph companies may make all proper and needful rules to
enable them with convenience and dispatch to do the business
of their customers is now unquestioned.” Such rules how-
ever by reason of the quasi-public character of telegraph com-
panies the law requires to be “reasonable in view of all the
circumstances, and of the nature of the business, its risks
and responsibilities, the necessity of securing to the public
a reasonable protection against neglect or fraud or want of due
care and effort, to perform punctually and correctly the acts
undertaken.” Not only must the rules be reasonable, but they
must be reasonably applied in every case. Of the reasonable-
ness of any rule the court and not the company is the judge.
§389. ——Notice of rules.—Regulations afiecting the
rights of the sender are not binding unless brought home to
his knowledge. His assent to mere regulations is not neces-
sary, though it is otherwise as to stipulations affecting his
§388. Bartlett v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209, 16 Am.
R. 437; [—] True v. International
Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. R.
156; [—] Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464,
54 S. W. R. 827, 92 Am. St. R. 366;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E.
R. 874, 54 Am. St. R. 515; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Reynolds,
77 Va. 173, 46 Am. R. 715; Tele-
phone Co. v. Brown, 104 Tenn. 56,
78 Am. St. R. 906.
§389. Breece v. United States
Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132, 8 Am.
R. 526; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 46 Am.
R. 715 ; Harris'v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 121 Ala. 519, 25
So. R. 910, 77 Am. St. R. 70; Ex-
press Company v. Caldwell, 21 Wall.
(U. S.) 264; Bartlett v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209,
16 Am. R. 437; [*—l Webbe v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 169
Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 670, 61 Am.
St. R. 207 and extended note; Hend-
ricks v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 1.26 N. C. 304, 78 Am. St. R.
658; Telephone Co. v. Brown, 104
Tenn. 56, 78 Am. St. R. 906; Hill
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,

















































































































































§ §  388-389 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
tender of equal pay for equal services and must not render to 
one service at a less rate than to another where such dis­
crimination operates to the disadvantage of the other. By 
the better opinion a discrimination based merely on the quan­
tity of business offered is unjust, tends to create a monopoly 
and destroy competition, and is therefore contrary to public 
policy. But it is not unjust discrimination to make a dif­
ference in rates based on the expense and difficulty of per­
forming the service. 
§ 388. ( 2 )  Right to ma.ke rules and regulations.-" That 
telegraph companies may make all proper and needful rules to 
enable them with convenience and dispatch to do the business 
of their customers is now unquestioned. ' '  Such rules how­
ever by reason of the quasi-public character of telegraph com­
panies the law requires to be " reasonable in view of all the 
circumstances, and of the nature of the business, its risks 
and responsibilities, the necessity of securing to the public 
a reasonable protection against neglect or fraud or want of due 
care and effort, to perform punctually and correctly the acts 
undertaken. "  Not only must the rules be reasonable, but they 
must be reasonably applied in every case. Of the reasonable­
ness of any rule the court and not the company is the judge. 
§ 389. --Notice of rules.-Regulations affecting the 
rights of the sender are not binding unless brought home to 
his knowledge. His assent to mere regulations is not neces­
sary, though it is otherwise as to stipulations affecting :&is 
§ 388. Bartlett v. Western Union Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 46 Am. 
Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209, 16 Am. R. 715 ; Harris · v. Western Union 
R. 437 ; [-] True v. International Telegraph Co., 121 Ala. 519, 25 
Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. R. So. R. 910, 77 Am. St. R. 70 ; Ex-
156 ; [-] Western Union Telegraph press Company v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 
Co. v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, (U. S. ) 264 ; Bartlett v. Western 
54 S. W. R. 827, 92 Am. St. R. 366 ; Union Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209, 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 16 Am. R. 437 ; [-] Wehbe v. 
Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E. Western Union Telegraph Co., 169 
R. 8741 54 Am. St. R. 515 ; Western Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 670, 61 Am. 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Reynolds, St. R. 207 and extended note ; Hend-
77 Va. 173, 46 Am. R. 715 ; Tele- ricks v. Western Union Telegraph 
phone Co. v. Brown, 104 Tenn. 56, Co., 126 N. C. 304, 78 Am. St. R. 
78 Am. St. R. 906. 658 ; Telephone Co. v. Brown, 104 
§ 389. Breece v. United States Tenn. 56, 78 Am. St. R. 906 ; Hill 
Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132, 8 Am. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
R. 526 ; Western Union Telegraph 85 Ga. 425, 11 S. E. R. 874, 21 Am. 
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contract relations with the company. The same considerations
control the contract rights against the company of the sendee
of the message, but he is not hound in a tort action by regula-
tions assented to by the sender of which he had no notice.
These regulations are usually printed on blanks on which the
sender is required to write his message. A party using such
a blank assents to its terms so far as they are reasonable,
whether he knows them or not. An omission to inform him-
self of the rules with full opportunity to do so is his own
fault. But a rule made without notice, and not observed by
the company itself, can not avail, and if the company waives
its rules it can not plead them in defence.
§390. -—What regulations‘ are rea.sonab1e.—It is almost
universal to include among the rules printed on telegraph
blanks conditions under which the company undertakes to
perform the service. Such are the ofier of half rates for
night messages on condition that the company shall be freed
St. R. 166. As to the necessity of
knowledge compare the rule in
United States Telegraph Co. v. Gil-
dersleeve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. D.
519, with the general rule in Car-
land v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 118 Mich. 369, 76 N. W. R.
762, 74 Am. St. R. 394.
§390. The following are cases
illustrating regulations that have
been held valid: Breece v. United
States Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132,
8 Am. R. 526; Western Union»Tele-
graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173,
46 Am. R. 715; Birkett v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 103 Mich. 361,
61 N. W. R. 645, 50 Am. St. R. 374;
Hill v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 85 Ga. 425, 11 S. E. R. 874,
21 Am. St. R. 166; [—] Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Van Cleave,
107 Ky. 464, 54 S. W. R. 827, 92
Am. St. R. 366 ; Harris v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 121 Ala, 519,
25 So. R. 910, 77 Am. St. R. 70;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 So. R.
419, 18 Am. St. R. 148; McPeek v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 107
Iowa 356, 78 N. W. R. 63, 70 Am.
St. R. 205; Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St.
442, 18 Atl. R. 441, 15 Am. St. R.
687; Sweetland v. Illinois & Mis-
sissippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa 433,
1 Am. R. 285.
In the following cases regulations
have been held not binding on the
party suing the company: Bart-
lett v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 62 Me. 209, 16 Am. R. 437;
[—] Webbe v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R.
670, 61 Am. St. R. 207; [—] True
v. International Telegraph Co., 60
Me. 9, 11 Am. R. 156; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Moore, 12
Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E. R. 874,
54 Am. St. R. 515; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky.
591, 38 S. W. R. 1068, 66 Am. St.


















































































































































OF TELEGRAPlt COMPANIES. § 390 
contract relations with the company. The same considerations 
control the contract rights against the company of the sendee 
of the message, but he is not bound in a tort action by regula­
tions assented to by the sender of which he had no notice. 
These regulations are usually printed on blanks on which the 
sender is required to write his message. A party using such 
a blank assents to its terms so far as they are reasonable, 
whether he knows them or not. An omission to inform him­
self of the rules with full opportunity to do so is his own 
fault. But a rule made without notice, and not observed by 
the company itself, can not avail, and if the company waives 
its rules it can not plead them in defence. 
§ 390. --What regulations· are reasonable.-It is almost 
universal to include among the rules printed on telegraph 
blanks conditions under which the company undertakes to 
perform the service. Such are the offer of half rates for 
night messages on condition that the company shall be freed 
St. R. 166. As to the neceB!lity of 
knowledge compare the rule in 
United States Telegraph Co. v. Gil· 
dersleeve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. D. 
519, with the general rule in Car· 
land v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 118 Mich. 369, 76 N. W. R. 
762, 74 Am. St. R. 394. 
§ 390. The following are cases 
i1lustrating regulations that have 
been held valid : Breece v. United 
States Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132, 
8 Am. R. 526 ; Western Union Tele­
graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 
46 Am. R. 715 ; Birkett v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 103 Mich. 361, 
61 N. W. R. 645, 50 Am. St. R. 374 ; 
Hill v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 85 Ga. 425, 11 S. E. R. 874, 
21 Am. St. R. 166 ; [-] Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Van Cleave, 
107 Ky. 464, 54 S. W. R. 827, 92 
Am. St. R. 366 ; Harris v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 121 Ala, 519, 
25 So. R. 9101 77 Am. St. R. 70 ; 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 So. R. 
419, 18 Am. St. R. 148 ; McPeek v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 
Iowa 356, 78 N. W. R. 63, 70 Am. 
St. R. 205 ; Western Union Tele­
graph Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St. 
442, 18 Atl. R. 441, 15 Am. St. R. 
687 ; Sweetland v. 111inois & Mis­
sissippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa 433, 
1 Am. R. 285. 
In the following cases regulations 
have been held not binding on the 
party suing the company : Bart­
lett v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 62 Me. 209, 16 Am. R. 437 ; 
[-] Wehbe v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 169 111. 610, 48 N. E. R. 
670, 61 Am. St. R. 207 ; [ -] True 
v. International Telegraph Co., 60 
Me. 9, 11 Am. R. 156 ; Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Moore, 12  
Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E. R.  874, 
54 Am. St. R. 515 ; Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 
591, 38 S. W. R. 10681 66 Am. St. 
R. 361. See also note to 92 Am. St. 
R. 372. 
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from liability for negligence as to transmission or delivery
of the message; a requirement that all claims be presented in
writing within sixty days; that messages whose accuracy in
transmission is to be guaranteed shall be repeated at an
additional charge of one-half the regular rate; that an extra
charge shall be paid for delivery outside the free delivery
limits. Rules as to hours of business and conduct of the
office are proper, if reasonable in view of the public nature
of the business.
In passing upon the reasonableness of regulations the courts
are in hopeless conflict. By the weight of authority it is rea-
sonable to require claims to be filed in writing within sixty
days, but it is unreasonable to refuse responsibility for unre-
peated messages.
§391. (3) Duty to serve all impa.rtial1y.—It is the duty
of telegraph companies to transmit messages for individuals
and corporations faithfully and impartially in the order in
which they are offered for transmission. All customers must
be treated with the same consideration. The telegraph and
the telephone are “public vehicles of intelligence, and they
who own and control them can no more refuse to perform
impartially the functions that they have assumed to dis-
charge than a railway company as a common carrier can
rightfully refuse to perform its duty to the public. They have
no power to discriminate and while offering to serve some
refuse to serve others.”
Neither can they refuse to receive a dispatch which is free
from indecency and improper language on account of its
subject matter, unless to send it might subject the company
to civil or criminal liability. To refuse such a dispatch is
not a wrong resting on contract, but it grows out of the duty
§391. Chesapeake etc. Telephone
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph
Co., 66 Md. 399, 7 Atl. R. 809,
59 Am. R. 167; Commercial Union
Telegraph Co. v. New England Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 241,
17 Atl. R. 1071, 15 Am. St. R. 893;
[—] Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37
Ohio St. 301, 41 Am. R. 500; West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Dubois,
128 Ill. 248, 21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am.
St. R. 109; Tyler v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am.
R. 38; Gray v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 87 Ga. 350, 13 S. E. R.
562, 27 Am. St. R. 259; [—] Lea-
vell v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 116 N. G. 211, 21 S. E. R. 391,
47 Am. St. R. 798; [—] Mentzer
v. Western Union Telegraph Col,


















































































































































§ 391 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
from liability for negligence as to transmission or delivery 
of the message ; a requirement that all claims be presented in 
writing within sixty days ; that messages whose accuracy in 
transmission is to be guaranteed shall be repeated at an 
additional charge of one-half the regular rate ; that an extra 
charge shall be paid for delivery outside the free delivery 
limits. Rules as to hours of business and conduct of the 
office are proper, if reasonable in view of the public nature 
of the business. 
In passing upon the reasonableness of regulations the courts 
are in hopeless conflict. By the weight of authority it is rea­
sonable to require claims to be filed in writing within sixty 
days, but it is unreasonable to refuse responsibility for unre­
peated messages. 
§ 391. (3)  Duty to serve aJ1 imparti&lly.-It is the duty 
of telegraph companies to transmit messages for individuals 
and corporations faithfully and impartially in the order in 
which they are offered for transmission. All customers must 
be treated with the same consideration. The telegraph and 
the telephone are ' ' public vehicles of intelligence, and they 
who own and control them can no more refuse to perform 
impartially the functions that they have assumed to dis­
charge than a railway company as a common carrier can 
rightfully refuse to perform its duty to the public. They have 
no power to discriminate and while offering to serve some 
refuse to serve others. ' '  
Neither can they refuse to receive a dispatch which is free 
from indecency and improper language on account of its 
subject matter, unless to send it might subj ect the company 
to civil or criminal liability. To refuse such a dispatch is 
not a wrong resting on contract, but it grows out of the duty 
§ 391. Chesapeake etc. Telephone St. R. 109 ; Tyler v. Western Union 
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am. 
Co., 66 Md. 399, 7 Atl. R. 809, R. 38 ; Gray v. Western Union Tele-
59 Am. R. 167 ; Commercial Union graph Co., 87 Ga. 350, 13 S. E. R. 
Telegraph Co. v. New England Tele- 562, 27 Am. St. R. 259 ; [-] Lea­
phone & Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 241, veil v. Western Union Telegraph 
17 At1. R. 1071, 15 Am. St. R. 893 ; Co., 116 N. C. 211, 21 S. E. R. 391, 
[-] Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 47 Am. St. R. 798 ; [-] Mentzer 
Ohio St. 301, 41 Am. R. 500 ; West- v. Western Union Telegraph Co·., 
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Dubois, 93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. 
128 Ill. 248, 21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am. St. R. 294. 
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owed by a public service corporation to render service to all
indiscriminately.
§392. (4) Duty to provide adequate faci1ities.—Another
consequence of the public employment of the telegraph com-
pany is its duty to provide facilities adequately to serve the
public. It is-the duty of the company to maintain wires and
operators enough to transact all the business offered it, for
all the points at which it has offices, but it can not be required
to furnish greater facilities than the volume of business rea-
sonably to be expected at any oflice justly demands.
It is also bound to have suitable instruments and skilled
operators and servants who will render the service with that
degree of diligence and skill which the peculiar nature of the
undertaking requires. For any failure due to defective in-
struments or unskillful operators the company is responsible
as it is for the acts of servants who are negligent or unfaith-
ful while in the course of their employment.
§393. (5) Liability for mistakes in transmission.—The
most important consequence of the peculiar.nature of the
profession and undertaking of the telegraph company and
of the intimate dependence of the public upon the proper
fulfillment of its functions as
§392. [—] Leavell v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 116 N. C. 211,
21 S. E. R. 391, 47 Am. St. R. 798;
Birkett v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 103 Mich. 361, 61 N. W. R.
645, 50 Am. st. R. 374; [—] West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Van
Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, 54 S. W. R.
827, 92 Am. St. R. 366; Tyler v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 60
Ill. 421, 14 Am. R. 38; Fowler v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 80
Me. 381, 15 Atl. R. 29, 6 Am. St. R.
211; Sweetland v. Illinois & Mis-
sissippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa 433,
1 Am. R. 285; McCord v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 39 Minn. 181,
39 N. W. R. 315, 12 Am. St. R.
636.
§393. Fowler v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 80 Me. 381, 15
a carrier of intelligence, often
Atl. R. 29, 6 Am. St. R. 211; Tyler
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 60
111. 421, 14 Am. R. 38; [-1 Tele-
graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St.
301, 41 Am. R. 500; Reed v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 135 Mo.
661, 37 S. W. R. 904, 58 Am. St. R.
609; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Chamblee, 122 Ala. 428, 25 S. R.
232, 82 Am. St. R. 89; [—] Webbe
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 670, 61
Am. St. R. 207; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky.
591, 38 S. W. R. 1068, 66 Am. St. R.
361; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589;
[—] Mentzer v. Western Union Tel-
egraph Co., 93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W.

















































































































































OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. § §  392-393 
owed by a public service corporation to render service to all 
indiscriminately. 
§ 392. ( 4) Duty to provide adequate facilities.-Another 
consequence of the public employment of the telegraph com­
pany is its duty to provide facilities adequately to serve the 
public. It is the duty of the company to maintain wires and 
operators enough to transact all the business offered it, for 
all the points at which it has offices, but it can not be required 
to furnish greater facilities than the volume of business rea­
sonably to be expected at any office justly demands. 
It is also bound to have suitable instruments and skilled 
operators and servants who will render the service with that 
degree of diligence and skill which the peculiar nature of the 
undertaking requires. For any failure due to defective in­
struments or unskillful operators the company is responsible 
as it is for the acts of servants who are negligent or unfaith­
ful while in the course of their employment. 
§ 393. ( 5) Liability for mistakes in transmission.-The 
most important consequence of the peculiar . nature of the 
profession and undertaking of the telegraph company and 
of the intimate dependence of the public upon the proper 
fulfillment of its functions as a carrier of intelligence, often 
§ 392. [-] Leavell v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 116 N. C. 211, 
21 S. E. R. 391, 47 Am. St. R. 798 ; 
Birkett v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 103 Mich. 361, 61 N. W. R. 
645, 50 Am. St. R. 374 ; [-] West­
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Van 
Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, 54 S. W. R. 
827, 92 Am. St. R. 366 ; Tyler v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 60 
Ill. 421, 14 Am. R. 38 ; Fowler v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 80 
Me. 381, 15 Atl. R. 29, 6 Am. St. R. 
211 ; Sweetland v. Illinois & Mis· 
sissippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa 433, 
1 Am. R. 285 ; McCord v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 39 Minn. 181, 
39 N. W. R. 315, 12 Am. St. R. 
636. 
§ 393. Fowler v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 80 Me. 381, 15  
Atl. R.  29, 6 Am. St. R.  211 ; Tyler 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 60 
Ill. 421, 14 Am. R. 38 ; [-i Tele­
graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 
301, 41 Am. R. 500 ; Reed v. West· 
ern Union Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 
661, 37 S. W. R. 904, 58 Am. St. R. 
609 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Chamblee, 122 Ala. 428, 25 S. R. 
232, 82 Am. St. R. 89 ; [ -] W ebbe 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 670, 61 
Am. St. R. 207 ; Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 
591, 38 S. W. R. 1068, 66 Am. St. R. 
361 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589 ; 
[-] Mentzer v. Western Union Tel­
egraph Co., 93 Ia. 752, 62 N. W. 
R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 294, 
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of vital importance to the sender and sendee, is that they are
held to a rigid accoimtability for the negligence of their agents
and employees.
They are not insurers of the safe and accurate transmission
and prompt delivery of messages received by them, but they
are bound to perform their service with a care and diligence
proportioned to their profession of special skill and commen-
surate with the importance of the trust reposed in them.
Any failure to exercise such care and skill is negligence for
which the carrier is liable, but no responsibility is assumed
for errors or imperfections arising from causes not within
their control and not capable of being guarded against.
§394. ——Limiting liability for negligence by contract.—
Conditions limiting the liability of the company if assented
to by the sender are universally upheld unless they excuse
from liability for negligence. But to allow the company by
§394. Gillis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 461, 17 Atl.
R. 736, 15 Am. St. R. 917;
[—] Ayer v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. R.
495, 1 Am. St. R. 353; Bartlett v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 62
Me. 209, 16 Am. R. 437; [—] Tele-
graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St.
301, 41 Am. R. 500; Express Com-
pany v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. (U. S.)
264; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 591, 38 S. W.
R. 1068, 66 Am. St. R. 361;
[—] Webbe v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R.
670, 61 Am. St. R. 207; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Blanchard,
68 Ga. 299, 45 Am. R. 480 and note;
Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Underwood,
37 Neb. 315, 55 N. W. R. 1057, 40
Am. St. R. 490; [-—] True v. Inter-
national Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9,
11 Am. R. 156; Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 230,
9 Am. R. 136; Smith v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104,
4 Am. St. R. 126; Manville v. West-
crn Union Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa
214, 18 Am. R. 8; Sweetland v.
lllinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co.,
27 Iowa 433, 1 Am. R. 285; Brown
v. Postal Telegraph Co., 111 N. C.
187, 16 S. E. R. 179, 32 Am. St. R.
793 (overruling 89 N. C. 334);
Reed v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R. 904,
58 Am. St. R. 609 (overruling 37
Mo. 472); Tyler v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am.
R. 38; Candee v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 34 VVis. 471, 17 Am.
R. 452; Western Union Telegraph
Jo. v. Tyler, 74 Ill. 168, 24 Am.
R. 279.
Contra: [—] Grinnell v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 113 Mass.
299, 18 Am. R. 485; Birkett v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 103
Mich. 361, 61 N. W. R. 645, 50 Am.
St. R. 374; Pearsall v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 124 N. Y. 256,
26 N. E. R. 534, 21 Am. St. R. 662;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589;
United States Telegraph Co. v. Gil-


















































































































































§ 394 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
of vital importance to the sender and sendee, is that they are 
held to a rigid accountability for the negligence of their agents 
and employees. 
They are not insurers of the safe and accurate transmission 
and prompt delivery of messages received by them, but they 
are bound to perform their service with a care and diligence 
proportioned to their profession of special skill and commen­
surate with the importance of the trust reposed in them. 
Any failure to exercise such care and skill is negligence for 
which the carrier is liable, but no responsibility is assumed 
for errors or imperfections arising from causes not within 
their control and not capable of being guarded against. 
§ 394. --Limiting liability for negligence by contract.­
Conditions limiting the liability of the company if assented 
to by the sender are universally upheld unless they excuse 
from liability for negligence. But to allow the company by 
§ 394. Gillis v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 461, 17 Atl. 
R. 736, 15 Am. St. R. 917 ; 
L-1 Ayer v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. R. 
495, 1 Am. St. R. 353 ; Bartlett v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 62 
Me. 209, 16 Am. R. 437 ; [-] Tele­
graph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 
301, 41 Am. R. 500 ; Express Com­
pany v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 
264 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Euba11ks, 100 Ky. 591, 38 S. W. 
R. 1068, 66 Am. St. R. 361 ; 
[-] Wehbe v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 
670, 61 Am. St. R. 207 ; Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Blanchard, 
68 Ga. 299, 45 Am. R. 480 and note ; 
Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Underwood, 
37 Neb. 315, 55 N. W. R. 1057, 40 
. Am. St. R. 490 ; [-] True v. Inter­
national Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 
11 Am. R. 156 ; Western Union Tele­
graph Co. v. Grahum, 1 Colo. 230, 
9 Am. R. 136 ; Smith v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 
4 Am. St. R. 126 ; Manville v. West­
ern Union Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa 
214, 18 Am. R. 8 ;  Sweetland v. 
lllinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 
27 Iowa 433, l Am. R. 285 ; Brown 
v. Postal Telegraph Co., 111 N. C. 
187, 16 S. E. R. 179, 32 Am. St. R. 
793 (overruling 89 N. C. 334) ; 
Reed v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. B. 904, 
58 Am. St. R. 609 (overruling 37 
Mo. 472 ) ; Tyler v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am. 
R. 38 ; Candee v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471 , 17 Am. 
R. 452 ; Western Union Telegraph 
Jo. v. Tyler, 74 Ill. 168, 24 Am. 
R. 279. 
Contra : [-] Grinnell v. West­
ern Union Telegraph Co., 113 Mass. 
299, 18 Am. R. 485 ; Birkett v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 103 
Mich. 361, 61 N. W. R. 645, 50 Am. 
St. R. 374 ; Pearsall v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 124 N. Y. 256, 
26 N. E. R. 534, 21 Am. St. R. 662 ; 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589 ; 
United States Telegraph Co. v. Gil­




stipulations on the message blank or other agreement with
the sender to escape this rigid liability for negligence is by
the weight of authority contrary to public policy, and such
stipulations demand unreasonable concessions and are void.
While the art of telegraphy was in its infancy and its appli-
ances were crude, many courts upheld stipulations against
liability for errors that have since overruled their earlier de-
cisions and laid down the more rigid rule. Regulations ex-
empting a carrier from liability for negligence are in some
cases held to be void for want of consideration. In some
states constitutional or statutory provisions forbid contracts
against the liability for negligence of telegraph companies.
Those states that permit a common carrier to contract
against negligence (§ 269), naturally extend the same privi-
lege to telegraph companies. But there are a number of states
which deny such immunity to common carriers, that have
nevertheless permitted telegraph companies to contract
against liability for negligence/\at least if the acts causing the
injury did not amount to gross negligence, wilful misconduct
or fraud.
The law of the telegraph is comparatively new, and is still
in process of formation. The present tendency is toward
applying the same principles in contracts against negligence
to carriers of intelligence as have been settled upon in the
case of common carriers of goods and of passengers, and it
is difficult to justify any distinction, though it is still main-
tained in a few states.
§395. (6) Liability for delay or failure to de1iver.—The
undertaking of the telegraph company is not only to transmit
with reasonable care and dispatch but to deliver the message
to the sendee without neglect or unnecessary delay. No dis-
§395. Barnes v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 24 Nev. 125, 50 Pac.
R. 438, 77 Am. st. R. 791;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 39
N. E. R. 874, 54 Am. St. R.
515 ; [—] Harkness v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 73 Ia. 190,
34 N. W. R. 811, 5 Am. St. R. 672;
Smith v. Western Union Telegraph
(‘o., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 126;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Eubanks, 100 Ky. 591, 38 S. W. R.
1068, 66 Am. St. R. 361; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Broesche,
72 Tex. 654, 10 S. W. R. 734, 13
Am. St. R. 843; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala.
510, 7 So. R. 419, 18 Am. St.
R. 148; Francis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59


















































































































































OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. § 39ti 
stipulittions on the message blank or other agreement with 
the sender to escape this rigid liability for negligence is by 
the weight of authority contrary to public policy, and such 
stipulations demand unreasonable concessions and are void. 
While the art of telegraphy was in its infancy and its appli­
ances were crude, many courts upheld stipulations against 
liability for errors that have since overruled their earlier de­
cisions and laid down the more rigid rule. Regulations ex­
empting a carrier from liability for negligence are in some 
cases held to be void for want of consideration. In some 
states constitutional or statutory provisions forbid contracts 
against the liability for negligence of telegraph companies. 
Those states that permit a common carrier to contract 
against negligence ( §  269 ) ,  naturally extend the same privi­
lege to telegraph companies. But there are a number of states 
which deny such immunity to common carriers, that have 
nevertheless permitted telegraph companies to contract 
against liability for negligencel\at least if the acts causing the 
injury did not amount to gross negligence, wilful misconduct 
or fraud. 
'l'he law of the telegraph is comparatively new, and is still 
in process of formation. The present tendency is toward 
applying the same principles in contracts against negligence 
to carriers of intelligence as have been settled upon in the 
case of common carriers of goods and of passengers, and it 
is difficult to justify any distinction, though it is still main­
tained in a few states. 
§ 395. ( 6 )  Liability for delay or failure to deliver.-The 
undertaking of the telegraph company is not only to transmit 
with reasonable care and dispatch but to deliver the message 
to the sendee without neglect or unnecessary delay. No dis-
§ 395. Barnes v. Western Union Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Telegraph Co., 24 Nev. 125, 50 Pac. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 591, 38 S. W. R. 
R. 438, 77 Am. St. R. 791 ; 1068, 66 Am. St. R. 361 ; Western 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Union Telegraph Co. v. Broesche, 
Moore, 12 Ind. App. 136, 39 72 Tex. 654, 10 S. W. R. 734, 13 
N. E. R. 874, 54 Am. St. R. Am. St. R. 843 ; Western Union 
515 ; [-] Harkness v. Western Telegraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 
Union Telegraph Co., 73 Ia. 190, 510, 7 So. R. 419, 18 Am. St. 
34 N. W. R. 811, 5 Am. St. R. 672 ; R. 148 ; Francis v. Western Union 
Smith v. Western Union Telegraph Telegraph Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 
Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. R. 126 ; N. W. R. 1078, 49 Am. St. R. 507. 
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tinction is to be drawn between the duty to receive and trans-
mit and that to promptly deliver the message when trans-
mitted. As speed is a first consideration in communicating
by telegraph it results naturally that any negligence in
prompt service should be regarded as a serious default.
Though stipulations against liability for errors in unre-
peated messages have been upheld in some of the states, it is
universally conceded that such exemptions are no defence
against delay or failure to deliver an unrepeated message
unless the cause of the delay would have been removed by a
repetition. Those courts that deny the right to stipulate
against negligence in transmitting also deny the right of
exemption from liability for negligent delay.
3. Termination of the Relation.
§396. Delivery where.—The relation is ordinarily ter-
minated by delivery of the message. Within free delivery
limits delivery should be made to the addressee in person
wherever by reasonable diligence he can be found. It is of
first importance that the message should be delivered to the
addressee and the place of delivery is of minor importance.
The place to which the message is directed is but a guide and
if the addressee can not be found at that address he should
be sought at his office or residence. In the case of impor-
tant telegrams it may be the duty of the messenger to seek him
on the street or elsewhere if there is reason to suppose he
can be found. In such a case failure to use reasonable efforts
to make personal delivery is negligence for which the com-
pany is liable.
If the company undertakes to transmit a message to one
outside the free delivery limits it must perform, but an extra
§396. Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Houghton, 82 Tex. 561, 17
S. W. R. 846, 27 Am. St. R. 918
a.nd note; McPeek v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 107 Iowa 356,
78 N. W. R. 63, 70 Am. St. R. 205;
Hendershot v. Western Union Tel-
egraph Co., 106 Ia. 529, 76 N. W.
R. 828, 68 Am. St. R. 313; com-
pare Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 So. R.
419, 18 Am. St. R. 148 with West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Moore,
12 Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E. R.
874, 54 Am. St. R. 515; see also
[—] Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Mitchell, 91 Tex. 454, 44 s. W.
R. 274, 66 Am. St. R. 906; West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Cooper,
71 Tex. 507, 9 S. W. R. 598, 10

















































































































































§ 396 OF QUASI-BAlLEES. 
tinction is to be drawn between the duty to receive and trans­
mit and that to promptly deliver the message when trans­
mitted. As speed is a first consideration in communicating 
by telegraph it results naturally that any negligence in 
prompt service should be regarded as a serious default. 
Though stipulations against liability for errors in unre­
peated messages have been upheld in some of the states, it is 
universally conceded that such exemptions are no defence 
against delay or failure to deliver an unrepeated message 
unless the cause of the delay would have been removed by a 
repetition. Those courts that deny the right to stipulate 
against negligence in transmitting also deny the right of 
exemption from liability for negligent delay. 
3. Terminat-ion of the Relation. 
§ 396. Delivery where.-The relation is ordinarily ter­
minated by delivery of the message. Within free delivery 
limits delivery should be made to the addressee in person 
wherever by reasonable diligence he can be found. It is of 
first importance that the message should be delivered to the 
addressee and the place of delivery is of minor importance. 
The place to which the message is directed is but a guide and 
if the addressee can not be found at that address he should 
be sought at his office or residence. In the case of impor­
tant telegrams it may be the duty of the messenger to seek him 
on the street or elsewhere if there is reason to suppose he 
can be found. In such a case failure to use reasonable efforts 
to make personal delivery is negligence for which the com­
pany is liable. 
If the company undertakes to transmit a message to one 
outside the free delivery limits it must perform, but an extra 
§ 396. Western Union Telegraph 
Co. v. Houghton, 82 Tex. 561, 1 7  
S. W. R. 846, 27 Am. St. R. 918 
and note ; McPeek v .  Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 107 Iowa 356, 
78 N. W. R. 63, 70 Am. St. R. 205 ; 
Hendershot v. Western Union Tel­
egraph Co., 106 Ia. 529, 76 N. W. 
R. 828, 68 Am. St. R. 313 ; com­
pare Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 1 So. R. 
419, 18 Am. St. R. 148 with West­
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Moore, 
12 Ind. App. 136, 39 N. E. R. 
87 4, 54 Am. St. R. 515 ; see also 
[-] Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Mitchell, 91 Tex. 454, 44 8. W. 
R. 274, 66 Am. St. R. 906 ; West­
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Cooper, 
71 Tex. 507, 9 S. W. R. 5981 10 
Am. St. R. 772. 
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charge may be made. Whether the burden of knowing
whether the sendee lives within such limits rests on the sender
or on the company is in dispute. If the sender fails to give
sufficient address his contributory negligence will prevent a
recovery by him for failure to deliver.
§ 397. Delivery to whom.—De1ivery to the person intended
is essential to the service by the company, is part of the con-
tract for transmission. An undelivered message is not trans-
mitted. In general the delivery should be personal but deliv-
ery to one in whose care the message is sent is sufficient, and
if the addressee is stopping at a hotel the hotel clerk is pre-
sumed to be his agent to receive the message. If the addressee
can 11ot be found the sender should if it is practicable be noti-
fied that the message can not be delivered.
§398. Delivery to connecting lines.—Telegraph lines have
so far consolidated that questions of liability as between con-
necting carriers are comparatively rare. Practically the same
considerations as to the duty to receive and liability for loss
that have been already noticed in discussing connecting car-
riers of goods (§ 290 and the following) are recognized in the
case of connecting telegraph lines.
Telephone Companies.
§399. Telegraph and telephone companies alike occupy a
quasi-public position and for many purposes the word “tele-
graph” in a law has been held to include “telephone,” and
§397. [—] Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Mitchell, 91 Tex.
454, 44 s. W. R. 274, 66 Am. st.
R. 906; Westem Union Telegraph
Co. v. Houghton, 82 Tex. 561, 17
S. W. R. 846, 27 Am. St. R. 918,
note; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Young, 77 Tex. 245, 13 S. W. R.
985, 19 Am. St. R. 751; Laudie v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 126
N. C. 431, 35 S. E. R. 810, 78 Am.
St. R. 668; Hendricks v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 126 N. C. 304,
35 S. E. R. 543, 78 Am. St. R. 658.
§398. Smith v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 84 Tex. 359, 19 S.
W. R. 441, 31 Am. St. R. 59 and
note and cases cited; Telephone Co.
v. Brown, 104 Tenn. 56, 78 Am. St.
R. 906.
§399. [—] Central Union Tel-
ephone Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind. 194,
20 N. E. R. 145, 10 Am. st. R. 114,
and extended note; State v. Citi-
zens’ Telephone Co., 61 S. C. 83,
39 S. E. R. 257, 85 Am. St. R. 870;
Hudson River Telephone Co. v.
Watervliet etc. Railway Co., 135
N. Y. 393, 32 N. E. R. 148, 31 Am.
St. R. 838; San Antonio etc. Rail-
way Co. v. South Western Tele-
graph & Telephone Co., 93 Tex.


















































































































































OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES. § §  397-399 
charge may be made. Whether the burden of knowing 
whether the sen.dee lives within such limits rests on the sender 
or on the company is in dispute. If the sender fails to give 
sufficient address his contributory negligence will prevent a 
recovery by him for failure to deliver. 
§ 397. Delivery to whom.-Delivery to the person intended 
is essential to the service by the company, is part of the con­
tract for transmission. An undelivered message is not trans­
mitted. In general the delivery should be personal but deliv­
ery to one in whose care the message is sent is sufficient, and 
if the addressee is stopping at a hotel the hotel clerk is pre­
sumed to be his agent to receive the message. If the addressee 
can not be found the sender should if it is practicable be noti­
fied that the message can not be delivered. 
§ 398. Delivery to connecting lines.-Telegraph lines have 
so far consolidated that questions of liability as between con­
necting carriers are comparatively rare. Practically the same 
considerations as to the duty to receive and liability for loss 
that have been already noticed in discussing connecting car­
riers of goods ( § 290 and the following) are recognized in the 
case of connecting telegraph lines. 
Telephone Companies. 
§ 399. Telegraph a.nd telephone companies alike occupy a 
quasi-public position and for many purposes the word " tel�­
graph ' '  in a law has been held to include ' ' telephone, ' '  and 
§ 397. [-] Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Mitchell, 91 Tex. 
454, 44 S. W. R. 274, 66 Am. St. 
R. 906 ; Western Union Telegraph 
Co. v. Houghton, 82 Tex. 561, 17 
S. W. R. 846, 27 Am. S�. B. 9181 
note ; Western u nion Telegraph Co. 
v. Young, 77 Tex. 245, 13 S. W. R. 
985, 19 Am. St. R. 751 ; Laudie v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 126 
N. C. 431, 35 S. E. R. 810, 78 Am. 
St. R. 668 ; Hendrick!! v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 126 N. C. 304, 
35 S. E. R. 543, 78 Am. St. R. 658. 
I 398. Smith v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 84 Tex. 359, 19 S. 
W. R. 441, 31 Am. St. R. 59 and 
1 :.!  
note and cases cited ; Telephone Co. 
v. Brown, 104 Tenn. 56, 78 Am. St. 
R. 906. 
§ 399. [-] Central Union Tel­
ephone Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind. 194, 
20 N. E. B. 1451 10 Am. St. R. 114, 
and extended note ; State v. Citi­
zens ' Telephone Co., 61 S. C. 83, 
39 S. E. R. 257, 85 Am. St. R. 870 ; 
Hudson River Telephone Co. v. 
Watervliet etc. Railway Co., 135 
N. Y. 393, 32 N. E. R. 148, 31 Am. 
St. R. 838 ; San Antonio etc. Rail­
way Co. v. South Western Tele­
graph & Telephone Co., 93 Tex. 
3 1 3, 55 S. W. R. 117, 77 Am. St. 
R. 884. 
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“telegram” to include a “telephone message.” Telegraph
law is therefore equally the law of the telephone, except in so
far as the difference in the nature of the services rendered
and in the manner of rendering them necessitates a difference.
Even in such matters, the applications rather than the founda-
tion principles differ.
§ 400. Not a common carrier.—The telephone has often
been referred to as a common carrier of news, but such expres-
sions must be understood to mean no more than it is a common
carrier, just as a telegraph company is a common carrier, in
that it is engaged in carrying news as a public calling, but
not in that it is an insurer of its service.
§ 401. Duty to serve all impartially.—As the telephone has
been devoted to a public use, it has become charged with a
public interest and must submit to public control for the com-
mon good. It is bound to serve the public indiscriminately
and can not serve one and refuse another. One discriminated
against may by mandamus compel the company to furnish
him service like that furnished to others.
§ 402. Patent subject to public control.—The right to serve
and refuse service at the will of the company has been urged
upon the ground that the telephone is a patent under the
§400. State v. Citizens’ Tele-
phone Co., 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. R.
257, 85 Am. St. R. 870; Hockett v.
State,-105 Ind. 250, 5 N. E. R. 178,
55 Am. B. 201; [—] Central Union
Telephone Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind.
194, 20 N. E. R. 145, 10 Am. St.
R. 114; State v. Nebraska Tele-
phone Co., 17 Neb. 126, 22 N. W.
R. 237, 52 Am. R. 404; Commer-
cial Union Telegraph Co. v. New
England Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 61 Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 1071,
15 Am. St. R. 893.
§401. [—-] Central Union "Tel-
ephone Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind. 194,
20 N. E. R. 145, 10 Am. St. R.
114; Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel-
egraph Co., 66 Md. 399, 7 Atl. R.
809, 59 Am. R. 167; State v. Ne-
braska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126,
22 N. W. R. 237, 52 Am. R. 404;
State v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St.
296, 38 Am. R. 583; Commercial
Union Telegraph Co. v. New Eng-
land Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61
Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 1071, 15 Am. St.
R. 893; State v. Citizens’ Tele-
phone Co., 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. R.
257, 85 Am. St. R. 870.
§402. State v. Telephone Co., 36
Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. R. 583; Hock-
ett v. State, 105 Ind. 250, 5 N. E.
R. 178, 55 Am. R. 201; Chesapeake
& Potomac Telephone Co. v. Balti-
more & Ohio Telegraph Co., 66 Md.
399, 7 Atl. R. 809, 59 Am. R. 167;
Commercial Union Telegraph Co. v.
New England Telephone &; Tele-
graph Co., 61 Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R.

















































































































































§ §  400-402 OF QUASI-BAILEES. 
' ' telegram ' '  to include a ' ' telephone message. ' '  Telegraph 
law is therefore equally the law of the telephone, except in ;o 
far as the difference in the nature of the services rendered 
and in the manner of rendering them necessitates a difference. 
Even in such matters, the applications rather than the founda­
tion principles differ. 
§ 400. Not a common carrier.-The telephone has often 
been referred to as a common carrier of news, but such expres­
sions must be understood to mean no more than it is a common 
catrier, just as a telegraph company is a common carrier, in 
that it is engaged in carrying news as a public calling, but 
not in that it is an insurer of its service. 
§ 401. Duty to serve all impartially.-As the telephone has 
been devoted to a public use, it has become charged with a 
public interest and must submit to public control for the com­
mon good. It is bound to serve the public indiscriminately 
and can not serve one and refuse another. One discriminated 
against may by mandamus compel the company to furnish 
him service like that furnished to others. 
§ 402. Patent subject to public control.-The right to serve 
and refuse service at the will of the company has been urged 
upon the ground that the telephone is a patent under the 
§ 400. State v. Citizens ' Tele­
phone Co., 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. R. 
257, 85 Am. St. R. 870 ; Hockett v. 
State, . 105 Ind. 250, 5 N. E. R. 178, 
55 Am. R. 201 ; [-] Central Union 
Telephone Co. v. Falley, 1 1 8  Ind. 
194, 20 N. E. R. 145, 10 Am. St. 
R. 114 ; State v. Nebraska Tele­
phone Co., 17 Neb. 126, 22 N. W. 
R. 237, 52 Am. R. 404 ; Commer­
cial Union Telegraph Co. v. New 
England Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 61 Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 1071, 
1 5  Am. St. R. 893. 
§ 401 . [-] Central Union ·Tel­
rphonc Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind. 194, 
20 N. E. R. 145, 10 Am. St. R. 
1 14 ;  Chesapeake & Potomac Tele· 
phone Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel­
egraph Co., 66 Md. 399, 7 Atl. R. 
809, 59 Am. R. 167 ; State v. Ne-
braska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126, 
22 N. W. R. 237, 52 Am. R. 404 ; 
State v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 
296, 38 Am. R. 583 ; Commercial 
Union Telegraph Co. v. New Eng­
land Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61 
Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 1071, 15 Am. St. 
R. 893 ; State v. Citizens ' Tele­
phone Co., 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. R. 
257, 85 Am. St. R. 870. 
§ 402. State v. Telephone Co., 36 
Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. R. 583 ; Hock­
ett v. State, 105 Ind. 250, 5 N. E. 
R. 178, 55 Am. R. 201 ; Chesapeake 
& Potomac Telephone Co. v. Balti­
more & Ohio Telegraph Co., 66 Md. 
399, 7 Atl. R. 809, 59 Am. R. 167 ; 
Commercial Union Telegraph Co. v. 
New England Telephone & Tele­
graph Co., 61 Vt. 241, 17 Atl. R. 
1071 , 15 Am. St.  R. 893. 
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control of the patentee. That is true in so far that it pre-
vents others from using his invention without his consent,
but when his use of his invention requires public patronage
and state aid, as in the use of the right of eminent domain,
then the patent becomes impressed with the public use and
interest and subject to reasonable public control for the pub-
lic good.
§403. Right to regulate cha.rges.—It is another result of
the public calling of the telephone company that the charges
for its service are subject to legislative control in fixing a
reasonable maximum rate, as is permitted in the case of all
property charged with a public use, and the company can not
evade such regulation by making separate charges for the
various pieces of the transmitting and receiving instruments.
§403. Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 113; [—] Central Union Telephone
250, 5 N. E. R. 178, 55 Am. R. Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind. 194, 20

















































































































































OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES. § 403 
control of the patentee. That is true in so far that it pre­
vents others from using his invention without his consent, 
but when his use of his invention requires public patronage 
and state aid, as in the use of the right of eminent domain, 
then the patent becomes impressed with the public use and­
interest and subject to reasonable public control for the pub­
lic good. 
§ 403. Right to regulate cha.rges.-It is another result of 
the public calling of the telephone company that the charges 
for its service are subject to legislative control in fixing a 
reasonable maximum rate, as is permitted in the case of all 
property charged with a public use, and the company can not 
evade such regulation by making separate charges for the 
various pieces of the transmitting and receiving instruments. 
§ 403. Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 
250, 5 N. E. R. 178, 55 Am. R. 
201 ; [ -] Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 
113 ; [-] Central Union Telephone 
Co. v. Falley, 118 Ind. 194, 20 






















OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS.
i.i..i-
CHAPTER XVI.
THE ACTION AND THE DAMAGES.
Classification.
A. Actions against common
carriers of goods.
1. The parties to the action.
The proper party plaintiflf.
Contract action.













For injury or loss.
Proximate cause.
The measure of damages.
——Value how determined.
For default in carrying.
——Expected profits.




2. The form of the action.
The choice of action.






















Compensation for the in-
jury.
Damages for wrongful ejec-
tion.
Damages for mental suifer-
- ing and fright alone.
Exemplary damages.
C. Actions against carriers
of intelligence.
a. Carriers of mail.
No action maintainable.
b. Telegraph and Telephone
companies.
1. Parties to the action.
2. Form of action.
Contract or tort action.
An action on the contract.
A tort action.
3. The pleadings.





Duty to disclose importance
of message.
Damages for mental sufi'er-


















































































































































OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
CHAPTER XVI. 
THE ACTION AND THE DAMAGES. 
§ 404. Classification. 
.A.. Actwns against com11ion 
carriers of goo<la. 
1. The parties to the action. 
405. The proper party plaintift'. 
406. Contract action. 
407. ---Consignor agent of con· 
signee. 
408. Tort action. 
e. The actwn. 
409. The form of the action. 
410. Action ez delicto. 
411. Action ez contractu. 
412. Modem procedure. 
S. The pleadings. 
413. Show case or assumsit. 
4. The evidence. 
414. Burden of proof. 
5. The damages. 
415. For injury or loss. 
416. Proximate cause. 
417. The measure of damages. 
418. --Value how determined. 
419. For default in carrying. 
420. --Expected profit!!!. 
B. Actions against carriers 
of passengers. 
1. The parties. 
421. The injured party. 
fJ. The form of the action. 
422. The choice of action. 
. S. The pleadings. 
§ 423. Special damages specially 
pleaded . 
4. The evidence. 
424. Burden of proof. 






Compensation for the in· 
jury. 
Damages for wrongful ejec­
tion. 
Damages for mental suffer­
ing and fright alone. 
Exemplary damages. 
C. Actions against carriers 
of intelligence, 
a. Carriers of mail. 
No action maintainable. 
b. Telegraph and Telephone 
companies. 
1. Parties to the action. 
t. Form of action. 
430. Contract or tort action. 
431. An action on the contract. 
432. A tort action. 
3. The pleadings. 
433. Governed by general rules. 
4. The evidence. 
434. Burden of proof. 
5. The damages. 
435. Measure of damages. 
436. Duty to disclose importance 
of message. 
437. Damages for mental suffer· 
ing and injury to feelings. 
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ACTIONS AGAINST caamnas OF GOODS. 5-§ 404-405
§404. Olassificati0n.—In the preceding chapters the rules
of actions against carriers have been incidentally mentioned
but of necessity in a fragmentary and desultory way. It seems
proper therefore to supplement this by an orderly, but very
brief, view of the leading principles of actions in so far as
there are peculiarities in actions against carriers. For full
treatment of actions the student is referred to a work on
pleading.
It is convenient to consider separately
A. Actions against common carriers of goods.
B. Actions against carriers of passengers.
C. Actions against carriers of intelligence.
Under each brief notice will be taken of
1. The parties to the action.




A. Actions Against Common Carriers of Goods.
1. The Parties to the Action.
§405. The proper party pla.intifi'.—The party defendant
in an action is of course the carrier who undertakes the serv-
ice. In determining who is the proper party plaintiffi in
an action against a carrier it is of the first importance to
determine the form of the action to be brought. When the
remedy is sought in an action on the contract it must be in
the name of the party to the contract, but when a tort action
is brought for the breach of a common law duty to carry it
may be brought in the name of any party having a bene-
ficial interest in the performance of that duty.
§406. Contract action.—'l‘he consignor usually makes the
contract of affreightment. To him therefore the carrier is
responsible for the fulfillment of its terms, and he is a proper
§405. Hutchinson on Carriers,
720-736.
§406. Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray
(Mass.) 281; Wooster v. Tarr, 8 Al-
len (Mass.) 270, 85 Am. D. 707;
[—] Finn v. Western Railroad Cor-
poration, 112 Mass. 524, 17 Am. R.
128; Union Freight Railroad Co. v.
Winkley, 159 Mass. 133, 34 N. E. R.
91, 38 Am. St. R. 398; Hooper v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railway

















































































































































ACTIONS AGAINST CARRlERS OF GOODS. § § 404-406 
§ 404. Olaasiftcation.-In the preceding chapters the rules 
of actions against carriers have been incidentally mentioned 
but of necessity in a fragmentary and desultory way. It seems 
proper therefore to supplement this by an orderly, but very 
brief, view of the leading principles of actions in so far as 
there are peculiarities in actions against carriers. For full 
treatment of actions the student is referred to a work on 
pleading. 
It is convenient to consider separately 
A. Actions against common carriers of goods. 
B.  Actions against carriers of passengers. 
C. Actions against carriers of intelligence. 
Under each brief notice will be taken of 
1. The parties to the action. 
2. The form of the action. 
3. The pleadings. 
4. The evidence. 
5. The damages. 
A. Actions Against Common Carriers of Goods. 
1. The Parties to the Action. 
§ 405. The proper party plaintiff.-The party defendant 
in an action is of course the carrier who undertakes the serv­
ice. In determining who is the proper party plaintiff in 
an action against a carrier it is of the first importance to 
determine the form of the action to be brought. When the 
remedy is sought in an action on the contract it must be in 
the name of the party to the contract, but when a tort action 
is brought for the breach of a common law duty to carry it 
may be brought in the name of any party having a bene­
ficial interest in the performance of that duty. 
§ 406. Contract action.-The consignor usually makes the 
contract of affreightment. To him therefore the carrier is  
responsible for the fulfillment of its terms, and he is a proper 
I 405. Hutchinson on Carriers, poration, 112 MaSB. 524, 17 Am. R. 
720·736. 128 ; Union Freight Railroad Co. v. 
§ 406. Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray Winkley, 159 Mass. 133, 34 N. E. R. 
(M888. )  281 ; Wooster v. Tarr, 8 Al· 91, 38 Am. St. R. 398 ; Hooper v. 
len (Maas.) 270, 85 Am. D. 707 ; Chicago & Northwestern Railway 
[-] Finn v. W eetern Railroad Cor· Co., 27 Wis. 81, 9 Am. R. 439 ; South. 
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party plaintifi in an action against the carrier for the breach
of a contract of affreightment made with such consignor. If
the real interest in the property remained in him he is the only
proper party to sue, but if he acted for the consignee in ship-
ping the goods as for example in cases where he has sold the
goods to the consignee and received the price, then any recov-
ery by him he holds in trust for the consignee.
§407. ifionsignor agent of consig-nee.—Presumptively
the consignee is the owner of the goods at whose risk they are
carried, and in contracting for their shipment the consignor
acts as his agent. If such be the case the consignee, as the
party for whose benefit the contract was made, has a right
to sue for its breach, and his right, if he choose to exercise it,
is paramount to that of the consignor. A recovery against the
carrier by either is a bar to an action by the other. The
assignee of a bill of lading of course stands in the shoes of
the consignee, his assignor.
The presumption that the consignee is the owner may be
rebutted, and if it be shown that he had no property, general
or special, in the goods, and incurred no risk in their trans-
portation, he can not maintain an action against the carrier.
§408. Tort action.—Any party having a beneficial interest
in the performance of the common law duty to carry may sue
in tort for the carricr’s failure to perform, and also for a
refusal to carry made to such party or his agent. His right
or interest in the property gives him a right to insist that the
ern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44
Ala. 101, 4 Am. R. 118; Sisson v.
Cleveland & Toledo Railroad Co.,
14 Mich. 489, 90 Am. D. 252; Hand
v Baynes, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 203, 33
Am. D. 54.
§407. Hooper v. Chicago & North
Western Railway Co., 27 Wis. 81,
9 Am. R. 439; [—] Dyer v. Great
Northern Railway Co., 51 Minn. 345,
53 N. W. R. 714, 38 Am. St. R.
506; Southern Express Co. v. Craft,
49 Miss. 480, 19 Am. R. 4; [—] Finn
v. Western Railroad Corporation, 112
Mass. 524, 17 Am. R. 128; Murray
v. Warner, 55 N. H. 546, 20 Am. R.
227; Thompson v. Fargo, 49 N. Y.
188, 10 Am. R. 342; Krudler v. Elli-
son, 47 N. Y. 36, 7 Am. R. 402;
Southern Express Co. v. Caperton,
44 Ala. 101, 4 Am. R. 118.
§408. [—] Finn v. Western
Railroad Corporation, 112 Mass. 524,
17 Am. R. 128; Murray v. Warner,
55 N. H. 546, 20 Am. R. 227;
[—] New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How.
(U. S.) 344; Elkins v. Boston &
Maine Railroad Co., 19 N. H. 337,
51 Am. D. 184; Ralph v. Chicago &
North VVestern Railway Co., 32 Wis.
177, 14 Am. R. 725. Compare Lock-
hart v. Western & Atlantic Railroad

















































































































































§§ 407-408 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
party plaintiff in an action against the carrier for the breach 
of a contract of affreightment made with such consignor. If 
the real interest in the property remained in him he is the only 
proper party to sue, but if he acted for the consignee in ship­
ping the goods as for example in cases where he has sold the 
goods to the consignee and received the price, then any recov­
ery by him he holds in trust for the consignee. 
§ 407. --Consignor agent of consignee.-Presumptively 
the consignee is the owner of the goods at whose risk they are 
carried, and in contracting for their shipment the consignor 
acts as his agent. If such be the case the consignee, as the 
party for whose benefit the contract was made, has a right 
to sue for its breach, and his right, if he choose to exercise it, 
is paramount to that of the consignor. A recovery against the 
carrier by either is a bar to an action by the other. The 
assignee of a bill of lading of course stands in the shoes of 
the consignee, his assignor. 
The presumption that the consignee is the owner may be 
rebutted, and if it be shown that he had no property, general 
or special, in the goods, and incurred no risk in their trans­
portation, he can not maintain an action against the carrier. 
§ 408. Tort action.-Any party having a beneficial interest 
in the performance of the common law duty to carry may sue 
in tort for the carrier 's failure to perform, and also for a 
refusal to carry made to such party or his agent. His right 
or interest in the property gives him a right to insist that the 
ern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 188, 10 Am. R. 342 ; Krndler v. Elli­
Ala. 101, 4 Am. R. 118 ; Sisson v. son, 47 N. Y. 36, 7 Am. R. 402 ; 
Cleveland & Toledo Railroad Co., Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 
14 Mich. ·489, 90 Am. D. 252 ; Hand 44 Ala. 101, 4 Am. R. 118. 
v Baynes, 4 Whart. (Pa. ) 203, 33 § 408. [-J Finn v. Western 
Am. D. 54. Railroad Corporation, 112 Mass. 524, 
§ 407. Hooper v. Chicago & North 17 Am. R. 128 ; Murray v. Warner, 
Western Railway Co., 27 Wis. 81, 55 N. H. 546, 20 Am. R. 227 ; 
9 Am. R. 439 ; [-] Dyer v. Great [-] New Jersey Steam Navigation 
Northern Railway Co., 51 Minn. 345, Co. v. Merehant11 ' Bank, 6 How. 
53 N. W. R. 714, 38 Am. St. R. (U. S.) 344 ; Elkins v. Boston & 
506 ; Southern Express Co. v. Craft, Maine Railroad Co., 19 N. H. 337, 
49 Miss. 480, 19 Am. R. 4 ;  [-] Finn 51 Am. D. 184 ; Ralph v. Chicago & 
v. Western Railroad Corporation, 112 North Western Railway Co., 32 Wis. 
Mass. 524, 17 Am. R. 128 ; Murray 177, 14 Am. R. 725. Compare Lock· 
v. Warner, 55 N. H. 546, 20 Am. R. hart v. Western & Atlantic Railroad 
227 ; Thompson v. Fargo, 49 N. Y. Co., 73 Ga. 472, 54 Am. R. 883, 
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carrier shall perform the duty imposed upon him by law, or
respond in damages for failing therein.
The owner then may always sue in tort for loss, injury or
detention of the goods, and in contract if he is directly, or
by agent, a party to the contract. And this he may do though
he was undisclosed to the carrier, and though he was not the
general owner, but had a mere special property, such as that
of a bailee. In the latter case he of course recovers for the
benefit of the general owner.
2. The Action.
§409. The form of the action against the carrier depends
on the nature of the complaint. A breach of the carrier’s
common law duty is a tort for which an action on the case will
lie. For breach of a special contract the action must be in
assumpsit on that contract. Where the old rules of pleading
are still in force it often becomes important to choose between
the action ex delicto and one ex contractu.
§410. ——Action ex de1icto.—If there be doubt as to the
proper parties defendant the tort action is preferable, as re-
covery may be had against all or any part of the defendants
in a tort action. Liability of joint tort feasors is several and
nonjoinder or misjoinder can not defeat the action as to the
parties actually sued.
A declaration in case moreover does not require the same
certainty of pleading asflin assumpsit, and finally the measure
of damages in some cases is larger in a tort action, covering
the full loss and sometimes punitive damages as well.
§ 411. ——The action ex eontractu has the advantage that
with the declaration on contract may be joined the common
counts in assumpsit. Furthermore, the action ex contractn
survives to the personal representative of the plaintiff.
But a count in trover can not be joined with assumpsit, and
failure to join all parties who are jointly liable for the wrong
is fatal to an action ex contractu.
§412. -——Modern procedure in most of the states has
§410. Hutchinson on Carriers, §412. Hutchinson on Carriers,
740-742. 746-748-



















































































































































AC'l"IONS AGAINS'l" CARRIERS OF GOODS. § §  409-41 � 
carrier shall perform the duty imposed upon him by law, or 
respond in damages for failing therein. 
The owner then may always sue in tort for loss, injury or 
detention of the goods, and in contract if he is directly, or 
by agent, a party to the contract. And this he may do though 
he was undisclosed to the carrier, and though he was not the 
general owner, but had a mere special property, such as that 
of a bailee. In the latter case he of course recovers for the 
benefit of the general owner. 
2. The Action. 
§ 409. The form of the action against the carrier depends 
on the nature of the complaint. A breach of the carrier 's 
common law duty is a tort for which an action on the case will 
lie. For breach of a special contract the action must be in 
assumpsit on that contract. Where the old rules of pleading 
are still in force it often becomes important to choose between 
the action ex delicto and one ex contractu.  
§ 410. --Action ex delicto .-If there be doubt as to the 
proper parties defendant the tort action is preferable, as re­
covery may be had against all or any part of the defendants 
in a tort action. Liability of joint tort feasors is several and 
nonjoinder or misjoinder can not defeat the action as to the 
parties actually sued. 
A declaration in case moreover does not require the same 
certainty of pleading as"'in assumpsit, and finally the measure � 
of damages in some cases is larger in a tort action, covering 
the full loss and sometimes punitive damages as well. 
§ 411. --The action ex contractu has the advantage that 
with the declaration on contract may be joined the common 
counts in assumpsit. Furthermore, the action ex contractu 
survives to the personal representative of the plaintiff. 
But a count in trover can not be joined with assumpsit, and 
failure to join all parties who are jointly liable for the wrong 
is fatal to an action ex contractu. 
§ 412. --Modern procedure in most of the states has 
§ 410. Hutchinson on Carriers, § 412. Hutchinson on Carriers, 
740-742. 746-748. 
§ 411. Hutchinson on Carriers, 
748. 
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assimilated tort and contract actions to the same rules. Yet
occasionally, even now, it is important to sue upon contract
rather than upon the common law duty. This is so where
the carrier has by special contract undertaken some duty not
imposed by law. For breach of this duty the suit must be
upon the contract.
On the other hand it is better to sue for breach of the com-
mon law duty where/\as is usually the case/.the contract of
shipment limits the liability of the carrier. This throws upon
the carrier the burden of pleading and proof of such special
terms.
3. The Pleadtngs.
§413. Show case or assumpsit.—Even under modern prac-
tice codes it is important to know whether the plaintiff sues
for breach of duty or of contract, as the nature of the defence
may depend upon the form of the declaration. If breach of
duty is relied on this duty must be set out with particularity
and its violation and the resulting damage must be averred.
If the suit be upon the contract it must be set out verbatim
or according to its legal effect. Some codes require a de-
scription of the contract accompanied by its profert or ex-
hibit. Such description and exhibit will of course be con-
clusive that the plaintiffi had elected to rely upon the contract.
Without further mention in this connection the usual rules
of pleading are to be understood as applicable to actions
against carriers.
4. The Evidence.
§ 414. Burden of proof.——The only departure from the ordi-
nary rules of evidence calling for remark in this connection
is that the burden of proving the cause of the injury or loss
rests, not upon the party affirming the loss, but upon the
carrier.
§413. Hutchinson on Carriers, Indiana Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79,
749; Tallehassee Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Western Railway Co., 117 Ala. 520,
23 So. R. 139, 67 Am. St. R. 179,
note.
§414. Hutchinson on Carriers,
766-767; [—] Railroad v. Reeves,
10 Wall. (U. S.) 176; [—] McMil-
lan v. Michigan Southern & Northern
93 Am. D. 208; Turney v. Wilson,
7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 340, 27 Am. D.
515 ; Tallahassee Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Western Railway Co., 117 Ala 520,
23 So. R. 139, 67 Am. St. R. 179 and
note; Lamb v. Camden & Amboy etc.
Co., 46 N. Y. 271, 7 Am. R. 327.

















































































































































§§ 413-414 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
assimilated tort and contract actions to the same rules. Yet 
occasionally, even now, it is important to sue upon contract 
rather than upon the common law duty. This is so where 
the carrier has by special contract undertaken some duty not 
imposed by law. For breach of this duty the suit must be 
upon the contract. 
On the other hand it is better to sue for breach of the com-
"} mon law duty wher� as is usually the case/'the contract of 
shipment limits the liability of the carrier. This throws upon 
the carrier the burden of pleading and proof of such special 
terms. 
3. The Pleadings. 
§ 413. Show case or assumpsit.-Even under modern prac­
tice codes it is important to know whether the plaintiff sues 
for breach of duty or of contract, as the nature of the defence 
may depend upon the form of the declaration. If breach of 
duty is relied on this duty must be set out with particularity 
and its violation and the resulting damage must be averred. 
If the suit be upon the contract it must be set out verbatim 
or according to its legal effect. Some codes require a de­
scription of the contract accompanied by its profert or ex­
hibit. Such description and exhibit will of course be con­
clusive that the plaintiff had elected to rely upon the contract. 
Without further mention in this connection the usual rules 
of pleading are to be understood as applicable to actions 
against carriers. 
4. Tke Evidence. 
§ 414. Burden of proof .-The only departure from the ordi­
nary rules of evidence calling for remark in this connection 
is that the burden of proving the cause of the injury or loss 
rests, not upon the party affirming the loss, but upon the 
carrier. 
§ 413. Hutchinson on Carriers, Indiana Railroad Co., 16 Mich. 79, 
749 ; Tallehassee Falls Mfg. Co. v. 93 Am. D. 208 ; Turney v. Wilson, 
Western Railway Co., 117 Ala. 520, 7 Yerg. (Tenn. ) 340, 27 Am. D. 
23 So. R. 139, 67 Am. St. R. 179, 515 ; Tallehassee Falls Mfg. Co. v. 
note. Wes tern Railway Co., 117 Ala 520, 
§ 414. Hutchinson on Carriers, 23 So. R. 139, 67 Am. St. R. 179 and 
766-767 ; [-] Railroad v. Reeves, note ; Lamb v. Camden & Amboy etc. 
10 Wall. (U. S.) 1 76 ;  [-] McMil- Co., 46 N. Y. 271, 7 Am. R. 327. 
Ian v. Michigan Southern & Northern Compare Shriver v. Sioux City & St. 
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The plaintifi must prove delivery to the carrier, the car-
rier’s undertaking and the loss or damage. To excuse himself
the carrier then rests under the burden of showing that the
loss was caused by one of the excepted perils, or that it was
due to a cause from which he is by contract excused.
Whether the carrier must go farther and establish his own
freedom from negligence is a disputed question.
5. The Damages.
§415. For inj1u'y or loss the damages recoverable have
been said to depend on the nature of the action. The tort-
feasor is liable for “all the injurious consequences of his
tortious act, which, according to the usual course of events
and the general experience, were likely to ensue.” It does
not matter that he did not actually contemplate the resulting
injury as the probable consequence of his wrongful act.
For the breach of the contract the damages extend only
to the direct consequences of the breach; to such as usually
occur from the breach of such a contract, and as were within
the contemplation of the parties, when the contract was
entered into, as likely to result from a breach.” The greater
foresight, at the time of the breach, of the defaulting party
as to the probable consequences of his act will not increase
his responsibility in contract, but in tort it does. This dis-
tinction is often ignored and it is sometimes denied that the
character of the wrong declared upon can afiect the damages.
Ki
§ 416. ——Proximate cause.—The default of the carrier
must have been the proximate cause of the injury. For losses
Paul Railway Co., 24 Minn. 506,
31 Am. R. 353; Hull v. Chicago etc.
Railway Co., 41 Minn. 510, 43 N. W.
R. 391, 16 Am. St. R. 722; Adams
Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill.
184, 14 Am. R. 57.
§415. Compare Hutchinson on
Carriers, 768 b (quoting Sutherland
on Damages), and 5 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, 394 ;‘ see also [—] Sa-
vannah etc. Railway Co. v. Pritch-
ard, 77 Ga. 412, 1 S. E. R. 261, 4
Am. St. R. 92; Swift River Co. v.
Fitchburg Railroad Co., 169 Mass.
326, 47 N. E. R. 1015, 61 Am. St.
R. 288; Brown v. Chicago, Milwau-
kee & St. Paul Railway Co., 54 Wis.
342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am. R.
41; Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523, 14
Am. R. 356.
§416. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341; Griflin v. Colver, 16 N.
Y. 489, 69 Am. D. 718; [—] Savan-
nah etc. Railway Co. v. Pritchard,
77 Ga. 412, 1 S. E. R. 261, 4 Am.
St. R. 92 ; Brown v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 54

















































































































































ACTIONS AGAiNST CARRiERS OF GOODS. §§ 415-416 
The plaintiff must prove delivery to the carrier, the car­
rier 's undertaking and the loss or damage. To excuse himself 
the carrier then rests under the burden of showing that the 
loss was caused by one of the excepted perils, or that it was 
due to a cause from which he is by contract excused. 
Whether the carrier must go farther and establish his own 
freedom from negligence is a disputed question. 
5. The Damages. 
§ 415. For injury or loss the damages recoverable have 
been said to depend on the nature of the action. The tort­
feasor is liable for ' ' all the injurious consequences of his 
tortious act, which, according to the usual course of events 
and the general experience, were likely to ensue: " It does 
not matter that he did not actually contemplate the resulting 
injury as the probable consequence of his wrongful act. 
For the breach of the contract the damages extend only 
' ' to the direct consequences of the breach ; to such as usually 
occur from the breach of such a contract, and as were within 
the contemplation of the parties, when the contract was 
entered into, as likely to result from a breach. ' '  The greater 
foresight, at the time of the breach, of the defaulting party 
as to the probable consequences of his act will not increase 
his responsibility in contract, but in tort it does. This dis­
tinction is often ignored and it is sometimes denied that the 
character of the wrong declared upon can affect the damages. 
§ 416. --Proximate cause.-The default of the carrier 
must have been the proximate cause of the injury. For losses 
Paul Railway Co., 24 Minn. 506, 
31 Am. R. 353 ; Hull v. Chicago etc. 
Railway Co., 41 Minn. 510, 43 N. W. 
R. 391, 16 Am. St. R. 722 ; Adams 
Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 
184, 14 Am. R. 57. 
§ 415. Compare Hutchinson on 
Carriers, 768 b (quoting Sutherland 
on Damages) ,  and 5 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. of Law, 394 f see also [-] Sa­
vannah etc. Railway Co. v. Pritch­
ard, 77 Ga. 412, 1 S. E. R. 261, 4 
Am. St. R. 92 ; Swift River Co. v. 
Fitchburg Railroad Co., 169 Mass. 
326, 47 N. E. R. 1015, 61 Am. St. 
R. 288 ; Brown v. Chicago, Milwau­
kee & St. Paul Railway Co., 54 Wis. 
342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am. R. 
41 ; Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523, 14 
Am. R. 356. 
§ 416. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 
Exch. 341 ; Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. 
Y. 489, 69 Am. D. 718 ; [-] Sa van· 
nab etc. Railway Co. v. Pritchard, 
11 Ga. 412, 1 S. E. R. 261, 4 Am. 
St. R. 92 ; Brown v. Chicago, Mil­
waukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 54 
Wis. 342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am, 
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that are remote, speculative or possible merely there can be
no recovery. But for losses due to its default the carrier
is liable if they are the usual and natural consequences of such
default, or can fairly be said to have been within the con-
templation of the parties at the time the contract of shipment
was made as the natural and probable consequences of such
default provided the losses are the proximate and not the
remote consequences of the default, and are certain in their
nature and not speculative and contingent. In tort the car-
rier is liable for all the natural and proximate results of the
wrongful act complained of whether reasonably expected or
not.
§417. The measure of damages for loss or injury is, in
general, the value of the goods at the destination with interest
on such value from the time when they should have been
delivered, together with any other loss of which the carrier ’s
fault was the proximate cause. From this must be deducted
any unpaid charges of the carrier and any value the goods
may have had if accepted in an injured condition. The same rule
applies where the carrier has been guilty of conversion. Goods
so injured as to be practically worthless need not be accepted
at all.
§ 418. ——Value how determined.—The value of the goods
is ordinarily the market value or the cost of obtaining other
goods of like kind. Embarrassment is met in framing a‘
R. 41; Swift River Co. v. Fitch-
burg Railroad Co., 169 Mass. 326,
47 N. E. R. 1015, 61 Am. St. R. 288;
Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523, 14 Am.
R. 356; Harvey v. Connecticut etc.
Railroad Co., 124 Mass. 421, 26 Am.
R. 673; Deming v. Granld Trunk
Railway Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 Am.
R. 267; Ward v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 29, 7 Am. R.
405; [—] Mentzer v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.
W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 294.
§417. McGregor v. Kilgore, 6
Ohio 359, 27 Am. D. 260; Blumen-
thal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402, 91 Am.
D. 349; [—] Cooper v. Young, 22
Ga. 269, 68 Am. D. 502; Harvey v.
Connecticut etc. Railroad Co., 124
Mass. 421, 26 Am. R. 673; Bowman
v. Teall, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 306, 35
Am. D. 562; Hand v. Baynes, 4
Whart. (Pa.) 204, 33 Am. D. 54.
§ 418. Hudson v. Northern Pacific
Railway Co., 92 Iowa 231, 60 N. W.
R. co8, 54 Am. st. R. 550;
[—] Cooper v. Young, 22 Ga. 269,
68 Am. D. 502; Sisson v. Cleveland
& Toledo Railroad Co., 14 Mich. 489,
90 Am. D. 252; Jones v. St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & Southern Railway
Co., 53 Ark. 27, 13 S. W. R. 416,
22 Am. St. R. 175 ; [—] Green v.
Boston & Lowell Railroad C01, 128
Mass. 221, 35 Am. R. 370; Fairfax

















































































































































§ §  417-418 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
that are remote, speculative or possible merely there can be 
no recovery. But for losses due to its default the carrier 
is liable if they are the usual and natural consequences of such 
default, or can fairly be said to have b�en within the con­
templation of the parties at the time the contract of shipment 
was made as the natural and probable consequences of such 
default provided the losses are the proximate and not the 
remote consequences of the default, and are certain in their 
nature and not speculative and contingent. In tort the car­
rier is liable for all the natural and proximate results of the 
wrongful act complained of whether reasonably expected or 
not. 
§ 417. The measure of damages for loss or injury is, in 
general, the value of the goods at the destination with interest 
on such VB.lue from the time when they should have been 
delivered, together with any other loss of which the carrier 's 
fault was the proximate cause. From this must be deducted 
any unpaid charges of the carrier and any value the goods 
may have had if accepted in an injured condition. The same rule 
applies where the carrier has been guilty of conversion. Goods 
so injured as to be practically worthless need not be accepted 
at all. 
§ 418. -Value how determined.-The value of the goods 
is ordinarily the market value or the cost of obtaining other 
goods of like kind. Embarrassment is met in framing a·  
R. 41 ; Swift River Co.  v.  Fitch­
burg Railroad Co., 169 Mass. 326, 
47 N. E. R. 1015, 61 Am. St. R. 288 ; 
Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523, 14 Am. 
R. 356 ; Harvey v. Connecticut etc. 
Railroad Co., 124 Mass. 421, 26 Am. 
R. 673 ; Deming v. Gran'd Trunk 
Railway Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 Am. 
R. 267 ; Ward T. New York Central 
Railroad Co., 41 N. Y. 29, 1 Am. R. 
405 ; [-) Mentzer v. Western Union 
'l'elegraph Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N, 
W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 294. 
§ 417. McGregor v. Kilgore, 6 
Ohio 359, 27 Am. D. 260 ; Blumen­
thal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402, 91 Am. 
D. 349 ; [-] Cooper v. Young, 22 
Ga. 269, 68 Am. D. 502 ; Harvey v. 
Connecticut etc. Railroad Co., 124 
Mass. 421, 26 Am. R. 673 ; Bowman 
v. Teall, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 306, 35 
Am. D. 562 ; Hand v. Baynes, 4 
Whart. (Pa.) 204, 33 Am. D. 54. 
§ 418. Hudson v. Northern Pacific 
Railway Co., 92 Iowa 231, 60 N. W • .  
R. 608, 54 Am. St.  R. 550� 
[-] Cooper v. Young, 22 Ga. 269, 
68 Am. D. 502 ; Sisson v. Cleveland 
& Toledo Railroad Co., 14 Mich. 489, 
90 Am. D. 252 ; Jones v. St. Louis, 
Iron Mountain & Southern Railway 
Co., 53 Ark. 27, 13 S. W. R. 416, 
22 Am. St. R. 175 ; [-] Green v. 
Boston & Lowell Railroad Co·., 128 
Mass. 221, 35 Am. R. 370 ; Fairfax 
v. New York Central :Railroad Co., 
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ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS Or cOOns. §§ 419-420
proper rule of damages for property having special value to
the owner, but no market value. It has been said that it is
compensated at the actual value to the owner, not at a fanci-
ful price but at the actual money loss he sustains, and that of
this value only a jury can be the judges. No rule has been
suggested that is definite, satisfactory and logical. The effect
of fixing the value in the contract of shipment has been pre-
viously discussed (§ 270).
§419. The measure of damages for default in carrying,
either because of delay, or failure or refusal to carry at all, is the
difference between the market value of the goods at the place
where they were to be delivered and at tlie time they should
have arrived and their Value when they did arrive or at the
place where they were refused. To this should be added in-
terest from the time when they should have been delivered,
and such other damages as result proximately from the car-
rier’s default. This will include reasonable expenses of the
owner incurred in trying to prevent loss including any reason-
able charges that may have been paid to other carriers to per-
form the service for which the defendant carrier is in default.
§420. Expected profits from a business can not be recov-
73 N. Y. 167, 29 Am. R. 119; Hous-
ton & Texas Central Railroad Co. v.
Burke, 55 Tex. 323, 40 Am. R. 808.
Compare Watt v. Nevada Central
Railroad Co., 23 Nev. 154, 44 Pac.
R. 423, 46 Pac. R. 52, 726, 62 Am.
St. R. 772 with note to the same,
62 Am. St. R. 791.
§419. [—] Savannah etc. Rail-
way Co. v. Pritchard, 77 Ga. 412,
1 S. E. R. 261, 4 Am. St. R. 92;
[—] Cooper v. Young, 22 Ga. 269,
68 Am. D. 502; Deming v. Grand
Trunk Railway Co., 48 N. H. 455,
2 Am. R. 267; Ward v. New York
Central Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 29,
7 Am. R. 405; Hudson v. Northern
Pacific Railway Co., 92 Iowa 231,
60 N. W. R. 608, 54 Am. St. R.
550; Ward’s etc. Co. v. Elkins, 34
Mich. 439; Devereaux v. Buckley,
34 Ohio st. 16, 32 Am. R. 342;
Priestley v. Northern Indiana &
Chicago Railroad Co., 26 Ill. 206,
79 Am. D. 369; Grifiin v. Colver, 16
N. Y. 489, 69 Am. D. 718; Foard v.
Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad
Co., 8 Jones’s L. (N. C.) 235, 78
Am. D. 277; Cooper v. Young, 22
Ga. 269, 68 Am. D. 502; Harvey v.
Connecticut etc. Railroad Co., 124
Mass. 421, 26 Am. R. 673;
[—] Ayres v. Chicago & North West-
ern Railway Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37
N. W. R. 432, 5 Am. st. R. 226;
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Fagan, 72 Tex. 127, 9 S. W. R. 749,
13 Am. St. R. 776; [—] Galena
etc. Railroad Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488,
68 Am. D. 574; Sisson v. Cleveland
& Toledo Railroad Co., 14 Mich.
489, 90 Am. D. 252; Peet v. Chicago
& North Western Railway Co., 20
Wis. 624, 91 Am. D. 446.
§420. Swift River Co. v. Fitch-
















































































































































ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF GOODS. § §  419-420 
proper rule of damages for property having special value to 
the owner, but no market value. It has been said that it is 
compensated 'at the actual value to the owner, not at a fanci­
ful price but at the actual money loss he sustains, and that of 
this value only a jury can be the judges. No rule has been 
suggested that is definite, satisfactory and logical. The effect 
of fixing the value in the contract of shipment has been pre­
viously discussed ( § 270) . 
§ 419. The measure of damages for default in carrying, 
either because of delay, or failure or refusal to carry at all, is the 
difference between the market value of the goods at the place 
where they were to be delivered and at the time they should 
have arrived and their value when they did arrive or at the 
place where they were refused. To this should be added in­
terest from the time when they should have been delivered, 
and such other damages as result proximately from the car­
rier 's default. This will include reasonable expenses of the 
owner incurred in trying to prevent loss including any reason­
able charges that may have been paid to other carriers to per­
form the service for which the defendant carrier is in default. 
§ 420. Expected profits from a business can not be recov-
73 N. Y. 167, 29 Am. R. 119 ; Hous­
ton & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. 
Burke, 55 Tex. 3231 40 Am. R. 808. 
Compare Watt v. Nevada Central 
Railroad Co., 23 Nev. 154, 44 Pac. 
R. 423, 46 Pac. R. 52, 726, 62 Am. 
St. R. 772 with note to the same, 
62 Am. St. R. 791. 
§ 419. [-] Savannah etc. Rail­
way Co. v. Pritchard, 77 Ga. 412, 
1 S. E. R. 261, 4 Am. St. R. 92 ; 
[-] Cooper v. Young, 22 Ga. 269, 
68 Am. D. 502 ; Deming v. Grand 
Trunk Railway Co., 48 N. H. 455, 
2 Am. R. 267 ; Ward v. New York 
Central Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 29, 
7 Am. R. 405 ; Hudson v. Northern 
Pacific Railway Co., 92 Iowa 231, 
60 N. W. R. 608, 54 Am. St. R. 
550 ; Ward 's etc. Co. v. Elkins, 34 
Mich. 439 ; Devereaux v. Buckley, 
34 Ohio St. 16, 32 Am. R. 342 ; 
Priestley v. Northern Indiana & 
Chicago Railroad Co., 26 Ill. 206, 
79 Am. D. 369 ; Griffin v. Colver, 16 
N. Y. 489, 69 Am. D. 718 ; Foard v. 
Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad 
Co., 8 Jones 's L. ( N. C.) 235, 78 
Am. D. 277 ; Cooper v. Young, 22 
Ga. 269, 68 Am. D. 502 ; Harvey v. 
Connecticut etc. Railroad Co., 124 
Mass. 421, 26 Am. R. 673 ; 
[-] Ayres v. Chicago & North West­
ern Railway Co., 71 Wis. 372, 37 
N. W. R. 4321 5 Am. St. R. 226 ; 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Fagan, 72 Tex. 127, 9 S. W. R. 749, 
13 Am. St. R. 776 ; [ -] Galena 
etc. Railroad Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 
68 Am. D. 574 ; Sisson v. Cleveland 
& Toledo Railroad Co., 14 Mich. 
489, 90 Am. D. 252 ; Peet v. Chicago 
& North Western Railway Co., 20 
Wis. 624, 91 Am. D. 446. 
§ 420. Swift River Co. v. Fitch­
burg Railroad Co., 169 Mass. 3261 
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ered where they are speculative and uncertain, or where the
carrier had no notice that such damages might ensue from
his non-performance. But profits that are certain, and that
may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of
the parties may be recovered.
B. AoT1ONs AGAINST CARRIERS Or PASSENGERS.
1. The Parties.
§ 421. The injured party at the common law was the proper
person to bring an action for personal injuries. For loss of
services because of such injuries the master, parent or husband
might maintain an action.
If the injury caused death there was no right of action, as
all right to services ceased at death. Lord Campbell’s Act,
however, in various forms, has been enacted in all the states
but not by the federal congress. According to its provisions
the right of action for injury causing death survives to the
personal representative of the deceased. Actions under these
statutes must be governed strictly by the statutes, and the
action will be defeated if brought by any other person than
the party named in the statute.
2. The Form of Action.
§ 422. The choice of action is governed largely by the same
considerations as those already noted in actions against carriers
47 N. E. R. 1015, 61 Am. St. R.
288; [—] Savannah etc. Railway Co.
v. Pritchard, 77 Ga. 412, 1 S. E. R.
261, 4 Am. St. R. 92; [—] Cooper
v. Young, 22 Ga. 269, 68 Am. D.
502; Rocky Mount Mills v. Wilming-
ton etc. Railroad Co., 119 N. C. 693,
25 S. E. R. 854, 56 Am. St. R. 682;
Priestley v. Northern Indiana &
Chicago Railroad Co., 26 Ill. 206,
79 Am. D. 369; Foard v. Atlantic &
North Carolina Railroad Co., 8
Jones’s L. (N. C.) 235, 78 Am. D.
277; Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523, 14
Am. R. 356.
§421. Kelley v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 168
Mass. 308, 46 N. E. R. 1063, 60 Am.
St. R. 397; Morgan v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 95 Cal. 510, 30 Pac. R. 603,
29 Am. St. R. 143; [—] Louisville
etc. Railway Co. v. Goodykoontz,
119 Ind. 111, 21 N. E. R. 472, 12
Am. St. R. 371 and note; Usher v.
West Jersey Railroad Co., 126 Pa.
St. 206, 17 Atl. R. 597, 12 Am. St.
R. 863; Dwyer v. Chicago etc. Rail-
way Co., 84 Iowa 479, 51 N. W. R.
244, 35 Am. St. R. 322; Hawkins v.
Front Street Cable Co., 3 Wash. 592,
28 Pac. R. 1021, 28 Am. st. R. 72;
McDonald v. Chicago & North West-
ern Railway Co., 26 Iowa 124, 96
Am. D. 114; Carey v. Berkshire Rail-
road Co., 1 Cush. (Mass.) 475, 48

















































































































































§ §  421-422 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIElRS. 
ered where they are speculative and uncertain, or where the 
carrier had no notice that such damages might ensue from 
his non-performance. But profits that are certain, and that 
may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of 
the parties may be recovered. 
B. ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF P ASSENGEBS. 
1. The Parties. 
§ 421. The injured party at the common law was the proper 
person to bring an action for personal injuries. For loss of 
services because of such injuries the master, parent or husband 
might maintain an action. 
If the injury caused death there was no right of action, as 
all right to services ceased at death. Lord Campbell's Act, 
however, in various forms, has been enacted in all the states 
but not by the federal congress. According to its provisions 
the right of action for injury causing death survives to the 
personal representative of the deceased. Actions under these 
statutes must be governed strictly by the statutes, anu the 
action will be defeated if brought by any other person than 
the party named in the statute. 
2. The Form of Action. 
§ 422. The choice of action is governed largely by the same 
considerations as those already noted in actions against carriers 
47 N. E. R. 1015, 61 Am. St. R. St. R. 397 ; Morgan v. Southern Pa· 
288 ; [ -] Savannah etc. Railway Co. cific Co., 95 Cal. 510, 30 Pac. R. 603, 
v. Pritchard, 77 Ga. 412, 1 S. E. R. 29 Am. St. R. 143 ; [-] Louisville 
261, 4 Am. St. R. 92 ; [ -] Cooper etc. Railway Co. v. Goodykoontz, 
v. Young, 22 Ga. 269, 68 Am. D. 119 Ind. 111, 21 N. E. R. 472, 12 
502 ; Rocky Mount Mills v. Wilming· Am. St. R. 371 and note ; Usher v. 
ton etc. Railroad Co., 119 N. C. 693, West Jersey Railroad Co., 126 Pa. 
25 S. E. R. 854, 56 Am. St. R. 682 ; St. 206, 1 7  Atl. R. 597, 12 Am. St. 
Priestley v. Northern Indiana & R. 863 ; Dwyer v. Chicago etc. Rail­
Ghicago Railroad Co., 26 Ill. 206, way Co., 84 Iowa 479, 51 N. W. R. 
79 Am. D. 369 ; Foard v. Atlantic & 244, 35 Am. St. R. 322 ; Hawkins v. 
North Carolina Railroad Co., 8 Front Street Cable Co., 3 Wash. 592, 
Jones 's L. (N. C.) 235, 78 Am. D. 28 Pac. R. 1021, 28 Am. St. R. 72 ; 
277 ; Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523, 14
. 
McDonald v. Chicago & North West· 
Am. R. 356. ern Railway Co., 26 Iowa 124, 96 
§ 421. Kelley v. New York, New Am. D. 114 ; Carey v. Berkshire Rail­
Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 168 road Co., 1 Cush. ( Mass.) 475, 48 
Mass. 308, 46 N. E. R. 1063, 60 Am. Am. D. 616 and note. 
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of goods. If exemplary or punitive damages are desired the
declaration must be in case for the tort of the carrier.
3. The Pleadings.
§423. Special damages because of the plantiff’s station in
life, business, or relation to members of a dependent family,
must be specially pleaded. But if an injury be set forth
injuries naturally and proximately flowing from it need not
be specially alleged.
4. The Evidence.
§424. Burden of pr0of.-—Proof of injury to a passenger
raises no such presumption of liability against the carrier as
was noted in the case of the carriage of goods. The passen-
ger carrier is liable only when guilty of negligence and the
plaintiff must prove facts or conditions from which it is rea-
sonable to infer negligence before there is a prima faoie case
against the carrier. Proving defects in the vehicle, collision
of trains, etc., will raise a presumption of negligence which
the carrier is then called upon to rebut. ,
Whether the carrier has the burden of proving that the
passenger was guilty of contributory negligence is in dis-
pute but the weight of authority is that he must. Proof that
the carrier was free from negligence of course releases him
from liability.
§-422. Brown v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 54
Wis. 342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am. R.
41; Walsh v. Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23, 24
Am. R. 376; Spellman v. Richmond
& Danville Railroad Co., 35 S. C. 475,
14 S. E. R. 947, 28 Am. St. R. 858.
§423. [—] Williams v. Oregon
Short Line Railroad Co., 18 Utah
210, 54 Pac. R. 991, 72 Am. St. R.
777.
§424. [—] Meier v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. St. 225,
3 Am. R. 581; Hawkins v. Front
Street Cable Railroad Co., 3 Wash.
592, 28 Pac. R. 1021, 28 Am. St. R.
72; Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid
Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N. W.
R. 270, 38 Am. St. R. 753; Louis-
ville, New Albany & Chicago Rail-
way Co. v. Snyder, 117 Ind. 435,
20 N. E. R. 284, 10 Am. St. R.
60; Mitchell v. Chicago & Grand
Trunk Railway Co., 51 Mich. 236,
16 N. W. R. a88, 47 Am. R.
566; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Raiordon, 119 Pa. St. 577, 13 Atl.
R. 324, 4 Am. St. R. 670; [—] War-
ren v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 8 Al-
len (Mass.) 227, 85 Am. D. 700;
Deyo v. New York Central Railroad
Co., 34 N. Y. 9, 88 Am. D. 418,
note; Philadelphia etc. Railroad Co.
v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519, 20 Atl. R.
2, 20 Am. St. R. 490, note; Ala-
bama Great Southern Railroad Co.
v..Frazier, 93 Ala. 45, 9 So. R. 303,
30 Am. St. R. 28 and note at page

















































































































































ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. § §  423-424 
of goods. If exemplary or punitive damages are desired the 
declaration must be in case for the tort of the carrier. 
3. The Pleadings. 
§ 423. Speci&l damages because of the plantiff 's station in 
life, business, or relation to members of a dependent family, 
must be specially pleaded. But if an injury be set forth 
injuries naturally and proximately flowing from it need not 
be specially alleged. 
4. The Evidence.  
§ 424. Burden of proof.-Proof of injury to a passenger 
raises no such presumption of liability against the carrier as 
was noted in the case of the carriage of goods. The passen­
ger carrier is liable only when guilty of negligence and the 
plaintiff must prove facts or conditions from which it is rea­
sonable to infer negligence before there is a prima f acie case 
against the carrier. Proving defects in the vehicle, collision 
of trains, etc., will raise a presumption of negligence which 
the carrier is then called upon to rebut. / 
Whether the carrier has the burden of proving that the 
passenger was guilty of contributory negligence is in dis­
pute but the weight of authority is that he must. Proof that 
the carrier was free from negligence of course releases him 
from liability. 
§ 422. Brown v. Chicago, Mil· ville, New Albany & Chicago Rail­
waukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 54 way Co. v. Snyder, 117 Ind. 435, 
Wis. 342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am. R. 20 N. E. R. 284, 10 Am. St. R. 
41 ; Walsh v. Chicago, Milwaukee & 60 ; Mitchell v. Chicago & Grand 
St. Paul Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23, 24 Trunk Railway Co., 51 Mich. 236, 
Am. R. 376 ; Spellman v. Richmond 16 N. W. R. 388, 47 Am. R. 
& Danville Railroad Co., 35 S. C. 475, 566 ; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. 
14 S. E. R. 947, 28 Am. St. R. 858. Raiordon, 119 Pa. St. 577, 13 Atl. 
§ 423. [-] Williams v. Oregon R. 324, 4 Am. St. R. 670 ; [-] War­
Short Line Railroad Co., 18 Utah ren v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 8 Al­
f:lO, 54 Pac. R. 991, 72 Am. St. R. len ( Mass. ) 227, 85 Am . D. 700 ; 
777. Deyo v. New York Central aailroad 
§ 424. [-] Meier v. Pennsyl- Co., 34 N. Y. 9, 88 Am. D. 418, 
vania Railroad Co., 64 Pa. St. 225, note ; Philadelphia etc. Railroad Co. 
3 Am. R. 581 ; Hawkins v. Front · v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519, 20 Atl. R. 
Street Cable Railroad Co., 3 Wash. 2, 20 Am. St. R. 490, note ; Ala-
592, 28 Pac. R. 1021, 28 Am. St. R. bama Great Southern Railroad Co. 
72 ; Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid v . . Frazier, 93 Ala. 45, 9 So. R. 303, 
Transit Co., 36 Neb. 890, 55 N. W. 30 Am. St. R. 28 and note at page 
R. 270, 38 Am. St. R. 753 ; Louis- 40, see also note to 43 Am. D. 363. 
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5. The Damages.
§425. Compensation for the injury is the measure of dam-
ages to a passenger who has suffered from the negligence or
wrongful act of the carrier. This includes inconvenience, loss
of time, pecuniary loss, medical expenses, and pain and suf-
fering of mind and body, past and also future, if such future
suffering seems reasonably inevitable.
Future damages caused by diminution of earning power, or
in case of death, earnings during the probable duration of
life, are properly considered as well as the number and sta-
tion of those dependent on the deceased.
But all damages must be the natural and proximate conse-
quence of the injury. Whether sickness and disease follow-
ing the injury are so caused by it as to be within the rule of
proximate cause depends partly on the circumstances and
partly on the jurisdiction where the case is tried. Some
courts are more liberal than others in their view of what is
to be included as a proximate result.
§426. Damages for wrongful ejection from the train, or
for rightful ejection with unnecessary force or in an improper
§425. Goodhart v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 177 Pa. St. 1, 35 Atl. R
191, 55 Am. St. R. 705; [—] Filer
v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
49 N. Y. 47, 10 Am. R. 327; Mc-
Donald v. Chicago & North Western
Railway Co., 26 Iowa 124, 96 Am. D.
114; Brown v. Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway Co., 54 Wis.
342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am. R. 41;
Barker v. Ohio River Railroad Co.,
51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. R. 148, 90
Am. St. R. 808; Louisville, New
Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v.
Snyder, 117 Ind. 435, 20 N. E. R.
284, 10 Am. St. R. 60; Terre Haute
etc. Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind.
346, 49 Am. R. 168; Turner v. Great
Northern Railway Co., 15 Wash. 213,
46 Pac. R. 243, 55 Am. St. R. 883;
[—] Louisville etc. Railway Co. v.
Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, 21 N. E.
R. 472, 12 Am. St. R. 371, note;
Georgia Railroad Co. v. Hayden,
71 Ga., 518, 51 Am. R. 274; McHugh
v. Schlosser, 159 Pa. St. 480, 28 Atl.
R. 291, 39 Am. St. R. 699; Dwyer
v. Chicago etc. Railway Co., 84 Ia.
479, 51 N. W. R. 244, 35 Am. St. R.
322; Morgan v. Southern Pacific Co.,
95 Cal. 510, 30 Pac. R. 603, 29 Am.
St. R. 143; Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 339, 98 Am.
D. 229; Hansley v. Jamesville etc.
Railroad Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S.
E. R. 528, 44 Am. St. R. 474; Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co.
\'. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S. W. R.
944, 77 Am. St. R. 856; Hawkins v.
Front Street Cable Co., 3 Wash. 592,
28 Pac. R. 1021, 28 Am. St. R. 72;
see also the extended note to 85
Am. St. R. 835 and 70 Am. st. R.
669.
§426. Kansas City Railroad Co.

















































































































































§§ 425-426 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
5. The Damages. 
§ 425. Compensation for the injury is the measure of dam­
ages to a passenger who has suffered from the negligence or 
wrongful act of the carrier. This includes inconvenience, loss 
of time, pecuniary loss, medical expenses, and pain and suf­
fering of mind and body, past and also future, if such future 
suffering seems reasonably inevitable. 
Future damages caused by diminution of earning power, or 
in case of death, earnings during the probable duration of 
life, are properly considered as well as the number and sta­
tion of those dependent on the deceased. 
But all damages must be the natural and proximate conse­
quence of the injury. Whether sickness and disease follow­
ing the injury are so caused by it as to be within the rule of 
proximate cause depends partly on the circumstances and 
partly on the jurisdiction where the case is tried. Some 
courts are more liberal than others in their view of what is 
to be included as a proximate result. 
§ 426. D&m.ages for wrongful ejection from the train, or 
for rightful ej ection with unnecessary force or in an improper 
§ 425. Goodhart v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co., 177 Pa. St. 1, 35 Atl. R 
191, 55 Am. St. R. 705 ; [-] Filer 
v. New York Central Railroad Co., 
49 N. Y. 47, 10 Am. R. 327 ; Mc­
Donald v. Chicago & North Western 
Railway Co., 26 Iowa 124, 96 Aro. D. 
114 ; Brown v. Chicago, Milwaukee 
& St. Paul Railway Co., 54 Wis. 
342, 11 N. W. R. 356, 41 Am. R. 41 ; 
Barker v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 
51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. R. 148, 90 
Am. St. R. 808 ; Louisville, New 
Albany & Chieago Railway Co. v. 
Snyder, 117 Ind. 435, 20 N. E. R. 
284, 10 Am. St. R. 60 ; Terre Haute 
etc. Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 
a46, 49 Am. R. 168 ; Turner v. Great 
Northern Railway Co., 15 Wash. 213, 
46 Pac. R. 243, 55 Am. St. R. 883 ; 
I -] Louisville etc. Railway Co. v. 
Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111,  21 N. E. 
R. 472, 12 Am. St. R. 371, note ; 
Georgia Railroad Co. v. Hayden, 
71 Ga., 518, 51 Am. R. 274 ; McHugh 
v. Schlosser, 159 Pa. St. 480, 28 Atl. 
R. 291, 39 Am. St. R. 699 ; Dwyer 
v. Chicago etc. Railway Co., 84 la. 
479, 51 N. W. R. 244, 35 Am. St. R. 
322 ; Morgan v. Southern Pacific Co., 
95 Cal. 510, 30 Pac. R. 603, 29 Am. 
St. R. 143 ; Pennsylvania Railroad 
Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 339, 98 Am. 
D. 229 ; Hansley v. Jamesville etc. 
Railroad Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 B. 
E. R. 528, 44 Am. St. R. 474 ; Gulf, 
Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. 
'"· Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 B. W. R. 
944, 77 Am. St. R. 856 ; Hawkins v. 
Front Street Cable Co., 3 WMh. 592, 
28 Pac. R. 1021, 28 Am. St. R. 72 ; 
see also the extended note to 85 
Am. St. R. 835 and 70 Am. St. R. 
669. 
§ 426. Kansas City Railroad Co. 
v. Foster, 134 Ala. 244, 32 S. R. 
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manner, include compensation for expenses actually incurred,
for the loss of time and interruption of business, for bodily
suffering and for mental pain caused by the injury to feelings,
annoyance, vexation and humiliation resulting from the in-
dignity.
If the ejection has been accompanied by insulting treatment
or by wilful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the
carrier's servants, such conduct may properly be considered
as aggravating the injury and increasing the damages.
§427. Damages for mental suffering or fright alone,
neither accompanied nor followed by physical injury are never
allowed. On the other hand if physical injuries are accom-
panied by mental pain or fright the damages may cover the
consequences of the mental as well as of the physical suffer-
773, 92 Am. St. R. 25; Cleveland etc.
Railway Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind.
App. 135, 60 N. E. R. 169, 87 Am.
St. R. 245; [—] Forsee v. Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co., 63
Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801; Hot
Springs Railroad Co. v. Deloney, 65
Ark. 177, 45 S. W. R. 351, 67 Am.
St. R. 913; Gillingham v. Ohio River
Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 588, 14 S. E.
R. 243, 29 Am. St. R. 827; Jefierson-
ville Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind.
1, 92 Am. D. 276; Duggan v. Balti-
more & Ohio Railroad Co., 159 Pa.
St. 248, 28 Atl. R. 182, 39 Am. st.
R. 672; Georgia Railroad 85 Banking
Co. v. Eskew, 86 Ga. 641, 12 S. E.
R. 1061, 22 Am. St. R. 490;
[—] Carsten v. Northern Pacific
Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W.
R. 49, 20 Am. St. R. 589; Hansley
v. Jamesville etc. Railroad Co., 115
N. C. 602, 20 S. E. R. 528, 44 Am.
St. R. 474; Gorman v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 97 Cal. 1, 31 Pac R. 1112,
33 Am. St. R. 157; Pittsburg etc.
Railway Co. v. Reynolds, 55 Ohio
St. 370, 45 N. E. R. 712, 60 Am.
St. R. 706; Philadelphia etc. Rail-
road Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155, 28
Am. R. 442; Du Laurans v. St. Paul
& Pacific Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49,
2 Am. R. 102.
§427. Mitchell v. Rochester Rail-
way Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E.
R. 354, 56 Am. St. R. 604;
[—] Spade v. Lynn & Boston Rail-.
road Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E.
R. 88, 60 Am. St. R. 393, 172 Mass.
488, 52 N. E. R. 747, 70 Am. St. R.
298; Turner v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co., 15 Wash. 213, 46 Pac. R.
243, 55 Am. St. R. 883; Goodhart
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 177
Pa. St. 1, 35 Atl. R. 191, 55 Am. St.
R. 705; Morgan v. Southern Pacific
Co., 95 Cal. 510, 30 Pac. R. 603,
29 Am. St. R. 143; Hot Springs
Railroad Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177,
45 S. W. R. 351, 67 Am. St. R. 913;
Contra, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239,
54 S. W. R. 944, 77 Am. St. R. 856;
see note at p. 859, Trigg v. St. Louis
etc. Railroad Co., 74 Mo. 147, 41
Am. R. 305; [—] Mentzer v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 93 Ia.
752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. st. R.
294; Wadsworth v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.
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manner, include compensation for expenses actually incurred, 
for the loss of time and interruption of business, for bodily 
suffering and for mental pain caused by the injury to feelings, 
annoyance, vexation and humiliation resulting from the in­
dignity. 
If the ejection has been accompanied by insulting treatment 
or by wilful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the 
carrier 's servants, such conduct may properly be considered 
as aggravating the injury and increasing the damages. 
§ 427. Damages for mental suffering or fright alone, 
neither accompanied nor followed by physical injury are never 
allowed. On the other hand if physical injuries are accom­
panied by mental pain or fright the damages may cover the 
consequences of the mental as well as of the physical suffer-
773, 92 Am. St. R. 25 ; Cleveland etc. 
Railway Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind. 
App. 135, 60 N. E. R. 169, 87 Am. 
St. R. 245 ; [-] Forsee v. Alabama 
Great Southern Railroad Co., 63 
Miss. 66, 56 Am. R. 801 ; Hot 
Springs Railroad Co. v. Deloney, 65 
Ark. 177, 45 S. W. R. 351, 67 Am. 
St. R. 913 ; Gillingham v. Ohio River 
Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 588, 14 S. E. 
R. 243, 29 Am. St. R. 827 ; J eiferson· 
ville Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 
1, 92 Am. D. 276 ; Duggan v. Balti· 
more & Ohio Railroad Co., 159 Pa. 
St. 248, 28 Atl. R. 182, 39 Am. St. 
R. 672 ; Georgia Railroad & Banking 
Co. v. Eskew, 86 Ga. 641, 12 S. E. 
R. 1061, 22 Am. St. R. 490 ; 
[ -] Carsten v. Northern Pacific 
Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W. 
R. 49, 20 Am. St. R. 589 ; Hansley 
v. Jamesville etc. Railroad Co., 115 
N. C. 602, 20 S. E. R. 528, 44 Am. 
St. R. 474 ; Gorman v. Southern Pa· 
cific Co., 97 Cal. 1, 31 Pac R. 1112, 
33 Am. St. R. 157 ; Pittsburg etc. 
Railway Co. v. Reynolds, 55 Ohio 
St. 370, 45 N. E. R. 712, 60 Am. 
St. R. 706 ; Philadelphia etc. Rail· 
road Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155, 28 
Am. R. 442 ; Du Laurans v. St.  Paul 
& Pacific Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49, 
2 Am. R. 102. 
§ 427. Mitchell v. Rochester Rail­
way Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 
R. 354, 56 Am. St. R. 604 ; 
[-] Spade v. Lynn & Boston Rail- . 
road Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 
R. 88, 60 Am. St. R. 393, 172 Mass. 
488, 52 N. E. R. 747, 70 Am. St. R. 
298 ; Turner v. Great Northern Rail­
way Co., 15 Wash. 213, 46 Pac. R. 
243, 55 Am. St. R. 883 ; Goodhart 
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 177 
Pa. St. 1, 35 Atl. R. 191, 55 Am. St. 
R. 705 ; Morgan v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 95 Cal. 510, 30 Pac. R. 603, 
29 Am. St. R. 143 ; Hot Springs 
Railroad Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177, 
45 S. W. R. 351, 67 Am. St. R. 913 ; 
Contra, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 
54 S. W. R. 944, 77 Am. St. R. 856 ; 
see note at p. 859, Trigg v. St. Louis 
etc. Railroad Co., 74 Mo. 147, 41 
Am. R. 305 ; [-] Mentzer v. West­
ern Union Telegraph Co., 93 Ia. 
752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 
294 ; Wadsworth v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. 
W. R. 574, 6 Am. St. R. 864 ; see 
post, sec. 437. 
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ing. All are part of the injury. But by the weight of author-
ity there can be no recovery for fright, not accompanied but
followed by physical injuries, both because such physical
injuries are regarded as too remote and uncertain to be a
proper element of damage, and because allowance of them
would open the door to a flood of litigation over imaginary
and fictitious claims. Some of the courts have adopted a
broader rule and have allowed damages even in this last case.
§Q8. Exemplary damages.—The cases can not be recon-
ciled as to the circumstances that justify, in addition to com-
pensatory damages, an allowance by way of “smart money.”
It is a general rule that for the wanton, wilful, malicious or
recklessly negligent conduct of the carrier, or of his agents or
servants in the course of their employment, the law allows
not ‘only damages by way of compensation for the injury but
also exemplary damages as a salutary example to induce upon
the part of carriers that regard for human life and personal
safety which the law so highly regards and so carefully pro-
tects.
C. ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS Or INTELLIGENCE.
a. Carriers of the Mails.
§ 429. N0 action can be maintained against the Post Office
Department, as the government can not be sued, and a private
person has no action against a contractor for carrying the
mail, since he is employed and owes his duty to the govern-
ment to which alone he is responsible (§ 379).
§428. Goddard v. Grand Trunk
Railway Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. R.
39; Spellman v. Richmond & Dan-
ville Railroad Co., 35 S. C. 475, 14 S.
E. R. 947, 28 Am. St. R. 858 and ox-
tended note; Gillingham v. Ohio Riv-
or 8.: Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 588,
14 S. E. R. 243, 29 Am. St. R. 827;
Frink v. Coe, 4 G. Green (Iowa)
555, 61 Am. D. 141; Gorman v.
Southern Pacific Co., 97 Cal. 1, 31
Pac. R. 1112, 33 Am. St. R. 157;
Pittsburg etc. Railway Co. v. Lyon,
123 Pa. St. 140, 16 Atl. R. 607, 10
Am. St. R. 517, note; Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125,
20 Am. R. 232; Hansley v. James-
ville etc. Railroad Co., 115 N. C.
602, 20 S. E. R. 528, 44 Am. St. R.
474; Barker v. Ohio River Railroad
Co., 51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. R.
148, 90 Am. St. R. 808; Philadel-
phia etc. Railroad Co. v. Larkin, 47
Md. 155, 28 Am. R. 442, see also

















































































































































§ §  428-429 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
ing. All are part of the injury. But by the weight of author­
ity there can be no recovery for fright, not accompanied but 
followed by physical injuries, both because such physical 
injuries are regarded as too remote and uncertain to be a 
proper element of damage, and because allowance of them 
would open the door to a flood of litigation over imaginary 
and fictitious claims. Some of the courts have adopted a 
broader rule and have allowed damages even in this last case. 
§ 428. Exemplary damages.-The cases can not be recon­
ciled as to the circumstances that justify, in addition to com­
pensatory damages, an allowance by way of " smart money. " 
It is a general rule that for the wanton, wilful, malicious or 
recklessly negligent conduct of the carrier, or of his agents or 
servants in the course of their employment, the law allows 
not ·only damages by way of compensation for the injury but 
also exemplary damages as a salutary example to induce upon 
the part of carriers that regard for human life and personal 
safety which the law so highly regards and so carefully pro­
tects. 
C. ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF INTELLIGENCE. 
a. Carriers of tke Maiis. 
§ 429. No action can be maintained against the Post Office 
Department, as the government can not be sued, and a private 
person has no action against a contractor for carrying the 
mail, since he is employed and owes his duty to the govern­
ment to which alone he is responsible ( § 379 ) .  
§ 428 . Goddard v. Grand Trunk 
Railway Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. R. 
39 ; Spellman v. Richmond & Dan­
ville Railroad Co., 35 S. C. 475, 14 S. 
E. R. 947, 28 Am. St. R. 858 and ex­
tended note ; Gillingham v. Ohio Riv­
er & Railroad Co., 35 W. Va. 588, 
14 S. E. R. 243, 29 Am. St. R. 827 ; 
Frink v. Coe, 4 G. Green (Iowa) 
555, 61 Am. D. 141 ; Gorman v. 
Bouthern Pacific Co., 97 Cal. 1, 31 
Pac. R. 1112, 33 Am. St. R. 157 ; 
Pittsburg etc. Railway Co. v. Lyon, 
123 Pa. St. 140, 16 Atl. R. 607, 10  
Am.  St. R .  517, note ; Pullman 
Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125, 
20 Am. R. 232 ; Hansley v. James­
ville etc. Railroad Co., 115 N. C. 
602, 20 S. E. R. 528, 44 Am. St. R. 
474 ; Barker v. Ohio River Railroad 
Co., 51 W. Va. 423, 41 S. E. R. 
148, 90 Am. St. R. 808 ; Philadel­
I•hia etc. Railroad Co. v. Larkin, 47 
M.d. 155, 28 Am. R. 442, see also 
note to 59 Am. St. R. 602. 
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ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS Or INTELLIGENCE. §§ 430'431
G
b. Telegraph and Telephone Companies.
1. The Parties to the Action. 2. The Form of the Action.
§430. Contract or tort a¢cti0n.—Actions against telegraph
companies may be on the contract to transmit the message,
or in tort for breach of the duty the company owes the public
to serve all impartially and faithfully. Actions against tele-
phone companies as carriers usually arise over refusal to fur-
nish service. The use of mandamus to compel "the telephone
company to fulfill its public function in such cases has already
been sufficiently explained (§ 401).
§ 431. An action on the contract may be maintained by the
sender, for he, as principal or agent, makes the contract with
the company and may hold it to a faithful performance of the
agreement. Moreover any one for whose benefit the sender
made the contract is in efiect a principal, disclosed or undis-
closed, and as such is a proper party plaintifi in an action on
the contract made by his agent on his behalf.
It has been said, with less reason, that the telegraph com-
pany is the agent of the party who selects that means of com-
munication. If therefore the sendee has so selected the tele-
graph company then the company is liable to him as an agent
to his principal. And by some courts this principle is ex-
tended to cases generally and it is said that the addressee who
has suffered actual damage may sue the telegraph company as
his agent.
§431. [—] Harkness v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 73 Iowa
190, 34 N. W. R. 811, 5 Am. St. R.
672; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W.
R. 857, 16 Am. St. R. 920; Wads-
worth v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. R. 574,
6 Am. St. R. 864 ; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala.
510, 7 So. R. 419, 18 Am. st. R.
148; [—] Ayer v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl.
R. 495, 1 Am. St. R. 353 ; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Wilson, 93
Ala. 32, 9 So. R. 414, 30 Am. St.
R. 23; Shingleur v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So.
R. 425, 48 Am. St. R. 604; Carland
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
118 Mich. 369, 76 N. W. R. 762,
74 Am. St. R. 394; [—] Mentzer
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93
Iowa 752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am.
St. R. 294; Coit v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 130 Cal. 657, '63
Pac. R. 83, 80 Am. St. R. 153; But-
ler v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
62 S. C. 222, 40 S. E. R. 162, 89 Am.
St. R. 893; United States Telegraph


















































































































































ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF INTELLIGENCE. § § 430-431 
b.  Teiegraph and Teiephone Companies. 
1. The Parties to the Action. 2. The Form of the Action. 
§ 430. Contra.ct or tort action.-Actions against telegraph 
companies may be on the contract to transmit the message, 
or in tort for breach of the duty the company owes the public 
to serve all impartially and faithfully. Actions against tele­
phone companies as carriers usually arise over refusal to fur­
nish service. The use of mandamus to compel �the telephone 
company to fulfill its public function in such cases has alreacly 
been sufficiently explained ( §  401 ) .  
§ 431. An action on the contract may be maintained by the 
sender, for he, as principal or agent, makes the contract with 
the company and may hold it to a faithful performance of the 
agreement. Moreover any one for whose benefit the sender 
made the contract is in effect a principal, disclosed or undis­
closed, and as such is a proper party plaintiff in an action on 
the contract made by his agent on his behalf. 
It has been said, with less reason, that the telegraph com­
pany is the agent of the party who selects that means of com­
munication. If therefore the sendee has so selected the tele­
graph company then the company is liable to him as an agent 
to his principal. And by some courts this principle is ex­
tended to cases generally and it is said that the addressee who 
has suffered actual damage may sue the telegraph company as 
his agent. 
§ 431. [-] Harkness v. West­
ern Union Telegraph Co., 73 Iowa 
190, 34 N. W. R. 811, 5 Am. St. R. 
672 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. 
R. 857, 16 Am. St. R. 920 ; Wads­
worth v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. R. 574, 
6 Am. St. R. 864 ; Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 
510, 7 So. R. 419, 18 Am. St. R. 
148 ; [-] Ayer v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 
R. 495, 1 Am. St. R. 353 ; Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Wilson, 93 
Ala. 32, 9 So. R. 414, 30 Am. St. 
R. 23 ; Shingleur v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. 
R. 425, 48 Am. St. R. 604 ; Carland 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
. 118 Mich. 369, 76 N. W. R. 762, 
7 4 Am. St. R. 394 ; [ -] Mentzer 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 
Iowa 752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. 
St. R. 294 ; Coit v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 130 Cal. 657, · 63 
Pac. R. 83, 80 Am. St. R. 153 ; But­
ler v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
62 S. C. 222, 40 S. E. R. 162, 89 Am. 
St. R. 893 ; United States Telegraph 
Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 96 
Am. D. 5l!l.  
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§§ 432-434 OF ACTION S AGAINST CARRIERS.
1
In England the addressee is held not to be a party to the
contract, and therefore he can not sue upon it, but in this
country that view has never prevailed. There is so great
diversity of view as to the ground upon which an action can
be brought that general statements are difiicult, but the above
seem to be the most rational explanations of the contract rela-
tions of the parties.
§432. A tort action may be maintained by any one to
whom the company owes the duty of correct transmission and
prompt delivery. When, therefore, it undertakes to deliver a
message to an addressee it is liable for legal injuries to him,
and also to the sender, and to any third party who is the
real party in interest, for the faithful performance of the
duty undertaken. But this does not extend to third parties
who may or may not have an interest in the message, who
are strangers to the company, and to whom it owes no duty;
nor does it extend to any one who has suffered no legal
wrong.
3. The Pleadings.
§433. Governed by general ru1es.—No special mention of
the pleadings in actions against telegraph companies is called
for. The general rules of pleading control.
4. The Ev'ide~nce.
§434. Burden of pr0of.——Error or delay in transmitting a
message raises a presumption of negligence which casts upon
the company the burden of proving that the fault was due
§432. Western Union Telegraphglg R. 153; Butler v. Western Union
Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, 21 N. Telegraph Co., 62 S. C. 222, 40
R. 4, 15 Am. St. R. 109; [—] Webbe 1 S. E. R. 162, 89 Am. St. R. 893;
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,“
169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 670, 61
Am. St. R. 207; Gray v. Telegraph
Co., 108 Tenn. 39, 64 S. W. R. 1063,
91 Am. St. R. 706; Pegram v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 100 N. O.
28, 6 S. E. R. 770, 6 Am. St. R.
557; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 S0.
R. 419, 18 Am. St. R. 148; Coit v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 130
Cal. 657, 63 Pac. R. 83, 80 A'm. St.
Yoimg v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. R. 1044,
22 Am. St. R. 883; Clay v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 81 Ga. 285,
6 S. E. R. 813, 12 Am. St. R. 316;
Shingleur v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. R.
425, 48 Am. St. R. 604.
§434. [—] Ayer v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493,
10 Atl. R. 495, 1 Am. St. R. 353;

















































































































































§ §  432-434 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS. 
In England the addressee is held not to be a party to the 
contract, and therefore he can not sue upon it, but in this 
country that view has never prevailed. There is so great 
diversity of view as to the ground upon which an action can 
be brought that general statements are difficult, but the above 
seem to be the most rational explanations of the contract rela­
tions of the parties. 
§ 432. A tort action may be maintained by any one to 
whom the company owes the duty of correct transmission and 
prompt delivery. When, therefore, it undertakes to deliver a 
message to an addressee it is liable for legal injuries to him, 
and also to the sender, and to any third party who is the 
real party in interest, for the faithful performance of the 
duty undertaken. But this does not extend to third parties 
who may or may not have an interest in the message, who 
are strangers to the company, and to whom it owes no duty ; 
nor does it extend to any one who has suffered no legal 
wrong. 
3. The Pleadings. 
§ 433. Governed by general rules.-No special mention of 
the pleadings in actions against telegraph companies is called 
for. The general rules of pleading control. 
4. The Evidence. 
§ 434. Burden of proof.-Error or delay in transmitting a 
message raises a presumption of negligence which casts upon 
the company the burden of proving that the fault was due 
§ 432. �estern Union Telegraph;, R. 153 ; Butler v. Western Union 
Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, 21 N. E . . -. Tefogre.ph Co., 62 S. C. 222, 40 
R. 4, 15 Am. St. R. 109 ; [-] Wehbe
·
; S. E. R. 162, 89 Am. St. R. 893 ; 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.;·· Young v. Western Union Telegraph 
169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. R. 670, 61 Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S.  E. R. 1044, 
Am. St. R. 207 ; Gray v. Telegraph 22 Am. St. R. 883 ; Clay v. Western 
Co., 108 Tenn. 39, 64 S. W. R. 1063, Union Telegraph Co., 81 Ge.. 285, 
91 Am. St. R. 706 ; Pegram v. West- 6 S. E. R. 813, 12 Am. St. R. 316 ; 
em Union Telegraph Co., 100 N. C. Shingleur v. Western Union Tele· 
28, 6 S. E. R. 770, 6 Am. St. R. graph Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. R. 
557 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 425, 48 Am. St. R. 604. 
v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 So. § 434. [-] Ayer v. Western 
R. 419, 18 Am. St. R. 148 ; Coit v. Union Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 1 0  Atl. R. 495, 1 Am. St. R. 353 ; 
Cal.  657, 63 Pac. R. 83, 80 Am. St. [ -] Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 
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ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF INTELLIGENCE. '§435
to causes beyond its control, or of showing that it exercised
all proper care and diligence commensurate with the under-
taking.
Some cases hold that, when the company assumes liability
for errors only in ease the message is repeated, that in the
case of unrepeated messages the burden is on the plaintiff to
show that the errors were due to negligence. In such case a
mere error is not prima facile evidence of negligent transmission.
5. The Damages.
§435. The measure of damages for loss due to the negli-
gence of the company is the damage sustained. This may
include the price paid for the message and any other injury
which flowed proximately and naturally from the default,
and which is certain and not speculative and contingent in
its nature (sec. 416). Exemplary damages may be added
where malice or aggravating circumstances are shown.
Illustrations of damages allowed because of a mistake in
the telegram or a delay in its transmission are: loss of time
or expense incurred, loss of a claim against a debtor, loss of
an opportunity to buy or sell property, purchase at an in-
creased or a sale at a decreased price, and loss or destruction
Ohio St. 301, 41 Am. R. 500 ;
[—] Harkness v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 73 Ia. 190, 34 N. W.
R. 811, 5 Am. St. R. 672; Fowler v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 80
Me. 381, 15 Atl. R. 29, 6 Am. St.
R. 211; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. R.
309, 5 Am. St. R. 795; Western
Union Telegraph C0. v. Dubois, 128
Ill. 248, 21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am. St.
R. 109; Reed v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R.
904, 58 Am. St. R. 609; Hendricks
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
126 N. O. 304, 78 Am. St. R. 658;
Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am. R. 38.
Contra: United States Telegraph
Co. v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md. 232, 96
Am. D. 519; Sweetland v. Illinois &
Mississippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa
433, 1 Am. R. 285; Aiken v. West-
tern Union Telegraph Co., 69 Iowa,
31, 28 N. W. R. 419, 58 Am. R. 210;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589;
Womack v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 58 Tex. 176, 44 Am. R.
614.
§435. Smith v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am.
St. R. 126; Pegram v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 100 N. C. 28,
6 S. E. R. 770, 6 Am. St. R. 557;
[—] Ayer v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. R.
495, 1 Am. St. R. 353; [—] Hark-
ness v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
73 Iowa 190, 34 N. W. R. 811, 5
Am. St. R. 672; Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173,
46 Am. R. 715; Squire v. Western

















































































































































ACTIONS AGAINST CARRIERS OF INTELLiGENCE. § 435 
to causes beyond its control, or of showing that it exercised 
all proper care and diligence commensurate with the under­
taking. 
Some cases hold that, when the company assumes liability 
for errors only in case the message is repeated, that in the 
case of unrepeated messages the burden is on the plaintiff to 
show that the errors were due to negligence. In such case a 
mere error is not prima facie evidence of negligent transmission. 
5. The Damages. 
§ 435. The measure of damages for loss due to the negli­
gence of the company is the damage sustained. This may 
include the price paid for the message and any other injury 
which flowed proximately and naturally from the default, 
and which is certain and not speculative and contingent in 
its nature (sec. 416) . Exemplary damages may be added 
where malice or aggravating circumstances are shown. 
Illustrations of damages allowed because of a mistake in 
the telegram or a delay in its transmission are : loss of time 
or expense incurred, loss of a claim against a debtor, loss of 
an opportunity to buy or sell property, purchase at an in­
creased or a sale at a decreased price, and loss or destruction 
Ohio St. 301, 41 Am. R. 500 ; 433, 1 Am. R. 285 ; Aiken v. West­
[-] Harkness v. Western Union tern Union Telegraph Co., 69 Iowa, 
Telegraph Co., 73 Ia. 190, 34 N. W. 31, 28 N. W. R. 419, 58 Am. R. 210 ; 
R. 811, 5 Am. St. R. 672 ; Fowler v. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 80 Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 44 Am. R. 589 ; 
Me. 381, 15 Atl. R. 29, 6 Am. St. Womack v. Western Union Tele­
R. 211 ; Western Union Telegraph graph Co., 58 Tex. 176, 44 Am. R. 
Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. R. 614. 
309, 5 Am. St. R. 795 ; Western § 435. Smith v. Western Union 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Dubois, 128 Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. 
Ill. 248, 21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am. St. St. R. 126 ; Pegram v. Western 
R. 109 ; Reed v. Western Union Tele- Union Telegraph Co., 100 N. C. 28, 
graph Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R. 6 S. E. R. 770, 6 Am. St. R. 557 ; 
904, 58 Am. St. R. 609 ; Hendricks [-] Ayer v. Western Union Tele­
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., graph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. R. 
126 N. C. 304, 78 Am. St. R. 658 ; 495, 1 Am. St. R. 353 ; [-] Hark­
Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph ness v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 Am. R. 38. 73 Iowa 190, 34 N. W. R. 811, 5 
Contra : United Statel!I Telegraph Am. St. B. 672 ; Western Union Tel­
Co. v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md. 232, 96 egraph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 
Am. D. 519 ; Sweetland v. Illinois & 46 Am. R. 715 ; Squire v. Western 
Mississippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa Union Telegraph Co., 98 Mass. 2321 
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of property. But damages cannot be recovered for a failure
to gain possible, but uncertain profits. It is always the duty
of the injured party to use all reasonable diligence to avoid or
lessen the damages.
§436. Duty to disclose importance of message.—The de-
cisions are squarely in conflict as to the liability for loss when
the company was not informed of the special importance of
the message and of the loss that may result for default in its
proper transmission and delivery. The authorities agree that
the loss must result naturally, and in the usual course of busi-
ness from.failure to send or deliver the dispatch correctly
or promptly. But they diifer as to what results are natural
and in the usual course of business.
One line of decisions holds that there is a presumption
when the parties resort to the telegraph that they have mat-
93 Am. D. 157; Tyler v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421,
14 Am. R. 38; Manville v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa 214,
18 Am. R. 8; McPeek v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 107 Iowa, 356,
78 N. W. R. 63, 70 Am. St. R. 205;
Barnes v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 24 Nev. 125, 50 Pac. R. 438, 77
Am. St. R. 791; Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248,
21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am. St. R. 109;
Reed v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R; 904, 58
Am. St. R. 609; Pepper v. Telegraph
00., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 s. W. R. 783,
10 Am. St. R. 699; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Shelfield, 71 Tex.
570, 10 S. W. R. 752, 10 Am. St. R.
790; Alexander v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 66 Miss. 161, 5 So.
R. 397, 14 Am. St. R. 556; Gulf etc.
Railway Co. v. Loonie, 82 Tex. 323,
18 S. W. R. 221, 27 Am. St. R. 891;
Clay v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 81 Ga. 285, 6 S. E. R. 813, 12
Am. St. R. 316; [—] True v. Inter-
national Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11
Am. R. 156; Western Union .Tele-
graph Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 230,
9 Am. R. 136; Shingleur v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 72 Miss. 1030,
18 So. R. 425, 48 Am. St. R. 604.
As to a telephone company see Cum-
berland Telephone and Telegraph Co,
v. Hurdon, — Ky. —, 60 L. R. A.
849.
§436. The following cases illus-
trate the first rule: Pepper v. Tele-
graph Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W.
R. 783, 10 Am. St. R. 699; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Edsall, 74
Tex. 329, 12 S. W. R. 41, 15 Am.
St. R. 835; Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12
S. W. R. 857, 16 Am. St. R. 920;
Postal Telegraph Co. v. Lathrop, 131
Ill. 575, 23 N. E. R. 583, 19 Am.
St. R. 55; Hendershott v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 106 Iowa 529,
76 N. W. R. 828, 68 Am. St. R. 313;
Davis v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 107 Ky. 527, 54 S. W. R. 849,
92 Am. St. R. 371; [—] True v. In-
ternational Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9,
11 Am. R. 156; Tyler v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14
Am. R. 38; Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173,


















































































































































§ 436 OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARR lERS. 
of property. But damages cannot be recovered for a faih1re 
to gain possible, but uncertain profits. It is always the duty 
of the injured party to use all reasonable diligence to avoid or 
lessen the damages. 
§ 436. Duty to disclose importance of messa.ge.-The de­
cisions are squarely in conflict as to the liability for loss when 
the company was not informed of the special importance of 
the message and of the loss that may result for default in its 
proper transmission and delivery. The authorities agree that 
the loss must result naturally, and in the usual course of busi­
ness from . failure to send or deliver the dispatch correctly 
or promptly. But they differ as to what results are natural 
and in the usual course of business. 
One line of decisions holds that there is a presumption 
when the parties resort to the telegraph that they have mat-
93 Am. D. 157 ; Tyler v. Western 9 Am. R. 136 ; Shingleur v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, Union Telegraph Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 
14 Am. R. 38 ; Manville v. Western 18 So. R. 425, 48 Am. St. R. 604. 
Union Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa 214, As to a telephone company see Cum-
18 Am. R. 8 ;  McPeek v. Western berland Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
Union Telegraph Co., 107 Iowa , 356, v. Hurdon, - Ky. -, 60 L. R. A. 
78 N. W. R. 631 70 Am. St. R. 205 ; 849. 
Barnes v. Western Union Telegraph � 436. The following cases illus­
Co., 24 Nev. 125, 50 Pac. R. 438, 77 trate the first rule : Pepper v. Tele­
Am. St. R. 791 ; Western Union Tel· graph Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. 
egraph Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, R. 783, 10 Am. St. R. 699 ; Western 
21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am. St. R. 109 ; Union Telegraph Co. v. Edsall, 74 
Reed v. Western Union Telegraph Tex. 329, 12 S. W. R. 41, 15 Am. 
Co., 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W. R: 904, 58 St. R. 835 ; Western Union Tele­
Am. St. R. 609 ; Pepper v. Telegraph graph Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531 , 12 
Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. R. 783, S. W. R. 857, 16 Am. St. R. 920 ; 
10 Am. St. R. 699 ; Western Union Postal Telegraph Co. v. Lathrop, 131 
Telegraph Co. v. Sheffield, 71 Tex. Ill.  575, 23 N. E. R. 583, 19 Am. 
570, 10 S. W. R. 752, 10 Am. St. R. St. R. 55 ; Hendershott v. Western 
790 ; Alexander v. Western Union Union Telegraph Co., 106 Iowa 529, 
Telegraph Co., 66 Miss. 161 , 5 So. 76 N. W. R. 828, 68 Am. St. R. 313 ; 
R. 397, 14 Am. St. R. 556 ; Gulf etc. Davis v. Western Union Telegraph 
Rn.ilway Co. v. Loonie, 82 Tex. 323, Co., 107 Ky. 527, 54 S. W. R. 849, 
1 8  S. W. R. 221, 27 Am. St. R. 891 ; 92 Am. St. R. 371 ; [-] True v. In­
Clay v. Western Union Telegraph ternational Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 
Co., 81 Ga. 285, 6 S. E. R. 813, 12  1 1  Am. R.  156 ; Tyler v .  Western 
Am. St. R. 316 ; [-] True v. Inter- Union Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 14 
national Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11  Am. R. 38 ; Western Union Tele­
Am. R. 156 ; Western Union . Tele- graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, 
graph Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 230, 46 Am. R. 715, note ; Daughtery v, 
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ters of importance, especially if the message shows on its
face that it relates to a commercial transaction or other im-
portant matter. The unimportant message is to be regarded
as the exception and not the rule, and if the company desires
fuller information it should seek it.
But the weight of authority is that, if the message is in
cipher or does not on its face show that it relates to trans-
actions of importance, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale ap-
plies, and the company is not liable for special losses unless
their agent was informed of the importance of the message
when it was oifered for transmission.
§ 437. Damages for mental suifering and injury to feelings
resulting from default in delivering a telegram, by the weight
of authority, can not be recovered, unless there is other sub-
stantial injury which is aggravated by the sufierings of the
mind. The rule has already been stated (sec. 427) as applied
to carriers of passengers. But there are many cases, and the
American Union Telegraph Co., 75
Ala. 168, 51 Am. R. 435; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.
637, 1 Am. St. R. 222.
Contra, Smith v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St.
R. 126; [—] Fergusson v. Anglo-
American Telegraph Co., 178 Pa. St.
377, 35 Atl. R. 979, 56 Am. St. R.
770; Baldwin v. United States Tele-
graph Co., 45 N. Y. 744, 6 Am. R.
165; Candee v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 34 Wis. 471, 17 Am. R.
452; Hibbard v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 558, 14 Am.
R. 775; United States Telegraph Co.
v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am.
D. 519; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Wilson, 32 Fla. 527, 37 Am.
St. R. 125 (overruling Hyer case,
supra).
§437. For liability: [—] Ment-
zer v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62
N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 294;
[—] Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, 54 S.
W. R. 827, 92 Am. St. R. 366;
Wadsworth v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W.
R. 574, 6 Am. St. R. 864 ; Graham
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
(1903), . La. Ann. 34 S.
R. 91; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9 S. W.
R. 598, 10 Am. St. R. 772, and ex-
tended note; Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Nations, 82 Tex. 539,
18 S. W. R. 709, 27 Am. St. R. 918,
note; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Wilson, 93 Ala. 32, 9 So. R. 414,
30 Am. St. R. 23. (Compare West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Ayers,
131 Ala. 391, 31 S. R. 78, 90 Am. St.
R. 92.) Butler v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 62 S. C. 222, 40 S.
E. R. 162, 89 Am. St. R. 893, note;
Young v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. R.
1044, 22 Am. St. R. 883.
Contra, Francis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N.
W. R. 1078, 49 Am. St. R. 507;
[—] West v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. R.
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ters of importance, especially if the message shows on its 
face that it relates to a commercial transaction or other im­
portant matter. The unimportant message is to be regarded 
as the exception and not the rule, and if the company desires 
fuller information it should seek it. 
But the weight of authority is that, if the message is in 
cipher or does not on its face show that it relates to trans­
actions of importance, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale ap­
plies, and the company is not liable for special losses unless 
their agent was informed of the importance of the message 
when it was offered for transmission. 
§ 437. Damages for mental suft'ering and injury to feelings 
resulting from default in delivering a telegram, by the weight 
of authority, can not be recovered, unless there is other sub­
stantial injury which is aggravated by the sufferings of the 
mind. The rule has already been stated (sec. 427 ) as applied 
to carriers of passengers. But there are many cases, and the 
American Union Telegraph Co., 75 
Ala. 168, 51 Am. R. 435 ; Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 
637, 1 Am. St. R. 222. 
Contra, Smith v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 83 Ky. 104, 4 Am. St. 
R. 126 ; [-] Fergusson v. Anglo­
Ameriean Telegraph Co., 178 Pa. St. 
377, 35 Atl. R. 979, 56 Am. St. R. 
770 ; Baldwin v. United States Tele­
graph Co., 45 N. Y. 744, 6 Am. R. 
165 ; Candee v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 34 Wis. 471, 17 Am. R. 
452 ; Hibbard v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 558, 14 Am. 
R. 775 ; United States Telegraph Co. 
v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. 
D. 519 ; Western Union Telegraph 
Co. v. Wilson, 32 Fla. 527, 37 Am. 
St. R. 125 (overruling Hyer case, 
supra). 
§ 437. For liability : [-] Ment­
zer v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 
N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 294 ; 
[-] Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Van Cleave, 107 Ky. 464, 54 S. 
W. R. 827, 92 Am. St. R. 366 ; 
Wadsworth v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 
R. 574, 6 Am. St. R. 864 ; Graham 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 
( 1903 ) ,  -. - La. Ann. - 34 S. 
R. 91 ; Western Union Telegraph 
Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9 8. W. 
R. 598, 10 Am. St. R. 772, and ex­
tended note ; Western Union Tele­
graph Co. v. Nations, 82 Tex. 539, 
1 8  S. W. R. 709, 27 Am. St. R. 918, 
note ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
v. Wilson, 93 Ala. 32, 9 So. R. 414, 
30 Am. St. R. 23. (Compare West­
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Ayers, 
131 Ala. 391, 31 S. R. 78, 90 Am. St. 
R. 92. ) Butler v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 62 S. C. 222, 40 8. 
E. R. 162, 89 Am. St. R. 893, note ; 
Young v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. R. 
1044, 22 Am. St. R. 883. 
Contra, Francis v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N. 
W. R. 1078, 49 Am. St. R. 507 ; 
[-] West v. Western Union Tele­
graph Co., 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. R. 
807, 7 Am. St. R. 530 ; Chapman 
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number is growing, in which it is held that the very purpose of
a telegram may be a mere matter of feelings, and that as the
company undertakes a duty with reference to such feelings it
is justly chargeable with the direct and proximate results of
failure faithfully to perform such duty.
The most serious objection to such an extension of the rule
is the uncertainty of the damage, the opportunity for fraud
and the encouragement to litigation. Though the weight of
authority is still against it, the modern tendency is marked
toward the broader view which makes the company liable for
the breach according to the nature of the contract, and which
often furnishes the only basis for damages in cases where the
company has been guilty of the grossest dereliction of duty.
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 88
Ga. 763, 15 S. E. R. 901, 30 Am.
St. R. 183; Morton v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 53 Ohio St.
431, 41 N. E. R. 689, 53 Am. St.
R. 648; see also Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala.
510, 7 So. R. 419, 18 Am. St. R.
148. In many of the states the
question has not as yet been passed


















































































































































§ 437 OF ACTIONS ·AGAINST CARRIERS. 
number is growing, in which it is held that the very purpose of 
a telegram may be a mere matter of feelings, and that as the 
company undertakes a duty with reference to such feelings it 
is justly chargeable with the direct and proximate results of 
failure faithfully to perform such duty. 
The most serious objection to such an extension of the rule 
is the uncertainty of the damage, the opportunity for fraud 
and the encouragement to litigation. Though the weight of 
authority is still against it, the modern tendency is marked 
toward the broader view which makes the company liable for 
the breach according to the nature of the contract, and which 
often furnishes the only basis for damages in cases where the 
company has been guilty of the grossest dereliction of duty. 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 88 
Ga. 763, 15 S. E. R. 901, 30 Am. 
St. R. 183 ; Morton v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 53 Ohio St. 
431, 41 N. E. R. 689, 53 Am. St. 
R. 648 ; see also Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 
510, 7 So. R. 419, 18 Am. St. R. 
148. In many of the states the 
question has not as yet been paSBed 
upon with reference to telegraph 
companies. 
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